The Gorgias of Plato

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THE GORGIAS OF PLATO.

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CHIEFLY ACCORDING TO STALLBAUM’S TEXT,

WITH

NOTES,

BY

THEODORE D. WOOLSEY.

PRESIDENT OF YALE COLLEGE.

Athenis diligentius legi Gorgiam: quo in libro in hoc maxime admirabar Platonem,
quod mihi in oratoribus irridendis ipse esse orator summus videbatur.
Cic. ΒῈ OnarTorg, I. 11.

NEW EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS.

BOSTON AND CAMBRIDGE:
JAMES MUNROE AND COMPANY.

1856.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1848, by
James Munkes anp Company,

in the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts,

CAMBRIDGE:
STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED BY

METCALF AND COMPANY,

PRINTERS TO THE UNIVERSITY,

TO

PROFESSOR FELTON

OF MARVARD UNIVERSITY

THIS EDITION OF GORGIAS

IS INSCRIBED,

AS A MEMORIAL OF LONG FRIENDSHIP,
BY

THE EDITOR.

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1. Tue text of this edition principally follows Stallbaum’s,
published at Gotha in 1840. After examining the various
readings, as Ast has given them, the editor was led to make
about forty changes in the text of Stallbaum’s first Gotha
edition of 1828. On receiving, not very long since, the
same critic’s second edition of 1840, mentioned above, the
editor was pleased to find a large part of these alterations,
and nearly all the more important ones, made by Stallbaum
himself. A number of others have since been ‘made, in
reliance upon Stallbaum’s long study of Plato and ability ;
and the text now differs from his last revision chiefly in the
following places.

450, D, my ed. inserts.) before ἀριθμητική. ---- 451, A,
I have given οὖν for viv. — 459, A, τοι viv δὴ for τοίνυν δή. ----
460, C, Stallb. has no brackets. — ibid. D, omits the words
in brackets. — 461, B, vid. not. — 462, E, Stallb. has a’
for &.— 465, B, gives ἐσθῆσιν. ---- 466, A, omits the words
in brackets. — 472, A, has ταὐτὰ for ταῦτα. ---- ibid. B, has
Πυθοῖ. Vid. not. — ibid. ἐνθάδε. Vid. not.— 480, D, has
τοῦτο for τούτῳ. ---- 481, A, omits αὖ before θανάτου. ---- 483,
E, puts a colon after mAdrrovres. — 491, D, vid. not. — 492,
B, omits the words in brackets. — 494, E, omits *ro*. —

Viil PREFACE.

496, A, reads ἅνθρωπος. ---- 497, A, gives kai... νουθετεῖς to
Callicles. Vid. not. — 500, B, brackets κατὰ τὸ σῶμα after
μαγειρικήν, Which I have omitted. — 505, E, joins οὕτως to
the next sentence. —508, B, inserts ἔάθλιοι ἢ. ---- 514, C, I
have bracketed if’. — 522, C, have given οὕτως. Vid. not.
— 525, D, have omitted τοὺς before τούτων. ---- 527, C, Stallb.
gives ὁ σὸς λόγος. Vid. not.

In the text, like other editors of Plato, I have allowed
οὐκοῦν, nonne igitur, to be thus accented, and, as 1 think, for
- good reasons. In the notes, I have followed what is, I be-
lieve, Hermann’s practice, in treating a single Greek oxy-
toned word in an English sentence just as it would be treat-
ed ina Greek one. If, for example, ἂν occurs in the mid-
dle of a clause, it is not written ἄν.

2. I have had access to the following editions of Gor-
gias, which include all the modern ones of much value.
1. Routh’s, Oxford, 1784. 2. Findeisen’s,—an edition
of indifferent judgment. Gotha and Amsterdam, 1796.
3. Heindorf’s second, edited by Buttmann, Berlin, 1829,
— excellent, especially for the Commentary. 4. Bekker’s.
5. Stallbaum’s Leipzig ed. ‘These are concerned only
with the text. Bekker’s has some Scholia. 6. Coray’s,
Paris, 1825, together with Xenophon’s Memorab. 7. Ast’s,
in his Plato. ‘The bulky Commentary on Gorgias is in Vol.
ΧΙ. Leipzig, 1832; valuable, but ill-arranged and tedious,
and not always judicious. 8. Stallbaum’s, in his Gotha ed.
of Plato, 1828 and 1840. Both text and interpretation owe |
much to him, and he has collected most of what is useful in
other editions.

From these editions, above all from the last, I have de-
rived great assistance, which is often acknowledged and

PREFACE. ix

often not. In a work like this, it would be plainly impos-
sible to trace everything up to its source, but nothing has
been adopted without examination ; much, also, is original ;
but I fear that, if any one should pass the severe judgment
upon the edition, that much of what is faulty is original, he
would not be very far out of the way. ᾿

Besides these editions, I have consulted several of those
works relating to Plato, to which an editor of his dialogues
would naturally think of turning for aid. Of this descrip-
tion are Ast’s Lexicon Platonicum (the first three vols.),
which is of no great use after all, Ast’s, Socher’s, and the
first vol. of C. F. Hermann’s Introduction to Plato, Schleier-
macher’s and Cousin’s translations, and Dobson’s translation
of Schleiermacher’s Prefaces.

3. An introduction is prefixed to the text of the dialogue,
with a view to give an explanation and critique of the argu-
ment. To this are added, in notes, rather literal transla-
tions of a few illustrative passages out of very many from
Plato’s other writings, most of which I have read with ref-
erence to the present edition during its preparation. I had
intended to add an index, in which some things omitted in
the notes were to find their place, and had made some prog-
ress in it, but was tempted by the overpowering tediousness
of the task to lay it aside until too late.

4. I have said nothing, thus far, as to the propriety of
laying the Gorgias before American students of Greek,
rather than some other dialogue of the same great author.
To persons familiar with the Platonic dialogues, perhaps
nothing need be said on this point. Let me say, however,
that while many of the dialogues would not have suited my

design, on account of their abstruseness or their length, the

x PREFACE.

Gorgias deserved to be preferred to others equally finished
in style, on account of its positive inculeation of truth and
its high moral tone. Something better is to be found in it
than the miserable doctrine of instruction, and the duty of
the politician to obey the popular will.

Yale College, New Haven,
July, 1842.

A sEconp edition of the Gorgias being called for, the
editor has done what he could, amid the pressing cares of a
new Office, to render it, by the necessary changes and addi-
tions, less imperfect than the former. In doing this, he has
received kind aid from several friends, and takes this oppor-
tunity of making his acknowledgments to Professor Crosby
of Dartmouth College, Mr. Sophocles of Harvard Univer-
sity, Mr. Hadley of Yale College, and C. A. Bristed, Esq.,
of New York.

Yale College, June 1, 1848.

INTRODUCTION.

THE times in Greece which just preceded the age of
Socrates gave birth to a class of men denominated the
Sophists. This title, which before was honorably applied
to such as excelled in wisdom or ingenuity, was then
chiefly confined to those who, with mercenary views, pro-
fessed a vain and shallow kind of wisdom. Such is in
substance Aristotle’s definition of a Sophist. In the suc-
cessive sketches of Plato’s Sophistes, he is hit off as a
mercenary hunter after rich young men; a dealer and
huckster in intellectual wares, especially of his own pro-
duction ; a logomachist ; one who, by his power of taking
the opposite on all subjects, gets a reputation for wisdom;
one who is employed about that which is false, or merely
appearing, instead of the invariable objects of true science,
and who conceals his ignorance of true science by artificial
and crafty turns of words. This last characteristic is one
which gives the relation of the Sophist to philosophy. He
denied all objective truth, and stood only on the fluctuat-
ing, uncertain ground of subjective opinion. Hence, as to
truth, he was an unbeliever. He could accommodate him-
self to one side or its opposite, contending for or against
any point, as interest might dictate. Finding nothing in
philosophy to employ himself with, he withdrew from the
study of it to the arts of practical life, and aimed, by attract-

xii INTRODUCTION.

ing admiration and educating the young, to gain wealth and
honor. Gratification or pleasure was the immediate object
in his view, and he could have no higher ; for to instruct in
virtue would imply the existence of unalterable moral dif-
ferences, which he denied. Or, if he professed to teach
virtue and justice, it was only in accommodation to a vague
opinion of those who employed him; and it was necessary
for him to pervert these notions, in order to make his in-
structions consistent with the rule of gratification by which
he was governed.

It would carry us far beyond our bounds, were we to at-
tempt to exhibit at any length the causes to which this class
of men owed their origin and their prominence. These
causes lay partly in the unsatisfactory results to which the
prevailing systems of Greek philosophy had arrived, and
partly in the circumstances of the times. On the one
hand, many of the philosophers either wholly denied the
existence of truth within the reach of man, or so contracted
its dimensions as to make it not worth pursuing. Hence
arose scepticism, despair, and the fading away of a serious
regard for truth, which were succeeded by frivolity and by
the purpose to gain immediate selfish ends through preten-
sions to superior knowledge. On the other hand, the de-
cay of religious belief which attends upon increasing civil-
ization in heathen countries, and the disregard of political
morality so prevalent in Greece, threw uncertainty into the
opinions of men upon the most important subjects. Thus
the same disease attacked the roots of philosophy, religion,
and morals.

In the schools of the philosophers, the art of reasoning
and its instrument had received by degrees some attention.
Thus logic had been cultivated by the Eleatic sect, but
was turned, in the hands of the Sophists, into an art of dis-
puting, applied to puzzle the unpractised and display their

INTRODUCTION. xili

own dexterity. The right and elegant use of words was
employed by other Sophists to procure for themselves ad-
miration and pupils. Many of this class of men exhibited
their knowledge in public by answering any question that
might be proposed to them, or gave lectures prepared with
great care; while in private they imparted such instruc-
tions to young men as would give them polish and ability
in civil and political life. All of them took money for
their instructions,—a practice not regarded as entirely
honorable at that time in Greece.

The sophistical principles of the time were brought into
closer connection with public affairs by means of the art of
rhetoric, which arose at about the same era. Rhetoric be-
gan to be taught as a means of gaining a cause in the
courts at Syracuse after the year 466, when a popular gov-
ernment, succeeding to the sway of Hiero’s family, greatly
multiplied judicial proceedings. An art like this was cal-
culated to be popular in free states, and especially in Ath-
ens, where the judicial function of the people was the most
important one; where the crowds of ignorant judges were
easily deceived by sophistry ; and where there was an un-
common fondness ’for displays of skill in the use of words.

The sophistical tendency, which we have represented as
one in its origin, affected all branches of truth and every
art which can be referred to scientific principles. In meta-
physics it may be exemplified by the tenets of Protagoras,
that all knowledge consists in sensation, and that whatever
appears true to any man is true to him; and by the doctrine
of Gorgias, that there is no truth which men can ascertain
or communicate to one another. In morals and politics, it
appeared in the opinions, that there is no natural justice, or
that justice is the interest of the stronger; and that pleas-
ure is the chief good. In the use of rhetoric, it showed

its nature when Protagoras offered to teach how to prevail
b

Xiv INTRODUCTION.

by the worse argument (τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν), and
when Tisias and Gorgias said that the probable must be
held in higher esteem than the true.

The Sophists could not fail to disgust a man like Socra-
tes, who hated show and pretension, and who had a deep
veneration for truth. Hence he was sometimes brought into
collision with them, and in a degree his doctrines, as well
as those of Plato, were shaped by opposition to theirs. And
in accordance with this, Plato, especially in his first works,
represents Socrates arguing against some false opinion or
other maintained by a person imbued witn this spirit.

One of the more prominent Sophists, with whom Soc-
rates was contemporary, was Gorgias, after whom this dia-
logue is named. Gorgias was a Sicilian Greek of Leontini,
a Chalcidian town, which lay some twenty miles to the north
of Syracuse, and suffered much from its nearness to that
powerful Doric state. The birth of Gorgias is assigned by
Foss * to the first year of the 71st Olympiad, or 496 B. C.
But there is good reason, I think, for putting it several
years later. For the art of rhetoric began to flourish at
Syracuse after 466 B. C., and Gorgias learned this art from
Tisias, a scholar of Corax, the first preceptor.t And with
this it accords, that Gorgias heard Empedocles in philos-
ophy, whose birth even Foss places no earlier than the 71st
Olympiad, while the ancients say that he flourished from
forty to sixty years afterward.

From this time we know nothing of Gorgias until he was

* De Gorgia Leontino Commentatio. Halle. 1828.

+ This is asserted by the author of the Prolegomena to the Rhetoric of
Hermogenes. (in Walz’s Collection, Vol. IV. p. 14). The passage is in-
serted by Spengel into his valuable book entitled Artium Seriptores. Stutt-
gardt. 1828. Foss denies it without authority, “tum propter alius testi-
monii inopiam, tum propter Tisiz xtatem.”

-

INTRODUCTION. ἀφ

sixty years old or upwards. In the interval he may have
taught rhetoric in Sicily, for Polus of Agrigentum appears
at Athens as his disciple, and he probably stood high in his
native state. In the second year of the 88th Olympiad, he
came to Athens on the following occasion. “The Leon-
tines (Diodor. 12. 53), who were emigrants from Chalcis,
and of the same stock with the’ Athenians, were invaded
by the people of Syracuse. As they were pressed by the
war, and in danger of being reduced by the superior might
of Syracuse, they sent ambassadors to Athens, begging the
people to help them as speedily as possible, and rescue their
state from its dangers. The principal ambassador among
those who were sent was Gorgias, the orator, a man who
excelled all his time in eloquence, and first invented the
artifices of rhetoric * (τέχνας pnropixas). — On his arrival at
Athens he was introduced into the Assembly, and discoursed
before the people concernig the alliance. The Athenians,
who were fond of displays of genius and skill in the use of
words, were struck with wonder by the novelty of his style,
by his various antitheses, his clauses of equal length, his
words of similar forms and endings, and the like artifices ;
which then, being new, met with favor, but now seem to be
a waste of labor, and are ridiculous if repeated so often as
to produce satiety. At last, having persuaded the Atheni-
ans to form an alliance with the Leontines, and gained ad-
miration at Athens for his rhetorical art, he returned to his
native town.” The sensation which his rhetoric produced
at Athens is spoken of by others also. The days on which
he made his exhibitions were called festivals, and his dis-
courses themselves torches.t ‘* He won great praise,” says

* See Spengel, u.s., p. 81.
} This is said by the commentator on Hermog. u.s., p. 15, by Olym-
piodor. apud Routh, p. 562, and other late writers.

xvi INTRODUCTION.

Socrates in Plato’s Hippias Maj. (282, B), “‘ by his speech-
es in the Assembly, and by his private displays of his elo-
quence. By the instructions he imparted to the young (ov-
νὼν τοῖς νέοις) he gained a large amount of money, and
carried it with him from Athens.” If Plato, who is some-
times careless about precise facts and dates, may here be
relied upon, he must have.stayed long enough at Athens to
act the part of a teacher before he went elsewhere. It is
probable that, after discharging his mission, he soon re-
turned to Greece, where the rest of his life seems to have
been spent. Thessaly was his principal residence, and that
he passed no very long time in Athens may be argued from
the fact, that Isocrates, an Athenian, received his instruc-
tions in that country. There, also, he taught Meno, and
Aristippus, one of the nobles of Larissa, and there, or in
Beeotia, Proxenus, the comrade of Xenophon. The wealthy
families of Thessaly had that rude taste which would make
them fond of the glitter and ostentation of Gorgias, and
were able to pay him well. He lived in splendor, affecting
in his dress the same show and parade which marked his
eloquence. . (/Elian, Var. Hist. 12. 82.) Owing to his hab-
its of temperance, he attained to a very great age, to six or
eight years over a century, and acted the rhetorician to the
last, by saying, according to ‘lian (u. s. 2. 85), when in-
vaded by a lethargic sleep, premonitory of his end,—‘ Sleep
is now beginning to lay me in the hands of his brother.”
His works, in his capacity as a rhetorician, were, — 1. One
on the art, or on one branch of it, the art of speaking suit-
ably to the occasion. 2. A number of orations, declamato-
ry and laudatory. One of these was delivered at the Olym-
pic festival, in which, like Isocrates afterwards, he tried to
unite the Greeks against the Persians. Another was a fu-
neral discourse in honor of Athenians slain in battle, a frag-
ment of which, preserved by a Scholiast on Hermogenes,

INTRODUCTION. XVii

supplies us with the longest extant specimen of his style.
These works exhibited a stately, uncommon, and poetical
diction, together with frequent rhetorical figures, which
must have been tedious and frigid in the extreme.* Two
declamations still extant, bearing his name, are unlike his
fragments in style, and ought probably to be regarded as
spurious.

Gorgias was, as we Baye said, at bottom a Sophist,f but
he avoided the title, which was not very popular, ‘ and
laughed at the Sophists, who professed to know how to
make men better, confining himself to instructions concern-
ing the art of speaking.” (Plat. Meno, 95, C.) His lit-
erary labors in the more appropriate sphere of the Sophist
were confined, so far as we know, to a work entitled περὶ
φύσεως ἢ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, Which may have been unknown
to Plato, but is analyzed in a little treatise among the
works of Aristotle. &In this work, with such an ominous
title, he attempted to prove, first, that nothing exists, then, if
any thing exists, that it cannot be known, and, finally, that
if known, it cannot be made known to others. Olympiodo-
rus (in Routh’s ed. of Gorgias, p. 567) says, that this work
was written in the 84th Olympiad, that is, sixteen years or
thereabouts before his embassy to Athens. For the sophis-

* The fragments, which are few, are collected by Foss, but not complete-
ly. Thus, Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. 11, § 51, cites some words of Gorgias,
apparently from his Olympian oration. The following words are a good
sample of the style of Gorgias, and show some just thought. They are
cited by Foss from Plutarch. Dooyias τὴν σραγῳδίαν εἶπεν εἶναι ἀπάτην ny
a τε ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος σοῦ μὴ ἀπατήσαντος καὶ 6 ἀπατηϑεὶς σοφώτερος
σοῦ “μὴ ἀσατηϑέντος.

+ And so the men of that time regarded those who displayed their tal-
ents after the manner of Gorgias. Thucyd. 3. 38, ἀκοῆς ἡδονῇ ἡσσώμενοι
καὶ σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς ἐοικότες καϑημένοις. For the estimation in which the
Sophists were held, comp. Protag. 316, seq.

b*

xvili INTRODUCTION.

tries out of which, with the help of the principles of the
Eleatic Sect, he built up this triple wall against truth, I
must refer to the treatise of Aristotle,* and to Ritter’s his-
tory of philosophy.

Such was Gorgias. Of Polus, another speaker in the
dialogue, little is known. He was a Sicilian of Agrigen-
tum, a scholar of Gorgias in rhetoric, and perhaps of Em-
pedocles in philosophy. He wrote, together with other
works, a treatise, probably on rhetoric, to which Plato re-
fers in the Gorgias. As we learn from the Pheedrus and
other sources, he gave great prominence to the figures of
that artificial rhetoric of which his master was so fond ;
such as equality of periods and correspondence of adjoining
words in sound ; and taught the mode of using maxims and
similes under separate heads, to which he gave pedantic
names.

Callicles is an unknown Athenian, not a Sophist, as some
have regarded him, but rather a contemner of the Sophists ;
although he carried out in practical life those principles
which they laid down. He is a specimen of a considerable
number of Athenians of his time, who, while they courted
the people, despised it ; who would have grasped at tyran-
nical power, without scruple as to the means; who looked
down upon the pursuits of philosophy, when compared with
the honors of political life ; who had no faith in the distine-
tion between right and wrong, and held pleasure to be the
supreme good.

Besides these and Socrates, Cherephon bears a small
part at the opening of the dialogue. He was an early
friend and a follower of the philosopher, ardent in whatever
he undertook, whose variance with his brother is mentioned
in Xen. Memorab. 2. 3, and who obtained a response from

* It is edited by Foss, in his Commentatio before mentioned, and by
Mullach (Berlin, 1845).

INTRODUCTION. xix

the Pythia commendatory of Socrates, according to the
Apologies of Plato and Xenophon. He went into exile in
the time of the thirty tyrants, and died soon afterwards, be-
fore his friend’s condemnation. He injured his health and
complexion through his studies, and received the nicknames
of νυκτερίς, νυκτὸς παῖς (Aristoph. Birds, 1564, and Horarum
frag.), for never coming abroad during the day, and of
πύξινος θάψινος, for his sallow hue (Eupolis πόλεων frag.,
Aristoph. Wasps, 1413), as well as other ridicule from the
comic poets.* When, according to the Scholiast on Plato’s
Apology, these reckless jesters proceeded further to call
him a sycophant, a parasite, and a thief, we may put by the
side of these aspersions the testimony of Xenophon, who
classes him among those friends of Socrates who sought
his company to improve themselves in household and civil
relations, and who, at no time of their lives, either did, or
were charged with doing, any wrong.

The persons of this dialogue are represented as having
met in the year after the sea-fight at Arginuse. Gorgias,
being then on.a visit at Athens, was lodging at the house of
Callicles, and there, it is generally supposed, the dialogue
was spoken. There is, however, good reason, I think, to
accede to the opinion of Schleiermacher, who lays the scene
in some public place, like the Lyceum, where the parties in
several other dialogues convened.t At the opening of the

* In the procemium to Philostrat. Vite Sophist., another Cherephon, as
we are there expressly told, is brought into connection with Gorgias. He
asked the Sophist a foolish question, Av τί of κύαμοι τὴν μὲν γαστέρα φυ-
σῶσι τὸ δὲ πῦρ οὐ φυσῶσι ; To which the other replied, Τοῦτο σοὶ καταλείπω
σκοπεῖν" ἐγὼ δὲ ἐκεῖνο πάλαι οἷδα ὅτι ἡ γῆ τοὺς vaodnuas ἐπὶ τοὺς τοιούτους
φύει. Ihave seen the opinion somewhere expressed, that the story was first
told of this Chzrephon, the declaration of Philostrat. notwithstanding.

+ For some observations on the time and place of the dialogue, see Ap-
pendix, No. 1.

ΧΧ INTRODUCTION.

work, Socrates and his friend find that they have reached
the place where Gorgias and others were assembled, too
late to witness his exhibitions of rhetorical skill. In the
hope, however, of drawing from him his views concerning
his art, they approach and begin the conversation. Gorgias
being fatigued, the younger rhetorician, Polus, volunteers
to take his place, and answer to tbe inquiries concerning
the nature of rhetoric ; but as it is soon apparent that he
is unwilling or unable to observe a logical method, Socrates
transfers the discourse to Gorgias, from whom he professes
to think that more brevity and accuracy of definition may be
expected. (447-449.) By a series of questions in his pe-
culiar manner, he gathers from Gorgias that he is a rhetori-
cian, and able to make others such; and that his art is em-
ployed about words as instruments of thought. Socrates
asks whether the definition is not too general, since seyeral
arts called by other names are also employed about words.
To this Gorgias replies, that other arts ask principally,
“What is to be done?” and use words as a secondary
thing ; but that rhetoric inquires, “* What is to be said?”
(—450,B.) Socrates objects that there are other arts, such
as those of calculation and astronomy, which mainly depend
on words, and demands to what the words relate which rhet-
oric employs. The most important of human affairs, says
Gorgias. (-—451,B.) But what are the most important ?
asks Socrates; for other arts might make a similar claim.
The good, replies Gorgias, to which rhetoric opens the way,
is freedom for the orator and the power of controlling other
men, and this it effects by the power of persuading public
assemblies. By this power it brings every other art under
its control. (-- 459.) Socrates still is not satisfied. For
although Gorgias has defined rhetoric to be the art of per-
suasion, he inquires whether other arts, which have to do
with words, do not aim at persuasion also. What, then, is

INTRODUCTION. XX

the province and the nature of rhetorical persuasion? Gor-
gias is brought to admit that its province is to persuade ju-
dicial and other popular assemblies concerning things right
and wrong; and that it attains its end rather by plausible
arguments than by proofs drawn from absolute truth.
(-- 455.) But Socrates still finds it hard to comprehend
what is the peculiar sphere of rhetoric. In all public delib-
erations, the artificer, the general, or other person acquainted
with the point in question, can give the best counsel. Where,
then, is the orator’s place? In reply, Gorgias refers to mat-
ters of fact. It was the advice of the political leaders
which led to the building of the Athenian walls and docks,
and not that of the artificers. He himself had often per-
suaded sick persons to comply with the directions of physi-
cians, who had exhausted their arguments in yvain.- ‘There
was no occasion when an orator was opposed to an artifi-
cer, without gaining an easy victory. Such was the power
of rhetoric, but, like other arts, it might be abused by those
who learned it. Yet that abuse was no good cause of com-
plaint against the teacher. (-- 457, C.) Socrates, after
offering an apology for his seemingly contentious spirit,
now forces Gorgias to allow that the orator may be ignorant
of the subject-matter of other arts; all his study being con-
cerned with finding the means of appearing to ‘‘ those who
do not know to know more than those who do.” This
Gorgias regards as an advantage, since it furnishes the ora-
tor with power acquired by small pains.* Socrates, without
stopping to examine into the extent of this advantage, in-
quires whether the case is the same with justice and injus-
tice, good and evil, and the like ; whether, without know-

* Philebus. 58, A. “1 heard Gorgias say, on a variety of occasions,
that the art of persuasion far surpassed all the other arts, since it brought
all things under its sway, not by force, but by their own will.”

xxii INTRODUCTION.

ing what these are in themselves, the orator can gain a
reputation for such knowledge ; and whether, as a master
in rhetoric, Gorgias would teach a scholar justice, who
should come to him unacquainted with its nature. Gorgias
has here to reply, either that there is no need of knowing
anything about right and wrong in order to be an orator,
and that, too, when he is perpetually employed upon ques-
tions involving right and wrong; or that he will teach his
students their nature. He chooses the latter alternative, al-
though the preyious conversation shows that, to be consistent,
he should have taken the former. Socrates now forces him
to admit that he who knows justice is just. ‘The rhetorician,
then, under his training, must be a just man. But he had
before said, that the art might be used for a good or a bad
purpose,— to favor justice or injustice. Socrates brings
forward this inconsistency as needing explanation, when
this, the first part of the dialogue, is broken off by the im-
patience of Polus. (-- 461, B.) ;

There are two remarks which this portion of the discus-
sion seems to demand. The first is, that, while it ends
with an argumentum ad hominem, and with fastening upon
Gorgias an inconsistency of no importance in itself to phil-
osophical truth, it is not without its use. It shows how
little the Sophists had reflected upon the nature of their
arts, and how little they cared for truth or justice.* The

* Several passages of Phadrus, a work which treats of the worthlessness
of rhetoric when not dependent on philosophy, may be adduced in illus-
tration of what is here said. On 260, A, Phedrus tells Socrates that he
hears the remark made, “ that one who wishes to be an orator has no need
to learn true justice, but only what may seem to be such to the multitude,
who will exercise the office of jurymen ; nor the truly good or beautiful,
but only the seeming ; for from thesé sources, and not from the truth,
persuasion is derived.” And, again, 272, D: “They say that there is no
need of making so much of this, or of taking such a long, round-about

INTRODUCTION. XXiil

art itself, haying in its own nature no reference to truth, but
merely to the force of arguments upon the minds of others,
and, at the same time, being employed in discussions con-
cerning what is good and just, could in its best estate be as
easily used against truth as in its behalf. But as it then
was, it was based on sophistical principles and opposed to
sound philosophy, its aim being something else than the
greatest good. It was an art of acting on the ignorant, and
of acting on them by pretending to knowledge. It must
use such arguments as were suited to persuade the masses,
who are not capable of taking the true philosophical view of
things. What arguments could a person ignorant of justice
use before an audience also ignorant, when the question
related to justice, but such as almost necessarily mislead ?

course to reach it. For the orator, who would be well versed in his art,
(they maintain,) has no occasion to possess true views in regard to just or
true actions, or in regard to men that are such either by nature or edu-
cation. In fact, they assert that no one in the courts cares for the truth
about these things, but only for that which is adapted to persuade. And
this is the probable,” ete. Plato goes on to illustrate this by an example
drawn from Tisias, one of the rhetoricians. If a brave man of weak body
should have beaten and stripped of his garment a strong but cowardly man,
and the case_be brought before a court, neither ought to tell the truth; the
coward ought to deny that the weak but courageous man was alone in beat-
ing him ; while the other should ask, “ how he, being so deficient in bodily
strength, could:have attempted it.” He then shows how weak, at its very
foundation, that unphilosophical rhetoric is which is built on merely empiric
rules ; since he who knows what is true must know, also, what is like truth,
and he who studies the classes of human minds with philosophy for his
guide will know by what arguments each class of minds is most influenced.
“But,” he adds, very nobly, “the virtuous man will not study this art of
rhetoric for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but that he may
be able to speak in a manner acceptable to the divinities, and to act so as
to please them to the extent of his power.”
Plato’s opinion of advocates, which was none of the highest, may be
found in Book XI. of the Laws, at the end.

XXIV INTRODUCTION.

But in the second place, if the art taught or presupposed
the teaching of justice, its scholars would be a very different
sort of persons from what even Gorgias allows that they
were. For he who has learned justice is just. This looks
to us like sophistry on the part of Socrates himself, as if
the knowledge and practice of virtue could not exist apart.
But whatever of untruth there is in the proposition, it was
not meant for sophistry ; itis a part of the system of Soc-
rates and Plato. In the view of Socrates, and in that of Pla-
to at first, all virtue could be resolved into science ; all vice
into ignorance.* Nor was the reason voluntarily ignorant,
but merely deceived by the conceit of knowledge, and false
opinion. When this was removed, and knowledge took
possession of the mind, there was no cause why he who
knew should not act in conformity with his knowledge.

In the second part of the dialogue, Polus takes his mas-
ter’s place. He begins by complaining that Socrates had
unfairly involved Gorgias in inconsistency. Gorgias had
said that he would teach justice to a scholar ignorant of it,
only in accommodation to the prejudices of mankind, who
regarded instruction upon that point as of high importance.
A discussion now arises, in which Socrates explains in part
his views of rhetoric. It is not an art, but a knack, or prac-
tical observation of rules aiming ta produce pleasure. It
belongs to a nature which is adroit, courageous, and skilled
in mingling with mankind. It is reducible to flattery ; like
the arts of cookery, cosmetics, and sophistry, being mere rou-
tine or practice, not guided by the laws of absolute truth, and

* Comp. Aristot. Ethic. Eudem. 1. 5, ἐπιστήμας (Σωκράτης) ᾧετ᾽ εἶναι
σπάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσϑ᾽ ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι re σὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι
δίκαιον. See, also, Xen. Memorab. 3. 9, 5. Plato appears at first to have
entertained the same opinion, but afterwards made virtue to consist in this:
that the faculties of the soul respectively perform their parts, and are all
obedient to the reason.

INTRODUCTION. XXV

aiming at gratification. The real arts relating to the soul
and body are two, with a twofold division each; of which the
one, — the political art, or that which conserves the public
good, — when it seeks to secure that good, is called the legis-
lative art, when to restore it, is called justice. To these two
arts, two touching the body correspond: gymnastics, aiming
to preserve bodily good or health, and medicine, to bring it
back. To these four arts four arts of flattery answer, and,
acting adroitly without settled principles, slip into their
places. These are sophistry, answering to legislation, rhet-
‘ oric to justice, cosmetics to gymnastics, and cookery to
medicine. Aiming at pleasure, and not at the highest' good,
these false arts attract and deceive the ignorant and thought-
less. And, being incapable of exact limits from their want
of a scientific basis, they run into one another. (— 466.)
Polus is displeased at this brand of flattery put upon rheto-
ric, and asks if good orators are so regarded in the states
where they live. Socr. ‘* They are not regarded at all.’ Pol.
‘* How not regarded? Have they not the greatest power in
their countries?” To this Socrates replies by admitting
that they do what seems good to them, but denies that they
do what they wish. In explaining this, he shows that what
men wish is not what they do, but that for the sake of which
they do it. It is a good in prospect which moves to action.
Unless, then, the great power which enables orators to dis-
pose, as Polus says, of the lives and fortunes of others, is a
good, it is not what they wish. And if to have great power
is a good, orators cannot have it, seeing they use that which
they call such as an evil. They may do, then, what seems
good to them, without either really having great power, or
doing what they wish. (-- 469.) Polus sneers at these
views expressed by Socrates. ‘ Just as though you would
not choose the liberty of doing what seemed good to you in
the state, and would feel no envy if you saw one killing
6

Xxvi INTRODUCTION.

whom he liked, or stripping him of his goods, or binding

him.” Socrates earnestly declares, that he regards such a
one, if doing this unjustly, as most wretched, and to do
wrong as the greatest of evils. Polus is surprised that he
should think so, and affirms, that to be wronged is a greater
evil than to wrong; and that the possession of supreme
power in the state — which is won by the orator —is to be
desired as enabling him to do what he thinks fit, — to wrong,
if he pleases, and to keep others from wronging him. Up-
on this, Socrates makes his opponent own that uncontrolled
power in the state, if it is a good, may also be an evil. It
cannot, therefore, be a good in itself, and something beyond
it must determine when it is good and when the contrary.
This criterion is, that it shall be justly or unjustly exercised.
(-- 410, C) Polus responds in a superior tone to this, as going
against the common sense of men, and appeals rhetorically
to the prosperity of Arehelaus, king of Macedon, which
was begun by atrocious crimes. If you wish, says Socrates,
to support yourself by examples and by testimony, you will
have no want of them. But I shall not consider the matter
settled until I force you, with whom I hold the argument,
to acknowledge that the unjust man is unhappy, or you
compel me to the contrary admission. (-- 47:2, D.)

The discussion during the rest of this part of the dia-
logue embraces two points, arising out of the proposition, that
it is better to wrong than to be wronged : — 1. That the unjust
man is, in every event, miserable; and, 2. That if he es-
capes punishment for his crimes, he is more miserable than
if he suffers. And hence no man can prefer doing wrong
to being wronged, which Polus says is the choice of all men.

1. Polus acknowledges that it is baser (αἴσχιον, more
ugly) to wrong, but denies that it is more evil (κάκιον).
This leads to an analysis of the ideas of the beautiful and
the base (τὸ καλόν, τὸ αἰσχράν), in which Socrates shows that

INTRODUCTION. XXVll

a thing is beautiful owing to its utility or pleasure, or both ;
and base, owing to its evil or pain. But to wrong — which

lus, then, nor any other man, as desirous of the highest good,
can prefer the more evil and base to the less. (— 476.)

2. Polus admits, that to be the object of justice (διδόναι
δίκην) and to be justly punished for wrong-doing are the
same ; that a just punisher supposes one who suffers what
is just, and that everything just 15 Ὥαλὸν as far as it is just.
If, then, what is suffered is just, it is καλόν, and if so, either
useful or pleasant. But suffering for doing wrong is not
pleasant; therefore, it is useful or good. This goodness
consists in removing pravity of soul, which, of all_kinds of

badness, is the greatest. Justice, the medicine of the soul,
effects this removal: hence, to escape from punishment is
more miserable than to be punished. It is better to go un-
healed of a disease, than not cured of this inward severer
malady. And not to seek this cure from justice is like ἔβα
ing the pain necessary for attaining to health. (— 480.)

If these things are so, of what use is rhetoric? Fr if it
place a man in a situation where he can wrong more easily
than be wronged, it does him so much the more harm; and
if he be enabled by it to escape the punishment of his mis-
deeds, again it does him so much the more harm. If it help
him to punish an enemy, it benefits that enemy, — an object
at which he is far from aiming. He cannot even defend
himself against an enemy without doing the enemy this
good.* (--.481], C.)

The end reached in this second division of the Gorgias
is to set forth in a clear light that a pretended art, like the
rhetoric of Gorgias and Polus, which has the gratification

* See Buttmann’s view, in the note on 480, Ε,

XXViii INTRODUCTION.

of others, as well as one’s own, in view, fails, by running t
against the law of right, to attain to anything good or use-
ful, defeats its own objects, and falls into inconsistency with
itself. It will not be doubted by the reader, that the moral
tone of this discussion is worthy of the highest praise, and
the conclusion most gratifying, considering it is formed by
a heathen. But there are several places in the stream of
the argument where we may fancy that we see shallows, or
touch upon the ground. In the first place, we may ques-
tion the accuracy of the comparison of the legislative art
and justice with the self-styled arts of sophistry and rhetoric.
What is the truth of the distinction, and what-sphere must
we suppose that Plato assigns to rhetoric ? In reply, it must
-be owned, I think, that Plato fluctuates a little,* owing to
his analogy between rhetoric and medicine, on the one hand,
and between rhetoric and justice, on the other. If we press
the resemblance to medicine, rhetoric must be confined to
the reparation of injustice, and restoration of the public
health. If we follow the parallel with justice, rhetoric must
embrace within its limits every case where the question of
conformity to the rule of right is involved; the rule of true
right being laid down at the outset by the legislative art,
and that of seeming right or gratification, in the place of
justice, by sophistry. In this part of the dialogue, the nar-
rower notion of rhetoric, determined by comparing it with
medicine, seems to prevail in Plato’s mind: the art has to
do with the courts. And in this Plato was fully justified by
the practice of writers on this art, who all, as Aristotle
affirms (Rhet. 1. 1. 10), said nothing about the popular as-
sembly, and confined their rules of art to the judicial

* Comp. Aristides (2. 377, Dindorf.), ror? μέν yi, φησι, ταυτόν ἐστιν,
le / ἘΣ Ν ’ 4 Ψ om A Ν - φ ~
ὦ μακάριε, ῥήτωρ καὶ σοφιστής, Tors δ᾽ αὖ Thy σοφιστικὴν κρεῖττον εἶναι τῆς

ῥητορικῆς καὶ διαφέρειν. See 517, A, note.

INTRODUCTION. ΧΧΙΧ

(περὶ τοῦ δικάζεσθαι πάντες πειρῶνται τεχνολογεῖν). But in the
latter division of this work, Plato treats the rhetorician and
the political man as the same, which accords with the anal-
ogy between rhetoric and justice. This is the truer view
of the subject, for otherwise the assembly of the people,
where there lay open a wide field for false art, must be un-
occupied.* We must recollect that Plato himself speaks
of the boundaries of rhetoric as uncertain ; and, also, that
he is not opposing the bare “art of inventing and arranging
arguments,” but a sophistical art opposed to truth.t

In the second place, we may doubt whether-the-analysis
of the beautiful into the pleasant and the good, that is, the
useful, and of the opposite to the beautiful into the painful
and the harmful, is correctly made out, and, consequently,
whether the principles of the latter part of the discourse be-

* With more justice still, Socrates, in Phedr. 261, A, regards it “as
the art of bending men’s minds by words without respect to the occasion,
not only in courts and other public assemblies, but also in private meetings;
being the same in nature, whether small or great affairs are in question.”
To which, in reply, Phdrus says, that the rules of art are used in speak-
ing and writing when suits at law are brought, and in speaking when ad-
dresses are made to the Assembly ; but that he has not heard of a wider
application of rhetorical precepts.

t Whately’s definition. Aristotle’s is, δύναμεις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ ϑεωρῆσαι
7d ἐ,δεχέμενον πιϑανόν. Τ is worthy of remark how Aristotle alludes to this
dialogue without naming it. He begins with saying, that rhetoric is ὠντίς
σαροῷος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ. In speaking of its abuse, he says, “ It tries to put
on the garb (drodveras) of the political art”; and, soon afterwards, ἔσει
yee μόριόν τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς. Comp. 464, B, C.— This conduct of rheto-
ricians is ascribed to ignorance, or vanity, or other human reasons (1. 2. 7);
and doubtless he joined with Plato in condemning the sophistical rhetoric
of the preceding age. (Comp. 1. 1.3.) But when he says that the judge
himself ought to know whether a thing is just or not, and not learn it from
the parties, whose only duty is to discuss the fact, he must be regarded not
only as opposing Plato’s views (454, B), but as condemning the Athenian

and every other system where the judges were ignorant.
#
c

-- INTRODUCTION.

tween Socrates and Polus, true as we feel them to be, are
not-built upon the sand. If lam not deceived, Plato does
not here intend to enter into a close dialectical exposition
of what is meant by τὸ καλόν, the beautiful. But, still, his
definition is exact enough for the argument and the purposes
of the dialogue. The attempts of others to analyze this
idea prove this. Whether the term beautiful is or is not
applied on account of pleasure derived from contemplating
the object so called, or on account of the perception of a
certain fitness, implying a relation of the parts to the whole,
and of the whole to some good or pleasant end ; — what-
ever we may decide to be the primary and essential charac-
teristic of beautiful objects, it is sufficient, I think, for the
argument to say, that pleasure or utility, or both, invariably
attend on objects so called, and the author was not required
to stop and subject this idea to a closer examination. It is
also to be remarked, that the good and the useful are treated
here as identical.* Upon this point we ‘need only say, that
it is assumed that whatever is good tends to promote the
perfection or well-being of the person; in other words, is
useful in reaching a good end.

Again, it may be thought that the last argument, concern
ing the good or utility of punishment, renders it necessary
that punishment should reform the offender, whereas Plato,
in this work and elsewhere, speaks of incorrigible criminals.t

* Comp. Repub. 2. 379, B. ‘‘Is not God truly good, and ought he
not to be spoken of as such? Certainly. But nothing good is harmful.
15 it? I think not. Can what is not harmful, then, do harm? By no
means. Does that which does no harm do any evil (κακόν 7)? No,
no more this than the other. But whatever does no evil can be the cause
of noevil. Is it so? Assuredly. But what? is the good useful (agé-
λιμον)ῦ Yes. Is it, then, the cause of well-being (εὐπραγίας) ἢ Yes.”
Etc.

t On the design and efficacy of punishments in society, a number of

INTRODUCTION. XXxi

If to suffer δίκαια = to suffer καλά = to suffer ὠφέλιμα or
ἀγαθά, can the criminal help being profited ? and does not

passages from the Laws give us Plato’s views. One is found in Book XI.
934, A. “Not suffering for the sake of his crime, — for what he has
done can never be undone, — but in order that for the future he and they
who see him suffering justice (δικαιούμενον) may either altogether hate
wrong-doing, or, at least, that a considerable part of so great an evil may
cease.” Another occurs in Book IX. 854, D. ‘For, perhaps, if he suf-
fer this penalty, he may become better, by being rendered more sober-minded
(σωφρονισϑείς). For no penalty which is inflicted by law is inflicted for
evil (γίγνεται tx} κακῷ), but has, for the most part, one of two effects: it
improves him who is punished, or, at least, checks the growth of his de-
pravity.” He then goes on to speak of incurable offenders doing good as
examples. On page 862, E, after remarking on the excellence of legal ex-
pedients by which transgressors shall be made “‘ to hate wrong, and to love
or not hate the nature of right,” he continues thus : — “ When a lawgiver
finds men incurable, he will provide some law and penalty for them, being
assured that, for such persons themselves, it is not the better part to live,
and that, by withdrawing from life, they will confer a twofold benefit on
others: they will serve as an example to others to deter from evil, and
will rid the state of bad inhabitants. Thus [that is, on these principles},
in the case of such persons must the lawgiver establish death as the pen-
alty for crimes, and in no other way.”

In Book V. 728, C, he speaks of becoming like the wicked, and being
separated from the good, as the greatest penalties for wrong-doing.
“Though this is not penalty (3/7), — since justice and penalty are always
beautiful, — but vengeance, which is suffering attendant on iniquity. And
as well he who has suffered this vengeance is miserable, as he who avoids
suffering it ; the one, because there is no cure for him ; the other, because
he is lost, that many may be sayed.” Jn these passages, the end of pun-
ishment is to cure and deter, or, at least, such is its result. And with
these may be compared such places as Repub. 1. 335, where it is said, that
a just man cannot harm even an enemy and a bad man. It is true that the
notion of harm is confined there to making such a man worse, but the
reasoning appears to include pain if unproductive of good. Cousin, in his
Preface to Gorgias, contends very brilliantly, and in some degree justly,
that the right to punish in society is derived, not from the good effects of

XXXI1 INTRODUCTION.

the argument look like a dead algebraic formula, more than
like living moral truth? This difficulty must attend the ar-
gument at the first view of it. Nor can it be removed, un-
less we allow δίκαια and καλὰ to be what they are, not only
in themselves, but also in the apprehension of the sufferer,
while ὠφέλιμα is simply objective. ‘The argument now be-
comes tenable. Punishment can be a good to none who do
not receive it as just; nor can it, in the arrangements of this
world, fail of being more or less of a good to him who feel-
ingly owns that it is rightly inflicted. But there may be
some who do not own this, and they are the incorrigible.
Polus being reduced to silence, Callicles steps forth as
the third champion of the arts of show. He begins with
doubting whether Socrates is in earnest in maintaining these
principles, which would throw human life and conduct off
from their old foundations. ‘To this Socrates answers, that
he follows wherever philosophy shows the way, just as im-
plicitly as Callicles obeys the popular will, and that, before
he can change his tone, he must hear her strike a different
key. In reply, Callicles says that it was not philosophical
reasoning, but trick, by which Polus was beaten. He had
made the incautious admission, that to do wrong is baser
(αἴσχιον) than to be wronged. It is so, indeed, by law, but
not by nature. This ambiguity it is between the naturally

punishment upon the criminal or others, but from the duty of punishing,
which is based on the instinctive feeling of desert of evil for doing wrong.
He adds, “ This theory is, without doubt, only indicated in Plato, but it oe-
curs in a number of places, briefly but positively expressed.” I could wish
that the learned translator had proved this assertion, which his familiar ac-
quaintance with Plato must have rendered easy. Doubtless Plato could
not get rid of the conviction written on the heart, that the sinner ought to
suffer, or of the tendency to view suffering as a debt owed to justice. But
cd not Plato try to go further back than this conviction, and search into
, reason of the right which it admits ?

INTRODUCTION. XXXili

and the legally beautiful or right which enables crafty rea-
soners to gain their points. When Polus spoke of that
which is legally base, Socrates shuffled the natural into its
room. But by nature nothing is baser which. is not more
- harmful. The natural feelings of men, which, when in-
jured, instantly rise against the aggressor, show, that to be
wronged is no property of a man. ‘The legal definitions of
base and wrong deeds are introduced by the many and the
weak, in order to keep the strong in check. But herein
law is opposed to nature, which teaches that the better
ought to have more* than the worse, and the more powerful

* πλεονεκτεῖν. α΄ἰλεονεξία is substantially selfishness, to which cause in

a very striking passage Plato ascribes all the wrong actions of men. Le-
ges, V. 731, Ὁ: πάντων δὲ μέγιστον, etc. “The greatest of all evils is
inherent in the souls of the mass of men, for which they excuse themselves
and seek no deliverance from it. This is what the vulgar saying implies,
that every man by nature loves himself, and that it is right so to do. But
in truth the cause of all errors in every case is to be ascribed to too great
self-love. For the lover becomes blind in regard to the object beloved, so
that he judges wrongly of the beautiful, the good, and the just, thinking that
he ought to honor what pertains to himself before the truth. The man
who will be truly great ought not to love himself or his own things, but
what is just and right, whether pertaining to his own actions or another
man’s. From this fault it comes, that all think their own ignorance wis-
dom. Whence, though we know next to nothing, we think we know every-
thing ; and, being unwilling to intrust to others that which we are not well
skilled to do, we are forced to make mistakes in doing it. Therefore ought
every man to avoid undue self-love, and to seek out some one better than
himself, allowing no shame to prevent his taking such a course.”

In another fine passage of the same work (IX. 875, B), the necessity of
law is partly ascribed to the selfishness of man. δεύτερον δέ, etc. “ In the
second place, should any one in theory properly comprehend that this is so
[that is, that the political art ought to care for the community more than
for the individual, and that it is for the interests of both to have the com-
munity, rather than the individual, well arranged], and then rule a state with
irresponsible and autocratical power, yet can he not adhere to this persuasion,

‘

XXXIV INTRODUCTION.

than the less powerful. The ‘ good old plan, that they
should get who have the power,” is the law of nature —
ay, and of right — in animals and man, as they show when-
ever they can seize the occasion. All this is very evident
to the man of the world. But philosophy makes a man
blind to these truths of common sense, and, if pursued be-
yond the requirements of education, is the ruin of a man.
It unfits him for civil and political life ; it is unbecoming for
a full-grown man, who should be practical and mix with his
fellows ; it makes one slink away to a corner with two or
three disciples ; and, if attacked by foes in the courts, he
cannot help himself, but falls into their hands, as defence-
less prey, to be slain at their pleasure. (-- 486, D.)

In this brilliant passage we see described the contempt
felt by the vulgar politician for the true philosopher, and the
sympathy of such a man with false and sophistical princi-
ples. He aims at pleasure rather than good, and the Soph-
ists give their maxims for the prudential attainment of the
same end. ‘There is a plain allusion, also, to the behavior
of Socrates at his trial, and to the charges against Socrates
and Plato, — especially the latter, — of neglecting the ser-
vice of the state. ‘The ground which Callicles takes is ey-
idently the only one which can be taken against Socrates,*

and through life keep the interests of the community foremost in the state,
and his private interests subordinate ; but his mortal nature will ever drive
him into selfishness and the pursuit of his own ends (πλεονεξίαν καὶ ἰδιοσρα-
yiay), since it blindly shuns pain and seeks pleasure. Thus it will give a
higher place to pleasure and pain than to the more just and good ; and, by
producing darkness in itself, will at length plunge the man himself and the
state into all sorts of evils.”

* The philosopher Archelaus, who was, perhaps, an Athenian and a schol-
ar of Anaxagoras, taught (although he may not have meant by his words
what the Sophists taught) τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ
νόμῳ. This principle is admirably ridiculed in the Clouds, 1421, seq. Pla~

INTRODUCTION. XXXV

but it is equally the foundation of an attack against all mo-
rality. If the idea of right is admitted, it must be supreme ;
and pleasure, if opposed to it, must bow before it. The
only escape is to show that pleasure is never inconsistent
with the right and the good. But right, as fixed by law,
restrains the individual, and is therefore inconsistent with
self-gratification. Hence the advocate for pleasure must
yield, unless he can show that natural right — which is re-
ally such — is another thing from what the opinions of men,
expressed in their laws, call such, and that it authorizes
selfish indulgence. But if this be natural right, it contains
no moral element, implies no relation of one man to others,
and sanctions obedience to every desire which looks to-
wards pleasure.

Socrates first answers with exquisite irony to the maxim
of Callicles, that the better ought, by natural right, to have
more than the worse. If his opponent means, as he admits
that he does, by the better (βελτίους), the superior and
stronger, then, since the many are stronger than the one, as
is shown by their enforcing their laws, they have a natural
right to make laws for the one. Now they say, in their
laws, that to wrong is baser than to be wronged; and hence,
according to Callicles, it must naturally be so. (- 489, B.)
2. Callicles now shifts his ground, and makes the better
the more intelligent. If so, replies Socrates, and if the
more intelligent ought to have more than another of that to
which his intelligence relates, then, in a mixed collection
of men, a physician ought to have more food and drink
than others, while yet the greater portion thus assigned to

to refers to it in a striking passage, Leges, X. 890. The discussion with
Thrasymachus, in the first part of the Republic, attacks a kindred principle,
and may be read here to advantage. Hobbes went to the length of any of
the ancient Sophists on this point. See Mr. Hallam’s Critique, Hist. of
Lit., Vol. III. 365 — 382, especially the close of the chapter.

XXXvi INTRODUCTION.

him may do him extreme harm. In short, there is no end
to the absurdities which will follow from the principle, that
intelligence should move in an orbit around desire and not
around good. (-- 491, Β.) 3. Callicles forsakes this defi-
nition, and the better now become the more intelligent and
courageous in-politics, — such as are capable of governing.*
Socrates here changes his point of attack, and takes a posi-
tion nearer to the enemy’s inner works. For whatever defi-
nition Callicles gives, to have more than others (πλεονεκτεῖν);
or self-gratification, is the centre of the system, and must
be laid bare in all its deformity. Do you mean, says he,
by governing, governing one’s self? At this the man of
the world sneers, and pronounces a man’s well-being to
consist in having as large desires as possible, with the cour-
age and intelligence to fulfil them. ‘These qualities the
many do not possess, whence, to hide their weakness, they
praise self-restraint and blame incontinence. But it was
not so from the beginning; the great and mighty of old
acted by another rule; they regarded justice and self-
restraint as base and evil, and got all they could from their
enemies for themselves and their friends. Good and pleas-
ure are the same. (-- 492, C.)

Socrates answers this in two ways. He first tries, by se-
lecting some examples of low bodily pleasures, to awaken
Callicles to the consciousness of the amazing baseness and
evil which may attend a life of enjoyment.t The illustra-
tions which form the long prologue of this part show that a
most important topic is begun. (-- 495, Β.) In the second
place, he searches for some tests of the nature of pleasure,

* This may be regarded as the notion of the ἀγαϑοί, the optimates,
which was somewhat in vogue at the time, only a little altered.

+ Comp. Philebus (an important dialogue, in which the nature of the
good and the pleasant is closely examined), 46, A, B.

INTRODUCTION. XXXVli

which shall show that it differs from good. To do this, he
makes Callicles allow that courage, science, and pleasure
are not the same; and that εὖ πράττειν and κακῶς πράττειν
are opposites, so that one cannot be in both states at once,
any more than he can be well and ill at once. The same may
be said of weakness and strength, of swiftness and slowness,
of good and bad, of happiness and misery. But pleasure
and pain can coexist in the same person at the same time ;
as, for instance, thirst, a pain, exists, until drinking, which
is pleasant, slakes it.* Thus pleasure wants an essential
characteristic of good, and pain of evil. (-- 497, E.) An-
other test follows, grounded on the admission of Callicles,
that the manly and intelligent are good. A foolish boy or
man may be glad, and so may a wise one.¢_ In war a cow-
ard is as glad, if not more so, when the enemy goes away,
than the man of courage. ‘Then the coward is as good as
the courageous man, or even better, and yet bad by the
concession of Callicles. (—499, B.) In other words, if
good is relative to desire, as such, then its absolute nature
ceases, it is ina perpetual flux, and alters with every change
of desire or character.

Callicles now admits that some pleasures are evil and
some good. He thus overthrows his argument, for if pleas-

* Comp. Cic. de Fin. 2. 3. 9.

+ Comp. Philebus, 55, B: “ And, besides, to be compelled to say that a
man who feels grief is bad when he feels it, though he be the best of all men,
and that one who is glad, the more he is so, at the time when he is 80, is
the more virtuous.”

t In a fine passage, Leges, II. 663, Plato teaches that the good and bad
judge of pleasure subjectively, or relatively to their own character. He
then inquires whose judgment is to be received, as accordant with the truth,
and answers, that of the good. Neither the lawgiver, then, should ever sep-
arate the pleasant from the right, the good, and the beautiful, nor any one
else engaged in educating the young.

d

XXXVili INTRODUCTION.

ure is in itself a good, evil cannot be affirmed of it. Soc-
rates seizes upon the acknowledgment, and carries him
back to a point debated in the first part of the dialogue, —
that the good being the end of all actions, the pleasant must
be sought for its sake, and not vice versd. (—500, A.)
Now to know what pleasures are good and what evil needs
an artist, —a man who has studied the invariable absolute
principles of true good and right ;— whilst the knowledge
how to gratify, acquired by observation, and resting on no
unchanging truth, has nothing of the nature of true art,
and to apply that knowledge calls simply for an exercise
of memory.

If this be so, we have a standard by which we may try
the pursuits of men; and, according to this standard, must
condemn the music which is in vogue at the public contests,
dithyrambic poetry, and even tragedy itself, with all its lofty
pretensions. But how is it with rhetoric and the orators or
statesmen? Do they neglect their own or the public inter-
ests? Do they seek to benefit or gratify the community ?
To this Callicles responds, that the question admits of a
double answer ; the orators of the present day seek to please
the people, and follow their will, but he thinks that Miltiades,
Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles were good men, and
aimed at the highest public good. (—503, D.) This Soc-
rates denies, and, to make the matter_clearer, goes at some
length into the motives which should influence the good
orator, — the true political artist. As the physician has
health in view, so has he the health of the community, which
consists in justice and temperance* (σωφροσύνη, self-

* Vor σωφροσύνη, comp. Repub. 4. 430, Ὁ. It is there compared to a
concord and harmony, and called κόσμος τις καὶ ἡδονῶν σινων καὶ ἐπιϑυμιῶν
ἰγκράτεια. This κόσμος consists in the subjugation of the worse part of the
soul to the better. Ritter observes (2. 474) that the expression σωφρασύνη

INTRODUCTION. ΧΧΧΙΧ

restraint, soundness of mind in regard to all pleasures and
excess). Instead of flattering them and following popular
desires, such a politician will restrain and chastise the peo-
ple. (—505,C.) This is further enforced in.a most impor-
tant and admirable passage, by pointing out that the ideas
of true good, of virtue, of order, of self-restraint or order-
liness, of justice and piety (or the observance of the laws
of moral order), of courage, of the well-being of the indi-
vidual and his happiness, are closely and necessarily con-
nected; while the opposites of these are linked together
with the pursuit of pleasure. Neither a man, then, nor a
state, which would be happy, can have any end in view in-
consistent with justice and temperance. If this be admit-
ted, everything will follow which Socrates had maintained,
and his three adversaries had controverted. The orator
ought to be just, and to know justice ; otherwise he cannot
practise or promote it. ΤῸ be wronged is better than to
wrong, for it involves no violation of justice; and to be
punished for wrong-doing, than to go unpunished, for it
reconciles the soul to justice. The wonder of Callicles,
when Socrates defended these latter points, was misplaced.
Furthermore, by acting on such principles, he should help
himself and his friends, to do which Callicles pronounced
him unable. For by living according to these principles,
he would avoid the basest and the greatest evil. (-- 509,
C.) But cannot a man, it may be asked, gain the advantage
arising from not being wronged, as well as that arising from
not wronging others? For the latter, an art is needed.
As no one does wrong because he prefers it, but because
he thinks to gain some good by it, that art must inculcate

is vaguely used by Plato, especially in his early dialogues; and that the
definition in the passages of the Repub. which he cites (4. 430, π, s., and
8. 389, D) almost reduces its notion to that of δικαιοσύνη.

xl INTRODUCTION.

the nature of true good; for example, must distinguish it
from self-gratification. Is there, also, an art to avoid being
wronged? The only way of preventing injuries in all cases
1s, to have supreme power yourself, or to be a friend of the
supreme power ; — for instance, if the people is that power,
to gain its friendship by catering for its desires and follow-
ing all its whims. But if this is done, the other and great-
er good must slip out of your hands. Nor is it of any use
to say, that, if you do not thus conciliate the sovereign power
in the state, you may lose your life. For it is not a man’s
business in this world to seek to save his life, nor ought the
art of rhetoric to make higher pretensions because it saves
life than the art of the pilot or the engineer, by each of
which the life of those intrusted to its care is preserved, no
matter whether it be better for such persons to live or to die.
A man’s part is to leave it to God how long he shall live,
and to find out on what principles he shall pass the term of
life given to him; whether on those of the flattering politi-
cian, which will involve the ‘loss of the greatest good, or on
those of the man who sacrifices pleasure to the really good
and useful. (—514, A.) And the same will apply to the
management of a state. Hence the apprenticeship of po-
litical life must be in philosophy, which reveals the good and
just to those who search for them; and the true politician,
contrary to what Callicles had maintained, must be a phi-
losopher. A man who seeks to play the important part of
a leader in the state must first ask himself whether, in his
private capacity, he has cultivated justice and temperance,
and made men better; for the aim in the public and in the
private sphere is one and the same. With this in mind, we
may return to the four great Athenians, and bring their
characters to the touchstone. Did Pericles make the Athe-
nians better? or did they not rather become idle, cowardly,
talkative, and covetous through the measures of his admin-

INTRODUCTION. xli

istration? And did not those very Athenians, near the
close of his long political life, show their degeneracy, by
ungratefully bringing against him a charge of pecula-
tion? * The other three met with even worse treatment
at the hands of those whom, if skilful politicians, they must
have wished and known how to make better. Their ill-
success is a proof that they understood not the true art
of rhetoric, —- that of persuading men to aim at the good,
rather than the pleasant; and, indeed, that they were ig-
norant of the false art, also, if that enables its possessors,
as is alleged, to sail in safety amid the storms of ere
(-517, A.)

In this remarkable attack on four of the greatest men of
Athens, — men certainly not inferior, in any point, to hun-
dreds of public characters who have been extolled by Chris-
tian historians, — we discover an exasperation of feeling in
Plato, produced by the unjust fate of his master, and by the
wide difference between his own political views and those of
his native land. Nor can his character in general be freed
from the charge of fault-finding. ‘To this he was led by
that uncommonly high standard which the nature of his
mind compelled him to form; and, dwelling aloof, as he
did, from the turmoil of politics, in contemplative retire-
ment, he could not estimate all the practical difficulties
which even a perfect statesman must encounter from a
’ spoiled and self-willed people. But if we strike out what
is due to these prejudices, we must find something of jus-
tice left in his blame of “ the four.” The very fact that he
draws a broad line between them and Aristides (526, B) is
presumptive proof of a real difference. They were high-
minded leaders of parties, who humored the people in many
of its wishes for the sake of keeping power, and sought the

* See Appendix, No. II.
d*

xlii INTRODUCTION.

greatness, but not the real well-being, of their country.
Had they
“to divinity aspired,
Not on the breath of popular applause,
But through dependence on the sacred laws,
Framed in the schools where wisdom dwelt retired,
Intent to trace the ideal path of right,”

had they been philosophical statesmen, aiming at justice and
the highest good, the allies of Athens would have been less
oppressed ; the people would not have grown worse so fast ;
they themselves would have impressed something. of their
own virtue upon the state, and been less likely to suffer un-
justly from those to whom they had done good.

But is it not strange that Plato should reproach these pol-
iticians with their ill-success, as a proof of their want of
virtuous statesmanship ? This is the point which Aristides,
the Sophist, presses most effectively in his long and weari-
some defence of “the four.” If ill-success is to be the
test, what is to be argued from the two reprobate compan-
ions of Socrates, Critias and Alcibiades (Aristid. de Qua-
tuorviris, 2. 322, Dindorf., de Rhet. 2. 111)? What from
Plato’s abortive attempts to make a man out of Dionysius of
Syracuse (302-304, 324)? Nor is Plato, the Sophist goes
on to allege, consistent with himself, since he praises Peri-
cles, in the Pheedrus, for his rhetorical skill.* In the Apol-
ogy (31, E), he makes Socrates affirm that no one can be
safe who opposes any populace, or strives to prevent injus-
tice in a state, unless he avoid public life and live as a pri-
vate citizen. (343, 353, 366.) And, in our dialogue it-
self, he pronounces safety to arise from being like the sov-
ereign power, or from having supreme power in one’s own
hands. Again, he says: “1 should be a fool not to know

* Comp. Appendix, No. IL.

INTRODUCTION. xliil

that at Athens any man may suffer anything.” And yet
the fact, that these statesmen were not safe from the effects
of popular ingratitude, is his preof that they did not oppose
the people, or strive to prevent injustice.

How the reasonableness or consistency of Plato, as to this
point, can be defended, I do not see. Ill-success could
have the force which he gives it only in case the influence
of the four men outweighed the opposing influences of all
other causes acting at their time upon the opposite side. In
general, however, it may be said that politicians who com-
plain of ingratitude are only reaping what they have sown.
They have tickled the nice palate of the people until their
cookery pleases no longer; and now, by a rotation in office,
which was right in their eyes until they came into power,
and wrong afterwards, they are driven from the kitchen by
new hands, who pay a price for the situation, and have
learned some newer arts of falsehood. It was, perhaps, the
sight of such flatterers of the Athenian demus fallen into
disgrace, that led Plato beyond the bounds of truth, in im-
puting all the ill-success of politicians to their want of cor-
rect principles, —to their aiming at pleasure rather than
good. Being preoccupied by this partial view, and having
also in his mind the pretensions of the Sophists, — the
teachers of such politicians, —that they could make men
good, he loses sight of the great truth, that, in a corrupt
age, a good man must suffer ill from those whom he tries to
benefit.

But to return to the dialogue : — When Socrates had ex-
pressed such an opinion of these four great statesmen, Cal-
licles replied, that no one of his own contemporaries could
compare with them.in the works they had done for the state.
In answer, Socrates admits that they had shown uncommon
ability in gratifying the desires of the people. ‘They had
created the ships, walls, and docks of Athens, but they dif-

xliy INTRODUCTION.

fered in no respect from the politicians of the day in the
motives of their administration. If the highest good of the
state should be the statesman’s aim, they could no more
claim this title, than a cook or a writer on cookery could
claim to rank with the master of gymnastics in preserving
the bodily health. And as such persons, if intrusted with
the care of the body, would be blamed when the maladies
arising from luxury should come on, so will the politician,
who seeks to please rather than to profit, be punished for
political evils which he or his predecessors have occasioned.
The head of a state may not complain of ingratitude ; for
it is by his management that the character of those who
compose it has grown worse. And the same holds good of
the Sophists. They pretend that they can make their dis-
ciples better; and yet find fault with these very scholars for
keeping back the price of tuition from them, and for other
acts of unthankfulness. But what good, demands Callicles,
can you say of such worthless men as the Sophists ? ‘They
are the same with rhetoricians, answers Socrates, or nearly
so; only somewhat above them, because they deal with
principles which rhetoricians merely apply. If, now, their
pretensions are well founded, they, as well as politicians,
ought to fear no ingratitude; they should stipulate for no
fees of instruction beforehand, trusting to the generosity of
those pupils whom they had purged from vice.* (—521, A.)

Having thus compared the arts which aim at pleasure
with those which aim at good, Socrates makes a personal

* Schleiermacher thinks that this is aimed at Aristippus, who, by taking
gay for his instructions, brought reproach upon the Socratic philosophers.
The best account of the remunerations given to the Sophists which I have
met with is contained in Welcker’s Essay on Prodicus, his Life and Writ-
ings, in Welcker and Niike’s Rheinisches Museum, 1. 22, seq., and since
reprinted in his “ Kleine Schriften,” Part 2, p. 393, seq.

INTRODUCTION. xlv

appeal to Callicles. ‘Which mode of serving the state do
you now exhort me to follow ; that of seeking its best inter-
ests, or that of catering for its desires? ”’ Callicles persists
in telling over the same story, that fidelity in doing good
will make him suffer the loss of all things. Socrates ac-
knowledges, with evident allusion to his trial and condem-
nation, that he is exposed to such dangers from bad men,
and that he could say nothing in the court which would win
him the favor of his judges. If he should urge, on his de-
fence, that he had opposed the public will when it was base-
ly clamorous for present gratification, that he had striven to
make men good, and had their well-being in view, he would
fare as a physician might fare before a jury of children with
a cook for his accuser. What he called good, they called
evil; what he called hurtful, they called pleasant. It was
painful to be perplexed ; and yet he must lead them through
perplexity to truth. Would he not, then, before such
judges, be himself perplexed, and at a loss for a defence ?
** And do you think, then,” says Callicles again, “ that it is
well with a man who cannot help himself?” ‘+ Assured-
ἦγ" replies Socrates, ‘it would be very ill with me, if I
could not give myself that help which has been shown to be
truly such, —if 1 could not observe the rule of right in all
my relations. Leta man show me that lam not seeking to
help myself thus, and I shall be ashamed of my character,
and be grieved if I need punishment. But if I die for want
of the flattering art of rhetoric, I shall not be sorry. For
no one who is a man, and has reason, fears death in
itself, but rather to do wrong. For to go into the other
world with a soul full of all manner of iniquity is the worst
of evils.” (—523, A.)

Having thus brought the two principles of action to the
confines of the two states of being, he closes very nobly, by
presenting them in contrast beyond the grave. His views

xlvi INTRODUCTION.

are introduced as ‘an explanation of the common mythus
concerning a judgment after death ; which, however, Plato
scruples not to alter for his own purposes. ‘The views are
these: — The character formed by disregarding the good
and right, and pursuing pleasure, must be lasting, while all
the advantages it offers are temporary, being connected with
the world and the wrong judgments of men. But, at death,
men will come before a judge who will look at the bare soul,
and give sentence according to its qualities. Among trans-
gressors, there are some who are not gone too far in evil to
be curable. For these, punishment, bitter as it must be,
will prove a good. Others, having passed beyond the reach
of a cure, will suffer eternally, as an example to all who
shall behold them. Of this description, a large part will be
tyrants and other men in power, who had on earth the
greatest license to do evil. But if one of these, like Aris-
tides, rises above the temptations of his station on earth, his
reward will be so much the greater. The larger number,
however, of those who receive rewards will be private per-
sons; and, more especially, philosophers who had not min-
gled in public affairs. With this trial in view, Socrates
asserts that he strives to bring his soul, in its most healthy
condition, before the judge, and that he seeks to lead his
fellow-men to do the same. And to this he now urges Cal-
licles, warning him that the trial then will be more serious
than all earthly ones, and that, without such a preparation,
he will be unable to help himself, but, speechless and per-
plexed, must submit to worse than earthly indignities. Cal-
licles, he continues, might despise such fables, and the truth
they contain, if he could show anything better. But this,
neither he, Polus, nor Gorgias had been able to do. They
should, therefore, agree with Socrates, that to be, and not
to seem to be, a good man is a good thing; that the next
best thing is to become good by submitting to punishment ;

INTRODUCTION. xlvii

that all flattery of one’s self or others, of a few or a multi-
tude, must be shunned; and that rhetoric, like everything
else, must be used to promote the right, and that only.
“ὁ Let us, then,” he says in closing, “ join together to live
virtuously on such principles; then can we best apply our-
selves to politics, when we are no longer afloat on the most
momentous subjects. This is the only way to live well and
to die well.”

With respect to the close of the Gorgias, which must be
counted among the finest passages in Greck, it may be ob-
served that Plato shows elsewhere the same inclination to
clothe in a mythical dress those truths which lie beyond the
bounds of reason. It seems as if he felt the need of the
venerable authority and positive assurances of a revelation
upon such points, and resorted to the old traditions of his
country as the best substitute which he could find, as hav-
ing for their foundation real, though distorted, truth.* The
mythus is something more than mere drapery, something
more than a poetical fiction, which, with a beautifully plas-
tic hand, he shapes into a form and meaning corresponding
to his awakened moral sense. And yet the freedom with
which he treats the mythus, and the readiness with which
he alters its form on several occasions, prove that he accept-
ed it only in its leading outlines as true; it was to hima
μῦθος, and yet a pada καλὸς λόγος. It is found, also, at the
close of the Phedo and of the Republic. He who com-
pares the three passages will perceive that they agree in
affirming the rewards and punishments of another life,
which are used, with all seriousness, as motives for living

* This remark does not include those mytht which are of Plato’s own
invention. He was led to use them by his poetical temperament, and felt,
perhaps, that the view suggested by a beautiful fable was as true as any
which could be given ; more true, because more beautiful, than if put into

abstract propositions,

xlvili INTRODUCTION.

well here below ; and also in teaching that some criminals
are healed by punishment, while others must suffer for ever
without hope of a cure.* ‘This Platonic view of the reme-

* Phedo, 113, E. ‘Those whoare judged to be incurable on account
of the enormity of their crimes, who have committed many and heinous
sacrileges, or numerous unjust and lawless murders, or the like, these their
appropriate destiny hurls into Tartarus, whence they never come forth.”
He then speaks of the punishment of those who have committed curable
sins, in a passage too long to be inserted here, and then adds: “ With
respect to the mythus, to affirm positively that these things are as I have
narrated them, is not the part of a reasonable man” ; and then uses the
truth taught in the mythus as a motive for virtuous action. In the Repub-
lic, the narrator of the mythus is represented as near a chasm (see Gorg.
526, B, note) in the ground, by the side of a person who asked another
where Ardizus was. ‘‘ Now this Ardieus was a tyrant in a Pamphylian
city a thousand years before, and had slain his aged father and his elder
brother, besides doing, as was said, many other unhallowed deeds. The
person so asked replied, said the informant, ‘ He is not come, nor can he
hereafter come hither. Among the frightful spectacles that we saw, this
was one, continued he : — When we were near the mouth of the chasm, and
were expecting to go upwards, after enduring all the other things appointed,
on a sudden we saw this Ardizus and others, nearly all of them tyrants ;
although some enormous transgressors among private persons were there
also. When they thought that they should now go upwards (out of the
chasm), the mouth would not let them pass, but uttered a bellowing sound
wheneyer any such incurably wicked person, or any one who had not paid
a sufficient penalty, endeavored to ascend. Thereupon, wild men, said he,
all fiery to look upon, who stood by, when they heard the bellow, picked out
and carried off a part of the transgressors; but Ardizeus and others they
bound hand and foot, and threw them down, and beat them hard, and dragged
them along on one side of the road, scraping them upon thorns, while to
the by-standers they told the reasons why these sinners suffered these things,
and that they were drawn along to be plunged into Tartarus. There, said
he, of all the fears many and various which fell upon us, this was the great-
est, — lest, when each one was going upwards, the mouth should utter that
bellow, and most gladly did each one hear no sound as he ascended.” A
conception worthy of the highest flights of Dante!

INTRODUCTION. xlix

dial nature of punishment, in certain cases, even in another
life, seems to have recommended the doctrine of purgatory
to some of the Christian fathers.*

Having thus exhibited the argument of the Gorgias at
some length, it will be in order for us to ask, What is the
main subject of the dialogue ? A question which it is al-
most as difficult to answer, in regard to some of the Pla-
tonic dialogues, as it would be to express the sum total of
an evening’s conversation among refined and intelligent per-
sons: the delight you have felt, the instruction you have
received, you are conscious of, and you carry away much in
your memory ; but it is hard to say what was the leading top-
ic of the discourse, or whether there was any. The subject
of the Gorgias is more easy to be perceived, and yet all
have not been agreed concerning it. Olympiodorus (apud
Routh) mentions three opinions besides his own: — Some
say that it treats of rhetoric; others, of justice and injus-
tice, considered especially in their relations to happiness ;
others still, absurdly enough, make it relate to the demiur-
gus or divine builder of the world, on account of the mythus
at the close. ‘ But we say,” continues the Platonic com-
mentator, “‘ that the scope is, to treat of the principles which
lead men to political happiness.” With the first of these
opinions, Cousin and Stallbaum agree. The latter says,
however, that “‘ though the principal point of the discussion
is to blame the civil and rhetorical art at that day in vogue,
and to show that it could not attain to excellence without
the knowledge and practice of philosophy,” yet several
other topics are closely united with this, as the difference of
the just and the pleasant, the end of human actions, and
the constancy of a good man in bearing evils and injuries.
Nearly the same is the view taken by Ast. The Gorgias,

* Comp. Muenscher, Dogmengeschichte, -Vol. II. § 298.
[2

l INTRODUCTION.

says he, ‘has a decidedly political tendency ; and all the
philosophical inquiries which it contains are intended to
show, not only the unmeaning nature, but also the perni-
eiousness, and, in fact, the profligacy, of the political art,
when built on sophistry, that is, of the rhetoric there op-
posed.” Another writer on the higher criticism of Plato,
Socher, gives this dialogue a wider range. ‘ The whole
presents an arena, rising in three gradations. ‘The prize of
the contest is the better, happier mode of life ; the parties
are philosophy and rhetoric ; that contends for righteous-
ness and virtue ; this for the possession of political power ;
the champion of the former is Socrates ; on behalf of the
latter, three step forward, Gorgias, a rhetorician, Polus, a
Sophist, and Callicles, an Athenian politician.” Finally,
Schleiermacher and C. F. Hermann, in the words of the
latter, regard “‘ the kernel of the dialogue to be, that the
good alone is truly useful, and that men harm themselves
by wrong-doing ; that, accordingly, the rule of pleasure
must give way to the higher rule of the good.” *

* All these opinions may be found in the works of their respective advo-
eates, viz. Cousin’s in his transl. 3. 130, seq., Stallbaum’s in Vol. 2, sec.
1, p. 38, of his second ed., Ast’s in his work on Plato’s life and writings,
p- 133, Socher’s in his similar work (Munich, 1820), p. 237, in which he
is polemical towards Ast. Οὐ. Ἐν Hermann’s is contained in his Introd.
to Plato (Heidelberg, 1838 - 39, the second vol. has not appeared), p. 476,
and Schleiermacher’s — the critic to whom the thorough understanding of
Plato owes most —in Dobson’s translation of his prefaces. While I am
upon this subject, let me say, that Schleiermacher hardly receives justice
from the hands of this translator. His style, indeed, offers serious diffi-
culties, for his mind was not, “though deep, yet clear.” It may be
forgiven therefore, to a translator, that sometimes he constructs, out of
Schleiermacher’s formidable German sentences, something not exactly Eng-
lish, as though Le were only half conscious of the meaning. But when
such things as the turning of André Dacier, the French translator of parts of

INTRODUCTION. li

Most of these opinions have something of justice in them,
_ but, with the exception of the last, appear to me to look at
a part of the dialogue, rather than at the whole. If rheto-
ric is the subject, why have the researches into the nature
of pleasure, the comparison between suffering injustice and
committing it, and the discussion of the efficacy of punish-
ment, so great prominence? Much is said about rhetoric,
but it is the vehicle for conveying thought rather than the
subject, the starting-point of the dialogue rather than its
goal. I should entertain just the opposite opinion to that
of Ast above quoted: that the scientific part of the dia-
logue is the main thing, and rhetoric only an example.
Schleiermacher’s view, so far as I understand it, or one very
similar to it, appears te me to deserve the preference. The
main subject is the worthless nature of pleasure, and of
the pursuits founded on pleasure, as opposed to the right
and the good. Rhetoric, including politics in its cor-
rupt condition at that time, is selected as the mest promi-
nent and most esteemed of the arts which minister to
pleasure. This exhibition of the subject being admitted,
we see a propriety in the introduction of every topic. The
right and the good are inseparably linked te each other,
and, in fact, united with all that pertains to man’s excel-
lence and well-being. But to these, pleasure, pursued for
its own sake, is opposed. It is opposed to true good, for it
blindly seeks present gratification, however pernicious or
debasing. It is opposed to right or justice, for it tries to
avoid suffering wrong by inflicting wrong on others. It is
opposed to both, because its impulse is to escape from de-

Plato, into Madame Dacier occur, notwithstanding Schleiermacher’s “dem
Dacier,” and “‘Seiner einleitung,” it may be suspected that the translation
was made before sufficient knowledge of German was acquired, —a_ suspi-

cion from which only the plea of gross carelessness can free the translator.

τὰν INTRODUCTION.

served punishment, without regard to the good effects of
punishment on virtue and happiness. The arts which min-
ister to pleasure — one of which, and the chief in its pre-
tensions, is false rhetoric — fall under the same condemna-
tion. As truth is on the side of good, they have no com-
munion with truth; they are arts of imposition or flattery,
calculated to persuade the ignorant, and reared upon no
basis of unchanging truth or scientific principles. In the
end, as they sacrifice the highest good of those whom they
please to their present gratification, they involve in ruin him
who practises them, and those who are practised upon.
Politics, especially, which, when genuine, aims at the pub-
lic good, is, when based on these principles, a mischievous
trade. And this supreme pursuit of pleasure affects the
condition of man, not only in this life, but in the life to
come. ἶ
Such appears to me to be the subject of the Gorgias.
But it should be added, that Plato has so handled the sub-
ject that the dialogue answers also for a defence of him-
self and his master. ‘The allusions to the trial of Socrates
have been noticed already. He stands before us as the
philosopher who suffers reproach and death for seeking
men’s good rather than their pleasure. But Plato defends
himself, also, apparently against friends, who blamed him
for not publicly serving the state, as well as against public
men, who thought philosophy a useless pursuit. Politics,
he asserts, must be founded on the theory and practice
of philosophy. No man is a true politician until he. be-
comes τεχνικός, --- an artist, a philosopher able to distinguish
useful from harmful pleasures, — and reduces his science to
practice by making men better. ‘That this is a fair defence
I do not assert; for, with true good in view at the outset,
the practice perfects a man in the science. He might have
said, what he must have felt, that the corruption of the

INTRODUCTION. - lili

times, the necessity of using flattering arts, to which he
could not resort, would have altogether prevented his suc-
cess. In such an age,—and such an age is a very long
one, — the philosophical statesman, — let me add, the truly
enlightened Christian statesman, — the sound pilot of the
state, is thrust from the helm, and ignorant apprentices usurp
his place. Plato’s part, therefore, was to act on a few, and
on future times.

I would gladly now draw the attention of my younger
readers to the Gorgias, as a display of the mind and style
of Plato; but the limits of an Introduction forbid me to
enlarge upon this topic. I must, therefore, omit to speak
of the exquisite style of Plato, and the dramatic form in
which he clothes his works. I must only glance at the Pla-
tonic Socrates, the centre of Plato’s writings ; at his admi-
rable irony, now playful and now severe, his unruffled good-
nature, his hatred of show and pretence, his attitude as an
inquirer rather than as already wise, his unaffected modesty,
his propensity to illustrate the great by the small, philosoph-
ical truth by common life, his high estimate of moral truth
above physical. ‘There are, however, one or two points to
be noticed, in which Gorgias differs from many of Plato’s
works. One is, the earnestness, almost amounting to bit-
terness, with which the argument is carried on. There is
less here of playful irony than elsewhere. Another is, that
Socrates expresses his opinion, and lays down his princi-
ples, more than in most of the dialogues of an earlier date.
Another still is, that, compared with the Platonic works of
the first period, it has less of the dramatic about it; we
have no embellished preface, like that of Protagoras, but at
the beginning, Socrates, without any delay on the part of
the writer, enters into the discussion. All these character-
istics may be explained by a predominance of moral feeling,
which rises even into indignation, and deprives Plato of part

liv INTRODUCTION.

of his usual tranquillity. With all this, the form is admira-
ble.* The argument grows in interest and importance,
until it ends in a strain of highest mood. To mention but
a single characteristic, nothing can be finer than the way in
which Socrates deals with Callicles in the third part, where
he retorts his language upon him, and shows that the indig-
nities which he had described as the rewards of the just
man on earth will be heaped upon the unjust in a higher
degree hereafter.

The opinion of the greater number of critics assigns the
composition of the Gorgias to one of the years not long
after the death of Socrates, while that event was still fresh
in Plato’s mind. Athenzus has a story (11. 505, D), that
Gorgias read the work, and said, ““ How well Plato knows
!? and another, that Gorgias declared
that ‘*he never heard or said such things as Plato re-

how to lampoon

ported.” If Gorgias died soon after Socrates, as Foss main-
tains, these anecdotes, which may not be wholly unworthy
of credence, would supply us with the latter term for the
composition of the dialogue. But there is no certainty in
regard to the dates of the birth of Gorgias, and of his age
when he came to Athens as ambassador, on which the date
of his death depends. A comparison of this dialogue with
Plato’s other works enables us to come somewhere near the
time of its composition in another manner. It occupies a

* Stallbaum, in his Introd. to the Repub., says: ‘‘ Hoe monere juvat
disserendi quoque elegantiam in Politia tantam regnare ut paucissimi sermo-
nes preter Gorgiam, Protagoram, Phaedonem, Phedrum, et Symposium,
hoe in genere ad eam comparandi sint.” Ritter, 2.192. ‘In regard to
Plato’s imitative art in dialogue dialogisch-mimische kunst), we consider as
his most finished works Protagoras, Gorgias, and Symposium, next to which,
though at some distance, come Phadrus and Phado.” Here, however,
style, rather than form, is spoken of. As a work of art, I should place
Pheedrus first among all the Platonic dialogues.

INTRODUCTION. , lv

middle place, as Schleiermacher teaches us, between the
elementary writings of Plato’s first years, and the construc-
tive ones of his maturer life. This critic conceives that it
was written after Plato’s first visit to Sicily, in 389, B. C.,
when he was forty years of age. Stallbaum brings it much
nearer to the death of Socrates, in 399. ‘To this conclu-
sion he is led by a strong resemblance he discovers between
the Gorgias and Meno, which latter dialogue he carries
back even to a time before the death of Socrates, on ac-
count of Plato’s mildness there in attacking Anytus, the
accuser of his master. But neither of these considerations
has much weight ; Plato might and does resemble himself
in works written at considerable intervals from one another ;
and the more gentle tone of Meno may be owing to a frame
of its author’s mind which is not to be accounted for. It
is safer to say, that the date cannot be ascertained pre-
cisely.

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4

TA TOY, ALAAOKOY TIP OF DITA

KAAAIKAHS, ZQRKPATHS, XAIPEPGRN,

LOPTTAL, MIRAOX.

47 Cap. 1. KAA. πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασὶ
χρῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μεταλαγχάνειν. Σ΄.

2 αὶ {5 ‘ / , ς - “
Ad}? ἡ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν ἑορτῆς ἥκομεν
καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν; KAA. Kai μάλα ye ἀστείας
ἑορτῆς" πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ 7 ργίας ἡμῖν ολί-

Se er ge me er (
γον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο. Σ΄. Τούτων μέντοι,
Β ὦ Καλλίκλεις, αἴτιος Χαιρεφῶν ὅδε, ἐν ἀγορᾷ
ἀναγκάσας ἡμᾶς διατρῖψαι. XAT Οὐδὲν πρᾶ-
γμα, ὦ Σώκρατες" ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι. φίλος
, LT ? c 3 2 ὃ ΄ ς ~ > ‘
yao μοι Loeyias, ὥστ᾽ ἐπιδείξεται ἡμῖν, εἰ μὲν
δοκεῖ, νῦν, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἐσαῦθις.. KAA. Τὶ
dai, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν ; ἐπιθυμεῖ Σωκράτης ἀκοῦσαι
Τοργίον; ΧΑ]. °En’ αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πά-
ecouev. KAA. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε παρ᾽
ἐμὲ ἥκειν οἴκαδε, παρ᾽ ἐμοὶ yao Toeyias κα-
ταλύει καὶ ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν. 22. Ev λέγεις,
Ο ὦ Καλλίκλεις. ἀλλ᾽ dou ἐθελήσειεν ἂν ἡμῖν δια-
λεχθῆναι; βούλομαι γὰρ πυθέσθαι mag’ αὐτοῦ,
τίς ἡ δύναμις τῆς τέχνης τοῦ ἀνδρός, καὶ τί
Ss, a > fs “a ‘ , Ἁ ‘
ἔστιν ὁ ἐπαγγέλλεταῖ te καὶ διδάσκει. τὴν δὲ
1

Ὁ PLATONIS

ἄλλην ἐπίδειξιν ἐσαῦθις, ὥσπερ συ λέγεις, ποιη-
σάσθω. KAA. Οὐδὲν οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, ὦ
“Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ EV τοῦτ᾽ ἣν τῆς ἐπι-
δείξεως" ἐκέλευε γοῦν νῦν dn ἐρωτᾶν ὅ τι τις
βούλοιτο τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἔφη
ἀποχρινεῖσθαι. Σ). Ἢ καλῶς λέγεις. “2 Χαι-
ρεφῶν, ἐροῦ αὐτόν. XAI. Ti ἔρωμαι ; 2S. D
“Ὅστις éott. ΧΑ]. Πῶς λέγεις; XS. “Ὥσπερ
ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὧν ὑποδημάτων δημιουργός,
ἀπεχρίνατο ἂν δήπου σοι, ὅτι σκυτοτόμος. ἢ οὐ
μανθάνεις ὡς λέγω ;

Cap. I]. XAL Mavédva καὶ ἐρήσομαι. ---
Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Loeyia, ἀληθὴ λέγει Καλλικλῆς
ὅδε, ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅ τι ἄν τίς σε
ἐρωτᾷ; IOP. ᾿4ληθῆ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν" καὶ γοὶρ 448
νῦν δὴ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπηγγελλόμην, καὶ λέγω, ὅτι
οὐδείς μέ πω ἡρώτηκε καινὸν οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἑτῶν.
ΧΩ] Ἢ που ἄρα ῥᾳδίως ἀποκρίνει, ὦ ΠΤ οργία.
1.0}. Πάρεστι τούτον πεῖραν, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν,
λαιιδάνεινν. 142,41. Ny Δία: ἂν δέ γε βούλῃ,
ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐμοῦ. Ζοργίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπει-
ρηκέναι μοι δοκεῖ" πολλὰ γὰρ ἄρτι διελήλυθε.
ΧΑ] 7, dat, & Lads; otee ov xddAhvov dy
Looyiov ἀποκρίνασθαι; HRA. Ti δὲ τοῦτο,
ἐὰν oot γε ἱκανῶς; XAT. Οὐδέν" ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ B
cv βούλει, ἀποκρίνουι͵ ITA. ᾿Ερώτα. XAT.
᾿Ιρωτῶ δή. εἰ ἐτύγχανε 7 Ὁργίας ἐπιστήμων ὧν
τῆς τέχνης ἧσπερ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ᾿ Πρόδικος,
τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὠνομάζομεν δικαίως ; οὐχ ὅπερ

ἐκεῖνον; IRA. Πάνυ ye. ΧΑ]. ᾿]Ιατρὸν

D

GORGIAS. 8

ἄρα φάσκοντες αὐτὸν εἶναι καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγομεν.
MRA. Noi. XAT. Ei δέ γε ἧσπερ ᾿Δριστο-
φῶν ὁ Ayhaopavtos ἢ ὃ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἔμπει-
ρος ἣν τέχνης, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς ἐκαλοῦμεν ;
11.2.1. Anhov, ὅτι ζωγράφον. ΧΑ͂]. Νῦν δ᾽
ἐπειδὴ τίνος τέχνης ἐπιστήμων ἐστί, τίνα ἂν κα-
λοῦντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς καλοῖμεν: TRA. ἾΩ
“Χαιρεφῶν, πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν
ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως εὑρημέναι" ἐμπειρία
μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ
τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ xata τύχην. ἑκάστων δὲ
τούτων μεταλαμθάνουσιν ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως,
τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἄριστοι " ὧν καὶ Loeyias ἐστὶν
ὅδε, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν.
Cap. Ill. 22. Καλῶς γε, ὦ Ζοργία, pai-
νεται Πὶῶλος παρεσκευάσθαι εἰς λόγους" ἀλλὰ
yoo ὃ ὑπέσχετο Χαιρεφῶντι οὐ ποιεῖ. IOP.
Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες; LX. To ἐρωτώμε-
νον οὐ πάνυ μοι φαίνεται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. IOP.
᾿Αλλὰ σύ, εἰ βούλει, ἐροῦ αὐτόν. LS. Οὐκ,
εἰ αὐτῷ γε σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστὶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι,
ἀλλὰ πολυ av ἥδιον σέ. δῆλος γάρ μοι ΠΠ]ὥλος
καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκεν, ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν
μάλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι. IRA. Ti
δή, ὦ Σώκρατες ; XL. “Ὅτι, ὦ Eade, ἐρομέ-
νου Χαιρεφῶντος τίνος ΠΤ οργίας ἐπιστήμων τέ-
χνης, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην, ὥσπερ
τινὸς ψέγοντος, ἥτις δέ ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω.
MRA. Οὐ yoo ἀπεχρινάμην, ὅτι εἴη ἡ καλ-
λίστη; 22. Καὶ μάλα γε. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ

4, PLATONIS

» »” ς ’, r ? Ν - ‘ qc
moa tis etn ἡ Logytov τέχνη, AAG τίς, καὶ OV-
τίνα, δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Togyiav. ὥσπερ τὸ ἔμ-

κροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο Χαιρεφῶν καὶ αὐτῷ 449

καλῶς καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ νῦν οὕ-
γ ‘ ‘2 c 4 ‘ 7 a ~

Tas εἰπὲ τίς ἡ τέχνῃ καὶ τίνα 7 ργίαν καλεῖν
\ ς - - r > ΄, > \ [a
χρὴ μιᾶς. μᾶλλον δὲ, ὦ Loeyia, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν
εἰπὲ τίνα σὲ yon καλεῖν ὡς τίνος ἐπιστήμονα

-

>

τέχνης. L'OP. Tys ῥητορικῆς, ὦ «Σώκρατες.
DQ οὐθρήκορω dea you oe "καλεῖν WOR
"Ayaddv γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ On ὅ γε εὔχομαι
εἶναι, ὡς ἔφη “Ὅμηρος, βούλει μὲ καλεῖν. XL,
ἀλλὰ (βούλομαι. FOP. Kole dy. 22.
Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατὸν εἶναι
ποιεῖν; OP. ᾿Επαγγέλλομαί γε δὴ ταῦτα οὐ
μόνον ἐνθάδε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοθι. XL2. AQ’ οὖν
ἐθελήσαις ἄν, ὦ ΤΠ οργία, ὥσπερ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα,
διατελέσαι τὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δ᾽ ἀποκχρινόμενος,
τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἷον καὶ Πῶλος
ἤρξατο, ἐσαῦθις ἀποθέσθαι; ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖ,
un ψεύσῃ, ἀλλὰ ἐθέλησον xata βραχυ τὸ ἐρω-
τώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι. 70. Μἰσὶ μέν, ὦ Σώ-
κρατες, ἔνιαι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ
μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι" οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ
πειράσομαί γε ὡς διὸ βραχυτάτων. καὶ yao αὖ
καὶ τοῦτο ἕν ἐστιν ὧν φημι, μηδένα ἂν ἕν βρα-
χυτέροις ἐμοῦ ta αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν. 2X§2. Tovtov
μὴν δεῖ, ὦ Ζ7οργία - καί μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐτοῦ
τούτου ποίησαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας
δὲ ἐσαῦθις. ΤῸ. ᾿Αλλὰ ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς
φήσεις βραχυλογωτέρου ἀκοῦσαι.

C

GORGIAS. 5

Cap. JV. 28. Φέρε dn-—Ontogixys yao

Ὁ φῇς ἐπιστήμων τέχνης εἶναι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ

ἄλλον ῥήτορα"---ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων
τυγχάνει οὖσα ; ὥσπερ ἡ ὑφαντικῇ περὶ THY
τῶν ἱματίων ἐργασίαν " ἢ γάρ; IOP. Ναί.
22. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν
fishov xoinoyv; L'OP. Nai. 22. Ny “τὴν
"“Hoav, ὦ Ζ7οργία, ἄγαμαί γε tas ἀποκρίσεις,
ὅτε ἀποκρίνει ὡς οἷόν te διὰ βραχυτάτων.
TOP. Πάνυ γὰρ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς
τοῦτο ποιεῖν. 2X2. Εὖ λέγεις. ἴθι δή μοι ἀπό-
κρίναι οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῆς ρητορικῆς, περὶ τί τῶν
ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη; TOP. Περὲ λόγους.
2X8. Ποίους τούτους, ὦ Ποργία ; dea οἱ δηλοῦ-
σι τοὺς κάμνοντας, ὡς ἂν διαιτώμενοι ὑγιαίνοιεν ;
FOP. Ov.’ 22. Οὐχ ἄρα περὶ mdvtas ye
τοὺς λόγους ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν. IOP. Οὐ δη-
τα. 292. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατούς.
TOP. Nai. Σ΄. Οὐκοῦν περὲ ὦνπερ λέγειν,
καὶ φρονεῖν; L'OP. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; XS. ~Ao’

= > ‘ a =, πο He es Q Ἢ -
45000V καὶ ἣν νὺν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἰατρικὴ περὶ τῶν

καμνόντων ποιεῖ δυνατους εἶναι φρονεῖν καὶ
λέγειν; TOP. Avdyxn. 2X2. Καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ
ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, περὶ λόγους ἐστί. ΓΟΡ. Nat.
»Σ. Τούς γε περὶ τὸ νοσήματα; TOP. Μα-
λιστα. X92. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ γυμναστικὴ περὲ
λόγους ἐστὶ τοὺς περὶ εὐεξίαν τε τῶν σωμάτων
xot xayetiav; I'OP. Πάνυ" ye. XS. Kai
μὴν καὶ at ἄλλαι τέχναι, ὦ 7) οργία, οὕτως ἔχου-
σιν" ἑκάστη αὐτῶν περὲ λόγους ἐστὶ τούτους, οἵ
1"

G PLATONIS

τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες περὶ TO πρᾶγμα OU ἑκάστη
ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη. 70}. Φαίνεται. XM. Τί οὖν
δή ποτε tas ἄλλας τέχνας οὐ ῥητορικας καλεῖς,
οὔσας περὶ λόγους, εἴπερ ταύτην ῥητορικὴν κα-
λεῖς, ἢ ὧν ἢ περὶ λόγους; 7Ὸ ". “Ou, ὦ Σώ-
κρατες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ χειρουργίας
TE “aL τοιαύτας πράξεις, ws ἔπος εἰπεῖν, πᾶσά
ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς οὐδέν ἔστι
τοιοῦτον γειρούργημα, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ πράξις καὶ
ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λόγων ἐστί. διὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἐγὼ τὴν C
ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ λόγους, ὀρθώς
λέγων, ὡς ἐγώ φημι.

Car. V. 22. Ao’ οὖν μανθάνω οἵαν av-
τὴν βούλει καλεῖν ; τάχα δὲ εἴσομαι σαφέστερον.
ἀλλ᾽’ ἀπόκριναι. εἰσὶν ἡμῖν τέχναι. ἢ γάρ;
TOP. Noi. 2X8. Πασῶν δέ, oiwat, tov te-
YVOV τῶν μὲν ἐργασία TO πολύ ἐστι καὶ λόγου
βραχέος δέονται, ἔνιαι δὲ οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς
τέχνης περαίνοιτο ἂν καὶ DLA σιγῆς, οἷον γραφι- D
xn καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαί. Tas
τοιαύτας μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, περὶ ἃς OV MHS τὴν
ῥητορικὴν εἶναι. ἢ ov; 70}. Πάνν μὲν οὖν
καλῶς ὑπολαμθάνεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. .Σ 4). “Ε:ε-
oar δέ γέ εἰσι τῶν τεχνῶν, at διὰ λόγον πᾶν
περαίνουσι, καὶ ἔργου, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἢ οὐδενὸς
προσδέονται ἢ βραχέος πάνυ, οἷον ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ
καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεττευτική YE
καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι, ὧν ἔνιαι σχεδόν τι
ἴσους τοὺς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, at δὲ
πολλαὶ πλείους καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις E

GORGIAS. γι

Ἁ Ἁ ~ ? ~ ‘ , > td ~
καὶ TO κῦρος αὐταῖς dia λόγων ἐστί. τῶν τοι-
οὕτων τινά μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν τὴν ῥητορικήν.
TOP. ‘Anon divers. XL. Add’ οὐάον, τού-
των γε οὐδεμίαν οἶμαί oe βούλεσθαι ῥητορικὴν

= > 7 - Ὁ a > “ ς
καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες, ὅτι ἡ

Ν ~ ” ς
διὰ λόγου τὸ κύρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστι, καὶ
ς / 2: > Q fy ΄ >
ὑυπολαάθοι av τις, εἰ βούλοιτο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν
τοῖς λόγοις, Tijv ἀριθμητικὴν ἄρα ῥητορικήν, ὦ

΄ ΄ Z > 5 > > ΄ ” \
Loeyia, λέγεις ; ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ οἶμαί σε οὔτε τὴν

- ? ‘ ! c ‘

451 ἀριθμητικὴν οὔτε τὴν γεωμετρίαν ῥητορικὴν λέ-
γειν. 7Ὁ. ᾿Ορθῶς γὰρ οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ
δικαίως ὑπολαμθάνεις.

Cap. VI. 22. "lOc οὖν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἀπόκρι-
σιν ἣν ἠρόμην διαπέρανον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ
τυγχάνει μὲν οὖσα τούτων τις τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν
τὸ πολυ λόγῳ γρωμένων, τυγχάνουσι δὲ καὶ ἀλ-
λαι τοιαῦται οὖσαι, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἡ περὶ τί ἐν
λόγοις τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστιν. ὥσπερ
ἂν εἴ τίς με ἔροιτο ὧν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον περὶ ὑσ-
τινοσοῦν τῶν τεχνῶν, $2 Σώκρατες, τίς ἐστιν ἡ
Ύ ‘ oe é Ae 9 vn 2 pes qa é Ν

Β ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη ; εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ σὺ
ἄρτι, ὅτι τῶν διὼ λόγον τις τὸ κῦρος ἐχουσῶν.
καὶ εἴ με ἐπανέροιτο- Τῶν περὶ τί; εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν,
ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸ ἀρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν [γνῶσις],
ὅσα ἂν ἑκάτερα τυγχάνοι ὄντα. εἰ δ᾽ αὖ ἔροιτο"

‘ ‘ ‘ ’ ~ , ” 5]
Env δὲ λογιστικὴν τίνα καλεῖς τέχνην ; εἴποιμι
ἂν, ὅτι καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶ τῶν λόγῳ τὸ πᾶν κυρουμέ-

\ > me J la c Ἁ 7 ΒΩ 3 ἋἋ
νῶν. καὶ εἰ ἑπανέροιτο, H περὶ τί; εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν
ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι, ὅτι TA μὲν

Cc χλλ θ a ¢ > 10 \ ς λ A ”
ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἡ λογιστικὴ ἔχει

8 PLATONIS

περὶ TO αὐτὸ γάρ ἔστι, TO TE ἄρτιον καὶ TO πε-
ριττόν " διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸ
καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πώς ἔχει πλήθους ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ
περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον ἡ λογιστική. καὶ εἴ τις
7 be Hees ἀνέροιτο, ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι
καὶ αὕτη λόγῳ κυροῦται τὸ πάντα, Oi δὲ λόγοι
οἱ τῆς ΠΠΒΘΘΡΕΜΙΒΕΙ εἰ ape περὶ τί εἰσιν, ὦ
“Σώκρατες ; εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν, ὅτι περὶ τὴν τῶν ἄστρων
φορὰν καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα D
τάχους ἔχει. L'OP. ᾿Ορθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ὦ
Σώκρατες. ΣΙ. "Ἴθι δὴ καὶ σύ, ὦ Ζοργία.
τυγχάνει μὲν γὰρ On ἡ ῥητορικὴ οὖσα τῶν λόγῳ
τοὶ πάντα διαπραττομένων TE καὶ κυρουμένων
us. veo; LOP."Eoutavr1a. 22. Ave
δὴ τῶν περὶ τί; *té* ἐστι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων,
περὶ οὗ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, οἷς ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρῆ-
ται; IOP. Ta μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πρα-
γμάτων, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄριστα.

Cap. VIE. 22. °422’, ὦ Τοργία, ἀμφισθη-
τήσιμον καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις καὶ οὐδέν πῶ σαφές. E
οἴομαι γάρ oe ἀκηκοέναι ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις
ἀδόντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ σχολιόν, ἐν ᾧ κα-
ταριθμούνται ἔδοντες, ὅτι ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστόν
ἐστι, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ,
ὥς φησιν ὃ ποιητῆς τοῦ σκολιοῦ, τὸ πλουτεῖν
ἀδόλως. L'OP. ᾿Ακήκοα γάρ' ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί
τοῦτο λέγεις; XL. "Ow σοι αὐτίκα ἂν παρα- 458
σταῖεν οἱ δημιουργοὶ τούτων ὧν ἐπήνεσεν ὃ τὸ
σκολιὸν ποιήσας, ἰατρός τε καὶ παιδοτρίθης καὶὲ
χοηματιστής, καὶ εἴποι πρῶτον μὲν ὃ ἰατρός, ὅτι,

GORGIAS. 9

= ~
(2 Σώκρατες, ἐξαπατᾷ os ΤΖοργίας " ov γάρ
ἐστιν ἡ τούτου τέχνῃ MEQL τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν
» > ta 2 9 c 2 ‘4 >? 5 2 Ἁ 2 ἂς
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, GAA? ἢ ἐμὴ. εἰ οὖν αὐὑτον ἐγὼ
> ’ 4 ‘ a n Ὡς , 3» a
ἐροίμην" Xv δὲ Tis ὧν ταῦτα λέγεις ; εἴποι ἂν
» 4 2 ΄ὔ Vv 5 ΄ 5 \ ~ ~
tows, ore Lateos. Tt οὖν λέγεις ; ἡ τὸ τῆς σῆς
τέχνης ἔργον μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν ; Πῶς yao
2, ΄ Bat 5», Φ wr ere la 5
οὐ, φαίη ἂν lows, ὦ NXWxeatTES, ὑγίεια : τί ὃ
ἐστὲ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώποις ὑγιείας ; Et δ᾽
“- nN ~ ς ΄ »» g
αὖ μετὰ τοῦτον ὁ παιδοτρίθης εἴποι, ὅτι Θαυ-
, ΄ > >» “5 π΄ \ TW) »
featouut γ᾽ ἂν, ὦ LWxXQKTES, καὶ AUTOS, EL σοι
” a ~ 2 ‘ 2 ~ ~ ς
ἔχει 7 Ὁργίας μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδεῖξαι τῆς av-

Ἁ

τοῦ τέχνης ἢ ἐγὼ τῆς ἐμῆς" εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν αὖ καὶ
πρὸς τοῦτον" Xv δὲ δὴ τίς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε; καὶ
τί τὸ σὸν ἔργον; 171|αιδοτρίθης, φαίη ἄν, τὸ δ᾽
ἔργον μού ἐστι καλούς TE καὶ ἰσχυροὺς ποιεῖν
τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ta σώιατα. Meta δὲ τὸν παι-
vA a anv ς , ς > 5
δοτρίθην εἴποι ἄν ὃ χρηματιστής, ὡς ἐγῷμαι,
navy καταφρονῶν ἁπάντων, Σκόπει δῆτα, ὦ
“Σώκρατες, ἐάν σοι πλούτου φανῇ τι μεῖζον ἀγα-
‘ an ἂν \ δ᾽ " 9 2! ς ~
Gov ov ἢ παρὰ Ζ7Ὸργίᾳ ἢ παρ᾽ ἄλλῳ ot@ovy.
~ ” ~ ‘ > , ΄ ‘ , Ss 4
φαῖμεν av οὖν πρὸς αὐτόν " Tt δὲ δή; ἢ ov
τούτου δημιουργός; Dain av. Tis av; Χρη-
ματιστής. Τί οὖν; κρίνεις ov μέγιστον ἀνθρώ-
ποις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πλοῦτον ; φήσομεν. Πῶς
\ ” > ~ ‘ \ 2 im
yoo οὔκ; ἐρεῖ. Kat μὴν ἀμφισθητεῖ γε 7) 0ρ-
γίας ὅδε τὴν παρ᾽ αὐτῷ τέχνην μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ
αἰτίαν εἶναι ἢ τὴν σήν, φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς. δῆλον
οὖν, ὅτι TO μετοὶ τοῦτο ἔροιτ᾽ ἄν" Καὶ τί ἐστι
τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν ; ἀποχρινάσθω Togyias. "ἴθι
Ss ’΄ fs Τὰ » > = Vere ὃν 5 ὦ»
οὖν νομίσας, ὦ L'opyia, ἑἐρωτάσθαι καὶ ὑπ᾽ Exét-

10 PLATONIS

‘ c 9 > ioe > ’ 7 > Lie a
νῶν και VIE ἑμου, AMOXELVAL TL €6TL TOVTO, O

φῇς ov μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ. LJ'OP. “Ὅπερ

> [4 a f Cc 2 7 , > ‘
ἐστίν, ὦ LMXOATES, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον αγαθὸν
καὶ αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀν-
θρώποις, dua δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ
πόλει ἑκάστῳ. X82. Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις ; E
TOP. Τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγ᾽ οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι τοῖς λό-
γοις καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ dixaotas καὶ ἐν βουλευ-
τηρίῳ βουλευτὰς καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐχκκλησιαστοὶς
καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ξυλλόγῳ παντί, ὅστις ἂν πολιτικὸς
ξύλλογος γίγνηται. καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει
δοῦλον μὲν ἕξεις τὸν ἰατρόν, δοῦλον δὲ τὸν παι-
Pp. Cc ‘ Ν ira >! 5
δοτρίθην" ὁ δὲ γρηματιστὴς οὗτος ἄλλῳ ἀναφα-

oO \ 5 ς a 2 Ἀ
νήσεται χρηματιζόμενος καὶ οὐχ αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ Got

- , , \ ’, ‘ ,
τῷ δυναμένῳ λέγειν καὶ πείθειν τὰ πλήθη.

Cap. VIII. Σὰ. Nov μοι δοκεῖς δηλῶσαι;
ὦ 7οργία, ἐγγύτατα τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἥντινα τέ-458
χνην ἡγεῖ εἶναι, καΐ, εἴ τι ἐγὼ συνίημι, λέγεις,
ὅτε πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική, καὶ ἡ
πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἅπασα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς
τοῦτο τελευτᾷ. ἢ ἔχεις τι λέγειν ἐπὶ πλέον τὴν
ῥητορικὴν δύνασθαι ἢ πειθὼ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐν
τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖν; 7}. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρα-
τες, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς ἱκανῶς ὁρίζεσθαι " ἔστι γὰρ
τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς. 252. "Axovoor δή,
oa 1 ΄ > ᾽ ‘ . Ν a ex ” θ᾽ ii ¢ 2 ‘
ὦ 7οργία. ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ ἴσθ᾽ ὅτι, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν B
πείθω, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἄλλῳ διαλέγεται βουλό-
μενος εἰδέναι αὐτὸ τοῦτο, περὶ ὅτον ὃ λόγος
> Ue \ > ‘ a , a 2 “Ὁ ‘ \ ,
ἐστί, καὶ EWE εἶναι τούτων ἕνα " ἀξιῶ δὲ XO σέ.

GORGIAS. 11

~

TOP. Ti ovy 37, &6 Xaxeates; LN. ᾿Εγὼ
ἐρῶ νῦν. ἐγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς πειθώ, ἥτις
ποτ᾽ ἐστὴν ἣν ov λέγεις καὶ περὶ ὧντινων πρα-
γμάτων ἐστὲ πειθώ, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ἴσθ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ
οἶδα, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ὑποπτεύω γε ἣν οἶμαί σε
λέγειν καὶ περὶ ὧν" οὐδὲν μέντοι ἧττον ἐρήσο-
fad σε τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς
ῥητορικῆς καὶ περὶ τίνων αὐτὴν εἶναι. τοῦ οὖν
ἕνεκα δ᾽) αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύων σὲ ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλ᾽
οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω ; ov σοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλο τοῦ λόγου,
ἵνα οὕτω προΐῃ, ὡς μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς
ποιοῖ περὶ ὅτον λέγεται. σκύπει γαρ, εἴ σοι δοκῶ
δικαίως ἀνερωτᾶν σε. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανόν σε
ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστι τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεῦξις, εἴ μοι
εἶπες, ὅτι ὁ τὸ ζῶα γράφων, do’ οὐκ ἂν δικαίως
σε ἠρόμην ὁ τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζώων γράφων καὶ ποῦ;
TOP. Πάν: ye. XN. "Aga did τοῦτο; ὅτι
καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶ ζωγράφοι γράφοντες ἄλλα πολλὰ
faa; FOP. Not. 282. Εἰ δέ γε μηδεὶς ἀλ-
hos ἡ Ζεύξις ἔγραφε. καλῶς ἄν σοι ἀπεκχέκριτο ;
FOP. Πῶς γὰρ ov; XN. Ἴθι dn καὶ περὶ
τῆς ῥδητορικὴς εἰπέ, πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ πειθὼ ποι-
ely ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόνη, ἡ καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι ; λέγω
δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε - ὅστις διδάσκει ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα,
πότερον ὃ διδάσκει πείθει, ἢ οὐ; L'OP. Ov
δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.
22. Πάλιν δ᾽ εἰ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεγνῶν λέγομεν
ὧνπερ νῦν δή, ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ οὐ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς
ὅσα ἐστὶ τὸ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ ὃ ἀριθμητικὸς ἂἄν-

θρωπος; 70}. Πάνυ ye. X2. Οὐκοῦν καὶ

12 PLATONIS

xo

πείθει; L'OP, Nai. XS. Πειθοῦς ἄρα δη-
μιουργός ἐστι καὶ ἡ ἀριθμητική. 10}. Dai-
> ~ 5) of, > ~ ς ~ ᾽΄
νεται. Σδ. Οὐκοῦν ἐάν τις ἐρωτᾷ ἡμᾶς ποίας
πειθοῦς καὶ περὶ τί, ἀποχρινούμεθαά που αὐτῷ,

Ore τῆς διδασκαλικῆς τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀρτιόν TE καὶ 454

τὸ περιττὸν ὅσον ἐστί. καὶ τος ἄλλας ἃς νῦν δὴ
ἐλέγομεν τέχνας ἁπάσας ἕξομεν ἀποδεῖξαι πει-
θοῦς δημιουργους οὔσας καὶ ἧστινος καὶ περὶ ὅ
τί. 9 ov; L'OP. Nai. 282. Ovx dea 6n-
τορικῇὴ μόνῃ πειθοῦς ἐστι δημιουργός. IOP.
᾿“ληθὴ λέγεις.

Cap. IX. 22. ᾿᾿ἐπειδηὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνη ἀπερ-
γάζεται τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλαι, δι-
καίως, ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου, META τοῦτο
ἐπανεροίμεθ᾽ ἂν τὸν λέγοντα, ποίας On πει-
θοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί πειθοῦς ἡ ῥητορικῇ ἔστι
τέχνῃ; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι ἐπανερέ-
σθαι; . ΓΟῸΡ. "ἔμοιγε. XR. ᾿Ζπόκριναι δή,
ὦ Tooyia, ἐπειδή γε καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτω. I'OP.
Ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες,
τῆς ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις,
ὥσπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἅ ἔστι
δίκαιά τε καὶ ἀδικα. Σ.. Καὶ ἐγώ τοι ὑπώ-
πτευον ταύτην σε λέγειν τὴν πειθὼ καὶ περὶ
τούτων, ὦ 7 οργία " ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα μὴ ϑαυμάζῃς, ἐὰν
ὀλίγον ὕστερον τοιοῦτόν τί σε ἀνέρωμαι, ὃ δοκεῖ
μὲν δῆλον εἶναι, ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἐπανερωτῶ" ὅπερ yao
λέγω, τοῦ ἑξῆς ἕνεκα περαίνεσθαι τὸν λόγον
ἐρωτῶ, οὐ σοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα μὴ ἐθιζώμεθα
ὑπονοοῦντες προαρπάζειν ἀλλήλων τὼ λεγόμενα,

Β

Cc

GORGIAS. 13

ἀλλὰ OU TH σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ὧν
βούλῃ περαίνῃ. L'OP. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι
δοκεῖς ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες. XS. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ
τόδε ἐπισχεψώμεθα. καλεῖς τι μεμαθηκέναι ;
DWLOP.. Kala... 22. Ti dé; πεπιακευκέναι.;
TOP." Evyaye. XQ. Πότερον οὖν ταὐτὸν δο-
κεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, κοιὲ
μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι; L'OP. Οἴομαι
μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλος. XS. Καλῶς
yoo οἴει" γνώσει δὲ ἐνθένδε. εἰ γάρ τίς σε
ἔροιτο ἾΔ4ρ᾽ ἔστι τις, ὦ Ποργία, πίστις ψευδὴς
καὶ ἀληθής ; φαίης ἄν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι. 7ῸΡ.
fat. XSL. Τί δέ ; ἐπιστήμη ἐστὲ ψευδὴς καὶ
ἀληθής; 70}. Οὐδαμῶς. 2X2. Ayjhov γὰρ
Ε av, ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν. 10. ᾿4ληθὴ λέγεις.
XS. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οἵ τέ γε μεμαθηκότες πεπει-
σμένοι εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ πεπιστευκότες. 70} Ὁ. ΓΕστι
ταῦτα. x2. Βούλει οὖν δύο εἴδη ϑῶώμεν πει-
θοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν παρεχόμενον ἄνεν τοῦ εἰδέ-
ναι, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιστήμην; TOP. Πάνυ γε. 2S.
Ποτέραν οὖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ πειθὼ ποιεῖ ἐν δικα-
στηρίοις TE καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις περὲ τῶν δι-
καίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων ; ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύειν γίγνε-
ται ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἢ ἐξ ἧς τὸ εἰδέναι; IOP.
Ζῆλον δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύ-
4δδειν. ΣΣ 2). “H ρητορικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, πειθοῦς
δημιουργός ἐστι πιστευτικῆς, ἀλλ᾽ ov διδασκαλι-
“NS περὶ τὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ ἄδικον. 7Ὸ}. Nai.
XS. Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα διδασκαλικὸς ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐστὶ δικα-
στηρίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων δικαίων τε
Shy

14. PLATONIS

, ’ 2 ’ ° Ἁ ΄᾽ ’ τ Ἁ
πέρι καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλο πιστικος μόνον. OV γὰρ
δήπου ὄχλον γ᾽ ἂν δύναιτο τοσοῦτον ἐν ὀλίγῳ
χρόνῳ διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα. IOP.
Οὐ δῆτα.

Car. X. 22. Φέρε δή, ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ

, ~ ~ 2 . ,
λέγομεν περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς" ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ TOL

γ᾿ 2 ~ g ,
οὐδ᾽ αὐτός πω δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι ὅ τι λέγω.
σ δ 5 ~ Co: ὍΣ = / 7
ὅταν περὶ ἰατρῶν αἱρέσεως ἢ τῇ πόλει σύλλογος,
ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν, ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουργι-
κοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ὃ ῥητορικὸς OV συμ-
θονλεύσει ; δῆλον yop, ὅτι ἐν ἑκάστῃ αἱρέσει
τὸν τεχνικώτατον δεῖ αἱρεῖσθαι. οὐδ᾽ ὅταν τει-
χῶν περὲ οἰχκοδομήσεως, ἢ λιμένων κατασκευῆς,
ἢ νεωρίων, ἀλλ᾽ οἵ ἀρχιτέκτονες " οὐδ᾽ αὖ ὅταν
στρατηγῶν αἱρέσεως πέρι, ἢ τάξεώς τινος πρὸς
πολεμίους, ἢ χωρίων καταλήψεως συμθουλὴ ἢ;
2 3 c \ / , ς
αλλ᾽ οἱ στρατηγικοὶ tore συμθουλεύσουσιν, ot
ς ‘ x 2] " - r x ΄ \
ρητορικοὶ δὲ ov. ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Lopyia, τὸ
τοιαῦτα ; ἐπειδὴ) γὰρ αὐτός TE PHS ῥήτωρ εἶναι
καὶ ἄλλους ποιεῖν δητορικούς, εὖ ἔχει TH τῆς
σῆς τέγνης παρὰ σοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι. καὶ ἐμὲ
vUY γνύμισον καὶ τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν. ἴσως vag
καὶ τυγχάνει τις τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων μαθητής σου
βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὡς ἐγώ τινας σχεδὸν καὶὲ
συχνοὺς αἰσθάνομαι, of ἴσως αἰσχύνοιντ᾽ ἄν σε
ἀνερέσθαι. ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ οὖν ἀνερωτώμενος νόμισον

\ Cc 9 > , > ~ 4 ala ς ~ “Ὁ
καὶ vit’? ἐκείνων ἀνερωτᾶσθαι, Τί ἡμῖν, ὦ 1 ορ-
γία, ἔσται, ἐάν σοι συνῶμεν ; περὲ τίνων τῇ πό-
λει συμβουλεύειν οἷοί τε ἐσόμεθα ; πότερον περὶ
δικαίου μόνον καὶ ἀδίκου, ἢ καὶ περὲ ὧν νῦν δὴ

C

GORGIAS. 15

“Σωχράτης ἔλεγε; πειρῶ οὖν αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίνε-
3
σθαι. 7Ὁ}. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἐγώ σοι πειράσομαι, ὦ Σώ-
KOATES, σαφῶς ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς
δύναμιν ἅπασαν" αὐτὸς γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω.
E οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου, ὅτι το νεώρια ταῦτα καὶ τὰ
ΡΟ ΟΣ
’ Ν 2 bs ‘ ς =x l4
τείχη τὰ “Αθηναίων καὶ ἢ τῶν λιμένων κατα-
σκευῇ ἐκ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους συμθουλῆς γέγονε,
ta δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Περικλέους, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δη-
μιουργῶν. XS. “έγεται ταῦτα, ὦ 7 οργία, πε-
\ ΄ “1. ΚΑ, ν . πω ae
ρὲ Θεμιστοκλέους " ἐεριχλέους δὲ καὶ avtos
ἤκουον, ὅτε συνεθούλευεν ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ διὰ μέ-
«όσον τείχους. L'OP. Καὶ ὅταν γέ τις αἵρεσις
“ ὩΣ \ ΝΣ [κι ws € ~ a c
ἢ ὧν δὴ ov ἔλεγες, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρᾷς, OTL OL
ῥήτορές εἰσιν of συμδουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ νικῶντες
Tas γνώμας περὶ τούτων. XS. Ταῦτα καὶ
ϑαυμάζων, ὦ ΠΤ οργία, πάλαι ἐρωτῶ τίς ποτε ἡ
δύναμίς ἐστι τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δαιμονία yoo τις
(iS § ( ie
ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται TO μέγεθος οὕτω σκοποῦντι.
Cap. ΧΙ. -LOP. Et novia ye sideins, “ὦ
“Σώκρατες, ὅτι, ws ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἁπάσας tas dv-
2 9 =}

Β νάμεις ovddabovcoa wp’ αὑτῇ ἔχει" μέγα δέ σοι
τεκμήριον ἐρῶ πολλάκις γὰρ ἤδη ἔγωγε με-
τὸ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ μετὼ τῶν ἄλλων ἰατρῶν
> Ν μ᾿ ’ 2 ‘ > [4
εἰσελθῶν παρά τινὰ τῶν καμνόντων ovyt ἐθέ-
hovta ἢ φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ) τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι
παρασχεῖν τῷ ἰατρῷ, οὐ δυναμένου τοῦ ἰατροῦ
πεῖσαι, ἐγὼ ἔπεισα, οὐκ ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ ἢ τῇ ON-

τ , ‘ A > / qd /
τορικῇ. φημὶ δὲ καὶ εἰς πόλιν ὅποι βούλει
> ᾽ὔ c ‘ 2: ‘ 2 , 2 l4
ἐλθόντα ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα καὶ ἰατρόν, εἰ δέοι
λόγῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ

16 PLATONIS

τινὶ συλλόγῳ, ὁπότερον δεῖ αἱρεθῆναι, ῥήτορα C

Ἃ > , > ~ an” ~ ‘ > , ? 3
5 ἰατρόν, οὐδαμοῦ av φανῆναι tov ἰατρόν, ἀλλ
« ~ δ ‘ > ~ , > 7,
αἱρεθῆναι ἂν tov εἰπεῖν δυνατόν, εἰ βούλοιτο.
καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλον γε δημιουργὸν ὁντιναοῦν
2 δ ’ n «ς ‘ ᾿Ξ f ς ς
ἀγωνίζοιτο, πείσειεν ἂν αὑτὸν ἑλέσθαι ὃ ρητορι-
x0s μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν " OV vag ἔστι περὲ
ὅτον οὐκ av πιθανώτερον εἴποι ὃ ῥητορικὸς ἢ
ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν τῶν δημιουργῶν ἐν πλήθει. “Ἢ
μὲν οὖν δύναμις τοσαύτη ἐστὶ καὶ τοιαύτῃ τῆς
τέχνης. δεῖ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ῥητορικῇ

~ Ω͂ ᾿ ~ , 2 7 ‘
χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ ἀλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγωνίᾳ. καὶ Ὁ

᾿ “πὶ ” > ’ 2 / ca ~ ‘
yoo τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ ov τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ πρὸς
ἅπαντας χρῆσθαι ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἔμαθε πυκτεύ-
ειν τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχε-
σθαι, ὥστε κρείττων εἶναι καὶ φίλων καὶ ἐχθρῶν"

> , ca Ἂ la ms, , 3 ‘
οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα tovs φίλους δεῖ τύπτειν οὐδὲ
κεντεῖν τε καὶ ἀποχτιννύναι. οὐδέ γε μοὶ Δία
ἐάν τις εἰς παλαίστραν φοιτήσας, εὖ ἔχων τὸ
σώμα καὶ πυκτικὸς γενόμενος, ἔπειτα τὸν πατέρα

, ay at = ΄

τύπτῃ καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἢ ἄλλον τινὸ τῶν οἰκείων

rn ~ , ? , cr εις κι
ἢ τῶν φίλων, ov τοῦτον ἕνεκα δεῖ τοὺς matdo- E

, \ ss > ~ oO , ’

τρίθας καὶ τοὺς ἕν τοῖς ὅπλοις διδάσκοντας μα-
- \ > , > - ’ὔ

χέσθαι μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκθάλλειν Ex τῶν πόλεων.

ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ παρέδοσαν ἐπὶ τῷ δικαίως χρῆ-

σθαι τούτοις πρὸς τους πολεμίους καὶ τοὺς ἀδι-

~ ’ c
KOVYTAS, ἀμυνομένους, UN Videyovtas* οἱ JE457

μεταστρέψαντες χρῶνται TH ἰσχύϊ καὶ TH τέχνῃ

2 > - »” c ‘ ’ 2 ‘
οὐκ ὀρθῶς. ovxovy οἱ διδάξαντες πονηροΐ, οὐδὲ
ἡἣ τέχνη οὔτε αἰτία οὔτε πονηρὰ τούτου ἕνεκά
> > ; c \ , > 2 - ς
ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ Of μὴ χρώμενοι, οἶμαι, ὀρθῶς. Oo

ν

GORGIAS. 17

> x ‘ , A Α ~ ς ~
αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δυνα-
τὸς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἅπαντάς ἐστιν ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ
περὶ παντὸς λέγειν, ὥστε πιθανώτερος εἶναι ἐν
τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἐμδραχυ περὶ ὅτον ἂν βούληται"
' μδραχὺ περ ]

> > = ~ ' ἣν
B ἀλλ᾽ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ οὔτε τοὺς
2 Ν Ν ’ 2 - Ὡ , an
ἰατροὺς τὴν δόξαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ὅτι δύναιτο ἂν
τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς,
ἀλλὰ δικαίως καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ
- > Ἀ > ς ‘ ,
καὶ τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ. ἐὰν δέ, οἶμαι, ῥητορικὸς γενό-
μενός τις κάτα ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ
ἀδικῇ, οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα δεῖ μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκθάλ-
λειν ix τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνος μὲν yao ἐπὶ δικαίᾳ
Ο χρείᾳ παρέδωκεν, ὁ δ᾽ ἐναντίως γρῆται. τὸν οὖν
οὐκ ὀρθῶς γρώμενον μισεῖν δίκαιον καὶ ἐκβάλ-

λειν καὶ ἀποκτιννύναι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα.
Car. XII. 22. Οἷμαι, ὦ ΖΤοργία, καὶ σὲ
ἔμπειρον εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθεωρακέναι
ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ ῥᾳδίως δύνανται

Ἁ κι nn 2 / , ΄
περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσι διαλέγεσθαι διορισάμε-
νοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες
Ὁ ἑαυτοὺς οὕτω διαλύεσθαι tas συνουσίας, ἀλλ᾽
ἐὰν περί του ἀμφισθητήσωσι καὶ μὴ φῇ ὁ ἕτερος
τὸν ἕτερον ὀρθώς λέγειν ἢ μὴ σαφῶς, χαλεπαΐί-
νουσί τε καὶ κατὸ φθόνον οἴονται τὸν ἑαυτῶν
λέγειν, φιλονεικοῦντας, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ζητοῦντας τὸ
προκείμενον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ ἔνιοί γε τελευτῶν-
τὲς αἴσχιστα ἀπαλλάττονται, λοιδορηθέντες τε
καὶ εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν
, τοιαῦτα, οἷα καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἄχθεσθαι ὑπὲρ
σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ἠξίωσαν

Q*

13 PLATONIS

ἀκροαταὶ γενέσθαι. Tov dy ἕνεκα λέγω ταῦτα ; EB
ὅτι νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς σὺ οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλονθα λέγειν
οὐδὲ σύμφωνα οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες περὶ τῆς
ῥητορικῆς. φοθοῦμαι οὖν διελέγχειν σε, μή μὲ
ὑπολάθῃς οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα φιλονεικοῦντο, λέ-
γειν τοῦ καταφανὲς γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς σέ.
ἐγὼ οὖν, εἰ μὲν καὶ OV εἶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧνπερ 458
καὶ ἐγώ, ἡδέως ἄν σε διερωτῴην" εἰ δὲ μή, ἑῴην
ἄν. ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγ-
χθέντων, εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, ἡδέως. δ᾽ ἂν ἐλεγ-
ξάντων, εἴ τίς τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι, “ove ᾿ἀηδέ-
ὄτερον μέντ᾽ ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων ἢ ἐλεγξάντων" μεῖ-
ζον γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡγοῦμαι, ὅσῳπερ μεῖζον
ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ τοῦ με-
γίστου ἢ ἀλλον ἀπαλλάξαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι το-
σοῦτον κακὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅσον δόξα ψευδὴς Β
περὶ ὧν τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὧν. εἰ μὲν
οὖν καὶ συ φιὴς τοιοῦτος εἶναι, διαλεγώμεθα "
δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ γρῆναι ἐᾶν, ἐῶμεν ἤδη χαίρειν
καὶ διαλύωμεν τὸν λόγον. L'OP. ᾿Αλλὰ φημὲ
μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος εἶ-
ναι, οἷον OV ὑφηγεῖ" ἴσως μέντοι χρῆν ἐννοεῖν
καὶ τὸ τῶν παρόντων. πάλαι γάρ τοι, πρὶν καὶ
ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν, ἐγὼ τοῖς παροῦσι πολλὰ ἐπεδειξά-Ο
μην, καὶ νῦν ἴσως πόῤῥω ἀποτενούμεν, ἣν δια-
λεγώμεθα. σχοπεῖν οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὸ τούτων, μή
τινας αὐτῶν κατέχωμεν βουλομένους τι καὶ ἄλλο
πράττειν.

Car. XIII. XAL Τοῦ μὲν ϑορύθου, ὦ Iog-

γία τε καὶ Σώκρατες, αὐτοὶ ἀκούετε τούτων τῶν

GORGIAS. 19

~ , ,
ἀνδρῶν, βουλομένων ἀκούειν, ἐών τι λέγητε"
> ‘ 5 a τ ‘ » “ Ὁ ἃ Ψ 7 > % x
ἐμοὶ δ᾽ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μὴ γένοιτο τοσαύτῃ αὔχο
λία, ὥστε τοιούτων λόγων καὶ οὕτω λεγομένων

> , > , , 4 a /
Ὁ ἀφεμένῳ προυργιαίτερον τι γενέσθαι ἄλλο πρατ-

tev. ΚΑΙ͂. Ny τοὺς ϑεούς, ὦ Δαιρεφῶν.
καὶ μὲν On καὶ αὐτὸς πολλοῖς ἤδη λόγοις παρα-
γενόμενος οὐκ οἶδ᾽ εἰ πώποτε ἥσθην οὕτως, ὥσ-
MEQ νυνί, ὥστ᾽ ἔμοιγε, κἂν τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην ἐθέ-
Ante διαλέγεσθαι, χαριεῖσθε. LR. ᾿“Ιλλὰ μήν,
ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τό γ᾽ ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει, εἴπερ
ἐθέλει Γοργίας. I'OP. Αἰσχρὸν δηὴ τὸ λοιπόν,

6) τι ? pee 4 Ν 2A!’ ‘
ὦ Laxoatss, γίγνεται ἐμὲ γε μὴ ἐθέλειν, καὶ

Εταῦτα αὐτὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον ἐρωτᾶν ὃ τι τις

βούλεται. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ δοκεῖ τουτοισί, διαλέγου τε
καὶ ἐρώτα O τι βούλει. 282. “Axove δή, ὦ
71οργία, ἃ ϑαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ"
ἴσως γάρ τοι σοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς
ὑπολαμδάνω. ῥητορικὸν φῃς ποιεῖν οἷός τ᾽ εἶ-
ναι, ἐάν τις βούληται παρὸ σοῦ μανθάνειν ;
TOP. Nei. 22. Οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων͵ ὥστ᾽

459 ἐν ὄχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι, οὐ διδάσκοντα, ἀλλὸ πεί-

΄

q

Oovia 3; L'OP. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 2X2. "Edeyes
τοι νῦν Oy ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ ἰατροῦ
πιθανώτερος ἔσται ὁ δήτωρ. I'OP. Καὶ γὰρ
ἔλεγον, ἔν γε ὀχλῷ: XL. Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὄχλῳ
τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς μη) εἰδόσιν ; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἔν
ye τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται.
ΤΌ. ᾿ Αληθὴ λέγεις. 2X2. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τοῦ

2 a , »” ~~ ῳ ἢ tA
ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται, tov εἰδότος πιθανώ-

Btegos γίγνεται; IOP. Πάνν γε. 22. Οὐκ

920 PLATONIS

ἰατρός ye av: ἢ γάρ; ΤΌΡ. Nat. ZN. ‘O
δὲ μὴ ἰατρός γε δήπου ἀνεπιστήμων ὧν ὃ ἰα-
ερὸς ἐπιστήμων. ΤΌ. .4Ζῆλον ou. XR. Ὁ
οὐκ εἰδῶς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώ-
τερος ἔσται, ὅταν ὁ ῥήτωρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώ-
TEQ0S ἧ. τοῦτο συμθαίνει, ἢ ἄλλο τι; IOP.

Tovto ἐνταῦθά γε συμθαίνει. X22. Οὐκοῦν καὶ.

\ \ 3 ς , 4 ς , ” ς
περὶ τος ἄλλας ἁπάσας τέχνας ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὃ
φήτωρ καὶ ἡ δητορική" αὐτὼ μὲν Ta πράγματα
οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν δέ
τινὰ πειθοῦς εὑρηκέναι, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ
εἰδόσι μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδότων.

Cap. XIV. 7}. Οὐκοῦν πολλὴ ῥᾳστώνη,
a , ἣν Ν , \ 32
ὦ «ΦΖώχρατξες, γίγνεται, μὴ μαθόντα tas ἄλλας

, > ‘ ’, 7 Ἁ >| ~
τέχνας, ἀλλὰ μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι
τῶν δημιουργῶν ; 2X2. Er μὲν ἐλαττοῦται ἢ

\ 2 are ς ref? ~ ” ‘ \ [σὲ
Ln ἑλαττουται ὁ ῥήτωρ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὕ-
τῶς ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν
πρὸς λόγον ἢ" νῦν δὲ τόδε πρότερον σκειψώ-
μεθα, Goa τυγχάνει περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδι-
κον χαὶ τὸ αἰσγρὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν
καὶ κακὸν οὕτως ἔγων ὃ ῥητορικὸς ὡς περὲ τὸ
c κ \ \ NT - C. 5] ᾿,
υγιεινὸν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὧν αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι,
αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς, τί ἀγαθὸν ἡ τί κακόν ἐστιν,

27 ΄ Ν ” ΄ > / ” , vy 4 A
ἢ τί καλὸν ἢ τί αἰσχρόν, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, 40:

πειθῶ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν μεμηχανημένος, ὥστε δο-
κεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ sides ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον τοῦ
εἰδότος ; ἢ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖ προεπιστάμε-
νον ταῦτα ἀφικέσθαι παρὰ σὲ τὸν «μέλλοντα
μαθήσεσθαι τὴν δητορικήν ; εἰ δὲ μή, ov ὃ τῆς

Cc

D

E

Ι

GORGIAS |

ῥητορικῆς διδάσκαλος τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν διδάξεις
τὸν ἀφικνούμενον "--- οὐ γὰρ σὸν EQYOY *— ποιήσεις
δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖν εἰδέναι αὐτὸν το τοι-
αὔτα οὐχ εἰδότα καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι οὐκ
ὄντα ; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐχ οἷός TE ἔσει αὐτὸν
διδάξαι τὴν δητορικήν, ἐὰν μὴ προειδῇ περὶ τού-
Tav τὴν ἀλήθειαν ; ἢ πῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει, ὦ
«oD οργία ; καὶ πρὸς Ads, ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες, ἀπο-
καλύψας τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπὲ τίς ποθ’ ἡ δύναμίς
ἐστιν. IOP. “Add ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι. ὦ ΖΣώκρα-
τες, ἐὰν τύχῃ μὴ εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ
μαθήσεται. XS. “Eye δή" καλώς γὰρ λέγεις.
ἐάνπερ δητορικὸν σύ τινα ποιήσῃς, ἀνάγκη αὖ-
τὸν εἰδέναι τὸ δίκαια καὶ τὼ ἄδικα ἤτοι πρότε-
ρόν γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα naga σοῦ. ΖὉ.
Β. Πάνυ ve. XS. Τί οὖν; ὃ τὰ τεκτονικοὶ μεμα-
θηκῶς textovixos, ἢ ov; 70}. Nat. XS.
Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός; 7Ὁ .
Ναί. XS. Καὶ ὁ ta ἰατρικὰ ἰατρικός ; καὶ
τάλλα οὕτω κατὼ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὃ μεμαθηκῶς
ἕχαστα τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἕκαστον
ἀπεργάζεται; 7Ὸ}. Πάνυ γε. XS2. Οὐκοῦν
κατιοὼὶ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθη-
κῶς δίκαιος; IOP. Πάντως δήπουυ XS. Ὃ
Οδὲ δίκαιος δίκαιά πον πράττει. 7ΤὉ. Nai.
X22. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη [τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον
εἶναι], τὸν [δὲ] δίκαιον δίκαια βούλεσθαι πράτ-
tev; IOP. Φαίνεταί ye. XI. Οὐδέποτε
ἄρα βουλήσεται ὅ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν. IOP.
᾿Ανάγκη. XSL. Τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἔχ

29 PLATONIS

coal

~ ᾽ >
tov λόγον δίκαιον siva. FOP. Nat. JN.
> la ” ~
Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὃ ῥητορικὸς ἀδικεῖν.
TOP. Ov φαίνεταί γε.
Cap. XV. 22. μέμνησαι οὖν λέγων ὀλίγῳ D
πρότερον, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τοῖς παιδοτρίδαις ἐγκαλεῖν
2 9 2) " , > = / d5X [4 , ~
oud’ ἐκθαλλειν Ex τῶν πόλεων, EdY ὁ πύκτης TH
πυκτιχῇ [uy καλῶς] γχρῆταί τε καὶ ἀδικῇ ; ὡσ-
avtas δὲ οὕτω καὶ ἐὰν ὃ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητοριχῇ
ἀδίκως γρῆται, μὴ τῷ διδάξαντι ἐγκαλεῖν μηδὲ
2 2 . > ~ 75» 2 xX ~ =] ~ \
ἐξελαύνεϊν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, GALA τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ
> ~ - ς - SVS ~
οὐκ ὀρθῶς γρωμένῳ TH ρητορικῇ ; ἐῤῥήθη ταῦτα,
ῃ ov; TOP. ᾿Εῤῥήθη. 29. Νῦν δέ γε ὃ
αὐτὸς οὗτος φαίνεται, ὃ ῥητορικός, οὐκ ἂν ποτε E
ἀδικήσας. ἡ οὔ; TOP. Φαίνεται. LR. Kai
2 ~ Ud 5 ΄ / >> 7 cr
ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γε, ὦ 7 Ὁργία, λόγοις ἐλέγετο, ὅτι
ἡ ρητορικη περὶ λόγους εἴη οὐ τοὺς τοῦ ἀρτίον
καὶ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς TOV δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου.
ἡ γάρ; IOP. Nat. 28. ᾿Εγὼ τοίνυν cov
τότε Tavia λέγοντος ὑπέλαθον, ὡς οὐδέποτ᾽ ἂν
εἴη ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄδικον πρᾶγμα, ὅ γ᾽ ἀεὶ περὶ
/ ‘ , ~ > Ν Ν > ΄
δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται" ἐπειδὴ δὲ OAt-
γον ὕστερον ἔλεγες, ὅτι O ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ κἂν
7Q7 Ἂς a ΄ \ ς ,
αδίκως YOWTO, οὕτω ϑαυμάσας καὶ ἡγησάμενος 461
οὐ συνάδειν ta λεγόμενα ἐκείνους εἶπον τουῤς
λόγους, ὅτι, εἰ μὲν κέρδος ἡγοῖο εἶναι τὸ ἐλέγχε-
cr 2 Ud a a 5». ὃ λέ θ0 2 δὲ
σθαι, ὥσπερ ἐγώ, ἄξιον εἴη διαλέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή,
ἐὰν χαίρειν. ὕστερον δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπισκοπουμένων,
. ~ ‘ \ > , qa “ ς ~ ‘ ς
ὁρᾷς On καὶ αὐτός, ὅτι αὖ ὁμολογεῖται τὸν ῥητο-
κ > > Yaz ~ an ςε
ρικὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀδίκως γρῆσθαι τῇ eNTO-
- Ἢ > > - ~ ῳ} 7
ρικῇ καὶ ἐθέλειν ἀδικεῖν. ταῦτα οὖν ὅπῃ MOTE

GORGIAS. 23

cal

Β ἐχει, μὰ tov κύνα, ὦ Ποργία, οὐκ ὀλίγης συνου-

΄ > , “ ς - ΄ , es
σίας ἐστίν, ὥστε ἱκανῶς διασκέννασθαι. 4~ ~)
ἔν: XVI. HRA. .Ti..dat,, ὥς Loxpates.;
οὕτω καὶ GU περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δοξάζεις, ὥσπερ
νῦν λέγεις ; ἢ οἴει, ὅτι Logvias ἠσχύνθη σοι μὴ
προσομολογῆσαι τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα μη οὐχὶ
καὶ τὼ δίκαια εἰδέναι καὶ τὼ καλὼ καὶ τὼ ἀγα-
4 ‘ ch Ν ” ~ >a: 9 ? ’ὔ
θά, καὶ ἐὰν un ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδῶς παρ᾽ αὑτόν,
2 4 , ” > tA 2» =)
Cavtos διδάξειν — ἔπειτα ἔχ ταύτης ἴσως τῆς
ς 7 2 72 ἣν > ~ /
ὁμολογίας ἑναντίον τι συνέθη ἐν τοῖς λόγοις,
τοῦθ᾽ ὃ δὴ) ἀγαπᾷς, αὐτὸς ayayav ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα
ἐρωτήματα. ἐπεὶ τίνα οἴει ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ
2 ‘ ‘ 2 ‘ > 4 ‘ a ‘ 21
ουχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄλλους
διδάξειν ; ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὼ τοιαῦτα ἄγειν πολλὴ
ἀγροικία ἐστὶ τοὺς λόγους. 22. Ἶ χάλλιστε
Hohe, ἀλλά τοι ἐξεπίτηδες χτώμεθα ἑταίρους καὶ
υἱεῖς, ἵνα, ἐπειδὸν αὐτοὶ πρεσδύτεροι γιγνόμενοι
σφαλλώμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς: of νεώτεροι ἐπα-
Ὠνορθοῖτε ἡμῶν τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν
λόγοις. καὶ νῦν εἴ τι ἐγὼ καὶ 7) οργίας ἔν τοῖς
λόγοις σφαλλόμεθα, σὺ παρὼν ἐπανόρθου - δί-
4 το Sa Rae ~ ς ,
xatos δ᾽ εἰ. καὶ ἔγω ἐθέλω tov ὡμολογημένων
εἴ τί σοι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ὠμολογῆσθαι, ἀναθέ-
σθαι ὅ τι ἂν σὺ βούλῃ, ἐάν μοι ἕν μόνον φυλάτ-
ts. «οὐ }» 4. Τί tovto hives; XL. Τὴν μα-
κρολογίαν, ὦ Llake, ἣν καθείρξης, ἡ τὸ πρῶτον
ἐπεχείρησας γρῆσθαι. IQA. Τί δαί; οὐκ ἐξέ-
Ε σται μοι λέγειν ὁπόσα ἂν βούλωμαι; XL. Ae-
νοὶ μέντ᾽ av πάθοις, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ “AOryvate
~ ¢
ἀφικόμενος, οὗ τῆς Edlddos πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξου-

DA, PLATONIS

΄ ~ ” 415 ~ ,

σία tov λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτον μόνος

ἀτυχήσαις. ἀλλὰ ἀντίθες τοι" ““Σοῦ μακρὰ λέ-

γοντος καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντος τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρί-

νεσθαι, οὐ δεινὸ ἂν αὖ ἐγὼ πάθοιμι, εἰ μη ἐξέ-

ἀλλ᾽ εἴ 462
, “Ὁ / ~ > , Ἁ > [4

τι κήδει τοῦ λόγον τοῦ εἰρημένον καὶ ἑπανορθώ-

σται μοι ἀπιέναι καὶ μη ἀκούειν σου ;
σασθαι αὐτὸν βούλει, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον,
ἀναθέμενος 0 τι σοι δοκεῖ, ἐν τῷ μέρει ἐρωτῶν
τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ Toeyias,
ἐλεγχέ τὸ καὶ ἐλέγχον. φῇς γὰρ δήπον καὶ σὺ
ἐπίστασθαι ἅπερ 7) οργίας. ἢ οὔ; IRA.” Eyo-
γε. «ΣΜἢ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ov κελεύεις σαυτὸν ἐρω-
~ c , a 2! 7 «ς 2 ,
τἂν EXGOTOTE ὅ τι ἂν τις βούληται, ὡς ἐπιστά-

μενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι; IRA. Πάνν μὲν οὖν. Β
22. Kai νῦν dy τούτων ὁπότερον βούλει ποίει"

ἐρώτα, ἢ ἀποκρίνου.
Cap. XVII. U2RA. ᾿Δλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα.
7 > ’ Lot Me > \ Pe “ΜΆ

καί μοι ἀπόχριναι, ὦ Σώκρατες. ened) 7) οργίας
ἀπορεῖν σοι δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, OV αὐτὴν
΄ \ > τ 5 > ~ “ ,
τίνα φῇς εἶναι; 4,4}. dea ἐρωτᾷς ἡντιναὰ τέ-
> 32
χνην φημὶ εἶναι; LRA. "ἔγωγε. XS. Ov-
δεμία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Lake, ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ τά-
ληθὴ εἰρῆσθαι. IRA, ᾿Αλλὰ τί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ
15 ‘ ye y ~ a Ν Ἂς ~
ῥητορικὴ εἶναι; WS. Πράγμα, ὃ φῇς ov ποιὴ-
σαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι, ὃ ἐγὼ ἔναγχος

ἀνέγνων. IRA. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις; 22. “Eu-C
πειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα. ISLA. ᾿Εμπειρία ἄρα σοι
Oe es \ > ” > ,
δοκεῖ ἡ ontogixy εἶναι; 2'§2. “ἔμοιγε, et μὴ
τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις. LA. Τίνος ἐμπειρία ;
22. Χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας.

GORGIAS. D5

MRA. Οὐκοῦν καλόν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ᾧῥητορικὴ
εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι ἀνθρώποις: XL.
Tt δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; ἤδη πέπυσαι παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ ὅ τι
ἢ φημὶ αὐτὴν εἶναι, ὥστε TO μετοὶ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς,
εἰ οὐ καλή μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι; ITA. Οὐ γὰρ
πέπυσμαι, ὅτι ἐμπειρίαν τινὸὼ αὐτὴν φῇς εἶναι ;
22. Βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδῃ τιμᾷς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι,
σμικρόν τί μοι γαρίσασθαι; TRA. "ἔγωγε.
2. “Egov νῦν με, ὀψοποιία ἥτις μοι δοκεῖ
τέχνη εἶναι. 11.2.1. ᾿Ερωτῶ δή, τίς τέχνη owo-
ποιία; XS. Οὐδεμία, ὦ Πῶλε. 11.42.4. ᾿4λ-
hd τί; φάθιι XL. Φημὶ δή, ἐμπειρία τις.
EMRA. Tivos; φάθι. LR. Φημὶ δή, χάριτος
καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας, ὦ Πῶλε. HWA. Ταύ-
τὸν δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὀψοποιία καὶ ῥητορική; 22.
Οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως μό-
ρίον. ISA. Tivos λέγεις τἀύτης; XL. Μὴ
ἀγροικότερον ἢ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν - ὀκνῶ yao
7Ζοργίου ἕνεκα λέγειν. μὴ οἴηταί we διακωμῳδεῖν
46310 ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα. . ἐγὼ δέ εἰ μὲν τοῦτό
ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἣν Ποργίας ἐπιτηδεύει οὐκ
οἶδα " καὶ yao ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγον οὐδὲν ἡμῖν
καταφανὲς ἐγένετο τί ποτε οὗτος ἡγεῖται" ὃ δ᾽
ἐγὼ καλῶ τὴν ῥητορικήν, πράγματός τινός ἐστι
μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν. I'OP. Τίνος, ὦ
“Σώκρατες ; εἰπέ, μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθείς.

Cap. XVIII. 2:2. Aoxet τοίνυν μοι, ὦ 7 0ρ-
γία, εἶναΐ τι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν OV, ψυχῆς
δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς

Β προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις " καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ
3

26 PLATONIS

to κεφάλαιον κολακείαν. ταύτης μοι δοκεῖ τῆς
ἐπιτηδεύσεως πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μόρια εἶναι,
ἕν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιική ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη,
ὡς δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη, ἀλλ᾽ ἐμπειρία
καὶ τριθή. ταύτης μόριον καὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν
ἐγὼ καλῶ καὶ τήν γε κομμωτικηὴν καὶ THY σοφι-
στικήν, τέτταρα ταῦτα μόρια ἐπὲ τέτταρσι πρά-
γμασιν. εἰ οὖν βούλεται Πῶλος πυνθάνεσθαι,
πυνθανέσθω" οὐ γάρ ma πέπυσται ὑποῖόν φημι
ἐγὼ τῆς κολακείας μάριον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν
ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸν λέληθα οὔπω ἀποκεχριμένος, ὁ δὲ
ἐπανερωτᾷ, εἰ οὐ καλὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ
αὐτῷ οὐκ ἀποχρινοῦμαι πρότερον εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε
αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι τὴν ῥητοριχήν, πρὶν ἂν
πρῶτον ἀποχρίνωμαι ὅ τι ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον,
ὦ Πῶλε:" ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ βούλει πυθέσθαι, ἐρώτα
ὁποῖον μόριον τῆς κολακείας φημὶ εἶναι τὴν
ῥητοριχήν. IRA. ᾿Ερωτῶ δή, καὶ ἀπόκριναι,
ὁποῖον μόριον. XS. “4ρ᾽ οὖν ἂν μάθοις ἀπο-
κριναμένου ; ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν
λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίον εἴδωλον. LUA. Ti
οὖν ; καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι; XL.
Alsyoov ἔγωγε" τὸ γὰρ xaxa αἰσχρὰ καλῶ"
ἐπειδὴ δεῖ σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι. ὡς dn εἰδότι ἃ ἐγὼ
λέγω. TOP, Μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ᾽
ἐγὼ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς συνίημι ὅ τι λέγεις. XS. Εἰκό-
tas γε, ὦ Ζ7οργία:" οὐδὲν γάρ πω σαφὲς λέγω,
Πῶλος δὲ ὅδε νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὀξύς. IOP. ᾿Αλλὰ
τοῦτον μὲν fa, ἐμοὶ δ᾽ εἰπὲ πῶς λέγεις πολιτι-
κῆς μορίον εἴδωλον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν. XL.

Cc

D

E

GORGIAS. 27

> 8.5 ‘ , , is , ,
Ald’ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι ὃ YE μοι φαίνεται
εἶναι ἡ ῥητορική" εἰ δὲ μὴ τυγχάνει ὃν τοῦτο,
4644 ]Π]ὥλος ὅδε ἐλέγξει. coud πον καλεῖς τι καὶ
ψυχήν; IOP. Πῶς γὰρ ov ;- X22. Οὐκοῦν
καὶ τούτων οἴει τινὰ εἶναι ἑκατέρου εὐεξίαν ;
TOP. “Eyays. XI. Ti δέ; δοκοῦσαν μὲν
> ΄ 5 5 » >» , ἑοῦ ν
ευεξίαν, οὖσαν δ᾽ ov; οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω" πολ-
hoi δοκοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, OVS οὐκ ἂν
c , 3» δ μέ 2 “ » 2!
ρᾳδίως αἴσθοιτό τις, OTL οὐκ EV ἔχουσιν, ἄλλος
eee , ‘ ~ ~
ἢ ἰατρός TE καὶ τῶν yuuvactixov ms. L'OP.
᾿“ληθὴ λέγεις. XL. Τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγω καὶ ἐν
σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, O τι ποιεῖ δοκεῖν μὲν
5 » ~ , ." ‘
Bev ἔχειν τὸ σώμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲν
μᾶλλον. MOP.” Eo ταῦτα.
Cap. XIX. 22. Φέρε dy σοι, ἐὰν δύνωμαι,
, > 7 a [4 ~ 2! ~
σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω ὃ λέγω. δυοῖν ὄντοιν τοῖν
πραγμάτοιν δύο λέγω τέχνας" τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ
ψυχῇ πολιτικὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ Ext σώματι μίαν
μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μιᾶς δὲ οὔσης
τῆς τοῦ σώματος ϑεραπείας δύο μόρια λέγω, τὴν
μὲν γυμναστικήν, τὴν δὲ ἰατρικήν. τῆς δὲ πολι-
τικῆς ἀντίστροφον μὲν τῇ γυμναστικῇ τὴν νομο-
θετικήν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ἰατρικῇ τὴν δικαιο-
, 2 = ‘ ‘ 2 ΄ ivf A
Ο σύνην. ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἀλλήλαις, ἅτε περὶ
τὸ αὐτὸ οὖσαι. ἑκάτεραι τούτων, ἡ τε ἰατρικῃ TH
γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνῃ τῇ νομοθετικῇ "
ὅμως δὲ διαφέρουσί τι ἀλλήλων. τεττάρων δὴ
τούτων οὐσῶν. καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ϑερα-
πευουσῶν, τῶν μὲν τὸ σώμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχήν,
ς Ν > ΄ > Led , 2 A
ἡ κολακευτικῇ αἰσθομένη, οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ

’

28 PLATONIS

στοχασαμένηῃ, τέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανείμασα, ὑπο-
δῦσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, προσποιεῖται εἶ- Ὁ
γαι TOVTO, ὅπερ ὑπέδυ, καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστον
οὐδὲν φροντίζει, τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ ϑηρεύεται τὴν
EY Pe Ἄρες ( Faget
2! 2 ΜῈ » ,) er
ἄνοιαν καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ, ὥστε δοκεῖ πλείστου asia
xX S ah ‘ ς Ν
εἶναι. ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἡ ὀψοποιικὴ
ς \ ~ Ν ἰ ’
ὑποδέδυκε, καὶ προσποιεῖται Ta βέλτιστα σιτία,
= Γ γὼ "7 ca 9 ? 4 ? ‘
τῷ σώματι εἰδέναι, Wot’, εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ δια-
γωνίζεσθαι ὀψοποιόν τε καὶ ἰατρὸν ἡ ἐν ἀνδράσιν
~ “ΔΛ
οὕτως ἀνοήτοις ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, πότερος ἐπαΐει
~ ~ ~ ς Ν
περὶ τῶν γρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ πονηρῶν, ὁ ἰατρὸς
ἢ ὃ ὀψοποιός, λιμῷ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἰατρόν. Ἐ
> > = y K
κολακείαν μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καλῶ, καὶ αἰσχρὸν φημι
Sd ~ ὩΣ ~ -~ Ν ‘
εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὦ Llake, — τοῦτο vag πρὸς σὲ 465
λέγω, ---- ὅτι τοῦ ἡδέος στοχάζεται ἄνευ τοῦ βελ-
τίστου " τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν ov φημι εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽
” > \
ἐιιπειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ἃ προσ-
φέρει ὁποῖ᾽ ἄττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἷ-
τίαν ἑκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην
οὐ καλῶ ὃ ἂν ἢ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα. τούτων δὲ
, > τ - c ~
πέρι εἰ ἀμφισθητεῖς, ἐθέλω ὑποσχεῖν λόγον.
Cap. XX. Tn μὲν οὖν ἰατρικῇ, ὥσπερ λέγω,
ς ΄ - ‘
ἡ ὀψοποιικῇ κολακεία ὑπόχειται " τῇ δὲ γυμνα- B
στιχῇ κατὸ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἡ κομμω-
τική, κακοῦργός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀπατηλῃ καὶ ἀγεν-
νὴς καὶ ἀνελεύθερος, σχήμασι καὶ γρώμασι καὶ
λειότησι καὶ ἐσθήσει ἀπατῶσα, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀλλό-
΄ 2 ’ oS > es ~ \
τριον χάλλος ἐφελκομένους τοῦ οἰκείου TOV διὸ
τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἀμελεῖν. ἵν᾽ οὖν Uy μακρολο-
Lind > lf ~ Lg.
γώ, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι ---- ἤδη

GORGIAS. 29

yog av ἴσως ἀκολουθήσαις --- ὅτι ὃ κομμωτικὴ
Ο πρὸς γυμναστικήν, τοῦτο ὀψοποιικῇ πρὸς ἰατρι-
κήν. μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδε, ὅτι ὃ κομμωτικη πρὸς γυ-
μναστικήν, τοῦτο σοφιστικῇ πρὸς νομοθετικήν,
καὶ ὅτι ὃ OWOTOUX) πρὸς ἰατρικήν, τοῦτο ῥητο-
ρικῇ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην. ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω, διέ-
στηκε μὲν οὕτω φύσει" ἅτε δ᾽ ἐγγὺς ὄντων φύ-
ρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ σοφισταὶ καὶ
ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅ τι χρήσονται οὔτε
αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε οὗ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τούτοις.
Ὁ καὶ yao ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι ἐπεστάτει,
ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, καὶ μη ὑπὸ ταύτης κατεθεωρεῖ-
το καὶ διεχρίνετο ἥ τε ὀψοποιικῃ καὶ ἡ ἰατρική,
ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ σώμα ἔκρινε σταθμώμενον ταῖς
χάρισι ταῖς πρὸς αὐτό, τὸ τοῦ ᾿Αναξαγόρουν ἂν
πολὺ ἦν, ὦ φίλε Πώλε" ---σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἔμπει-
ρος "---ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα γρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ
αὐτῷ, ἀκρίτων ὄντων τῶν τε ἰατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιει-
γῶν καὶ ὀψοποιικῶν. ὃ μὲν οὖν ἐγώ φημι τὴν
ῥητορικὴν εἶναι, ἀκήκοας " ἀντίστροφον ὀψοποι-
Βίας ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι. "ἴσως μὲν
οὖν ἄτοπον πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἐῶν μακροὺς
, λόγους λέγειν αὐτὸς συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα..
ἄξιον μὲν οὖν ἐμοὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐστί" λέ-
γοντος γάρ μον βραχέα οὐκ ἐμάνθανες, οὐδὲ
χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἦν σοι ἀπεχρινάμην οὐδὲν
a660ids τ᾽ ἦσθα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐδέου διηγήσεως. ἐὰν μὲν
οὖν καὶ EY@, σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου, μ᾽) ἔχω ὅ τι
χρήσωμαι, ἀπότεινε καὶ συ λόγον, ἐὰν δὲ ἔχω,
3*

30 PEATONIS

E% μὲ γρῆσθαι" δίκαιον γάρ. καὶ νῦν ταύτῃ
τῇ ἀποκρίσει εἴ τι ἔχεις χρῆσθαι, you.

Cap. ΧΧΙ. 1.42.1. Τί οὖν φῇς ; κολακεία
δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἡ ῥδητορική; 54). Κολακείας
μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε εἶπον μόριον. ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μνημο-

7 - 2, 5 ~ ’ / ,
νεύεις τηλικοῦτος ὦν, ὦ Π]|ὥὧλε ; τί τάχα δράσεις
[πρεσβύτης γενόμενος]; ISA. Ἶ.Δρ᾽ οὖν doxov-

’ Ὁ / > ~ / i ’
Gl σοι ὡς κόλακες ἕν ταῖς πόλεσι φαῦλοι νομίζε- B
σθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες: 4.42. ᾿Ερώτημα τοῦτ᾽
ἐρωτᾷς, ἢ λόγου τινὸς ἀρχὴν λέγεις ; 1142.
᾿Ερωτώ ἔγωγε. XS. Οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε
δοκοῦσι. 1421. Πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγι-
στον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν; XS. Ovx, εἰ
τὸ δύνασθαί γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ δυνα-
μένῳ. IISA. ᾿Αλλὰ μὲν δὴ λέγω γε. ZS.
᾿Ελάχιστον τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει Ὁ
δύνασθαι ot ῥήτορες. 1142.1. Τί δέ; οὐχ, ὧσ-
MEQ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτιννύασί TE ὃν ἂν βούλων-
ται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται γρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν
ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν av δοκῇ αὐτοῖς; Σ,2. Ny

᾿ , 5» ~ , > ~ = i NZ
Tov κύνα, αἀμφιγνοώ μέντοι, ὦ Ilwds, ἐφ᾽ éxa-
στου ὧν λέγεις, πότερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγεις καὶὲ
γνώμην σαυτοῦ ἀποφαΐνει, ἢ ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾷς. IA.
᾿Αλλ’ ἔγωγε σὲ ἐρωτῷς XS. Εἶεν, ὦ φίλε"
ἔπειτα δύο ἅμα we ἐρωτᾷς; IISA. Πῶς δύο;
XL. Ove ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἔλεγες, ὅτι ἀποκτιν- D

Ψ, ς ΕΙΣ, a an , ἐ c
νύασιν οἱ ῥήτορες ovs av βούλωνται, ὥσπερ οὗ
τύραννοι, καὶ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξε-
λαύνουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν ᾿ δοκῇ αὐτοῖς ;

HRA. *"Eyoys.

GORGIAS. 21

Car. XXII. 22. Ζέγω τοίνυν σοι, ὅτι δύο
ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὲ Th ἐρωτήματα, καὶ ἀποχρινοῦμαί γέ
σοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ Lake, ἐγὼ
καὶ τους ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι

Ιὸ μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι σμικρότατον, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ
ἔλεγον" οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται, ὡς ἔπος
εἰπεῖν - ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅ τι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτι-
στον εἶναι. Π.2.1. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μέγα
δύνασθαι; 2X2. Ovy, ὥς γέ φησι Lados.
Π.2.1. ᾿Εγὼ οὔ φημι; φημὶ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε.
22. Med τὸν ----οὐ σύ γε, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι
ἔφης ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ. HA. Φημὶ
yao οὖν. 2X2. ᾿ΑΙγαθὸν οὖν οἴει εἶναι, ἐών τις
ποιῇ ταῦτα, ἃ av doxn αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι,
νοῦν μη ἔχων ; καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς μέγα δύνα-
σθαι; U2A. Οὐκ ἔγωγε. XS. Οὐκοῦν ἀπο-
δείξεις τοὺς δήτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ τέχνην

ὁττὴν ῥητορικήν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κολακείαν, ἐμὲ ἐξελέγ-
ξας ; εἰ δέ me ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, οἱ ῥήτορες οἱ
ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ
τύραννοι οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο κεχτήσονταε, εἰ δὴ
δύναμίς ἐστιν, ὡς ov φής, ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν
ἄνευ νοῦ ἃ δοκεῖ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς κακὸν εἶναι.
ἢ οὔ; Π,424. "ἔγωγε. XL. Πῶς ἂν οὖν ot
ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιντο ἢ οἱ τύραννοι ἐν ταῖς
πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ “Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ ὑπὸ Πώ-

Β λου, ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται; 1424. Οὗτος
ἀνήρ-- 28. Οὔ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἅ βού-
λονται- ἀλλά μ᾽ zdsyye. 142,4. Οὐκ ἄρτι
ὡμολόγεις ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι,

39 PLATONIS

τούτον πρόσθεν; XS. Kai yao νῦν ὁμολογῶ.
HRA. Οὐκοῦν ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται. 2.
Οὔ φημι. ISA. Ποιοῦντες δὲ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς ;
XS. Φημί. UNA. Σχέτλια λέγεις καὶ ὑπερ-
gun, ὦ Σώχρατεςς XS. My κατηγόρει, ὦ λῷστε
Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σὲ κατὰ σέ" ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν Ο
” ? ‘ > (4 > 7, μέ , > ‘
ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐπίδειξον, ὅτι ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ
μή, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου. IRA. ᾿Αλλ’ ἐθέλω ἀπο-

, cr Q I~ OF ,
κρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδώ O TL λέγεις.

Cap. XXIII. 22. Πότερον οὖν σοι doxov-

c 2! Coed / a an ve

σιν of ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι, ὃ ἂν πράττω-
σιν ἑκάστοτε; ἢ ἐκεῖνο, οὗ ἕνεκα πράττουσι τοῦὔθ᾽,
ὃ πράττουσιν ; οἷον οἱ τὸ φάρμακα πίνοντες
παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσι τοῦτο

/ a ed 7 ‘ ,
βούλεσθαι, ὅπερ ποιοῦσι, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον D
καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἕνεκα πί-
vovet;. IRA. Anhov, ὅτι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἕνε-
κα πίνουσιν. X22. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλέοντές τε
καὶ τὸν ἄλλον γρηματισμὸν γρηματιζόμενοι οὐ
τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται, ὃ ποιοῦσιν ἑκάστοτε "
’ x , ~ \ 4 |
tis γὰρ" βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ
πράγματ᾽ ἔχειν ; ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο, οἶμαι, οὗ ἕνεκα
πλέουσι, πλουτεῖν - πλούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα πλέουσι.
ΠΩ“. Πάνν ye. 222. "Ahho τι οὖν. οὕτω
καὶ περὶ πάντων ; ἐάν τίς τι πράττῃ ἕνεκά του,
> ~ , cS) , > Sing ἢ -
οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται, ὃ πράττει, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο, οὗ
ἕνεκα πράττε. ΠΩ. Nai. 2X22. 524ρ᾽ otvE
ἔστι τι τῶν ὄντων, ὃ οὐχὲ ἤτοι ἀγαθόν γ᾽ ἐστὶν
ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξυὺ τούτων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε

κακόν; ΠΩ 1. Πολλῃ ἀνάγκη. ὦ «Σώκρατες.

GORGIAS. 33

A τι

S22. Οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν
τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τἄλλα τὼ τοι-
auta, κακὼ δὲ τἀναντία τούτων ; 1142. "ἔγω-
γε. 2S. Τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ ἄρα
««ϑβτοιάδε λέγεις, ἃ ἐνίοιε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ,
ἐνίοτε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον
καθῆσθαι καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν,
χαὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τἄλλα τὸ τοι-
αὕτα ; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ; ἢ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα καλεῖς τὰ
pyte ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακά; LRA. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ
ταῦτα. 2X&!2, Πότερον οὖν ta μεταξυ ταῦτα
ἕνεκεν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράττουσιν, ὅταν πράττωσιν,
ἢ τἀγαθὰ τῶν μεταξύ; MQA, Τὰ μεταξυ δή-
Βπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν. £2. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώ-
κοντὲς xat βαδίζομεν, ὅταν βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι
βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἕσταμεν, ὅταν
ἑστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ bv;
WQA. Nai. £2, Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποχτίννυμεν,
εἴ τιν᾽ ἀποχτίννυμεν, καὶ ἐκθάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαι-
ρούμεθα χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν
ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή; QA. Hovy ye. > 222.
"Evex’ ἄρα tov ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν
οἱ ποιοῦντες. 1{{2.1. Dyui.
Cap. XXIV. 2.22, Οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἃ
Ο ἕνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μη) ἐκεῖνα. βούλεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽
ἐκεῖνο, οὗ ἕνεκα ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν; HQA, Μά-
λιστα. “42. Οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδ᾽
ἐχθάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ γρήματα ἀφαι-
ρεῖσθαι ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ἢ
ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, BAabega δὲ

34, PLATONIS

ὄντα ov βουλόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα,
ὡς φῇς σύ, τὸ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ pte κακὰ οὐ βου-
λόμεθα, οὐδὲ τὸ κακά. ἢ γάρ; ἀληθὴ σοι δοκῶ
λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢ ov : Ti οὐκ ἀποκχρίνει ; D
ΠΩ 1. ᾿4ληθη. XQ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα omo-
~ 3» > ’ν ‘ vn > / >
λογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει tive ἡ) ἐκθάλλει Ex
πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύραννος ὧν
εἴτε ῥήτωρ, οἰόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγ-
, ‘ n Us tee / ~ a ~
χάνει δὲ Ov κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ
αὐτῷ. ἢ γάρ; HOA. Noi. 222. “δ᾽ δὸν

.

Re » , “Ὁ X
καὶ ἃ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει ταῦτα κακὸ
' ΄ 3 1
ὄντα; Ti οὐκ anoxgiver; ΠΙ 4. AX’ ov
μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται. 212. "ἔστιν οὖν
qd c ~ , / 2 Lond ld ’ὔ
ὅπως ὃ τοιοῦτος μέγα δύναται ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύ- Εὶ
TN, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἀγαθόν τι κατοὶ
τὴν, σὴν ὁμολογίαν ; L2A. Ovx στιν. 222.
"AhnOn ἄρα Eva, ἔλεγον, λέγων, ὅτι ἔστιν ἄν-

~ > ͵ Gy ~ es τῇ ’
θρωπον ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα
δύνασθαι μηδὲ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται. IOLA. ‘Qs
δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναΐ σοι
~ qd ~ > ~ / τὸ n ’
ποιεῖν ὃ τι δοκεῖ σοι Ev τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ LN,
> ’ ~ ca 5», \ yn > 7 “a
OVOE ζηλοῖς. ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα OV
ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφελόμενον γρήματα ἢ δήσαντα.
222. Δικαίως, λέγεις, ἢ ἀδίκως; 2A, “One-

τερ᾽ ἂν ποιῇ, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρως ζηλωτόν ἐστιν ; 469'

£2. Evopnus, ὦ Toke. HOA. Τί δή; 222.

a 4 > \ 2! ‘ ry , “ - 2!
Ow ov yon ovte τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε
τοὺς αθλίουξ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐλεεῖν. ΠΗ Ti bat;
οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ λέγω τῶν ἂν-

θρώπων; 2X2. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 2A. “Ὅστις

w Γ

GORGIAS. 35

5s 3 ? a n” , > ~ ? 3

οὖν ἀποκτίννυσιν ὃν ἂν δόξῃ αὐτῷ, δικαίως ἀπο-
, 2” ~ a \ > ’

κτιννύς, ἄθλιος doxei σοι εἶναι καὶ ἐλεεινός ;
Σ42. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός. 2A.

Β Οὐκ ἄρτι ἄθλιον ἔφησθα εἶναι; X02. Τὸν adi-
κῶς γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀποχτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεεινόν γε
πρός - τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀζήλωτον. IQA. Ἢ
mov ὅ γε ἀποθνήσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεεινός τε καὶ
ἀθλιός ἐστιν. X82. *Httov ἢ ὃ ἀποκτιννύς,
ὦ Πώῶλε, καὶ ἧττον ἢ ὁ δικαίως ἀποθνήσκων.
ΠΑ... Πῶς δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες; L282. Οὕτως,
ὡς μέγιστον τῶν καχῶν τυγχάνει ὃν τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
HLA. Ἢ γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον ; οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖ-
σθαι μεῖζον; 222. “Ηκιστά γε. HLA. Lv
ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ἀδικεῖν ;

Ο. 242. Βουλοίμην μὲν dv ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα " εἰ δ᾽
ἀναγκαῖον ein ἀδικεῖν ἡ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἑλοίμην ἂν
μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι 7) ἀδικεῖν. Πἅ 4. XV ἄρα
τυραννεῖν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο: 222. Ovx, εἰ τὸ
τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὅπερ ἐγώ. 1Π2.,1. ᾿4λλ᾽
ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω, ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ πό-
λει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτιν-
νύντι καὶ ἐκθάλλοντι καὶ πάντα πράττοντι KATA
τὴν αὑτοῦ δόξαν.

Cap. XXV. 2. °Q μακάριε, ἐμοῦ: dn λέ-

Dyovtos τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαθοῦ. εἰ yao ἐγὼ ἐν ayo-
7 D λόγε . εἰ γὰρ ἐγ ;

LS / 2 "Α΄ la
ρᾷ πληθούσῃ λαθὼν ὑπὸ μάλης ἐγχειρίδιον λέ-
yout πρὸς σὲ, ὅτι 2 Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δύναμίς τις καὶ

’ oe ji ῥ
τυραννὶς ϑαυμασία ἄρτι προσγέγονεν " ἐὰν yao
ἄρα ἐμιοὶ δόξῃ τινὰ τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν

Ἁ i$ ~ Sol Vd ~ , ,
σὺ ορᾷς avtixa μάλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει

36 PLATONIS

οὗτος, ὃν ἂν δόξῃ " κἂν τινα δόξῃ μοι τῆς κεφα-
λῆς αὐτῶν κατεαγέναι δεῖν, κατεαγῶς ἔσται αὖ-
τίκα μάλα, κἂν ϑοἰμάτιον διεσχίσθαι, διεσχισμέ-
νον ἔσται " οὕτω μέγα ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐν τῇδε THE
πόλει" εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντί σοι δείξαιμι τὸ ἔγχει-
ρίδιον, ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ἰδῶν, ὅτι 2 Σώκρατες,
οὕτω μὲν πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναιντο, ἐπεὶ κἂν
ἐμπρησθείη οἰκία τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἥντιν᾽ ἄν σοι
δοκῇ, καὶ τά γε ᾿αθηναίων νεώρια καὲ τριήρεις
καὶ τὼ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὸ δημόσια καὶ To ἴδιαι.
ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, τὸ
ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ. ἢ δοκεῖ σοι; 1142) 4. Οὐ «το
δῆτα οὕτω γε. XS. "ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, διότι
μέμφει τὴν τοιαύτην δύναμιν ; ITA.” Eyoye.
Xf. Τί δή; λέγε. 12.41. “Ou ἀναγκαῖον τὸν
οὕτω πράττοντα ζημιοῦσθαί ἐστι. X42. Τὸ δὲ
ζημιοῦσθαι οὐ κακόν: LRQA. Πάνν ye ΖΣΏ.
Οὐκοῦν, ὦ ϑαυμάσιε, τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι πάλιν
αὖ σοι φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι ἃ δοκεῖ ἕπη-
ται τὸ ὠφελίμως πράττειν, ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι, καὶ
τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι" εἰ DEB
(ἡ, κακὸν καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι. Σκχεψώμεθα
δὲ καὶ τόδε. ἀλλο τι ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐνίοτε μὲν
ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν,
ἀποκτιννύναι τε καὶ ἐξελαύνειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ
ἀφαιρεῖσθαι γρήματα, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὔ; 1142.1.
Πάνυ γε. 222, Τοῦτο μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶὲ
παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ ὁμολογεῖται. HRA.
Nai. 2X22. Πότε οὖν σὺ φῇς ἄμεινον εἶναι tav-
τα ποιεῖν ; εἰπὲ τίνα ὅρον ὁρίζει. ISA. Σὺ

GORGIAS. 37

μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόχριναι ταὐτὸ τοῦτο.
C22. ᾿Εγὼ μὲν τοίνυν φημί, ὦ Ilwhe, εἴ σοι
παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἥδιόν ἐστιν ἀκούειν, ὅταν μὲν δικαίως
τις ταῦτα ποιῇ, ἄμεινον εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἀδίκως,
κάκιον.
Cap. XXVI. 5.42.1. Χαλεπόν γέ σε ἐλέγξαι,
ὦ Σώκρατες add’ οὐχὶ κἂν παῖς σὲ ἐλέγξειεν,
ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὴ λέγεις; XS. Πολλὴν ἄρα ἐγὼ
τῷ παιδὶ χάριν ἕξω, ἴσην δὲ καὶ ool, ἐάν με ἐλέγ-
Ens καὶ ἀπαλλάξῃς φλυαρίας. ἀλλὰ py κάμῃς
φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔλεγχε. HRA.
D’Ahha μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέν γέ σε δεῖ πα-
λαιοῖς πράγμασιν ἐλέγχειν - ta yao ἐχθὲς καὶ
πρώην γεγονότα ταῦτα ἱκανά σε ἐξελέγξαι ἐστὶ
καὶ ἀποδεῖξαι, ὡς πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι
εὐδαίμονές εἰσι. 2X2. Τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα; IRA.
᾿Αρχέλαον δήπου τοῦτον τὸν Legdixxov ὁρᾷς
ἄρχοντα Maxedovias; 22. Εἰ δὲ μή, add?
ἀκούω γε. IRA. Εὐδαίμων οὖν σοι δοκεῖ εἶ-
vat ἢ ἄθλιος; XS. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Πῶλε" οὐ
γάρ πω συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρίς IRA. Τί δαί;
Ε συγγενόμενος ἂν γνοίης, ἄλλως δὲ αὐτόθεν οὐ
γιγνώσκεις ὅτι εὐδαιμονεῖ; X22. Ma Ai’ οὐ
δῆτα. LILA. “λον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ
τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα γιγνώσκειν φήσεις εὐδαίμονα
ὄντα. XS. Καὶ ἀληθὴ γε ἐρῶ" οὐ γὰρ οἶδα
παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης. 1142. Τί
δέ; ἐν τούτῳ ἡ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν; LS.
“ὡς γε ἐγὼ λέγω, ὦ Πῶλε" τὸν μὲν γὰρ καλὸν
καγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα εὐδαίμονα εἶναί
4

38 PLATONIS

φημι, tov δὲ ἀδιχον καὶ πονηρὸν ἄθλιον. IRA.an-
"AOhios ἄρα οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ᾿“Ιρχέλαος κατὰ τὸν
OX
cov λόγον; 282. Hineg ye, ὦ φίλε, ἄδικος.
11.2.1. ᾿Αλλὰ μὲν δὴ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος; ᾧ γε
προσῆκε μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδέν, ἣν νῦν ἔχει, ὄντι
ἐκ γυναικός, ἢ ἣν δούλη ᾿Δίλκέτον, tov Περδίκ-
κου ἀδελφοῦ, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δίκαιον δοῦλος
ἣν Αλκέτου, καὶ εἰ ἐδούλετο τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν,
2 td an > [4 sh “ > γι ‘ x
ἐδούλενεν av Adnétyn καὶ ἣν εὐδαίμων κατὰ τὸν
σὸν λόγον" νῦν δὲ ϑαυμασίως ὡς ἄθλιος γέγονεν, Β
ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγιστα ἠδίκηκεν" ὅς γε πρῶτον μὲν
τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν δεσπότην καὶ ϑεῖον μεταπεμ-
, ς > 4 ‘ > , « ’
ψάμενος ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν ἀρχήν, ἣν Περδίκκας
αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο, ξενίσας καὶ καταμεθύσας αὐτόν
‘ ‘ GX 3 Ls 2 4 > ‘
τε καὶ tov υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Adésavdgov, ἀνεψιὸν
ς “ A ς 4 > ‘ > qd
αὑτοῦ, σχεδὸν ἡλικιώτην, ἐμθαλῶν εἰς ἅμαξαν,
νύχτωρ ἐξαγαγὼν ἀπέσφαξέ te καὶ ἠφάνισεν
ἀμφοτέρους, καὶ ταῦτα ἀδικήσας ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν
2 , 7 Ὰ 2 [4 > ~
ἀθλιώτατος γενόμενος καὶ OV μετεμέλησεν AUTO,
Ὗ 2 ἊΝ iv ‘ 2 ‘ ‘
ahh’ ὀλίγον ὕστερον tov ἀδελφὸν τὸν γνήσιον, C
Ν 4 Cz ~ ς c ~ κ΄ «
tov Ilegdixxov υἱόν, παῖδα ὡς ἑπταετῆ, οὗ ἢ
2 Ν De \ Ν ΄ 3 > /
ἀρχὴ ἐγίγνετο κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἑθδουλήθη
εὐδαίμων γενέσθαι δικαίως ἐχθρέψας καὶ ἀπο-
ὃ Ν ΑΝ > x 2 7 tha? 2 ’ > 6 wh ‘
οὺς THY ἀρχὴν ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς φρέαρ ἐμθαλῶν
ἀποπνίξας πρὸς τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ Κλεοπάτραν
χῆνα ἔφη διώκοντα ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀποθανεῖν.
τοιγάρτοι νῦν, ἅτε μέγιστα ἠδικηκῶς τῶν ἕν Ma-
κεδονίᾳ, ἀθλιώτατός ἐστι πάντων Maxsdover,
ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ εὐδαιμονέστατος, καὶ ἴσως ἔστιν ὅστις
᾿Αθηναίων ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρξάμενος δέξαιτ᾽ ἂν ἄλλος

GORGIAS. 89

Ὁ ὁστισοῦν Maxeddvav γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ᾿«ρ-
χέλαος. ὦ
Cap. XXVIII. 22. Kat κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τῶν λό-
γων, ὦ Πῶλε, ἔγωγέ σε ἐπήνεσα, ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς
εὖ πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικὴν πεπαιδεῦσθαι, τοῦ δὲ δια-
λέγεσθαι ἠμεληκέναι" καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι οὗτός
ἐστιν 0 λόγος, ᾧ μὲ καὶ ἂν παῖς ἐξελέγξειε, καὶ
ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν, ὡς συ οἴει, ἐξελήλεγμαι τούτῳ
τῷ λόγῳ, φάσκων τὸν ἀδικοῦντα οὐκ εὐδαίμονα
εἶναι ; πόθεν, ὦ ᾽γαθέ ; καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γέ σοι
τούτων ὁμολογῶ ὧν ov φῇς. ISA. Ov yao ἐθέ-
E λεις, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γέ σοι ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω. XS. 2
μακάριε, δητορικῶς γάρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν,
ὥσπερ οὗ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡγούμενοι ἐλέγχειν.
καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἕτεροι τοὺς ἑτέρους δοκοῦσιν
ἐλέγχειν, ἐπειδὰν τῶν λόγων ὧν ἂν λέγωσι μάρ-
τυρᾶς πολλοὺς παρέχωνται καὶ εὐδοκίμους, ὁ δὲ
τἀναντία λέγων ἕνα τινὰ παρέχηται, ἢ μηδένα.
οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἔλεγχος οὐδενὸς ἀξιός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν
«τοἀλήθειαν" ἐνίοτε YOQ ἂν καὶ καταψευδομαρτυ-
ρηθείη τις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναί τι.
καὶ νῦν περὶ ὧν ov λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες
συμφήσουσι ταῦτα ᾿Αθηναῖοι καὶ ξένοι " ἐὰν
βούλῃ κατ᾽ ἐμοῦ μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι ὡς
οὐκ ἀληθὴ λέγω, μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἐὰν μὲν
βούλῃ, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτον καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ᾽
αὐτοῦ, ὧν οἱ τρίποδες οἱ ἐφεξῆς ἑστῶτές εἰσιν ἐν
τῷ Avovucio, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ᾿“ριστοκράτης ὁ
Β Σ'χελλίου, οὗ αὖ ἔστιν ἐν Πυθίον τοῦτο τὸ xa-
ov ἀνάθημα, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἡ Περικλέους ὅλη

AQ PLATONIS

Ps Ft RC a? r σ 1 , ἐκ
οἰκία, 7 ἄλλῃ συγγένεια, ἥντινα ἂν βούλῃ τῶν
ἐνθένδε ἐκλέξασθαι. ἀλλ᾽ ἐγώ σοι εἷς ὧν οὐχ
ὁμολογῶ" οὐ γάρ μὲ σὺ ἀναγκάζεις, ἀλλὰ ψευ-
δομάρτυρας κατ᾽ ἐμοῦ πολλοὺς παρασχόμενος
ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκθάλλειν me ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ
5 ~ > \ ary ᾿ ν" ran a 2, ,
ἀληθοῦς. ἔγω δὲ ἂν μὴ GE αὐτὸν ἕνα OVTA MAQ-
τυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα πεῤρὲ ὧν λέγω,
οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγον μοι πεπεράνθαι περὲ
{4 Ἃ cw ς 4 ὋΣ > Ὁ 5.5 » Ss x
av av ἡμῖν ὃ λόγος ἢ οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ Got, ἐὰν UNC
ἐγώ σοι μαρτυρῶ εἷς ὧν μόνος, τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους
πάντας τούτους γαίρειν ἐᾷς. ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὐ-
7 > , Cc , », Ἁ 3»
Tos τις τρόπος ἐλέγχου, ὡς σύ τε οἴει καὶ ἄλλοι

» » Ν eed a Εν 5 >

πολλοί" ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι.
παραθαλόντες οὖν παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους σκεψώμεθα
εἴ τι διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων. καὶ γὰρ τυγχάνει
περὶ ὧν ἀμφισθητοῦμεν οὐ πάνν σμικρο ὄντα,
2 Q Ys ~ Ἁ τῷ IQ?’ /
αλλὰ σχεδὸν τι ταῦτα, περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι TE κάλλι-
στον, μὴ εἰδέναι τε αἴσχιστον * τὸ yao κεφάλαιον
αὐτῶν ἔστιν ἢ γιγνώσκειν ἢ ἀγνοεῖν ὅστις τε εὐ-
δαίμων ἐστὶ καὶ ὅστις μή. αὐτίκα πρῶτον, περὶ Ὁ
οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστί, ov ἡγεῖ οἷόν TE εἶναι μακά-
ριον ἄνδρα ἀδικοῦντά τε καὶ ἄδικον ὄντα, εἴπερ
2 ΄ BY] ‘ ς “ > > ΄ V4
Aopyéhaov ἀδικον μὲν ἡγεῖ εἶναι, εὐδαίμονα dé.
ἄλλο τι ὡς οὕτω σου νομίζοντος διανοώμεθα ;
MRA. Πάνυ γε.

Cap. XXVIII. 22. ᾿Εγὼ δέ φημι ἀδύνατον.
Ev μὲν τουτὲ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν. εἶεν - ἀδικῶν δὲ

δ > ’ > Sieh BA) , 7 \
δὴ) εὐδαίμων ἔσται ao’, ἂν τυγχάνῃ δίκης TE καὶ
τιμωρίας; IRA. “Πκιστά γε, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γ᾽ ἂν
ἀθλιώτατος εἴη. 2X2. AAA’ ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ τυγ-Ἐ

GORGIAS. 41

Γ᾿ ’ ς 2 ~ ny ‘ ‘ , > a
χαάνῃ δίκης ὁ ἀδικῶν, κατα τὸν σὸν λόγον εὐδαΐ-
pov ἔσται. IRA. Φημί. LX. Κατὰ δέ γε

‘ Ν εν — > ~ «
τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὦ Lake, ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ς
ΒΩ lA ‘ 2! > Ls 4
ἄδικος πάντως μὲν ἄθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι,
ow \ ~ ’ ‘ Δ 7 >
éav μὴ διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνῃ τιμωρίας ἀδι-

“ : , » 5 WS ~ ΄ \
κῶν, ἧττον δὲ ἄθλιος, ἐὰν διδῷ δίκην καὶ τυγ-

41 χάνῃ δίκης ὑπὸ ϑεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων. ITA.
“Atond γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν. IM.
Πειράσομαι δέ γε καὶ σὲ ποιῆσαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ταύ-
το ἐμοὶ λέγειν " φίλον γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι. νῦν

ν» 7 a , mi ΣΝ τὶ ΄ , .
μὲν οὖν ἃ διαφερόμεθα ταῦτ᾽ ἐστί" σκόπει δὲ
καὶ σύ. εἶπον ἐγώ nov ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τὸ
ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι. 1421.
Πάνυ γε. 2G. LV δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. IMA.
Nai. XS. Καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἀθλίους ἔφην
εἶναι ἐγώ, καὶ ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ. oad.

BNat μὰ Μία. XI. “Qs ov ye οἴει; ὦ Πώλε.
QA. ᾿4ληθὴ γε οἰόμενος ἴσως. LX. Xv δέ
γε εὐδαίμονας αὖ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἐὰν μὴ διδῶσι
δίκην. QA. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 22. ᾿Εγὼ δὲ

3, Ν > / ye ‘ b) ’ ,
αὐτοὺς ἀθλιωτάτους φημῖ, τοὺς δὲ διδόντας δίκην
ἧττον. βούλει καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγχειν; LA.
"ALR ἔτι τοῦτ᾽ ἐκείνου γαλεπώτερόν ἐστιν, ὦ
“Σώκρατες, ἐξελέγξαι. 2X2. Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Πῶλε,
ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον" τὸ yoo ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγ-
yetat. ISA. Πῶς λέγεις ; ἐὰν ἀδικῶν ἄνθρω-

C mos ληφθῇ τυραννίδι ἐπιδουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεὶς
στρεθλῶται καὶ ἐχτέμνηται καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς
> , ‘ 2, ‘ Ἁ ’ A
ἐκκάηται, καὶ ἄλλας πολλᾶς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ

8 4 3 δ ‘ Ἁ ‘
παντοδαποῖς λώθας autos te λωθηθεὶς καὶ τοὺς
με

42 PLATONIS

αὑτοῦ ἐπιδὼν παῖδας te καὶ γυναῖκα TO ἔσχατον
ἀνασταυρωθῇ ἢ καταπιττωθῇ, οὗτος εὐδαιμονέ-
στερος ἔσται ἢ ἐὼν Siapuyav τύραννος καταστῇ
καὶ ἄρχων ἐν τῇ πόλει διαθιῷ ποιῶν ὅ τι ἂν

' \ By \ 5) rea 2 Ca
βούληται, ζηλωτὸς ὧν καὶ ευδαιμονιζόμενος vito
τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων ; ταῦτα λέ- Ὁ
γεις ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἐξελέγχειν ;

Cap. XXIX. 22. Μορμολύττει αὖ, ὦ γεν-
~ Jot \ > 2 , - ΒΕ οἷ 2 /
vais Πῶλε, καὶ οὐκ Eheyysis* ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρου.
ὅμως δὲ ὑπόμνησόν μὲ σμικρόν - ἐὰν ἀδίκως ἐπι-
θουλεύων τυραννίδι, eines; URA. "ἔγωγε.
XL. Εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν τοίνυν οὐδέποτε ἔσται
οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν, οὔτε ὁ κατειργασμένος τὴν τυ-

, 2 - 2 ς id , ~ 8
ραννίδα ἀδίκως οὔτε ὁ δίκην διδοὺς " δυοῖν yao
2 ΄, > ’ ‘ > n » > ,
ἀθλίοιν εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴῃ " αθλιώ-
τερος μέντοι ὃ διαφυγὼν καὶ τυραννεύσας. TtE
τοῦτο, ὦ Πῶλε ; γελᾷς ; ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος
ἐλέγχου ἐστίν, ἐπειδάν τίς τι εἴπῃ, καταγελᾶν,
ἐλέγχειν δὲ μή; UA. Ovx οἴει ἐξεληλέγχθαι,
ἘῚ ὌΝ og Ὁ , Δ 2 . BY
ὦ “Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτο λέγῃς ἃ οὐδεὶς ὧν
φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων ; ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ τινα τουτωνί.
22. * 2 Mahe, οὐκ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, καὶ πέ-

3 a 7 λ , 2 ς ὃ Sigal λ NS /
ουσι βουλεύειν λαχών, ἐπειδη ἡ PUAN ἐπρυτάνενε
καὶ ἔδει μὲ ἐπιψηφίζειν, γέλωτα παρεῖχον καὶ
οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ νῦν 4τ4

i 2 ζω ‘ / 2 9 > Ν
us κέλευε ἐπιψηφίζειν τοὺς παρόντας, αλλ᾽ εἰ μὴ
” , s ” a ~ Ἀ > .«
ἔχεις τούτων βελτίω ἔλεγχον, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγω
ἔλεγον, ἐμοὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει παράδος, καὶ πείρασαι
τοῦ ἐλέγχου οἷον ἐγὼ οἶμαι δεῖν εἶναι. ἐγὼ yao
ὧν ἂν λέγω ἕνα μὲν παρασχέσθαι μάρτυρα ἐπί-

GORGIAS. 43

σταμαι, αὐτὸν πρὸς OY ἄν μοι ὁ λόγος ἢ, τοὺς
δὲ πολλους ἐῶ χαίρειν, καὶ ἕνα ἐπιψηφίζειν ἐπέ
Βσταμαι, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. ὅρα
οὖν, εἰ ἐθελήσεις ἐν τῷ μέρει διδόναι ἔλεγχον
ἀποχρινόμενος TA ἐρωτώμενα. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οἷ-
μαι καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους
τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ
τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ διδόναι. IRA.’ Eye δέ
γε οὔτ᾽ ἐμὲ οὔτ᾽ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα. ἐπεὶ σὺ
δέξαι᾽ ἂν μάλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν ; XL. Kal
σύ γ᾽ ἂν καὶ ot ἄλλοι mavtes. 1{42.1. Πολλοῦ
γε δεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἐγὼ οὔτε GU οὔτ᾽ ἄλλος οὐδείς.
C22. Οὐκοῦν ἀποχρινεῖ; HRA. Πάνυ μὲν
οὖν" καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι 0 τι ποτ᾽ ἐρεῖς.
Si. Δέγε δή μοι, tv’ εἰδῇς, ὥσπερ av εἰ ἐξ
ἀρχῆς σε ἠρώτων" πότερον doxei σοι, ὦ Llads,
κάκιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι; 1142...
Τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε. XM. Τί δὲ δὴ αἴσχιον ;
πότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ; “Anoxgivov.
MRA. Τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
Cap. XXX. 22. Οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον, εἴπερ
αἴσχιον. 1.2.1. “Ηκιστά γε. 2. Μανθάνω "
Dov ταὐτὸν ἡγεῖ σύ, ὡς ξοικας, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγα-
Gov καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. 1Π142.1. Οὐ δῆτα
XR. Τί δὲ τόδε ; τὰ καλὰ πάντα, οἷον καὶ
σώματα καὶ χρώματα καὶ σχήματα καὶ φωνὰς
καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς
ἑκάστοτε καλά; οἷον πρῶτον το σώματα τὰ κα-
hd οὐχὲ ἤτοι κατὸ τὴν χρείαν λέγεις καλὰ εἶναι,
πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον 7, πρὸς τοῦτο, ἢ

Ade PLATONIS

‘ ς LE aR > -»Ἥ ~ 7
κατα ἡδονὴν τινα, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ ϑεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν
ποιῇ τοὺς ϑεωροῦντας ; ἔχεις τι ἐχτὸς τούτων
λέγειν περὶ σώματος κάλλους: LA. ΟὐκἘ
ἔχω. 2&4. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τἄλλα πάντα οὕτω καὲ
σχήματα καὶ χρώματα ἢ διὸ ἡδονήν τινα, ἡ διὰ
ὠφέλειαν, ἢ δι᾽ ἀμφότερα καλὰ προσαγορεύεις ;
124. ΓἜγωγε. XL. Οὐ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ
TO κατὸ τὴν μουσικὴν πάντα ὡσαύτως; IRA.
Nai. Σ. Καὶ μὴν τά γε xata τους νόμους
καὶ Th ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δήπον ἐχτὸς τούτων
> ‘ ‘ / ἘΞ a” > / >. ᾽ν ς [4 nn
ἐστὶ τὰ καλᾶ, τον ἢ ὠφέλιμα εἶναι, ἢ HOEA, ἢ
ἀμφότεραι ISLA. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΖΜ). 4τὸ
Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὡσαύτως ;
QA. Πάνυ γε: καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὁρίζει, ὦ
“Σώκρατες, ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὁριζόμενος τὸ

θ ἦν ἀπ aaa ἡμόκα τὰ ον ον τ

» Lend ‘ ‘ ~ 2 ve
καλόν. 2§2. Οὐκοῦν to αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ,
λύπῃ τε καὶ κακῷ; URA. ᾿Ανάγκη. XML.
ὝὍταν ἄρα δυοῖν καλοῖν ϑἄτερον κάλλιον ἢ, ἢ

5 ἑτέρῳ τούτοιν ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερθάλλ (λ
τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτοιν ἢ ἀμφοτέροις οθάλλον κάλ-
! τ ~ a 2 » an >
λιόν ἐστιν, ἤτοι ἡδονῇ ἢ ὠφελείᾳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις.
HRA. Πάνυ γε. £82. Καὶ ὅταν δὲ dy δυοῖν
αἰσχροῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἴσχιον H, ἤτοι λύπῃ ἢ κα- Β
~ ς / 3» ” ” > 3 tA
κῷ ὑπερθάλλον αἴσχιον ἔσται. ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκῃ ;
Ὁ LA 7 ~ > , ~
MRA. Nai. XS. Φέρε dy, was ἐλέγετο νῦν δὴ
περὶ tov ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι ; οὐκ ἔλεγες τὸ
μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν ai-
σχιον; 1142.41. "ἔλεγον. Σ,2. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ
αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἤτοι λυπηρό-

2 ‘ , ς ’ 5» 3, »
τερόν ἐστι καὶ λύπῃ ὑπερθάλλον αἴσχιον ἂν εἴη,
ἢ κακῷ, ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ; οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη ;

1.2.1. Πῶς yee ov ;

GORGIAS. 45

c Cap. XXXI. 22. πρῶτον μὲν δ᾽) oxewous-
θα" ἄρα λύπῃ ὑπερθάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν tov ἀδικεῖ-
σθαι, καὶ ἀλγοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦνιες 1) οἵ
ἀδικούμενοι; HLA, Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες,
τοῦτό γε. ΣΏ. Οὐκ ἄρα λύπῃ γε ὑπερέχει.
ΠΩ“. Ov δῆται 22. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ λύπῃ,
ἀμφοτέροις μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὑπερθάλλοι. 1142.
Οὐ φαίνεται. 292. Οὐκοῦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ λείπεται.
HQA. Nai. 222. Τῷ κακῷ. [122 A." οιίκεν.
22. Οὐκοῦν κακῷ ὑπερθδάλλον τὸ ἀδικεῖν κά-

Ὁ κιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι. L2A. Ζ4ῆλον δὴ
ὅτι. Σ4). "4λλο τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν
ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὡμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ
ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ αἴσχιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδι-
κεῖσθαι; ITQ2A. Nai. 202. Nov δέ γε κάκιον
ἐφάνη. 1Π42.1. "Εοικε. 292. Ζέξαιο ἂν οὖν
ov μᾶλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἴσχιον ἀντὶ τοῦ
ἧττον; My ὕκνει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὦ Hake —
οὐδὲν yoo βλαδήσει ---, ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ,

Ε ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ, παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, καὶ ἢ φάθι ἢ
μἢ ἃ ἐρωτῶ. Π|42.1. ᾿4λλ᾽ οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, ὦ
“Σώκρατες. L282. “Ahhos δέ τις ἀνθρώπων :
Π2241. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.
ΣΩ. ᾿4ληθὴ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐγὼ
οὔτ᾽ ἂν συ οὔτ᾽ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων δέξαιτ᾽
ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι" κάκιον γὰρ
τυγχάνει ov. HQA, Φαίνεται. 222. “Ορᾷς
οὖν, ὦ Lads, ὁ ἔλεγχος maga τὸν ἔλεγχον παρα-
δαλλόμενος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, GALA σοὶ μὲν οἵ
ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ

4.6 PLATONIS

ἐξαρκεῖς εἷς ὧν μόνος καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτὺυ- 416
ρῶν, καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ μόνον ἐπιψηφίζων τοὺς ἄλλους
ἐῶ χαίρειν. Kat τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτως ἐχέτω "
{ETH τοῦτο δὲ περὶ οὗ τὸ δεύτερον ἠἡμφεσθητήσα-
μὲν, σκεψώμεθα, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην dea
μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἔστιν, ὡς συ ᾧου, ἢ μεῖζον τὸ
μὴ διδόναι, ὡς αὖ ἐγὼ ᾧμην. σχοπώμεθα δὲ τῇδε"
τὸ διδόναι δίκην καὶ τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως ἀδι-
κοῦντα aoa τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς; 1424. "ἔγωγε.
XS." Eyes οὖν λέγειν, ὡς οὐχὶ τά γε δίκαιο Β
πάντα καλά ἐστι, καθ᾽ ὅσον δίκαια ; καὶ δια-
oxewausvos εἰπέ. 1{2.1. ᾿Αλλά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ
“Σώχρατες.

Cap. XXXII. 2.2. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε" doa
εἴ τίς τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκῃ τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ
τούτου τοῦ ποιοῦντος: IQA. "Εμοιγε δοκεῖ.
22. "Agu τοῦτο πάσχον ὃ τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ
τοιοῦτον οἷον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν ; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοι-
Ovde* εἴ τις τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι ;
HRA. ᾿Ανάγκη. XL. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἢ ὁ
ταχυ ὃ τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτε-
σθαι; 2A. Ναί. 2X2. Τοιοῦτον ἄρα πά-
θος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστίν οἷον ἂν τὸ τύπτον ποιῇ;
HRA. Πάνυ γε. £92. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ καΐι τις,
ἀνάγκῃ τι κάεσθαι; URA. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; XM.
Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε κάει ἢ ἀλγεινῶς, οὕτω κάεσθαι
τὸ καόμενον ὡς ἂν τὸ xaov κάῃ; IRA. Πάνυ
γε. X42. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ τέμνει τις, ὁ αὐτὸς
λόγος ; τέμνεται γάρ τι. IA. Not. LIM.
Καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἢ βαθὺ τὸ τμῆμα ἢ ἀλγεινόν,

GORGIAS. Δ

Ὁ τοιοῦτον τμῆμα τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον οἷον τὸ
τέμνον τέμνει; HRA. Φαίνεται. XG, Συλ-
λήθδην dy ὅρα, εἰ ὁμολογεῖς ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον περὲ
πάντων " οἷον ἂν ποιῇ τὸ ποιοῦν, τοιοῦτον τὸ πά-
cyov πάσχειν. IQA. ᾿Α1λλ᾽ ὁμολογώ. XS.
Τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πό-
τερον πάσχειν τί ἐστιν ἢ ποιεῖν; ITA. Avdy-
xn, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάσχειν. X52. Οὐκοῦν ὑπό τινος
ποιοῦντος: II§2A. Πῶς γὰρ ov; ὑπό γε τοῦ

E κολάζοντος. X82. “O δὲ ὀρθῶς κολάζων δικαίως
κολάζει; TRA. Nai. LL. Ainara ποιῶν, ἢ
ov; IRA. Δίκαια. LQ. Οὐκοῦν ὃ κολαζό-
μένος δίκην διδοὺς δίκαια πάσχει ; HORA.
Φαίνεται. X02, Τὰ δὲ δίκαιά πον καλὰ wuo-
λόγηται; UA. Πάνυ γε. XQ. Τούτων ἄρα
ὁ μὲν ποιεῖ καλά, ὃ δὲ πάσχει, ὃ κολαζόμενος.
MRA. Nai.

Cap. XXXIII. 222. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλά,

“τἀγαθά; ἢ γὰρ ἡδέα ἢ ὠφέλιμα. IIA.’ Avdy-
χη. 282. Ayaba ἄρα πάσχει ὁ δίκην διδούς ;
Π2.4. "Ἔοικεν. 2Q.’Qpeheitat ἄρα ; IRA.
Nai. 222. "Aga ἥνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμθάνω τὴν
ὠφέλειαν ; βελτίων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται, εἴπερ
δικαίως κολάζεται; ΠΑ. Eixds ye. 222.
Κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται ὁ δίκην διδούς ;
HQA. Nai. ΣΏ. "4ρ᾽ οὖν τοῦ μεγίστον

Β ἀπαλλάττεται κακοῦ; 12δὲ δὲ σκόπει. ἐν γρη-
μάτων κατασκενῇ ἀνθρώπον κακίαν ἄλλην τινὰ
ἐνορᾷς ἢ πενίαν; IIA. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πενίαν.
222, Τί δ᾽ ἐν σώματος κατασκενῇ ; κακίαν ἂν

48 PLATONIS

φήσαις ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἶσχος καὶ
ta τοιαῦτα: QA. "Eyoye. 222. Οὐκοῦν
καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν ἡγεῖ τινα εἶναι; 1142...
Πῶς γὰρ ov; 222. Ταύτην οὖν οὐκ ἀδικίαν
καλεῖς καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ TH τοιαῦτα ;
1122.1. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 22. Οὐκοῦν χρημάτων
καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριῶν ὄντων, τριττὰς Ο
εἴρηκας πονηρίας, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν ;
ΠΩ. Nai. 22. Τίς οὖν τοὐύτῶν τῶν πονη-
ριῶν αἰσχίστῃη ; οὐχ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ συλλήθδην ἡ
τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία; 121. Πολύ γε. Σ.
Ei δη αἰσχίστη, καὶ κακίστη; IQA. Πῶς, ὦ
Σώκρατες, λέγεις; 292. ‘Qdir ἀεὶ τὸ αἴσχι-
στον, ἤτοι λύπην μεγίστην παρέχον ἢ βλάθην ἢ
ἀμφότερα, αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν ἔχ τῶν ὡμολογημένων
ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν. HA. Μάλιστα. 202. 4.
σχιστον δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία
γὺῦν dn ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν; [2 A. ‘Quoreyntar Ὁ
γάρ. ΣὉ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἀνιαρότατόν ἐστιν καὶ
avia ὑπερθάλλον αἴσχιστον τούτων ἐστίν, ἢ
βλάθῃ, ἢ ἀμφότερα; Π42Α͂. ᾿Ανάγκη. 222.
* Ao’ οὖν ἀλγεινότερόν ἐστι τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ
κάμνειν τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον xat δει-
λὸν καὶ ἀμαθῇ; IQA. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ
“Σώκρατες, ἀπὸ τούτων ve. 22. Ὕπερφυεϊζ τινι
ἄρα ὡς μεγάλῃ βλάθῃ καὶ κακῷ ϑαυμασίῳ ὑπερ-
θάλλουσα τἄλλα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία αἴσχιστόν Τὶ
ἐστι πάντων, ἐπειδι) οὐκ ἀλγηδόνι γε, ὡς ὃ σὸς λό-
γος. [QA Φαίνεται. 222. AAO μήν mov
τό γε μεγίστῃ βλάθῃ ὑπερδάλλον μέγιστον ἂν

GORGIAS. 49

κακὸν εἴη τῶν ὄντων. Π 4. Nai. 22. Ἢ
ἀδικία ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς
πονηρία μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακόν ἐστι; 1142...
Φαίνεται.

Cap. XXXIV. 222. Τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας
ἀπαλλάττει ; οὐ γρηματιστική; ΠΙΑ͂. Ναί.
292, Tis d& νόσου ; ovx iatexy; HQA.

418 νάγκη. 2X22. Tis δὲ πονηρίας καὶ ἀδικίας ;
Ei wy οὕτως εὐπορεῖς, ὧδε σκόπει" ποῖ ἄγομεν
Kal παρὸ τίνας τοὺς κάμνοντας Ta σώματα ;
ΠΩ 4. Παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, ὦ Σώκρατες. I.
Ποῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνον-
τας; HA. Παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις ;
22. Οὐκοῦν δίκην δώσοντας : MLA. Φημί.
2'f2. ἾΖρ᾽ οὖν οὐ δικαιοσύνῃ τινὲ χρώμενοι κο-
λάζουσιν οἱ ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες; IMA. Anhov

Β δή. 2X. Χρηματιστικὴ μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλ-
λάττει, ἰατρικὴ δὲ νόσον, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ
ἀδικίας. IQA. Φαίνεται. LI. Τί οὖν τού-
τῶν κάλλιστόν ἐστιν [av λέγει] ; UA. Τί-
γῶν λέγεις; X22. Χρηματιστικῆς, ἰατρικῆς,
δίκης. IRA. Πολυ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ
δίκη. XL. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ἤτοι ἡδονὴν πλείστην
ποιεῖ, 7) ὠφέλειαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα, εἴπερ κάλλιστόν
ἐστι; IIfLA. Ναί. X92. "4ρ᾽ οὖν τὸ ἰατρεύ-
εσθαι ἡδύ ἐστι, καὶ γαίρουσιν οἱ ἰατρευόμενοι ;
MRA. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. 22. ᾿Αλλ’ ὠφέλι-

Cuov ve. Hyde; TRA. Nat. LN. Μεγάλον
γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖ ὑπο-
μεῖναι τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καὶ ὑγιεῖ εἶναι. UNA

5

50 PLATONIS

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΏ. Ἶ4ρ᾽ οὖν οὕτως ἂν περὶ σώ-
μα εὐδαιμονέστατος ἄνθρωπος εἴη, ἰατρευόμενος,
ἢ μηδὲ κάμνων ἀρχήν; IISA. 4ηλον, ὅτι μηδὲ
κάμνων. 2&8. Οὐ yao τοῦτ᾽ ἣν εὐδαιμονία, ὡς
ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγή, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ
κτῆσις. IRA. “Eow tavta. 2S. Ti dé;
ἀθλιώτερος πότερος δυοῖν ἐχόντοιν κακὸν εἴτ᾽ ἐν Ὁ
σώματι εἴτ᾽ ἐν ψυχῇ; ὃ ἰατρενόμενος καὶ ἀπαλ-
λαττόμενος τοῦ κακοῦ, ἢ ὃ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος, ἔχων
δέ; LRA. Φαίνεταί μοι ὃ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος.
222. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστου κακοῦ
ἀπαλλαγὴ ἣν, πονηρίας; IRA. Ἢν γάρ.
22, Σωφρονίζει γάρ που xai δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ
καὶ ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἡ δίκη. ITA.
Nai. ΣΩ. Εὐδαιμονέστατος μὲν ἄρα ὁ μὴ ἔχων E
κακίαν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μέγιστον τῶν κα-
κῶν ἐφάνη. IQA. Anhov δή. XQ. Δεύτερος
δήπον ὁ ἀπαλλαττόμενος. IQA. "Ἐοικεν.
ΣΏ. Οὗτος δ᾽ ἦν ὁ νουθετοὐμενός τε καὶ ἐπι-
πληττόμενος καὶ δίχην διδούς. ITA. Nat.
ΣΩ. Κάκιστα ἄρα ζῇ ὁ ἔχων ἀδικίαν καὶ μὴ
ἀπαλλαττόμενος. QA. Φαίνεται. XL. Ov-
κοῦν οὗτος τυγχάνει ὦν, OS ἂν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικῶν
καὶ χρώμενος μεγίστῃ ἀδικίᾳ διαπράξηται ὥστε 479
μήτε νουθετεῖσθαι μήτε κολάζεσθαι μήτε δίκην
διδόναι, ὥσπερ ov φῃς ᾿Αρχέλαον παρεσκευάσθαι
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τυράννους καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ δυ-
νάστας; ITA.” Eoxe.

Carp. XXXV. 222. Σχεδὸν γάρ mov οὗτοι,

s ὃν x > is t 3) 4 cr vn
ὦ ἄριστε, TO αὐτὸ διαπεπραγμένοι εἰσι, ὥσπερ AV

GORGIAS. : 5]

εἴ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις νοσήμασι συνισχόμενος δια-
πράξαιτο μὴ διδόναι δίκην τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα
ἁμαρτημάτων τοῖς ἰατροῖς μηδὲ ἰατρεύεσθαι, φο-
Β βούμενος, ὡσπερανεὶ παῖς, τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ
τέμνεσθαι, ὅτι ἀλγεινόν. 1 οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ Gol
οὕτως; Π4|2.41. ΓΕμοιγε. X82. ᾿“γνοῶν γε, ὡς
ἔοικεν, οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ ὑγίεια, καὶ ἀρετὴ σώματος.
κινδυνεύουσι yao ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ὡμολογημένων
τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες,
ὦ Πῶλε, τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ
ὠφέλιμον τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν dow ἀθλιώ-
τερόν ἐστι μὴ ὑγιοῦς σώματος μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ
Ο συνοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαθρᾷ καὶ ἀδίκῳ καὶ ἀνοσίῳ.
ὅθεν καὶ πᾶν ποιοῦσιν, ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι
μηδ᾽ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ
χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι καὶ φίλους καὶ ὅπως
ἂν ὦσιν ὡς πιθανώτατοι λέγειν. εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀλη-
θὴ ὡμολογήκαμεν, ὦ Πῶλε, do’ αἰσθάνει τὸ
cuubaivovta ἐκ τοῦ λόγου : ἢ βούλει συλλογι-
σώμεθα αὐτά : ISA. Ei μὴ σοί γε. ἄλλως
δοκεῖ. 2X92.” Ao’ οὖν ovubaiver μέγιστον κα-
κὸν ἡ ἀδικία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν; ITA. Φαίνεταί
Dye 2X8. Καὶ μὴν ἀπαλλαγή γε ἐφάνη τού-
του τοῦ xaxov τὸ δίκην διδόναι; 1Π42.1. Κιν-
δυνεύει. 2X2. To δέ γε μὴ διδόναι ἐμμονὴ τοῦ
καχοῦ; IRA. Nai. ZL. Δεύτερον ἄρα ἐστὶ
τῶν κακῶν μεγέθει τὸ ἀδικεῖν - τὸ δὲ ἀδικοῦντα
μὴ διδόναι δίκην πάντων μέγιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον
κακῶν πέφυκεν. ISLA. "Ἔοικεν. X92. *Ao’
οὖν οὐ περὶ τούτου, ὦ φίλε, ἠμφεσθητήσαμεν, σὺ

52 PLATONIS

μὲν tov ᾿“΄Ιρχέλαον εὐδαιμονίζων τὸν Ta μέγιστα
ἀδικοῦντα δίκην οὐδεμίαν διδόντα, ἐγὼ δὲ τοὐ-
γαντίον οἰόμενος, εἴτ᾽ ᾿“Ιρχέλαος εἴτ᾽ ἄλλος ἀν-
θρώπων ὑστισοῦν μὴ δίδωσι δίκην ἀδικῶν, τούτῳ
προσήκειν ἀθλίῳ εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων
ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀεὶ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ ἀδικουμέ-
νου ἀθλιώτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὴ διδόντα δίκην
τοῦ διδόντος ; οὐ ταῦτ᾽ ἣν τὼ ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ λεγόμε-
να; 1,424. Ναί. Σ΄. Οὐκοῦν. ἀποδέδεικται,
ὅτι ἀληθὴ ἐλέγετο; ITA. Φαίνεται.

Cap. XXXVI. 22. Εἶεν. εἰ οὖν dy ταῦ- 480
τα ἀληθῆ, ὦ Πῶλε, τίς ἣ μεγάλη χρεία ἐστὶ τῆς
ῥητορικῆς ; δεῖ μὲν γὰρ On ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὡμολογη-
μένων αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα φυλάττειν, ὅπως
un ἀδικήσῃ, ὡς ἱκανὸν xaxov ἕξοντα. οὐ γάρ;
TRA. Πάνυ γε. XS. ᾿Εὰν δέ γε ἀδικήσῃ ἢ
αὐτός, ἢ ἄλλος τις ὧν ἂν κήδηται, αὐτὸν ἑκόντα
ἰέναι ἐκεῖσε ὅπου ὡς τάχιστα δώσει δίκην, παρὰ
τὸν δικαστήν ὥσπερ παρὰ τὸν ἰατρόν, σπεύδον-
TH ὅπως μ᾽) ἐγχρονισθὲν τὸ νόσημα τῆς ἀδικίας B
ὕπουλον τὴν ψυχὴν ποιήσῃ καὶ ἀνίατον - ἢ πῶς
λέγομεν, ὦ Πώλε, εἴπερ ta πρότερον μένει ἡμῖν
ὁμολογήματα ; οὐκ ἀνάγκῃ ταῦτα ἐκείνοις οὕτω
μὲν συμφωνεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ μή; ITA. Τί γὰρ
δὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες; XS. Eni μὲν ἄρα
τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀδικίας τῆς αὑτοῦ, ἢ
γονέων, ἢ ἑταίρων, ἢ παίδων, ἢ πατρίδος ἀδι-
κούσης οὐ χρήσιμος οὐδὲν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἡμῖν, ὦ
Πώῶλε, εἰ μὴ) εἴ τις ὑπολάθοι ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον, C
κατηγορεῖν δεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἑαυτοῦ, ἔπειτα δὲ

GORGIAS. 53

Q ~ Shah \ - )! a " > \ »
καὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὃς ἂν ἀεὶ τῶν
φίλων τυγχάνῃ ἀδικῶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι,
32 9 2 ‘ ‘ 2! Ν > a σ ~
ahd’ εἰς TO φανερὸν ἄγειν τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἵνα δῷ

c Ἁ , > "ἢ ‘ ς
δίκην καὶ ὑγιὴς γένηται, ἀναγκάζειν τε καὶ αὖ-
‘ ‘ A 72! ‘ > “~ 2 4 ,
Tov καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μῃ ἀποδειλιᾶν, ἀλλὰ παρέ-
χειν μύσαντα καὶ ἀνδρείως, ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ
κάειν ἰατρῷ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν διώκοντα, μὴ
ς , Ryd , 28 , ~
ἢ ὑπολογιζόμενον τὸ ἀλγεινόν " ἐὰν μέν γε πληγῶν
ἄξια ἠδικηκὼς ᾧ, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ δε-

~ ~ Γ ἘΔ ‘ ’΄ 2 ’ 2A =
σμοῦ, δεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ ζημίας, anotivorvta, ἐὰν δὲ φυ-
γῆς, φεύγοντα, ἐὰν δὲ ϑανάτου, ἀποθνήσκοντα,
αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὄντα κατήγορον καὶ αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρώμενον τῇ ῥητορι-
πκῇ, ὅπως ἂν καταδήλων τῶν ἀδικημάτων γιγνομέ-
νῶν ἀπαλλάττωνται τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἀδικίας.
E φῶμεν οὕτως, ἢ μὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Πῶλε; 2A.” _A-
TONG μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τοῖς μέντοι
ἔμπροσθεν ἴσως σοι ὁμολογεῖται. Σ 2. Οὐκοῦν
ἢ κἀκεῖνα. λυτέον, ἢ τάδε ἀνάγκῃ συμθαίνειν ;
MRA. Nai, τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχει. 22. Tov-
7 , z 4 2 2! ~

ναντίον δέ γε av μεταδαλόντα εἰ aoa δεῖ τινὰ
κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἴτ᾽ ἐχθρὸν εἴτε ὁντινοῦν, ἐὰν μό-
νον μη αὐτὸς ἀδικῆται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ, ---- τοῦτο

8 ‘ 5) , >\ Ν᾿ ἿὟ > ~ ¢
μὲν yao εὐλαθητέον"---δαν δὲ ἄλλον ἀδικῇ ὁ

ε8:1 ἐχθρός, παντὲ τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον καὶ πράτ-
τοντα καὶ λέγοντα, ὅπως μὴ δῷ δίκην μηδὲ ἔλθ

ντὰ χαι AEY ’ Pte ara te 2

a Mi OF ,
παρὸ tov δικαστήν ἐὰν δὲ ἔλθῃ, μηχανητέον
- ς , >
ὅπως av διαφύγῃ καὶ un δῷ δίκην ὁ ἐχθρός, ἀλλ᾽
Ἀ 32 “«
ἐάν τε χρυσίον ἡρπακῶς ἢ πολύ, μὴ ἀποδιδῷ
~ c =
τοῦτο, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχων ἀναλίσκηται καὶ εἰς EXUTOY
5*

5A, PLATONIS

\ > XN ε - IQ? 4 > ’ PI Le
καὶ ELS τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ αδίκως καὶ αθεως, ἕἑαν TE αὖ
ϑανάτου ἄξια ἠδικηκῶς ἢ, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθανεῖται,

μάλιστα μὲν μηδέποτε, ἀλλ᾽ ἀθάνατος ἔσται πο- Β

ἂν Pll 2 ‘ 4 a ς ~ ΄ 4
νηρὸς ὦν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅπως ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον βιώ-
σεται τοιοῦτος ὦν. ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἕμοιγε δοκεῖ,
ὦ Πῶλε, ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τῷ γε

X\ ld > ~ 2 / ’ ~ c
μῇ μέλλοντι αδικεῖν ov μεγάλῃ tis μοι δοκεῖ ἢ
χρεία αὐτῆς εἶναι, εἰ On καὶ ἔστι τις χρεία " ὡς ἔν
γε τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδαμῇ ἐφάνη οὖσα.

Carp. XXXVII. KAA. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Χαιρε-

~ , ~ , yn 7
φῶν, σπουδάζει ταῦτα “Σωκράτης, ἢ maifer ;
XAT. ᾿Εμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπερφυῶς
σπουδάζειν * οὐδὲν μέντοι οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν.
KAA. Nj τοὺς ϑεοὺς ahd’ ἐπιθυμῶ Εἰπέ
μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερόν GE φῶμεν νυνὶ σπου-
δάζοντα, ἢ παίζοντα; εἰ μὲν yoo σπουδάζεις τε

Ἁ , bed 2 ~ 3») κι 7 wv
καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθὴ ὄντα, ἃ λέγεις, ἀλλο
τι ἢ ἡμῶν ὃ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν Ein τῶν ἀν-
θρώπων καὶ πάντα τὸ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὡς
ἔοικεν, ἡ ἃ δεῖ; 2. "2 Καλλίχκλεις, εἰ μή τι
3 ~ 2 , la ~ ‘ 2!) ~
ἣν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος. τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς

σ

δὲ ἄλλο τι, τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλά τις ἡμῶν ἴδιόν τι ἔπα- Ὁ

Gye πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἣν ῥάδιον ἐνδεί-
ξασθ το c la Ἁ c ww (0 λέ Ν
αἱ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθημα. λέγω
2 la ~ >
ἐννοήσας, ὅτι ἐγώ TE καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν TAU-
τόν τι πεπονθότες, ἐρῶντε δύο ὄντε δυεῖν ἕκατε-
ρος, ἐγὼ μὲν ᾿Αλκιδιάδου τε τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ
φιλοσοφίας, ov δὲ τοῦ τε ᾿Αθηναίων δήμου xat
τοῦ Πυριλάμπους. αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σον ἕκχά-
στοτε, καίπερ ὄντος δεινοῦ, ὅτι ὁπόσ᾽ ἂν φῇ Gov

GORGIAS. 5

σι

ἥν, Ἁ Ἁ σ aA” δὰ: oh > ,
τὰ Maina καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῇ ἔχειν, ov δυναμένου
E ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταδαλλομένου "
3) ἘΠῚ ΄ 27 ~s7 Ὁ ~
ἔν te τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, Edy τι Gov λέγοντος ὁ δῆμος
[4] ’ ‘\ a wi ” /
ὁ ᾿Αθηναίων un φῇ οὕτως ἔχειν, μεταθαλλόμενος
᾿λέγεις ἃ ἐκεῖνος βούλεται, καὶ πρὸς tov LIvet-
λάμπους νεανίαν τὸν καλὸν τοῦτον τοιαῦτα ἕτε-
ρα πέπονθας. τοῖς γὰρ τῶν παιδικῶν βουλεύ-
pact te καὶ λόγοις οὐχ οἷός τ᾽ εἶ ἐναντιοῦσθαι,
ὥστε, εἴ τίς Gov λέγοντος ἑκάστοτε ἃ OLA τούτους
λέγεις ϑαυμάζοι ὡς ἄτοπά ἐστιν, ἴσως εἴποις ἂν
4) αὐτῷ, εἰ βούλοιο ταληθὴ λέγειν, ὅτι, εἰ μή τις
παύσει τὰ σὰ MALIK τούτων τῶν λόγων, οὐδὲ
OV παύσει ποτὲ ταῦτα λέγων. νόμιζε τοίνυν καὶ
παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ γρῆναι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀκούειν, καὶ
᾿ς, / [σὲ > Ἁ πε , > x ~
μὴ θαύμαζε, ὅτι eyo ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλα τὴν φι-
λοσοφίαν, ta ἐμὰ παιδικά, παῦσον ταῦτα λέγου-
σαν. λέγει γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ἀεὶ ἃ νῦν ἐμοῦ
ἀκούεις, καί μοί ἐστι τῶν ἑτέρων παιδικῶν πολὺ
ἧττον ἔμπληκτος " ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κλεινίειος οὗτος
ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἐστὲ λόγων, ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία ἀεὶ
- > ὦ Κῶ ΝΕ ον \ = ly
Btov αὐτῶν. λέγει δὲ ἃ ov νῦν ϑαυμάζεις " πα-
ρῆσθα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς λεγομένοις. ἢ οὖν ἐκείνην
> a εξ σα 2! τλε ς 2 ‘ 10 ~
ἐξέλεγξον, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ws οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖν
ἐστι καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην μὴ διδόναι ἁπάντων
ἔσχατον κακῶν" ἢ εἰ τοῦτο ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον,
“ \ , x > ΄φ , By] ες
ua τὸν κύνα, τὸν Aiyuntiov ϑεόν, ov σοι ouo-
λογήσει Καλλικλῆς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ διαφω-
νήσει ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ. καίτοι ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ὦ
βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ἀναρ-
~ ‘ ~ ι Ἃ 7
C μοστεῖν te καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χορὸν ᾧ χορηγοίην,

56 PLATONIS

καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ᾽
2 , NZ - n” a a > x > ~
ἐναντία λέγειν, μάλλον ἢ ἕνα ὄντα EME ἑμαντῷ
2 “ Ἐπ 2 ’
ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν.
Cap. XXXVIII. KAA. Ὦ Σώκρατες, δο-
~ , > ~ hs «ς 2 -
κεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι ἕν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἀληθῶς δημη-
γόρος ὧν " καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δημηγορεῖς ταὐτὸν
παθόντος Πώλον πάθος, ὅπερ ΤΖοργίουν κατηγό-
ρει πρὸς σὲ παθεῖν. ἔφη γάρ που 7 ργίαν ἐρω-
τώμενον ὑπὸ σοῦ, ἐὰν ἀφίκηται παρ᾽ αὐτὸν μὴ
> , x , Cc ‘ c Ν f
ἐπιστάμενος τὰ δίκαια ὁ τὴν ῥητορικὴν βουλό- Ὁ
~ > U > Ν ς , 2
μένος μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάξει αὐτὸν ὁ 7 ργίας, at-
σχυνθῆναι αὐτὸν καὶ φάναι διδάξειν διὰ τὸ ἔθος
τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἀγανακτοῖεν ἄν, εἴ τις μὴ
’, Ν ‘ ’ ἂν ς id 3 ~
φαίη " διὰ δὴ tavtyy τὴν ομολογίαν avayxacbn-
VOL ἐναντία αὐτὸν αὑτῷ εἰπεῖν, σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο
ἀγαπᾶν. καί σου κατεγέλα, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖν,
ὀρθῶς τότε. νῦν δὲ πάλιν αὐτὸς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο
ἔπαθε, καὶ ἔγωγε κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ ἄγαμαι
Πώῶλον, ὅτι σοι συνεχώρησε τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον E
εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι" ἐκ ταύτης yao αὖ τῆς
ὁμολογίας αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ συμποδισθεὶς ἐν τοῖς
λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη, αἰσχυνθεὶς ἃ ἐνόει εἰπεῖν.
‘ \ ~ oI Ξ᾽ , 2 ~ 2
σὺ γὰρ τῷ OVTL, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις
φορτικοὶ καὶ δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν
διώκειν, ἃ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστι καλά, νόμῳ δέ.
ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν,
ἥ τε φύσις καὶ ὃ νόμος. ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται
od , q ~ ΕῚ
καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται 488
> ’ , a“ vy 8 Ἁ ᾿ ~ Ἁ ‘
ἐναντία λέγειν. ὃ δὴ καὶ OV τοῦτο TO σοφὸν
κατανενοηχῶς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν

GORGIAS. Ba

c ~

τις κατὰ νόμον λέγῃ, KATH φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, ἐὰν
δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὸ τοῦ νόμον. ὥσπερ αὐτίκα
> , or 2 ~ ‘ Los > ~ ,
ἐν τούτοις, τῷ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι, Πώ-
λου τὸ κατὰ νόμον αἴσχιον λέγοντος, συ τὸν νό-
μον ἐδιώκαθες κατὰ φύσιν. φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν

» 7 ὦ, “ \ ἢ πε τς ὑὸν) 5
αἴσχιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, * οἷον ἢ τὸ ἀδι-
Β κεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. οὐδὲ yag ἀνδρὸς
τοῦτό γ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽
ἀνδραπόδου τινός, ᾧ κρεῖττόν ἐστι τεθνάναι ἢ
ζῆν, ὅστις ἀδικούμενος καὶ προπηλακιζόμενος μὴ
οἷόστε ἐστὶν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ βοηθεῖν μηδὲ ἄλλῳ οὗ
5 , > 3 > c , \ ,
ἂν κήδηται. αλλ᾽, οἶμαι, οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νο-
ες » a ” , > \ c ΄ὕ
μους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποί εἰσι καὶ οἱ πολλοί.
πρὸς αὑτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὑτοῖς συμφέρον τούς τε
γόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ
Ο τοὺς ψόγους ψέγουσιν" --- ἐκφοθοῦντές τοὺς ἐῤ-
ῥωμενεστέρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατους ov-
τας πλέον ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶν πλέον ἔχωσι,
λέγουσιν, ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἄδικον τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν,
καὶ τοῦτο ἔστι τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων
ζητεῖν ἔχειν - ἀγαπῶσι γάρ, οἶμαι, αὐτοὶ ἂν τὸ
ἴσον ἔχωσι φαυλότεροι ὄντες. Cap. XXXIX.
διὰ ταῦτα δὴ νόμῳ μὲν τοῦτο ἄδικον καὶ αἰσχρὸν
λέγεται, τὸ πλέον ζητεῖν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ
ἀδικεῖν αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν " ἡ δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσις
> eke | x ΓΝ ας qd 7 , > ‘ > ,
Ὁ αὐτῇ ἀποφαίνει αὐτὸ, ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸν ἀμεί-
va τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔγειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτε-

ἌΝ , ~ \ ~

gov tov aduvatwtégov. δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλα-
“ 6 v4 »” a | 2 ~ 21 , \
χοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ EV τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ
τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γέ-

48 PLATONIS

e ied Ν - 4 Ν LA
VEGLY, OTL οὕτω TO δίκαιον κέκριται, TOY XQELTTO
τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ ποίῳ
δικαίῳ χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν ᾿λλάδα éoted-E

as ‘ ) παν 2 1 \ ΄ vf
TEVOEV, ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ XnvOas; ἡ ἄλλα
μυρία ἂν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ᾽ οἶμαι,
οὗτοι κατὰ φύσιν [τὴν τοῦ δικαίου] ταῦτα πράτ-
τουσι, καὶ ναὶ pa Δία xata νόμον γε τὸν τῆς
2 ΄ , ~ ς ~
φύσεως, OV μέντοι ἴσως κατὰ τοῦτον, ὃν ἡμεῖς
[4 , ‘ v4 Ἁ 2 35C

τιθέμεθα πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐῤῥω-
μενεστοίτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν" ἐκ νέων λαμθάνοντες,

ὥσπερ λέοντας κατεπᾷάδοντές TE καὶ γοητεύοντες 484
καταδουλούμεθα, λέγοντες, ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρὴ ἔχειν
καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐὼν
δέ γε, οἶκαι, φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνήρ,
πάντα ταῦτα ἀποσεισάμενος καὶ διαῤῥήξας καὶ

[4 , ‘ ς ’

διαφυγών, καταπατήσας το ἡμέτερα γράμματα
Ν " ‘
καὶ μαγγανεύματα καὶ EMMDAS καὶ νόμους TOUS
παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας, ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπό-
ς VA ς δν πὶ Q > ~ 2 Ψ Dt

τῆς ἡμέτερος ὁ δουλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξέλαμψε TO B

= / ΄ ᾿ - ld \ 7
τὴς φύσεως δίκαιον. δοκεῖ JE μοι καὶ Πίνδαρος
qd > Ν ’ > ’ > ἊΝ 2» >

ἅπερ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐνδείκνυσθαι ἐν τῷ ἄσματι, ἐν ᾧ
λέγει, ὅτι Νόμος ὃ πάντων βασιλεὺς ϑνα-
~ Shae) , - . , ΄
τῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων" οὗτος δὲ δή, φησίν,
ἄγει δικαιῶν TO βιαιότατον ὑπερτάτᾳ
χερί: τεκμαίρομαι ἔργοισιν Hoaxdéos,
ἐπεὶ ἀπριάτας --- λέγει οὕτω πὼς" τὸ yao
Gowan οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι. λέγει δ᾽, ὅτι οὔτε πριά-
μενος οὔτε δόντος τοῦ ΤΠ ηρυόνου ἠλάσατο tas

βοῦς, ὡς τούτον ὄντος τοῦ δικαίον φύσει, καὶ Ο

“Ὁ \ i , πὰ / “ἴ

βοὺς καὶ τάλλα χτήματα εἶναι πάντα tov βελ-

GORGIAS. 59

τίονός TE καὶ κρείττονος TA τῶν γειρόνων τε καὶ
ἡττόνων. Cap. XL. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς οὕ-
Tas ἔχει, γνώσει δέ, ἂν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω ἔλθῃς ἐάσας
On φιλοσοφίαν. φιλοσοφία γάρ τοί ἐστιν, ὦ
Σώκρατες, χαρίεν, ἄν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ἅψηται
ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ" ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρω τοῦ δέοντος
ἐνδιατρίψῃ, διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἐὼν γὰρ
καὶ πάνυ εὐφυὴς H καὶ πόῤῥω τῆς ἡλικίας φιλο-
D copy, ἀνάγκη πάντων ἄπειρον γεγονέναι ἐστίν,

z Wer > 4 , \ >
ὧν Yon ἔμπειρον εἶναι tov μέλλοντα καλὸν xa-
γαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον ἔσεσθαι ἄνδρα. καὶ yoo
τῶν νόμων ἄπειροι γίγνονται τῶν XATH τὴν πό-
λιν, καὶ τῶν λόγων, οἷς δεῖ γρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν
τοῖς συμθολαίοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ
δημοσίᾳ, καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν TE καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν
2 7 ‘ / ~ 3 = ,
ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ συλλήηήδδην τῶν ἡθῶν παντάπασιν
ἄπειροι γίγνονται. ἐπειδὸν οὖν ἔλθωσιν εἴς τινα
3Q7 an ‘ ~ , Ἂν
E ἰδίαν ἡ πολιτικὴν meaty, καταγέλαστοι γίγνον-

ται, ὥσπερ γε, οἶμαι, οἱ πολιτικοί, ἐπειδὸν αὖ
2 ᾿ ς ld ‘ » x ‘ ,
εἰς Tas ὑμετέρας διατριθας ἔλθωσι καὶ tous Ao-
yous, καταγέλαστοί εἰσι. συμθαίνει yag τὸ

~ 3 7 , 9 2 Ἁ a >
tov Evoinidov: λαμπρὸς τ᾽ ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ἕν
τούτῳ,

᾿ > \ ED, τὸν. -
καπὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐπείγεται,
: Ἃ ~ ς l4 ’

νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος,

“54 = LRN | ς ~ , , i 2!

ἵν᾽ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνῃ βέλτιστος ὦν.
(A n” wn 5 ~

4s507ov δ᾽ av φαῦλος ἢ, ἐντεῦθεν φεύγει καὶ λοι-

δορεῖ τοῦτο, τὸ δ᾽ ἕτερον ἐπαινεῖ, εὐνοίᾳ τῇ ἕαυ-

~ c > ‘ ~
TOV, ἡγούμενος οὕτως αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν.
3 9 = Me ed / v > > z
GAL’, οἶμαι, TO ὀρθότατόν ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων μετα-

60 PLATONIS

σχεῖν. φιλοσοφίας μέν, ὅσον παιδείας χάριν,
καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρακίῳ ὄντι
φιλοσοφεῖν " ἐπειδὼν δὲ ἤδη πρεσθύτερος ὧν ἄν-
θρωπος ἔτι φιλοσοφῇ, καταγέλαστον, ὦ Laxoea-
τες, τὸ γρῆμα γίγνεται, καὶ ἔγωγε ὁμοιότατον
πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς Β
ψιελλιζομένους καὶ παίζοντας. ὅταν μὲν yao
, »” Zo ΄ ΄ “
παιδίον ἴδω, ᾧ ἔτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι οὕτω,
ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παῖζον, γαίρω τε καὶ χαρίεν
μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ πρέπον τῇ τοῦ
παιδίον ἡλικίᾳ " ὅταν δὲ σαφῶς dead EVO
ἡλικίᾳ * ὅτ φῶς διαλεγομένου
παιδαρίον ἀκούσω, πικρόν τί μοι δοκεῖ χρῆμα
εἶναι καὶ ἀνιᾷ μου Ta ὦτα καί μοι δοκεῖ δουλο- ἢ
πρεπές τι εἶναι " ὅταν δὲ ἀνδρὸς ἀκούσῃ τις
l4 n” ¢ Cc ~ ,
weddilousvov ἢ παίζοντα ὁρᾷ, καταγέλαστον
φαίνεται καὶ ἄνανδρον καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον. ταὺ-
τὸν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτο πάσχω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φι-
λοσοφοῦντας. παρὼ νέῳ μὲν yoo μειρακίῳ δρῶν
φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ
ἡγοῦμαι ἐλεύθερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρω-
πον, τὸν δὲ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντα ἀνελεύθερον καὶ
γῳ 7 > \ > , c \ ” ~
οὐδέποτε οὐδενὸς ἀξιώσοντα ἑαυτὸν οὔτε καλοῦ D
οὔτε γενναίον πράγματος " ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσθύτε-
ρον ἴδω ἔτι φιλοσοφοῦντα καὶ un ἀπαλλαττόμε-
γον, πληγῶν μοι doxet ἤδη δεῖσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες,
οὗτος ὃ ἀνήρ. ὃ yoo νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει
, ~ > 72 ΠῚ , > Ν gS > Τὰ
τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κἂν πάνυ εὐφυὴς ἢ, ἀνάνδρῳ
, ~ Ν
γενέσθαι φεύγοντι TA μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς
> ΕἸ >
ἀγοράς, ἐν ais ἔφη ὁ ποιητὴς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀρι-
~ - , ‘ Ν Ἁ
moemets γίγνεσθαι, καταδεδυκότι δὲ tov λοιπὸν

GORGIAS. 61

βίον βιῶναι μετὼ μειρακίων ἐν γωνίᾳ τριῶν ἢ
- , 7ω ἐλ , a δὲ \ la 2
E τεττόρων ψιθυρίζοντα, ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ

ἱκανὸν μηδέποτε φθέγξασθαι. Car. XLI. ἐγὼ

δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σὲ ἐπιεικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς.
’ 9 ee x

bY 7 τ fe ~ a ς ~
κινδυνεύω οὖν πεπονθέναι νῦν ὅπερ ὃ Ζηθος
πρὸς τὸν Aupiova 0 Εὐριπίδου, οὗπερ ἐμνή-
σθην. καὶ yoo ἐμοὶ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα ἐπέρχεται
πρὸς σὲ λέγειν, οἷάπερ ἐκεῖνος πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν,
ὅτι ἀμελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὧν δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι,
καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς ὧδε γενναίαν μειρα-
“βοχιώδει tivi διαπρέπεις μορφώματι, καὶ
οὔτ᾽ ἂν δίκης βουλαῖσι προθεῖ᾽ ἂν ὀρθώς
λόγον, οὔτ᾽ εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν λάθοις,
οὐθ’ ὑπὲρ ἄλλου νεανικὸν βούλευμα
7 7 fl 7 Γ re

Bovievoato. καίτοι, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες ---- καί

μοι μηδὲν ἀχθεσθῇς - εὐνοίᾳ yao ἐρῶ τῇ on —

οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ
σὲ οἶμαι ἔχειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς πόῤῥω GEL
φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας ; νῦν yoo εἴ τις σοῦ λα-

Gouevos ἢ ἄλλον ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ

δεσμωτήριον ἀπαγάγοι, φάσκων ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν
Β ἀδικοῦντα, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ὅ τι γρήσαιο

σαυτῷ, ἀλλ᾽ ἰλιγγιῴης ἂν καὶ γασμῷο οὐκ ἔχων ὅ

τι εἴποις, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀναθάς, κατη-

γόρου τυχῶν πάνν φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ, ἀπο-

θάνοις ἄν, εἰ βούλοιτο ϑανάτου σοι τιμᾶσθαι.
9 (

καίτοι πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ TLS

εὐφυᾶ λαδοῦσα τέχνη φῶτα ἔθηκε χεί-
, eo cf , ~ 3

Ova, μήτε αὐτὸν αὑτῷ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν μηδ

ἐχσῶσαι ἔκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μήτε ἑαντὸν

6

62 PLATONIS

μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περισυλᾶ- C
σθαι πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀτεχνῶς δὲ ἄτιμον ζῆν
ἐν τῇ πόλει; τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικό-
τερον εἰρῆσθαι, ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόῤῥης τύπτοντα μὴ
διδόναι δίκην. ἀλλ᾽ ὦ ᾽γαθέ, ἐμοὶ πείθου, παῦ-
σαι δ᾽ ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων δ᾽ εὐμουσίαν
ἄσκει, καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν,
ἄλλοις τὸ κομψὰὼ ταῦτ᾽ ἀφείς, εἴτε ληρή-
ματο χρὴ φάναι εἶναι εἴτε φλναρίας, ἐξ ὧν
κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις " ζηλών
οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας ἄνδρας τὸ μικρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ᾽ Ὁ
οἷς ἐστι καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ
ἀγαθά.

Car. XLII. 22. Et χρυσὴν ἔχων ἐτύγχα-
νον τὴν ψυχήν, ὦ Καλλίχλεις, οὐκ ἂν οἴει me
ἄσμενον εὑρεῖν τούτων τινὰ τῶν λίθων, ἧ βα-
σανίζουσι τὸν γρυσόν, τὴν ἀρίστην, πρὸς ἥντινα
ἔμελλον προσαγαγὼν αὐτήν, εἴ μοι ὁμολογήσειεν
ἐχείνῃη καλῶς τεθεραπεῦσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, εὖ εἴ-
σεσθαι, ὅτι ἱκανῶς ἔχω καὶ οὐδέν μοι δεῖ ἄλλης Ἐ,
Bacdvov; KAA. Πρὸς τί dy tovt’ ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ
Σώκρατες; 202. ᾿Εγώ σοι ἐρῶ νῦν. οἶμαι
ἐγὼ σοὶ ἐντετυχηκὼς τοιούτῳ ἑρμαΐῳ ἐντετυχηκέ-
vow. KAA. Ti dn; 282. Ed oid’, Gt, dv
μοι σὺ δμολογήσῃς περὶ ὧν ἡ Eun ψυχὴ δοξάζξει,
ταῦτ᾽ ἤδη ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τἀληθῆ. ἐννοῶ yoo, ὅτι 481
τὸν μέλλοντα βασανιεῖν ἱκανῶς ψυχῆς πέρι ὁρ-
θῶς τε ζώσης καὶ μὴ τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἔχειν, ἃ σὺ
πάντα ἔχεις, ἐπιστήμην TE καὶ εὔνοιαν καὶ
παῤφῥησίαν. ἐγὼ yoo πολλοῖς ἐντυγχάνω, οἵ

GORGIAS. 63

ἐμὲ οὐχ οἷοί τε εἰσὶ βασανίζειν dia τὸ μὴ σοφοὶ
εἶναι ὥσπερ σύ - ἕτεροι δὲ σοφοὶ μέν εἰσιν, οὐκ
ἐθέλουσι δέ μοι λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ τὸ μὴ
κήδεσθαί μον ὥσπερ σύ" τῶ δὲ ξένω τώδε, 7 ὁρ-
Bytas τε καὶ Πῶλος, copa μὲν καὶ φίλω ἐστὸν
ἐμώ, ἐνδεεστέρω δὲ παῤῥησίας καὶ αἰσχυντηρο-
τέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος - πῶς γοὶρ OV; ὦ γε εἰς
τοσοῦτον αἰσχύνης ἐληλύθατον, ὥστε διὸ τὸ ai-
σχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ
2 ’ 4 > , = 2 ’ ‘
ἐναντία λέγειν ἐναντίον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, και
ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων. συ δὲ ταῦτα πάντα
ἔχεις, ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἔχουσι" πεπαίδευσαΐ TE YAO
ς = Cc \ vn ’ 3 ’ \
ἱκανῶς, ὡς πολλοὶ av φήσαιεν ᾿Αθηναίων, καὶ
> ΄ 9 “- 50] Ἶ ΄ ΄ - ~ Ce
C ἐμοί γ᾽ εἶ εὔνους. τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῶμαι ; ἐγώ
σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα ὑμᾶς ἐγώ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τέτταρας
ὄντας, κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας, σέ TE καὶ
Τίσανδρον, τὸν “Agidvaiorv, καὶ "Δίνδρωνα, τὸν
᾿αἸνδροτίωνος, καὶ Ναυσικύδην, τὸν Χολαργέα.
καί ποτε ὑμῶν ἐγωῶ ἐπήκουσα βουλευομένων μέ-
χρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἀσκητέον εἴη, καὶ οἶδα, ὅτι
δας, Ὁ > Ε - / 7Ε \ ~
évinxa ἐν ὑμῖν τοιοίδε τις δόξα, un προθυμεῖσθαι
D εἰς τὴν ἀκρίθειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλο εὐλαθεῖσθαι
7 2 / ca Ἁ , = ld
παρεκελεύεσθε ἀλλήλοις, ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δε-
οντος σοφώτεροι γενόμενοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες.
ἐπειδὴ οὖν σον ἀκούω ταῦτα ἐμοὶ συμθουλεύ-
οντος, ἅπερ τοῖς σεαυτοῦ ἑἕταιροτάτοις, ἱκανόν
μοι τεχμήριόν ἐστιν, ὅτι ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι εὔνους εἶ,
καὶ μὴν, ὅτι γε οἷος παῤῥησιάζεσθαι καὶ μη αἷ-
, 2 , ‘ \ ς a 2 ᾽’
σχύνεσθαι, αὐτός TE φῇς καὶ O λόγος, ὃν ολίγον
πρότερον ἔλεγες, ὁμολογεῖ σοι. ἔχει OY οὑτωσὶ

ΘᾺ PLATONIS

δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πέρι νυνί" ἐάν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς Τὶ
λόγοις ὁμολογήσῃς μοι, βεθασανισμένον τοῦτ᾽
HOH ἔσται ἱκανῶς ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ TE καὶ σοῦ, καὶ οὐκέτι
αὐτὸ δεήσει ἐπ᾽ ἄλλην βάσανον ἀναφέρειν. ov
γὰρ ἄν MOTE αὐτὸ συνεχώρησας συ οὔτε σοφίας
ἐνδείᾳ ovt’ αἰσχύνης περιουσίᾳ" οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἀπα-
τῶν ἐμὲ συγχωρήσαις ἄν" φίλος γάρ μοι εἶ, ὡς
καὶ αὐτὸς φής. τῷ ὄντι οὖν ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ GY ὁμολο-
via τέλος dn ἕξει τῆς ἀληθείας. πάντων δὲ
καλλίστη ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, περὶ τού-
των ὧν ov δή μοι ἐπετίμησας, ποῖόν τινα χρὴ εἶ-
ναι τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τί ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ μέχρι TOV, 488
καὶ πρεσθύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα. ἐγὼ YOO εἴ
τι μη ὀρθῶς πράττω κατὰ τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ,
εὖ ἴσθι τοῦτο ὅτι οὐχ ἕκων ἐξαμαρτάνω, ἀλλ᾽
ἀμαθίᾳ τῇ ἐμῇ. συ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἤρξω νουθετεῖν
μὲ, μὴ ἀποστῇς, ἀλλ᾽ ἱκανῶς μοι ἔνδειξαι τί ἐστι
τοῦτο, ὃ ἐπιτηδευτέον μοι, καὶ τίνα τρόπον κτη-
σαίμην ἂν αὐτό. καὶ ἐάν μὲ λάδῃς νῦν μέν σοι
ὁμολογήσαντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ μὴ ταῦτα
πράττοντα, ἅπερ ὡμολόγησα, πάνυ με ἡγοῦ βλᾶ-
κα εἶναι καὶ μηκέτι ποτέ μὲ νουθετήσῃς ὕστερον, B
ὡς μηδενὸς ἄξιον ὄντα. ἐξ ἀρχῆς δέ μοι ἐπανά-
λαῦθε, πῶς φῇς τὸ δίκαιον ἔχειν καὶ ov καὶ Πίν-
δαρος τὸ κατοὶ φύσιν ; ἄγειν βίᾳ τὸν κρείττω τὰ
τῶν ἡττόνων καὶ ἄρχειν τὸν βελτίω τῶν χειρόνων
καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ φαυλοτέρου ; μή
τι ἄλλο λέγεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ ὀρθῶς μέ-
μνημαι ;

Car. XLII. KAA. ᾿Αλλὰ ταῦτα ἔλεγον

GORGIAS. 65

καὶ τότε, καὶ νῦν λέγω. 22. Πότερον δὲ tov
> ‘ 7 ~ ‘ \ v4 32 ‘ ,
C αὐτὸν βελτίω καλεῖς ov καὶ κρείττω ; οὐδὲ vag
τοι τότε οἷός τ᾽ ἦ μαθεῖν σου τί ποτε λέγεις.
πότερον τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους κρείττους καλεῖς καὶ
δεῖ ἀκροᾶσθαι τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου τοὺς ἀσθενεστέ-
ρους, οἷόν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ τότε ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὡς αἱ
μεγάλαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τὰς σμικροὶς κατὰ τὸ φύσει
δίκαιον ἔρχονται, ὅτι κρείττους εἰσὶ καὶ ἰσχυρό-
τεραι, ὡς τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ βέλτιον
ταὐτὸν ὄν, ἢ ἔστι βελτίω μὲν εἶναι, ἥττω δὲ καὶ
ἀσθενέστερον, καὶ κρείττω μὲν εἶναι, μοχθηρότε-
Z 8. (δ 2 4 {2 2 \ σὰ , ‘
Deov δέ" ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς ὅρος ἐστὶ tov βελτίονος καὶ
τοῦ κρείττονος ; τοῦτό μοι αὐτὸ σαφῶς διόρισον,

2 x rv CF la 2 ‘ ~ \ ‘ /
ταὐτὸν, ἢ ἕτερόν ἐστι TO κρεῖττον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον
καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον; KAA. ᾿Αλλ’ ἐγώ σοι σα-
φῶς λέγω, ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστιν. XS2. Οὐκοῦν οἱ
πολλοὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς κρείττους εἰσὶ xata φύσιν ; οἵ
δὴ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθενται ἐπὶ τῷ Evi, ὥσπερ καὶ

U »” ~ 3

ov ἄρτι ἔλεγες. KAA. Πῶς γὰρ ov; 2M.
Τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἄρα νόμιμα τὼ τῶν κρειττόνων
Ε ἐστί. KAA. Πάνυ ye. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν ta τῶν
, c ‘ ’ ne ‘
βελτιόνων ; οἱ γὰρ κρείττους βελτίους modu
κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. KAA. Nai. 222. Ov-
κοῦν TH τούτων νόμιμα κατὰ φύσιν καλά, κρειττό-
νων γε ὄντων; KAA. Φημί. ΣΏ. "Δ4ρ᾽ οὖν

[ \ 7 a c >! Tr Lee
ot πολλοὲ νομίζουσιν οὕτως, ὡς ἄρτι αὖ GV ἔλεγες,
489 δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν
τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἔστι ταῦτα, ἢ οὔ ; καὶ ὅπως μὴ
ἁλώσει ἐνταῦθα ov αἰσχυνύμενος. νομίζουσιν, ἢ

Pl » ,
οὔ, οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ πλέον
Ge

66 PLATONIS

δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖ-
σθαι; My φθόνει μοι ἀποχρίνασθαι τοῦτο,
Καλλίχλεις, tv’, ἐάν μοι ὁμολογήσῃς, βεθαιώσω-
μαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ, ἅτε ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς διαγνῶναι
ὡμολογηκότος. KAA. AAR’ οἵ γε πολλοὲ vout-
ζουσιν οὕτως. Σ΄). Οὐ νόμῳ ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν
αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ δίκαιον
τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει" ὥστε κινδυνεύεις
οὐκ ahnOn λέγειν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδὲ ορθῶς
ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν λέγων ὅτι ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὁ νό-
μος καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς κακουργῶ
ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὸν μέν τις κατὼ φύσιν λέγῃ, ἐπὶ
τὸν νόμον ἄγων, ἐὸν δέ τις KATA τὸν νόμον, ἐπὶ
τὴν φύσιν.

Carp. XLIV. KAA. Οὑτοσὶ ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσε-
tat φλυαρῶν. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἷ-
GYUVEL, τηλικοῦτος ὦν, ὀνόματα ϑηρεύων, καὶ ἐάν
τις ῥήματι ἁμάρτῃ, ἕρμαιον τοῦτο ποιούμενος ;
ἐμὲ yoo οἴει ἄλλο τι λέγειν τὸ κρείττους εἶναι ἢ
τὸ βελτίους ; οὐ πάλαι σοι λέγω, ὅτι ταὐτόν φημι
εἶναι τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κρεῖττον ; ἢ οἴει μὲ λέ-
γειν, ἐὰν συρφετὸς συλλεγῇ δούλων καὶ παντοδα-
πῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδενὸς ἀξίων πλὴν ἔσως τῷ σώ-
μᾶτι ἰσχυρίσασθαι, καὶ οὗτοι φῶσιν, αὐτὸ ταῦτα
εἶναι νόμιμα; X22. Μἶεν, ὦ σοφώτατε Kadri-
κλεις " οὕτω λέγεις: KAA. Πάνν μὲν. οὖν.
a2, ᾿Αλλ’ ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πά-
λαι τοπάζω τοιοῦτόν τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶὲ
ἀνερωτῶ γλιχόμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅ τι λέγεις.
οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε τοὺς δύο βελτίους ἡγεῖ τοῦ

Β

C

D

GORGIAS. 67

ἕνός, οὐδὲ τους σοὺς δούλους βελτίους Gov, ὅτι
ἰσχυρότεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύ. ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
εἰπέ, τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους, ἐπειδὴ οὐ τοὺς
ἰσχυροτέρους ; καί, ὦ ϑαυμάσιε, πραότερόν με
΄ cr κ > , κ᾿ ~
E προδίδασκε, ἵνα μὴ αἀποφοιτησῶ παρὰ σοῦ.
KAA. Εἰρωνεύει, ὦ Σώκρατες. Σ΄. Οὐ μὰ
τὸν Ζῆθον, ὦ Ιζαλλίκλεις, ᾧ ov yoousvos πολλὰ
- Ν 5 , , 2 3.) 3» 2 ῇ 7
νῦν On εἰρωνεύου πρὸς με. GAL’ ἴθι εἶπέ, τίνας
λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους εἶναι; KAA. Τοὺς ἀμεί-
νους ἔγωγε. X12. “Ὁρᾷς ἄρα, ὅτι ov αὐτὸς ovo-
, ~ ‘ > ΄ 2 > ~ ‘
ματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ οὐδέν. οὐχ ἐρεῖς τοὺς
βελτίους καὶ κρείττους πότερον τοὺς φρονιμωτέ-
ρους λέγεις, ἢ ἄλλους τινάς; KAA.’ ALLE ναὶ
pa Aia τούτους λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε. 2Σ4..
Πολλάκις ἄρα εἷς φρονῶν μυρίων μ᾽) φρονούν-
490 TOV κρείττων ἐστὶ κατὸ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὲ τοῦ-
τον ἄρχειν δεῖ, τοὺς δ᾽ ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πλέον ἔχειν
τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἀρχομένων. τοῦτο γάρ μοι
δοκεῖς βούλεσθαι λέγειν --- καὶ οὐ ῥήματα ϑη-
, a re ~ ΄ ΄ ΄
ρεύω ---, εἰ ὁ Eis τῶν μυρίων κρείττων. KAA.
᾿Αλλὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἃ λέγω. τοῦτο γορ οἶμαι
ἐγὼ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίω ὄντα xal
φρονιμώτερον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τῶν
φαυλοτέρων.
B Cap. XLV. 2.22. "Eye δὴ αὐτοῦ. ti note
αὖ νῦν λέγεις ; ἐὼν EV TO αὐτῷ ὥμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν,
\ > , 2 \ Cue has 5 > ~
πολλοὶ ἀθρόοι ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἢ ἐν κοινῷ
πολλὰ σιτία καὶ ποτά, ὦμεν δὲ παντοδαποί, ot
μὲν ἰσχυροΐί, οἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς, εἷς δὲ ἡμῶν ἢ φρονι-
μώτερος περὶ ταῦτα ἰατρὸς ὦν, ἢ δέ, οἷον εἰκός,

63 PLATONIS

τῶν μὲν ἰσχυρότερος, τῶν δὲ ἀσθενέστερος, ἄλλο TE
ἢ οὗτος φρονιμώτερος ἡμῶν ὧν βελτίων καὶ κρείτ-
τῶν ἔσται eis ταῦτα; KAA. Πάνυ γε. SI.
ἾΗ οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων πλέον ἡμῶν Extéov
αὐτῷ, ὅτι βελτίων ἐστίν, ἢ τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν πάντα
ἐκεῖνον δεῖ νέμειν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀναλίσκειν τε αὐτὰ
καὶ καταχρῆσθαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα οὐ πλεο-
νεχτητέον, εἰ UN μέλλει ζημιοῦσθαι, ἀλλο τῶν μὲν
πλέον, τῶν δ᾽ ἔλαττον Extéov* ἐὰν δὲ τύχῃ πάν-
τῶν ἀσθενέστατος ὦν, πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτί-
ota, ὦ Καλλίκλεις ; οὐχ οὕτως, ὦ ᾽γαθέ; KAA.
“Περὶ σιτία λέγεις καὶ ποτὸὼ καὶ ἰατροὺς καὶ φλυ-
αρίας - ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ ταῦτα λέγω. 22. Πότερον
οὖν τὸν φρονιμώτερον βελτίω λέγεις; Φάθι ἢ
μή. ΚΑ͂Ζ. "ἔγωγε. 292. ᾿41λλ᾽ οὐ τὸν βελτίω
πλέον δεῖν ἔχειν: KAA. Οὐ σιτίων γε οὐδὲ
ποτῶν. 2&2. MavOavo, ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ἱματίων, καὶ
δεῖ τὸν ὑφαντικώτατον μέγιστον ἱμάτιον ἔχειν
καὶ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἀμπεχόμενον περιιέ-
ναι. KAA. Ποίων ἱματίων; 22. Add’ εἰς
ὑποδήματα δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τὸν φρονι-
μώτερον εἰς ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστον. τὸν σκυτοτό-
μον ἴσως μέγιστα δεῖ ὑποδήματα καὶ πλεῖστα
ὑποδεδεμένον περιπατεῖν. KAA. Ποῖα ὑποδή-
pata φλυαρεῖς “ἔχων: L282. “Add? εἰ wy τὰ
τοιαῦτα λέγεις, ἴσως τὸ τοιάδε" οἷον γεωργικὸν
ἄνδρα περὶ γὴν φρόνιμόν τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀγα-
θόν, τοῦτον dn ἴσως δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν σπερ-
μάτων καὶ ὡς πλείστῳ σπέρματι χρῆσθαι εἰς τὴν
αὑτοῦ γῆν. KAA. “Ὡς ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ λέγεις, ὦ

σ

D

E

GORGIAS. 69

“Σώκρατες. LM. Ov μόνον γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις,

“ἀλλὰ καὶ περὲ τῶν αὐτῶν. KAA. Ny τοὺς
ϑεούς, ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ κναφέας
καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύει,
ὡς περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν ὄντα τὸν λόγον. XL.
Οὐκοῦν ov ἐρεῖς περὶ τίνων ὁ κρείττων τε καὶ
φρονιμώτερος πλέον ἔχων δικαίως πλεονεχτεῖ ;
ἢ οὔτε ἐμοῦ ὑποδάλλοντος ἀνέξει οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς
ἐρεῖς; KAA. Add? ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι λέγω.
πρῶτον μὲν TOUS κρείττους οἵ εἰσιν, οὐ σκυτοτό-

Β μους λέγω οὐδὲ μαγείρους, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ἂν εἰς τὸ
τῆς πόλεως πράγματα φρόνιμοι ὦσιν, ὅντινα ἂν
τρόπον εὖ οἰχοῖτο, καὶ μὴ μόνον φρόνιμοι, ἀλ-
λὰ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἱκανοὶ ὄντες ἃ ἂν νοήσωσιν
ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνωσι διὸ μαλακίαν
ψυχῆς.

Car. XLVI. 22. Ὁρᾷς, ὦ βέλτιστε Καλ-
hindets, ὡς οὐ ταὐτὰ σύ τ᾽ ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖς καὶ
ἐγὼ σοῦ; σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ φῇς ἀεὶ ταὐτὸ λέγειν,
καὶ μέμφει μοι" ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τοὐναντίον, ὅτι οὐ-

᾿ Οδέποτε ταὐτὸ λέγεις περὲ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ
μὲν τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους τους ἰσχυ-
οτέρους ὡρίζου, αὖθις δὲ τους φρονιμωτέρους,
νῦν δ᾽ αὖ ἕτερόν τι ἥκεις ἔχων" ἀνδρειότεροί τινες
ὑπὸ σοῦ λέγονται οἱ κρείττους καὶ οἱ βελτίους.
ἀλλ᾽ ὦ ᾽γαθέ, Einav ἀπαλλάγηθι τίνας ποτὲ λέ-
vets τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους καὶ εἰς ὅ τι.
KAA. ᾿Α4λλ’ εἴρηκά γε ἔγωγε τοὺς φρονίμους
Deis τὸ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα καὶ ἀνδρείους.
τούτους YAO προσήκει τῶν πόλεων ἄρχειν, καὶ

70 PLATONIS

τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ᾽ ἐστί, πλέον ἔχειν τούτους τῶν
ἄλλων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων. LM.
Ti δέ; αὐτῶν, ὦ ἑταῖρε ; [ἢ τί ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρ-
χομένους 3] KAA. Πῶς λέγεις; 222. “Eva
ἕκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα. ἢ τοῦτο
μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἀλ-
λῶν; KAA. Πῶς ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα λέγεις ;
2S. Οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί,
σώφρονα ὄντα καὶ ἐγχρατὴ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν
ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Ε
KAA. “Ὡς ἡδυς εἶ! τοὺς ἠλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς
σώφρονας. 282. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ ; οὐδεὶς ὅστις
οὐκ ὧν γνοίη, ὅτι οὕτω λέγω. KAA. Πάνυ γε
σφόδρα, ὦ Σώχρατες " ἐπεὶ πῶς av εὐδαίμων γέ-
γοιτο ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων ὁτῳοῦν ; αλλὰ τοῦτ᾽
ἐστὲ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὃ ἐγώ
σοι νῦν παῤῥησιαζόμενος λέγω, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὀρθῶς
βιωσόμενον tas μὲν ἐπιθυμίας tas ἑαυτοῦ ἐᾶν
ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ κολάζειν, ταύταις δὲ
ὡς μεγίσταις οὔσαις ἱκανὸν εἶναι ὑπηρετεῖν δι᾽ 492
ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι ὧν ἂν,
ἀεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ᾽, οἶμαι,
τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐ δυνατόν " ὅθεν ψέγουσι τοὺς
τοιούτους OL’ αἰσχύνην ἀποκχρυπτόμενοι τὴν αὖ-
τῶν ἀδυναμίαν, καὶ αἰσχρὸν δή φασιν εἶναι τὴν
ἀκολασίαν " ὕπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον,
δουλούμενοι τοὺς βελτίους τὴν φύσιν ἀνθρώ-
πους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐκπορίζεσθαι ταῖς
ἡδοναῖς πλήρωσιν ἐπαινοῦσι τὴν σωφροσύνην Β
καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν.

GORGIAS. 71

> » >» 58 = | - ς ~ n r cr
ἐπεί γε ois ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπῆρξεν ἢ βασιλέων υἱέσιν
εἶναι ἢ αὐτοὺς τῇ φύσει ἱκανοὺς ἐκπορίσασθαι
ἀρχήν τινα ἢ τυραννίδα i) δυναστείαν, τί τῇ
ἀληθείᾳ αἴσχιον καὶ κακιον εἴῃ σωφροσύνης
[καὶ δικαιοσύνης τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ; οἷς
ἐξὸν ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμπο-
dav ὄντος, αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς δεσπότην ἐπαγάγοιντο
τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμον τε καὶ λόγον
Ο καὶ ψόγον ; ἢ mas οὐκ ἂν ἄθλιοι γεγονότες εἴη-
σαν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς
σωφροσύνης, μηδὲν πλέον νέμοντες τοῖς φίλοις
τοῖς αὑτῶν ἢ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἄρχοντες
ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν πόλει: ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὦ LXO-
χρατες, ἣν φῇς συ διώκειν, ὧδ᾽ ἔχει" τρυφὴ καὶ
ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ;
a ee 5 ‘ > , \ 3 va \ eee
Ἰουτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀρετή TE καὶ εὐδαιμονία " Ta δὲ ἀλ-
λα ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὲ τὸ καλλωπίσματα, Ta παρὰ φύ-
σιν συνθήματα, ἀνθρώπων φλναρία καὶ οὐδενὸς
ἄξια."
D Cap. XLVII. 22. Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, ὦ Καλ-
ὯΝ > f = / SG /
λίκλεις, ἐπεξέρχει τῷ λόγῳ παῤῥησιαζόμενος
σαφῶς yao συ νῦν λέγεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦν-
, la ‘ 2 > , , 5)
ται μέν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι. δέομαι οὖν
ἐγώ σου μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀνεῖναι, ἵνα τῷ ὕντι κα-
/ 4 τς la ye! rf
τάδηλον γένηται πῶς βιωτέον. xat μοι λέγε"
‘ ‘ > - ‘ 2 , > id
Tas μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῇς ov κολαστέον, El μέλλει
τις οἷον δεῖ εἶναι, ἐῶντα δὲ αὐτὸς ὡς μεγίστας
/ 2 ~ ς / γ᾿ c 7
πλήρωσιν αὐταῖς ἀμόθεν ye ποθεν Etommacery,
καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν; KAA. Φημὲ
Ἑταῦτα ἐγώ. Σ,Ώ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς λέγονται ot

72 PLATONIS

μηδενὸς δεόμενοι εὐδαίμονες εἶναι. KAA. Οἱ
λίθοι γὰρ ἂν οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμονέ-
στατοι εἶεν. 292. ᾿Αλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὥς γε σὺ
λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ Bios. οὐ γάρ τοι ϑαυμάζοιμ᾽ ἄν,
εἰ Evounidns ἀληθὴ ἐν τοῖσδε λέγει, λέγων
τίς δ᾽ οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζὴν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ Lyv ;

καὶ ἡμεῖς τῷ ὄντι ἴσως τέθναμεν " ὅπερ ἤδη τοῦ 493
ἔγωγε καὶ ἤκουσα τῶν σοφῶν, ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθνα-
μὲν, καὶ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα, τῆς δὲ
ψυχῆς τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί, τυγχάνει ὃν
οἷον ἀναπείθεσθαι καὶ μεταπίπτειν ἄνω κάτω,
καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνήρ, ἴσως
Σικελός τις ἢ ᾿Ππαλικός, παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι διὸ
τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πιστικὸν ὠνόμασε πίθον, τοὺς
δὲ ἀνοήτους ἀμυήτους " τῶν δ᾽ ἀμυνήτων τοῦτο Β
τῆς ψυχῆς, οὗ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί, τὸ ἀκόλαστον
αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν, ὡς τετρημένος εἴη πίθος,
διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπεικάσας. τοὐναντίον δὴ
οὗτος σοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνδείκνυται, ὡς τῶν ἐν
“Aov — τὸ ἀειδὲς δὴ λέγων ---- οὗτοι ἀθλιώτα-
τοι ἂν εἶεν OL ἀμύητοι, καὶ φοροῖεν εἰς τὸν τετρη-
μένον πίθον ὕδωρ ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ κο-
oxiva* τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα λέγει, ὡς ἔφη ὃ πρὸς
ἐμὲ λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι" τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν xo-C
σχίνῳ ἀπείκασε τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὡς τετρημένην,
ἅτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν δι᾽ ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ
λήθην. ταῦτ᾽ ἐπιεικῶς μέν ἐστιν ὑπό τι ἄτοπα,
δηλοῖ μὴν ὃ ἐγὼ βούλομαί σοι ἐνδειξάμενος, ἐάν
mas οἷός τε ὦ, πεῖσαι μεταθέσθαι, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλή-

GORGIAS. 73

> ” ἊΝ x -

στως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος βίου τὸν κοσμίως

καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ παροῦσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ ἐξαρχούντως

ἔχοντα βίον ἑλέσθαι. ἀλλὰ πότερον πείθω τί σε

ἢ καὶ μετατίθεσαι εὐδαιμονεστέρους εἶναι τοὺς

κοσμίους τῶν ἀκολάστων, 7) οὐδέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἂν καὶ

πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μυθολογῶ, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον μετα-

~ > , ὩΣ

θήσει; KAA. Τοῦτ᾽ ἀληθέστερον εἴρηκας, ὦ
“Σώκρατες.

Cap. XLVIII. 22. Φέρε δή, ἄλλην σοι εἰ-
κόνα λέγω ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν. σκό-
πει γὰρ, εἰ τοιόνδε λέγεις περὶ τοῦ βίου ἑκατέρου
τοῦ τε σώφρονος καὶ τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οἷον εἰ δυ-

~ 2 ~ c ἡ 7 \ > \ πὶ
siv ἀνδροῖν ἑκατέρῳ πίθοι πολλοὶ εἰεν, καὶ τῷ
‘ c Ἑ c ~ Ἁ ’ ς » »” ες ‘
E μὲν ἑτέρῳ ὑγιεῖς καὶ πλήρεις, ὃ μὲν οἴνου, ὃ δὲ

ς ‘ ! ~

μέλιτος, ὃ δὲ γάλακτος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πολλῶν,
νάματα δὲ σπάνια καὶ χαλεπὰ ἑκάστου τούτων
εἴῃ καὶ meta πολλῶν πόνων καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐχπο-
ριζόμενα - ὃ μὲν οὖν ἕτερος πληρωσάμενος μήτ᾽
ἐποχετεύοι μήτε τι φροντίζοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἕνεκα τούτων
ἡσυχίαν ἔχοι " τῷ δ᾽ ἑτέρῳ τὰ μὲν νάματα, ὥσπερ

Ἐν 5 ΄ ‘ ‘ 7 Γ᾽ ΄
καὶ ἐκείνῳ, δυνατὸ μὲν πορίζεσθαι, χαλεποὸ δέ,

\ 9 9 - , ‘ , \ 3 ,
τὸ δ᾽ ἀγγεῖα τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά, καὶ avayxd-

> ς ?
494 [0LTO ἀεὶ καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν πιμπλάναι αὐτά,
ἢ tas ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας" ἄρα τοιούτου
c , ! ~ 4 , ‘ “ 2
ἑκατέρῳ ὄντος τοῦ βίου, λέγεις τὸν τοῦ ἀκολά-
στου εὐδαιμονέστερον εἶναι 7) τὸν τοῦ κοσμίου ;
πείθω τί σε ταῦτα λέγων συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κόσμι-
ον βίον τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀμείνω εἶναι, ἢ οὐ πείθω ;
KAA, Οὐ πείθεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. τῷ μὲν yao
t
πληρωσαμένῳ ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτ᾽ ἔστιν ἡδονῇ οὐδεμί
ηρωσαμένᾳ Ὁ οὐκέτ᾽ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ οὐδεμία,
7

7A, ~ PLATONIS

ἀλλὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸ ὥσπερ
λίθον ζῆν, ἐπειδὸν πληρώσῃ, μήτε χαίροντα ἔτι Ῥ
μήτε λυπούμενον. ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὲ τὸ ἡδέως
ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὡς πλεῖστον ἐπιῤῥεῖν. XSL. Οὐκοῦν
ἀνάγκη γ᾽, ἂν πολυ ἐπιῤῥέῃ, πολὺ καὶ τὸ ἀπιὸν
εἶναι καὶ μεγάλ᾽ ἄττα τὰ τρήματα εἶναι ταῖς
ἐχροαῖς; KAA. Πάνν μὲν οὖν. 2X82. Χαρα-
δριοῦ τινα αὖ ov βίον λέγεις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ νεκροῦ
οὐδὲ λίθου. καί μοι λέγε, τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις, οἷον
πεινὴν καὶ πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν; KAA.” ἔγωγε.
XS. Καὶ διψὴν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν; ΚΑΔ.Ο
Aéya, καὶ τὸς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἁπάσας ἔχοντα
καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως
ζῇν.

Cap. XLIX. 22. Εὖγε, ὦ βέλτιστε" διατέ-
λει γὰρ ὥσπερ ἤρξω, καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀπαισχυνεϊζ.
δεῖ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, μηδ᾽ ἐμὲ ἀπαισχννθῆναι. καὶ
πρῶτον μὲν εἰπὲ, εἰ καὶ ψωρώντα καὶ κνησιῶντα,
ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνῆσθαι, κνώμενον διατε-
λοῦντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνως ἔστι ζῆν. KAA.D
“Ὥς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημη-
yooos. 22. Τοιγάρτοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, Πῶλον
μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ ἐξέπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι
ἐποίησα, σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκπλαγῇς οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνθῇς"
ἀνδρεῖος γὰρ εἶ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποκρίνου μόνον. KAA.
Pyui τοίνυν καὶ τὸν κνώμενον ἡδέως ἂν βιῶναι.
Zi. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἡδέως, καὶ εὐδαιμόνως ;
KAA. Πάνυ ye. 2X2. Πότερον εἰ τὴν xepa-E
λὴν μόνον κνησιῷ, ἢ) ἔτι τί σε ἐρωτῶ ; ὅρα, ὦ
Καλλίκλεις, ti ἀποκρινεῖ, ἐάν τίς σε τὸ ἐχόμενα

GORGIAS. 75

δ AX

τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἅπαντα ἐρωτᾷ. καί, *to* tov-
τῶν τοιούτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον, ὃ τῶν κιναίδων
βίος οὗτος οὐ δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ ἄθλιος ; ἢ
τούτους τολμήσεις λέγειν εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, ἐὰν
ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν δέονται; KAA. Οὐκ αἱ-
σχύνει εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς λό-
yous; 202. Ἢ yoo ἐγὼ ἄγω ἐνταῦθα, ὦ
γενναῖε, ἢ ἐκεῖνος, ὃς av φῇ ἀνέδην οὕτω τοὺς
495γαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν γαίρωσιν, εὐδαίμονας εἶναι,
καὶ μὴ διορίζηται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὁποῖαι ἀγαθαὶ καὶ
κακαί; ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε, πότερον φῇς εἶναι
τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδυ καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἶναί τι τῶν ἡδέων, ὃ
οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν; KAA. “Iva δή μοι μὴ ἀνο-
μολογούμενος ἢ 0 λόγος, ἐὸν ἕτερον φήσω εἶναι,
τὸ αὐτό φημι εἶναι. XL. Διαφθείρεις, ὦ Kad-
λίκλεις, τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ᾽
ἐμοῦ ἱκανῶς τοὶ ὄντα ἐξετάζοις, εἴπερ παρὰ TH
Β δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἐρεῖς. KAA. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ
Σώκρατες. Σ΄. Οὐ τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὐτ’
ἐγώ, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο, οὔτε σύ. ἀλλ᾽, ὦ μακά-
ριε, ἄθρει μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ πάντως
χαίρειν" ταῦτά τε yoo τὰ νῦν Oy αἰνιχθέντα
πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ φαίνεται συμθαίνοντα, εἰ τοῦ-
το οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. KAA. “Ὡς σύ
γε οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες. XIN. Σὺ δὲ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ
Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἰσχυρίζει; KAA.” Eyoye.
c Cap. L. 22. ᾿Επιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ,
ὡς σοῦ σπουδάζοντος; KAA. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα.
XL. "10. δή μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ, διελοῦ τάδε.
ἐπιστήμην mov καλεῖς τι; KAA. "Eyoye.

76 PLATONIS

ZN. Ov καὶ ἀνδρείαν viv 3) ἔλεγές τινα εἶναι
μετὰ ἐπιστήμης; KAA. "Ἔλεγον γάρ. 22.
"Adio τι οὖν ὡς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς ἐπιστή-
uns δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες; KAA. Σφόδρα ye.
222. Τί δέ; ἡδονὴν καὶ ἐπιστήμην tavtov, nD
ἕτερον; KAA. “Ἕτερον δήπου, ὦ σοφώτατε σύ.
ΣΏ. Ἢ καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἑτέραν ἡδονῆς; KAA.
Has γὰρ ov; 2X22. Φέρε δι ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα
ταῦτα, ὅτι Καλλικλῆς ἔφη δ᾽ “Ιχαρνεὺς nov μὲν
καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀν-
δρείαν καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕτερον.
KAA. Σωκράτης δέ γε ἡμῖν o ᾿Αλωπεκῆθεν οὐχ
ὁμολογεῖ ταῦτα " ἢ ὁμολογεῖ; 222, Οὐχ ὁμολο- Ἐὶ
yet οἶμαι δέ γε οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς, ὅταν αὐτὸς
αὑτὸν ϑεάσηται ὀρθῶς. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, τους εὖ
πράττοντας τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν οὐ τοὐναντίον
ἡγεῖ πάθος πεπονθέναι; KAA.” Eyoye. XM. .
*Ao’ οὖν, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις,
ἀνάγκῃ περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὥσπερ περὶ ὑγιείας ἔχει
καὶ νόσου ; οὐ γὰρ ἅμα δήπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ
νοσεῖ ὃ ἄνθρωπος. οὐδὲ ἅμα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγιείας
τε καὶ vooov. KAA. Πῶς λέγεις; 2X22. Οἷον
περὶ ὅτον βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαδωῶν σκόπει. 496
γοσεῖ που ἄνθρωπος ὀφθαλμούς, ᾧ ὄνομα. ὀφθαλ-
μία; KAA. Has γὰρ οὔ; Σ. Οὐ δήπον
καὶ ὑγιαίνει γε ἅμα τοὺς αὐτούς; KAA. Οὐδ᾽

᾿ ὁπωστιοῦν. X22. Τί δέ; ὅταν τῆς ὀφθαλμίας
ἀπαλλάττηται, ἄρα τότε καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ἀπαλ-
λάττεται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τελευτῶν ἅμα ἀμ-

φοτέρων ἀπήλλακται ; KAA. “Πκιστά γε.

GORGIAS. - 77

B2IL2. Θαυμάσιον γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ ἄλογον γίγνε-
ται. ἠ γάρ; KAA. Σφόδρα ye. 2X22. “Add?
ἐν μέρει, οἶμαι, ἑκάτερον καὶ λαμθάνει καὶ ἀπολ-
λύει; KAA. Φημί. XQ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰσχὺν
καὶ ἀσθένειαν ὡσαύτως; KAA. Ναί. 222.
Καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτῆτα; KAA. Πάνυ γε.
22.°H xai τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ
τἀναντία τούτων, κακά TE καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέ-
ρει λαμθάνει, καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἑἕκατέ-
ρου; KAA. Πάντως δήπου. XL. “Edy εὕ-

C papEv ἄρα ἄττα, ὧν ἅμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται ἄνθρω-
πος καὶ ἅμα ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἂν εἴη
τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν. ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦ-
ta ; Καὶ εὖ μάλα σκεψάμενος ἀποκρίνου.
KAA. °Ad2? ὑπερφυῶς ὡς ὁμολογῶ.

Cap. LI. 2X. Ἴθι dy ἐπὶ τὸ ἔμπροσθεν
ὡμολογημένα. τὸ πεινὴν ἔλεγες πότερον ἡδύ, ἢ
ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν. KAA.

ἢ ᾿Δνιαρὸν ἔγωγε " τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἡδύ.
2. Μανθάνω: ἀλλ᾽ οὖν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ
ἀνιαρόν. ἡ οὐχί; KAA. Φημί. Σ΄. Ov-
κοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν; KAA. Σφόδρα ye. ΣΩ.
Πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὁμολογεῖς ἅπα-
σαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι ;
KAA. ᾿Ομολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα. 2X22. Εἶεν.
διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡδυ φῇς εἶναι ;
ΚΑ44. "Eyoye. 222. Οὐκοῦν τούτου οὗ λέγεις

E10 μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον δήπον ἐστί; KAA.
Nai. Σ. Τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσίς τε τῆς ἐν-
δείας καὶ ἡδονή; KAA. Nai. XR. Οὐκοῦν

~
7 *

78 PLATONIS

κατοὸ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις; KAA. Μάλι-
στα. 22. Διψῶντά γε; KAA. Φημί. XL,
“νπούμενον; KAA, Nat. 222. Αἰἰσθάνει
οὖν τὸ συμθαῖνον, ὅτι λυπούμενον yaigey λέγεις
ἅμα, ὅταν διψῶντα πίνειν λέγῃς ; ἢ οὐχ ἅμα
τοῦτο γίγνεται KATH τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον
εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος βούλει ; οὐδὲν γάρ,
οἶμαι, διαφέρει." ἔστι: tavta, ἢ ov; KAA.
στιν. 2X92. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν εὖ γε πράττοντα xa-
κῶς πράττειν ἅμα ἀδύνατον ἔφης εἶναι. KAA.
Φημὶ γάρ. XR. Aviousvov δέ γε χαίρειν δυ- 491
νατὸν ὡμολόγηκας. KAA. Φαίνεται. 2M.
Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ
ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ
τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. KAA, Οὐκ oid’ ἅττα σοφίζει, ὦ
“Σώκρατες. 2) .2. Οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ἀκκίζει, ὦ Καλ-
λίκλεις. καὶ πρόϊθί γε ἔτι εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν, ὅτι
ἔχων ληρεῖς, ἵνα εἰδῇς ὡς σοφὸς ὧν μὲ νουθε- Β
τεῖς. οὐχ ἅμα διψῶν τε ἕκαστος ἡμῶν πέπαυται
καὶ ἅμα ἡδόμενος Oia τοῦ πίνειν; KAA. Οὐκ
οἶδα ὅ τι λέγει. L'OP. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Καλλί-:
κλεις, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποχρίνου καὶ ἡμῶν Evexa, ἵνα πε-
ρανθῶσιν of λόγοι. KAA. ᾿Αλλ’ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτός
ἐστι Σωκράτης, ὦ ΖΠΖοργία " σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγον
ἄξια ἀνερωτᾷ καὶ ἐξελέγχει. 70}. ᾿Αλλὰ τί
σοὶ διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή, ὦ
Καλλίκλεις - ἀλλ᾽ ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι
ὅπως ἂν βούληται. KAA, ᾿Ερώτα δὴ ov taC
σμικρά τε καὶ στενὰ ταῦτα, ἐπείπερ 7 οργίᾳ δο-
κεῖ οὕτως.

GORGIAS. 79

Car. LIL. 22. εὐδαίμων εἶ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις,
ὅτι Ta μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρά" ἐγὼ
δ᾽ οὐκ ᾧμην ϑεμιτὸν εἶναι. ὅθεν οὖν ἀπέλιπες,
ἀποχρίνου, εἰ οὐχ ἅμα παύεται διψῶν ἕχαστος
ἡμῶν καὶ ἡδόμενος. KAA, Φημί. XSL. Οὐκ-
οὖν καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ
ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται; KAA. “Eo ταῦτα.
LiL. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν

Dopa navetar; KAA. Noi. “2.42. ALLE μὴν
τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἅμα παύεται, ὡς
ov ὡμολόγεις > νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς; KAA.
"Eyoye. τί οὖν δή; X82. Ὅτι οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ
γίγνεται, ὦ φίλε, τἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἡδέσιν οὐδὲ τὸ κα-
κοὶ τοῖς ἀνιαροῖς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅμα παύεται, τῶν
δὲ οὖ, ὡς ἑτέρων ὄντων. πῶς οὖν ταυτὸ ἂν εἴη
τοὶ ἡδέα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἡ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ τοῖς κακοῖς ;
‘Eav δὲ βούλῃ, καὶ τῇδ᾽ ἐπίσκεψαι" οἶμαι γάρ

E σοι οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ὁμολογεῖσθαι. ἄθρει δέ" τοὺς
ἀγαθους οὐχὲ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς κα-
λεῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ; KAA.
ἼἜγωγε. 292. Τί δέ; ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας καλεῖς
τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ δειλούς ; οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι γε, ἀλλὰ
τοὺς ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους ἔλεγες. ἢ οὐ τού-
τους ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς; KAA. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.
22. Τί δέ; παῖδα ἀνόητον χαίροντα ἤδη εἶδες ;
KAA." Eyoye. XS.” Aviea δὲ οὔπω εἶδες
ἀνόητον γαίροντα ; KAA. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. ἀλ-

sha τί τοῦτο: Σ.2. Οὐδέν - ἀλλ᾽ ἀποκρίνου.
KAA. Εἶδον. 22. Τί δέ; νοῦν ἔχοντα λυ-
πούμενον καὶ χαίροντα; KAA. Φημί. ZL.

80 PLATONIS

Πότεροι δὲ μᾶλλον γαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, of
φρόνιμοι, ἢ οἱ ἄφρονες; KAA. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε
οὐ πολύ τι διαφέρειν. X82. ᾿Αλλ’ ἀρκεῖ καὶ
τοῦτο. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἤδη εἶδες ἄνδρα δειλόν ;
KAA. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; X92. Τί οὖν; ἀπιόντων
τῶν πολεμίων πότεροί σοι ἐδόκουν μᾶλλον yat-
ρειν, οἱ δειλοί, ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι; KAA. ᾿Αἰμφότε-
ροι ἔμοιγε μᾶλλον" εἰ δὲ μή, παραπλησίως γε.
X22. Οὐδὲν διαφέρει. χαίρουσι δ᾽ οὖν καὶ οἱ
δειλοί; KAA. Σφόδρα γε. 282. Kai ot
ἄφρονες, ὡς ἔοικε. KAA. Ναί. 22. Προσ-
ἰόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦνται, ἢ καὶ οἵ
ἀνδρεῖοι; KAA. ᾿Αμφότερο. 292. “Ζ2ρα
ὁμοίως; KAA. MaAdov ἴσως οἱ δειλοί. 2X22.
᾿“Ἵπιόντων δ᾽ οὐ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν ; KAA,
Ἴσως. 2X22. Οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαΐ-
ρουσι καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δει-
hoi καὶ of ἀνδρεῖοι παραπλησίως, ὡς ov φῇς,
μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων: KAA.
Φημί. LL. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οἵ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ ἀν-
δρεῖοι ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοΐ ;
KAA, Ναί. ΣΏ. Παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίρουσι
καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ oi κακοί; KAA.
Φημί. ΣΏ. ° Ao’ οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγα-
θοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοί τε καὶ οἱ κακοί; ἢ καὶ
ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοί εἰσιν οἱ κακοί;

Β

Cc

Car. 111. KAA. ᾿Αλλὰ μὰ Δί᾽ οὐκ οἵδ᾽

ὅ τι λέγεις. 202. Οὐκ οἶσθ᾽, ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς
ἀγαθῶν φῇς παρουσίᾳ εἶναι ἀγαθούς, κακοὺς δὲ

om ‘ ‘ 3 XN ie ‘ ς 7 ‘ »
κακῶν ; τὸ δὲ αγαθὰ εἶναι tas ἡδονάς, κακοὶ δὲ

GORGIAS. 81

tas avias; KAA. "Eyoye. XS. Οὐκοῦν
τοῖς χαίρουσι πάρεστι τἀγαθά, ai ἡδοναί, εἴπερ
χαίρουσι; KAA. Πῶς γὰρ ov; 222. Οὐκ-
οὖν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοί εἰσιν οἱ yaigor-
tes; KAA. Nai. 2X. Ti d&5 tois ἀνίωμέε
Evo ov πάρεστι τὰ κακά, ai λῦπαι; KAA.
Πάρεστι. Σ΄. Κακῶν δέ γε παρουσίᾳ ys
GU εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς κακούς. 7) οὐκέτι φῇς ;
ΚΑ4. "ἔγωγε. 22.’ Ayadoi ἄρα ot ἂν γαΐ-:
ρῶσι, κακοὶ δὲ οἱ ἂν ἀνιῶώνται ; KAA. Πάνυ γε.
“2.2. Οἱ μέν γε μᾶλλον μάλλον, οἱ δ᾽ ἧττον ἧτ-
τον, οὗ δὲ παραπλησίως παραπλησίως; KAA.
Nati. Σ2. Οὐκοῦν φῃς παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ
λυπεῖσθαι τους φρονίμους καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ
τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον
éte tovs δειλούς, KAA.”"Evyoys. X22. Xvi-
λόγισαι dn κοινῇ μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ, τί ἡμῖν συμθαίνει
ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων " καὶ dis γάρ τοι καὶ τρίς
499 φασι καλὸν εἶναι τὰ καλὸ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισκο-
πεῖσθαι. “Ayadov μὲν εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ
avdgeiov φαμὲν... ἦ. γάρ; KAA. Nai. FTN.
Κακὸν δὲ tov ἄφρονα καὶ δειλόν; KAA. Πά.
vu γε. X82. ᾿Αγαθὸν δὲ αὖ τὸν χαίροντα ;
KAA, Ναί. XS. Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἀνιώμενον ;
KAA. ᾿Ζνάγκη. XS. ᾿Ανιᾶσθαι δὲ καὶ χαί-
ρειν τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὁμοίως, ἴσως δὲ καὶ
μάλλον τὸν κακόν; KAA. Ναί. £2, Οὐκ-
οὖν ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγα-
Βθῷ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸς ὃ xaxds; οὐ ταῦτα
συμθαίνει, καὶ το πρότερα ἐκεῖνα, ἐάν τις ταὺ-

82 PLATONIS

\ ~ eqr \ > x > > ~
Ta φῇ ἤδεα TE καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι ; OV ταῦτα
ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις ;

Cap. LIV. KAA. Πάλαι τοί cov ἀκροώμαι,
ΜΟΥ Τὰ Ξ > , Ω
ὦ Laxoates, καθομολογῶν, ἐνθυμούμενος, ὅτι,
κἂν παίζων τίς σοι ἐνδῷ ὁτιοῦν, τούτον ἄσμενος
ἔχει ὥσπερ TH μειράκια. ὡς On συ οἴει ἐμὲ ἢ

\ at Cc ~ 2 ; 2 Κ ~ ‘
καὶ ἄλλον ovtivouvy ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ηγεῖσθαι τὰς
μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, tas δὲ χείρους. Σ2. “Lov
ἰού, ὦ Καλλίχλεις, ὡς mavoveyos εἶ, καί μοι
ὥσπερ παιδὶ γρῇ, τοτὲ μὲν αὖ φάσκων οὕτως
ἔχειν, τοτὲ δὲ ἑτέρως, ἐξαπατῶν με. καίτοι οὐκ
ᾧμην γε κατ᾽ ἀρχος ὑπὸ σοῦ ἑκόντος εἶναι ἐξα-

, c 21 ’ Ἂν. Ἃ > ’ὔ
πατηθήσεσθαι, ὡς Ὄντος φίλου" νῦν δὲ εἐψεύ-
σθην, καὶ ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκῃ μοι κατο τὸν παλαιὸν
λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ
διδόμενον παρὰ σοῦ. ἔστι δὲ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ

~ 2 gq ς ’ὔ [4 > c ‘ 2 Α͂
γὺν λέγεις, OTL HOOVAL τινὲς εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀγαθαΐ,
at δὲ xaxai. ἢ γάρ; KAA, Not. Σὺ
οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἵ ὠφέλιμοι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ βλα-
θεραί; KAA. Πάνν γε. 282. ᾿(Ωφέλιμοι δέ
γε αἱ ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ κακόν TL;
KAA, Φημί. Σ΄. Ἶ4ρ᾽ οὖν tas τοιάσδε λέ-
γεις, οἷον κατοὶ τὸ σῶμα ἃς νῦν dy ἐλέγομεν ἐν

Coe) ΄ . ,΄ c , 8 , ε
τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονάς" εἰ ἄρα τούτων αἱ
μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιοῦσιν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ἰσχὺν ἢ
ἄλλην τινὰ ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος, αὗται μὲν ἀγα-
θαΐ, ai δὲ τἀναντία τούτων κακαί; KAA.
Mov γε. Σ.Ώ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ λῦπαι ὡσαύτως at E
μὲν χρησταί εἰσιν, at δὲ πονηραί; KAA. Has

‘ >! A wy > ~ Ἂν » ‘ 4
yap ov; XS. Οὐκοῦν tas μὲν yonotas καὶ

_ GORGIAS. 93

ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ αἱρετέον ἐστὶ καὶ toa
κτέον ; KAA, Πάνυ γε. X22. Τὰς δὲ i
οὔ; KAA. Anker an 282. “Evexa γάρ mov
τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἅπαντα ἡμῖν ἔδοξε πρακτέον εἶναι,
εἰ δὐημοχεθεῖς, ἐμοί τε καὶ Πώλῳ. ἄρα καὶ σοὲ
συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἁπασῶν τῶν πράξεων
τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκεν δεῖν πάντα τἄλλα
soo πράττεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τῶν ἄλλων; σύμ-
ψηφος ἡμῖν εἶ καὶ σὺ ἐκ 5 abies KAA." Eyo-
γε. 282. Τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὁ ἄρα ἕνεκα δεῖ καὶ τἄλλα
καὶ TH ἡδέα πράττειν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων.
KAA. υἹάνυ ve. FM. “do” οὖν παντὸς ἀν-
does ἐστιν ἐκλέξᾳ σθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων
ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖα κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἕχαστον ;
KAA. ἽΤεχνικοῦ.
ἔν», LV. 2.2. -Αναμνησθῶμεν δὴ ὧν αὖ
ἐγὼ πρὸς Πώῶλον καὶ ρρρίαν ἐτύγχανον λέγων.
Β edeyow γάρ, εἰ prquovevets, ὅτι εἶεν TERED
at μὲν μέχρι ἡδονῆς, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον sal
σχκευάζουσαι, dyvoovca δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ
“εῖρον, αἱ δὲ γιγνώσκουσαι 0 Tl TE ἀγαθὸν καὶ
ὅ τι κακόν" καὶ ἐείθην τῶν μὲν περὶ Tas ἡδονὰς
τὴν ἐαιχειριροὴν ἐμπειρίαν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τέχνην, τῶν
δὲ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἑαξβυσὴν τέχνην καὶ
πρὸς φϑλίοι, ὦ Καλλίκαλεις, Mize αὐτὸς οἴου
δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζειν μηγὰ: ὅ τι ἂν της σα-
Cm ta δοκοῦντα amoxoivou, μήτ᾽ αὖ τὰ ἘΠΕ
ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀποδέχου ὡς παίζοντος. ὁρᾷς γαὶρ,
ὅτι περὶ τούτον εἰσὶν ἡμῖω οἱ λόγοι, οὗ τί ἂν
μάλλον σπουδάσειέ τις χαὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων

84, PLATONIS

ἄνθρωπος, ἢ τοῦτο, ὅντινα. yon τρόπον ζὴν πότε-
ρον ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ, τὸ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ
SS / Ψ > Ὅν 7 Δ ὦ

ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντά τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ON-
τορικὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον τοῦτον τὸν
τρόπον, ὃν ὑμεῖς νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, ἢ ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν
Giov τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ τί mot’ ἐστὶν οὗτος
ἐκείνου διαφέρων ; ἴσως οὖν βέλτιστόν ἔστιν, ὡς
2! > No ’ ~ , ‘
ἄρτι Ey ἐπεχείρησα, διαιρεῖσθαι, διελομένους δὲ Ὁ
καὶ ὁμολογήσαντας ἀλλήλοις, εἰ ἔστι τούτω διττῶ

x 7 wr: és 4 2 ’ὔ Ἁ
τῶ βίω, σκέψασθαι τί τε διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν καὶ
ὁπότερον βιωτέον αὐτοῖν. ἴσως οὖν οὔπω οἶσθα
ti λέγων. KAA. Ov δῆτα. 222. “Add ΝΕ ὦ
σοι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. ἐπειδιὶ ὡιιολογήκαμεν ἐγώ
τε καὶ συ εἶναι μέν τι ἀγαθόν, εἶναι δέ τι ἡδύ,
[] . Ane: κ των ~ ¢ , Ν > ~
ἕτερον δὲ TO ἡδὺ Tov ayadou, ἑκατέρου δὲ αὐτοῖν
μελέτην τινο εἶναι καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως,

δ x Ὁ ς 4 ,ὔ Ἁ Ἁ ~ 3 ~
τὴν μὲν Tov ἡδέος ϑήραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ayabov —E

2 ‘ 4 ~ ~ ᾽ν , yn ,
αὐτὸ δὲ μοι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἢ σύυμφαθι, ἢ μὴ

/ v= ig
ovugys; KAA. Οὕτω φημί.

Car. LVI. 22. "J0u δή, ἃ καὶ πρὸς τούσδε
> Ν ” / ’ 2 2) ”
éya ἔλεγον διομολόγησαΐ μοι, εἰ ἄρα σοι ἔδοξα,

, > ~ r ” r ih ie ς δον ἢ
τότε ἀληθὴ λέγειν. ἕλεγον δὲ ποῦ, ὅτι ἡ μὲν οψο-
ποιικῃ οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐμπειρία, 7501
δ᾽ ἰατρική, λέγων, ὅτι ἡ μὲν τούτου οὗ ϑεραπεύει
καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ὧν πράτ-
τει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἑκάστου δοῦναι, ἡ
> 5 Pe c δ᾽ Cue 4 ~ ηὃ ~ ‘ cal ς 9
ἰατρική " ἡ δ᾽ ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς, πρὸς ἣν ἡ ε-
ραπεία αὐτῇ ἔστιν ἅπασα, κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπ᾿
αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι τὴν φύσιν σχεψαμένη τῆς
ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλόγως τε παντάπασιν,

GORGIAS. 85

ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν διαριθμησαμένη, τριδηὴ καὶ
. ἐμπειρία, μνήμην μόνον σωζομένη τοῦ εἰωθότος
, z ‘ \ foe x "ὃ ld eT
Β γίγνεσθαι, ᾧ δὴ καὶ πορίζεται τὰς ἡδονάς. ταῦτ
οὖν πρῶτον σχόπει εἰ δοκεῖ σοι ixavas λέγεσθαι,
καὶ εἶναί τινες καὶ περὲ ψυχὴν τοιαῦται ἄλλαι
πραγματεῖαι, at μὲν τεχνικαΐ, προμήθειάν τινα
51) τω Ἃ 7 Ἁ
ἔχουσαι τοῦ βελτίστον περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, ai δὲ
τούτου μὲν ὀλιγωροῦσαι, ἐσκεμμέναι δ᾽ αὖ, ὥσπερ
ἐχεῖ, τὴν ἡδονὴν μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς, τίνα ἂν αὐτῇ
τρόπον γίγνοιτο, ἥτις δὲ ἢ) βελτίων ἢ χείρων τῶν
ἡδονῶν οὔτε σχοπούμεναι, οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς
Ο ἄλλο ἢ χαρίζεσθαι μόνον, εἴτε βέλτιον εἴτε χεῖ-
> \ . ΄ 5 σ ΄ ~ +7
ρον. enor μὲν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, δοκοῦσί τε
εἶναι, καὶ ἔγωγέ φημι τὸ τοιοῦτον κολακείαν εἶναι
καὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ περὲ ἄλλο,
ὅτου ἄν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν ϑεραπεύῃ ἀσκέπτως ἔχων
τοῦ ἀμείνονος TE καὶ τοῦ χείρονος " συ δὲ δὴ πό-
τερον συγκατατίθεσαι ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων τὴν αὐ-
τὴν δόξαν ἢ ἀντίφῃς; KAA. Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ
συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῇ ὃ λόγος καὶ Iog-
’ = ‘ ‘
Dyia τῷδε. χαρίσωμαι. 2X§2. Πότερον δὲ περὶ μὲν
μίαν ψυχήν ἐστι τοῦτο, περὶ δὲ δύο καὶ πολλὰς
οὐκ ἔστιν; KAA. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ δύο καὶ
περὶ πολλάς. X42. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀθρόαις ἅμα
΄ ” ‘ 2 , \ I
χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι μηδὲν σκοπούμενον τὸ βέλτιστον ;
KAA. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

Cap. 011. 22.” Eyes οὖν εἰπεῖν αἵτινές
εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιτηδεύσεις ai τοῦτο ποιοῦσαι; δΙάλλον
δέ, εἰ βούλει, ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, ἣ μὲν ἄν σοι δοκῇ

’ > , a“ 4.» , \ , =
τούτων εἶναι, φάθι, ἡ δ᾽ ἂν μή, LH φάθι. πρῶ-

8

86 PLATONIS

tov δὲ σκεψώμεθα τὴν αὐλητικήν. ov δοκεῖ σοι Ἐ
τοιαύτη τις εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡμῶν «
μόνον διώκειν, ἄλλο δ᾽ οὐδὲν φροντίζειν; ΚΑΙ͂.
"Euows δοκεῖ. X§2. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε
ἅπασαι, οἷον ἡ κιθαριστικὴ ἡ ἕν τοῖς ἀγῶσι ;
KAA, Ναί. XL. Τί δὲ ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκα-
λία καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμθων ποίησις ; οὐ τοιαύτη
τίς σοι κατἀφαίνεται ; ἢ ἡγεῖ τι φροντίζειν Κι-
νησίαν τὸν Médntos, ὅπως ἐρεῖ τι τοιοῦτον, ὅθεν
ἂν οἱ ἀκούοντες βελτίους γίγνοιντο, 17) ὅ TL mEA-502
λει χαριεῖσθαι τῷ ὀχλῷ τῶν ϑεατῶν ; KAA.
Anhov dn τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, Κινησίου γε
πέρι. 2&2. Τί δὲ ὃ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ έλης ; ἦ
πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον βλέπων ἐδόκει σοι κιθαρῳδεῖν ;
ἢ) ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον ; ἡνία γορ
ἄδων τοὺς ϑεατάς. ἀλλὰ dn σκόπει " οὐχὲ H τε
κιθαρῳδικῇ δοκεῖ σοι πᾶσα καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμθων
ποίησις ἡδονῆς χάριν εὑρῆσθαι; KAA.” Epot-
γε. XS. Τί δὲ dn ἡ σεμνὴ αὕτη καὶ ϑαυμαστὴ Β
ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις ἐφ᾽ ᾧ ἐσπούδακε ; πότε-
ρόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδή, ὡς
σοὶ δοκεῖ, χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς ϑεαταῖς μόνον, ἢ καὶ
διαμάχεσθαι, ἐάν τι αὑτοῖς ἡδὺ μὲν ἢ καὶ κε-
χαρισμένον, πονηρὸν δέ, ὅπως τοῦτο μὲν μη) ἐρεῖ,
εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον, τοῦτο δὲ
καὶ λέξει καὶ ἄσεται, ἐάν τε χαίρωσιν ἐάν TE μή;
ποτέρως σοι δοκεῖ παρεσκευάσθαι ἡ τῶν τραγῳδι-
ὧν ποίησις; KAA, Ζῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώ-Ο
κρατες, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν μάλλον ὥρμηται καὲ
τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς ϑεαταῖς.. Σ.. Οὐκοῦν τὸ

GORGIAS. 87

S

~ , = ‘

τοιοῦτον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἔφαμεν νῦν dn κολα-

ld
. κείαν εἶναι; KAA. Πάνν ye. XS. Φέρε
δή, εἴ τις περιέλοιτο τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης TO TE
la \ b ς Ἁ Ἁ Ἂς 7 2! n
μέλος καὶ tov ρυθμὸν καὶ TO μέτρον, ἄλλο τι ἢ
λόγοι γίγνονται τὸ λειπόμενον; KAA. ᾿Αναγ-
xn. Σ,2. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον
Ὁ οὗτοι λέγονται οἱ λόγοι. KAA. Φημί. LX.

Γι >! VA > ε ,

Anunyogia ἄρα tis ἐστιν ἡ ποιητική. KAA.
3 “- ‘ a
Daivetat. 2X2, Οὐκοῦν ῥητορικὴ δημηγορία
ἂν εἴη. ἢ οὐ ῥητορεύειν δοκοῦσί σοι οἱ ποιηταὶ
ἐν τοῖς ϑεάτροις ; ΚΑΑ͂. ἔμοιγε. 222. Νῦν
ἄρα ἡμεῖς εὑρήκαμεν δητορικήν τινα πρὸς δῆμον
τοιοῦτον, οἷον παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικών καὶ

> ta \ ΓΝ ‘ > Le a 3
avdgayv, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων, ἣν οὐ mavu
. ἀγάμεθα " κολακικὴν yoo αὐτήν φαμεν εἶναι.

KAA. Πάνυ γε.

Car. LVIII. 22. Δ ῆῖεν.. ti δὲ ἡ πρὸς tov
᾿Αθηναίων δῆμον ῥητορικὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
Xx 2 ~ / / Χ ~ 2 x
E τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι δήμους τους τῶν ἐλευθέρων
ἀνδρῶν, τί ποτε ἡμῖν αὕτη ἐστί ; πότερόν σοι δο-
κοῦσι πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεὶ λέγειν οἱ ῥήτορες,
Ie ld σ S ~ ς fe
τούτον otoyatousvol, ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ws βέλτι-
στοι ἔσονται Sid τοὺς αὐτῶν λόγους, 1) καὶ οὗτοι
πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις ὡρμημένοι, καὶ
ἕνεκα τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ αὑτῶν ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ κοι-
νοῦ, ὥσπερ παισὶ προσομιλοῦσι τοῖς δήμοις, χαρί-
ζεσθαι αὐτοῖς πειρώμενοι μόνον, εἰ δέ γε βελτίους
ἔσονται ἢ χείρους διὰ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν ;
508 Κ'͵ἼΑ 4. Οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς " stot μὲν
x a ΄ ~ ~ r a r
yao οἵ κηδόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν λέγουσιν ἃ λέγου-

88 - PLATONIS

σιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οἵους ov λέγει. DL. ᾿Εξαρκεῖ.
εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι διπλοῦν, τὸ μὲν ἕτερόν πον
τούτου κολακεία ἂν εἴη καὶ αἰσχρὰ δημηγορία,
x 2 cf , \ / cr ¢

τὸ δ᾽ ἕτερον καλόν, TO παρασκευάζειν, ὑπῶς ὡς
βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ
διαμάχεσθαι λέγο ἡ βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἡδίω εἴ

μάχε γοντα ta βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἡδίω εἴτε
ἀηδέστερα ἔσται τοῖς ἀκούουσιν. GAA’ οὐ πώποτε Β
σὺ ταύτην εἶδες τὴν ῥητορικήν " ἢ εἴ τινα ἔχεις
τῶν ῥητόρων τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν, τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὲ
αὐτὸν ἔφρασας τίς ἐστιν; KAA. ᾿Αλλὰ μὰ A’
οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγέ σοι εἰπεῖν τῶν γε νῦν ῥητόρων οὐ-
δένα. 2. Τί δέ; τῶν παλαιῶν ἔχεις teva εἰ-
πεῖν, δι᾽ ὅντινα αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν ᾿“Ιθηναῖοι βελτί-
ous γεγονέναι, ἐπειδῃ ἐκεῖνος ἤρξατο δημηγορεῖν,
2 Ἂν; / / 7, 2! > Ν » Ν
ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ χείρους ὄντες : ἐγὼ μὲν YOO
οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστιν οὗτος. KAA. Ti δέ; O8-C
μιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα
καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα του-
τονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὗ καὶ συ ἀκή-
xous; Σ2. Hi ἔστι γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἣν πρό-
τερον συ ἔλεγες ἀρετήν, ἀληθής, τὸ Tas ἐπιθυμίας
ἀποπιμπλάναι καὶ τὸς αὑτοῦ καὶ τὸς τῶν ἄλλων "
εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ λόγῳ

μη ? Q Dias θη γᾷ

> c ἘΣ ς "ὦ τ ~
ἠναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖν, ὅτι at μὲν τῶν
2 Ἐπ U ΄ ὑπ ‘ 2»
ἐπιθυμιῶν πληρούμεναι βελτίω ποιοῦσι τὸν ἄν- Ὦ
θρωπον, ταύτας μὲν ἀποτελεῖν, at δὲ χείρω, μή"
τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι " τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα τούτων
τινοὶ γεγονέναι ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; KAA. Οὐκ ἔχω
ἔγωγε πῶς εἴπω.

Car. LIX. 22. "Add ἐὼν ζητῇς καλώς,

GORGIAS. 89

εὑρήσεις. ἴδωμεν dn οὑτωσὶν ἀτρέμα σχοπού-
μενοι, εἴ τις τούτων τοιοῦτος γέγονε. φέρε γάρ,
Ε ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων ἃ ἂν
λέγῃ ἄλλο τι οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐρεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποδλέπων πρός
τι; ὥσπερ καὶ οἵ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ βλέ-
ποντὲς πρὸς τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος οὐκ εἰκῇ
ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἔργον
τὸ αὑτοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως ἂν εἶδός τι αὐτῷ σχῇ τοῦτο,
ὃ ἐργάζεται. οἷον εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν τους ζωγρά-
gous, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυπὴηγούς, τοὺς
ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούς, ὅντινα βούλει av-
τῶν, ὡς εἰς τάξιν τινὰ ἕκαστος ἕχαστον τίθησιν ὃ
ἂν τιθῇ, καὶ προσαναγκάζει τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ
δθράπρέπον τε εἶναι καὶ ἁρμόττειν, ἕως ἂν τὸ ἅπαν
συστήσηται τεταγμένον TE καὶ κεκοσμημένον
πρᾶγμα, καὶ οἵ τε On ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ καὶ οὕς
νῦν On ἐλέγομεν, οἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα παιδοτρίδαι τε
καὶ ἰατροί, κοσμοῦσί πον τὸ σῶμα καὶ συντάττου-
σιν. ὁμολογοῦμεν οὕτω τοῦτ᾽ ἔχειν, ἢ οὔ ;
KAA. "Eoto τοῦτο οὕτω. X82. Τάξεως ἄρα
καὶ κόσμον τυχοῦσα. οἰκία χρηστὴ ἂν Ein, ἀταξίας
Bde μογθηρά; KAA. Φημί. XR. Οὐκοῦν καὶ
πλοῖον ὡσαύτως; KAA. Ναί. 22. Καὶ μὴν
καὶ τὸ σώματά φαμεν τὸ ἡμέτερα; KAA.
Πάνυ γε. Σ 2. Τί δ᾽ ἡ ψυχή; ἀταξίας τυχοῦ-
σα ἔσται γρηστή, ἢ τάξεώς τε καὶ κόσμου τινός :
KAA, ᾿νάγκη ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ τοῦτο συνο-
μολογεῖν. Σ ἢ. Τί οὖν ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώ-
ματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμον γιγνο-
μένῳ; KAA. “Ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν ἴσως λέγεις.
8

90 PLATONIS

Ὑ , κ 5 ~ 3 - “3
2. “ἔγωγε. τί δὲ av to ἐν τῇ wuyn ἐγγιγνο- C
~ ~ ~ ς
μένῳ ἐκ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου ; πειρῶ εὑ-

~ \ > ~ a > ’ A 2!
ρεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὄνομα. KAA.
Τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες ; XM.
“ALK? εἴ σοι ἥδιόν ἐστιν, ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. συ δέ, ἂν

fe eS) x ~ Ld f > ‘ ,
μέν σοι δοκῶ ἐγῶ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθι" εἰ δὲ μὴ;
ἔλεγχε καὶ μὴ ἐπίτρεπε. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν
τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεινόν, ἐξ

ra ee) 2 SG ane τὼ ἂν \ c LAA 2 Ν
οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ὑγίεια γίγνεται καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ
τοῦ σώματος. ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν; KAA,D
"Eou. 2X22. Ταῖς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσί τε καὶ
κοσμήσεσι νόμιμόν TE καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὲ νόμι-
μοι γίγνονται καὶ κόσμιοι" ταῦτα δ᾽ ἔστι δικαιο-
σύνῃ TE καὶ σωφροσύνη. φής, ἢ ov; KAA.
"Esta.

Carp. LX. 222. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα αὖ βλέ-
Mav ὃ ῥήτωρ ἐκχεῖνος, ὃ τεγνικός TE καὶ ἀγα-
θός, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ταῖς ψυχαῖς οὕς
ἂν λέγῃ καὶ tas πράξεις ἁπάσας, καὶ δῶρον
2 7 - VA Ἁ pd > “ >
ἐᾶν TL διδῷ, δώσει, καὶ ἐάν TL APALENTAL, ἀφαι-
ρήσεται, πρὸς τοῦτο ἀεὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως E
ἂν αὐτοῦ τοῖς πολίταις δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς
ψυχαῖς γίγνηται, ἀδικία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ
σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐγγίγνηται, ἀκολασία δὲ ἀπαλ-
λάττηται, καὶ ἡ ἄλλῃ ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνηται, κακία
δὲ ἀπίῃ; συγχωρεῖς, ἢ οὔ; KAA. Συγχωρώ.
2X, Τί γὰρ ὄφελος, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, σώματί γε
κάμνοντι καὶ μοχθηρῶς διακειμένῳ σιτία. πολλὰ
διδόναι καὶ τὼ ἥδιστα ἢ ποτὰ ἢ ἄλλ᾽ ὁτιοῦν, ὃ

ἣν > , > Ἄν. SF 9 a ; vn > ,

(ἢ ὀνήσει αὐτὸ ἔσθ᾽ ὅτε πλέον ἢ τοὐναντίον, κα-

GORGIAS. 91

505TH γε τὸν δίκαιον λόγον, καὶ ἔλαττον ; ἔστι ταῦ-
ta; ΚΑΔΑ. Ἔστω. Σ.Ώ. Ov γάρ, οἶμαι, λυ-
σιτελεῖ peta μοχθηρίας σώματος ζῆν ἀνθρώπῳ"
ἀνάγκῃ yoo οὕτω καὶ ζὴν μοχθηρῶς. ἢ οὐχ
ὄστω;; KAA. Ναί. XI. Οὐκοῦν καὶ tas
ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, οἷον πεινῶντα. φαγεῖν
ὅσον βούλεται ἢ διψῶντα πιεῖν, ὑγιαίνοντα μὲν
ἐῶσιν οἱ ἰατροὶ ὡς τὼ πολλά, κάμνοντα δέ, ὡς
ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέποτ᾽ ἐῶσιν ἐμπίπλασθαι ὧν ἐπι-
θυμεῖ ; συγχωρεῖς τοῦτό γε καὶ ov; KAA.
B’Eyaye. XSL. Περὶ δὲ ψυχήν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐχ ὃ av-
τὸς τρόπος ; ἕως μὲν ἂν πονηροὶ ἢ, ἀνόητός TE OV-
σα καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος, εἴργειν
αὐτὴν δεῖ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἄλλ᾽
ἄττα ποιεῖν ἢ ἀφ᾽ ὧν βελτίων ἔσται; φῇς, ἢ OV;
KAA. Φημί. XQ. Οὕτω γάρ που αὐτῇ ἄμκει-
γον τῇ ψυχῇ. KAA. Πάνυ γε. XSL. Οὐκοῦν"
τὸ εἴργειν ἐστὶν ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάζειν ;
KAA. Nai. 2X2. Τὸ κολάζεσθαι. ἄρα τῇ ψυ-
χῇ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἢ ἡ ἀκολασία, ὥσπερ συ νῦν δὴ
“gov. KAA. Οὐκ oid’ ἅττα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρα-
τες, ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλον τινὰ ἐρώτα. Σ2. Οὗτος ἀνὴρ
οὐχ ὑπομένει ὠφελούμενος καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο πά-
σχων, περὶ οὗ ὃ λόγος ἐστί, κολαζόμενος. KAA,
Οὐδέ γέ μοι μέλει οὐδὲν ὧν συ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτά
σοι Lopyiov χάριν ἀπεχρινάμην. X22. Εἶεν.
τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν ; μεταξυ τὸν λόγον κατα-
λύομεν; KAA, Αὐτὸς γνώσει. 2. “Add?
Ὦ οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους φασὶ μεταξυ ϑέμις εἶναι κατα-
λείπειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιθέντας κεφαλήν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνεν

92 PLATONIS

κεφαλῆς περιίῃ. ἀπόχριναι οὖν καὶ tad λοιπά,
ca Cc mw ς / Ν /
iva ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος κεφαλὴν λάθῃ.

Car. LXI. KAA. “Ὥς βίαιος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρα-
τες. ἐὰν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ἐάσεις γαίρειν τοῦτον
τὸν λόγον, ἢ καὶ ἄλλῳ τῳ διαλέξει. XS. Τίς
οὖν ἄλλος ἐθέλει; μὴ γάρ τοι ἀτελῇ γε τὸν Ad-
γον καταλείπωμεν. KAA. Αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν
δύναιο διελθεῖν τὸν λόγον, 7 λέγων κατὰ σαυτὸν E
ἢ ἀποκρινόμενος σαυτῷ; 22. “Iva μοι τὸ τοῦ
᾿Επιχάρμον γένηται, ἃ πρὸ τοῦ δύο ἄνδρες EA

χάρμου γένηται, ἃ πρὸ νδρες ἔλε-
γον, εἷς ὧν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι. atag κινδυνεύει
ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι οὕτως. εἰ μέντοι ποιήσο-
μὲν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονείκως
ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς τί ἐστι περὶ ὧν
λέγοιεν καὶ τί ψεῦδος " κοινὸν yao ἀγαθὸν
ἅπασι φανερὸν γενέσθαι αὐτό. δίειμι μὲν οὖν ©
τῷ λόγῳ ἐγὼ ὡς ἄν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν" ἐὰν δέ τῷ δ06
t ἐ t
ς ~ Ν Ν 2! ~ is ~ > Lod Ἀ
ὑμῶν μ᾽ Ta ὄντα δοκῶ ὁμολογεῖν ἐμαυτῷ, χρὴ
? or Ἁ > iA > ‘ ,
αἀντιλαμθανεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν. οὐδὲ YaQ TOL
ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ᾽
ὑμῶν, ὥστε, ἄν τι φαίνηται λέγων ὃ ἀμφισθητῶν
ἐμοί, ἐγὼ πρῶτος συγχωρήσομαι. λέγω μέντοι
ταῦτα, εἰ δοκεῖ γρῆναι διαπερανθῆναι τὸν λό-
) ν \ , >~ \ ᾿ὕ, \
γον" εἰ δὲ un βούλεσθε, Eanev δὴ χαίρειν καὶ
ἀπίωμεν. IOP. ᾿Αλλ’ ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ, ὦ
“Σώχρατες, yonvat mo ἀπιέναι, adda διεξελθεῖν Β
σε τὸν λόγον" φαίνεται δέ μοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
δοκεῖν. βούλομαι γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκοῦσαί
ΕῚ Cod >
Gov αὐτοῦ dudvtos τὸ ἐπίλοιπα. XS. Addo

. 5 rn

μὲν δή, ὦ Τοργία, καὶ αὐτὸς ἡδέως μὲν ἂν Kad-

GORGIAS. 93

~ , » / a > ~ ‘ ~
λικλεῖ τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμην, ἕως αὐτῷ THY TOU
t t
> ΄. ea, c~ > \ ~ ~ 7,
Aupiovos ἀπέδωκα ῥῆσιν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου"
ἐπειδὴ δὲ σύ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλεις συνδια-
περᾶναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ἐμοῦ YE ἀκούων
C ἐπιλαμθάνου, ἐάν τί σοι δοκῶ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν.
καί μὲ ἐὼν ἐξελέγξῃς, οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαΐ σοι,
ὥσπερ συ ἐμοί, ἀλλο μέγιστος εὐεργέτης παρ᾽
ἐμοὶ ἀναγεγράψει. KAA. Ζέγε, ὦ ’᾽γαθέ, αὐτὸς
καὶ πέραινε.

Cap. {Χ1Π1.. 222, “Axove δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμοῦ
ἀναλαθόντος τὸν λόγον. "Apu τὸ dv καὶ τὸ
ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν: Ov ταὐτόν, ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ
Καλλικλῆς ὡμολογήσαμεν. Πότερον δὲ τὸ ἡδυ
ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρακτέον, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἕνεκα
τοῦ ἡδέος: Τὸ ἡδυ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. “Hdv

ts ~ - , Car >

D δὲ ἔστι τοῦτο, οὗ παραγενομένου ἡδόμεθα ; ἀγα-
θὸν δέ, οὗ παρόντος ἀγαθοί ἐσμεν; Πάνυ γε.
᾿Αλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τάλλα
πάντα ὅσα ἀγαθά ἐστιν, ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενο-
μένης; ~Euotye δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὦ Καλ-
λίκλεις. ᾿Αλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἡ γε ἀρετὴ ἑκάστου, καὶ
σκεύους καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς avd καὶ ζώον
’, > = 2 ~ fe 7
παντὸς, OV τῷ εἴχῃ xXaAALGTAa παραγίγνεται,
ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέγνῃ. ἥτις ἑκάστῳ

. é ρθύτη χνῃ, ἥ ;
? 7ὔ 3 “- Ey ” Led > Ν ‘
ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν. aga ἔστι ταῦτα; ᾿Εγὼ μὲν

Ε γάρ φημι. Τάξει ἄρα τεταγμένον καὶ κεκοσμη-
μένον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετῇ ἑκάστου; Φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε.
Κόσμος τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὃ ἑκάστου
οἰκεῖος ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων;

"Εμοιγε δοκεῖ. Καὶ ψυχὴ ἄρα κόσμον ἔχουσα

94, PLATONIS

‘ c ~ >? , - > [4 3
τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἀμείνων τῆς ἀκοσμήτου ; ᾿Ανάγκη.
"AME μὴν ἣ γε κόσμον ἔχουσα χοσμία; Las
γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; “H δέ γε κοσμία σώφρων ; 601
᾿ Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. “H ἄρα σώφρων ψυχῇ ἀγαθή.
"Eye μὲν οὐκ ἔχω παρὸ ταῦτα ἄλλα φάναι, ὦ
φίλε Καλλίκλεις" σὺ δ᾽ εἰ ἔχεις, δίδασκε. KAA.
-«“1ἐγ’, ὦ ᾽γαθές. Σ, Aévo δὴ, ὅτι, εἰ ἡ σώφρων.
ἀγαθή ἐστιν, ἡ τοὐναντίον τῇ σώφρονι πεπονθυῖα
κακή ἐστιν. ἣν δὲ αὕτη ἡ ἄφρων TE καὶ ἀκό-
hactos; “Πάνυ ye. Καὶ μὴν ὅ γε σώφρων τὰ
προσήκοντα πράττοι ἂν καὶ περὶ ϑεοὺς καὶ περὲ
ἀνθρώπους; οὐ γὰρ ἂν σωφρονοῖ τὸ μη προσή-
κοντα πράττων. ᾿Ανάγκη -.ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι οὕτω.

\ ‘ X ‘ 2 4 Ν iP.
Kai μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους ta προσήκοντα B
πράττων δίκαι᾽ ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ ϑεοὺς ὅσια"
τὸν δὲ τὼ δίκαια καὶ ὅσια πράττοντα ἀνάγκῃ δί-
, 9 > 35 = \ ’

καιον καὶ ὅσιον εἰναι; Hott ταῦτα. Kou μὲν
dn καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν γε ἀνάγκη ; ov yao δὴ σώφρονος
ἀνδρός ἐστιν οὔτε διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν ἃ μὴ) προσ-
, > ~ Pes
ηκει, ἀλλ᾽ ἃ δεῖ καὶ πράγματα xat ἀνθρώπους
καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν, KOE
ς la ~ [4 ~ ivi A.
ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν omov δεῖ" ὥστε πολλὴ
ἀνάγχη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σώφρονα ὥσπερ διήλ-
θομεν, δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅσιον aya-

\ ” > ’ Ν ‘ ? Ν 5 Ἁ
θὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι τελέως, τὸν δὲ αγαθὸν EV TE καὶ
καλῶς πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττῃ, τὸν δ᾽ εὖ πράττον-
τα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πο-
νηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα ἄθλιον. οὗτος δ᾽ ἂν
5», c > 7 »” ,., Vs ς > / a
εἴη ὃ ἐναντίως ἔχων τῷ σώφρονι, ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ὃν
ov ἐπήνεις. Cap. LXIII. ᾿γὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα

GORGIAS. 95

~ > “Ὁ i
οὕτω τίθεμαι καί φημι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι. Et δὲ
Ὁ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ, τὸν βουλόμενον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐδαί-
μονα εἶναι σωφροσύνην μὲν διωκτέον καὶ ἀσκη-
τέον, ἀκολασίαν δὲ φευκτέον ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν ἕκα-
στος ἡμῶν, καὶ παρασκευαστέον μάλιστα μὲν
μηδὲν δεῖσθαι τοῦ κολάζεσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ δεηθῇ ἢ
BexaS nF = 2 7 Ay | ’ ” /
αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν οἰκείων, ἡ ἰδιώτης ἢ πόλις,
> Δ ’, Ἁ > iY 2 Μδ'
ἐπιθετέον δίκην καὶ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει evdai-
μῶν εἶναι. οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὁ σκοπὸς εἶναι,
πρὸς ὃν βλέποντα δεῖ ζῆν, καὶ πάντα εἰς τοῦτο
τὼ αὑτοῦ συντείνοντα καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως
᾿ Va ΄ ‘ 7 ὍΔ. rc
E δικαιοσύνη παρέσται καὶ σωφροσύνη τῷ μακαρίῳ
, 5) a , 32 >
μέλλοντι ἔσεσθαι, οὕτω πράττειν, οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας
ἐῶντα ἀκολάστους εἶναι καὶ ταύτας ἐπιχειροῦντα
πληροῦν, ἀνήνυτον κακόν, λῃστοῦ βίον ζῶντα.
οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ προσφιλὴς ἂν εἴη ὃ
τοιοῦτος οὔτε ϑεῷ " κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος "
[4 ‘ ” ’ , x 3
ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἔνι κοινωνία, φιλία οὐκ ἂν εἴη. past
δ᾽ of σοφοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γὴν
508xaL ϑεους καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν
καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ
δικαιότητα, ---- καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο dia ταῦτα κό-
σιον καλοῦσιν, ὦ Etaige, —ovx ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ
ἀκολασίαν. συ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν τὸν
4 [4 Ἁ ~ ‘ 21 2) A , ,
νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα Gopos ὧν, ahha λέληθε
u See Ld Ν \ ~
σε, ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικῇ καὶ ἐν ϑεοῖς καὶ ἐν
> , la & Ἃ ‘ 4 »
ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται. ov δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἴξει
δεῖν ἀσκεῖν " γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς. Εἶεν. ἢ
Φ' 7 Ἁ ς ~ >
B ἐξελεγκτέος Jn οὗτος ὃ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔστιν, ws οὐ
δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης κτήσει εὐδαίμονες

96 PLATONIS

οἱ εὐδαίμονες, κακίας δὲ of ἄθλιοι " 1) εἶ, οὗτος
ἀληθής ἐστι, σκεπτέον τί τὸ συμθδαίνοντα. τὸ
πρόσθεν ἐκεῖνα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, συμθαίνει πάντα,
ΤΩΝ ~ / 2 2 ly f re
Ep’ οἷς GU μὲ ἤρου, εἰ σπουδάζων λέγοιμι, Aé-
γοντα, ὅτι κατηγορητέον ELN καὶ αὑτοῦ καὶ υἱέος
καὶ ἑταίρον, ἐάν τι ἀδικῇ, καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐπὶ
τοῦτο χρηστέον. καὶ ἃ Πωώλον αἰσχύνῃ ᾧου
συγχωρεῖν, ἀληθη ἄρα ἣν, τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ C
ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅσῳπερ αἴσχιον, τοσούτῳ κάκιον " καὶ
Ν Ms 3 - c ‘ ” y
tov μέλλοντα ορθῶς ῥδητοριχὸν ἔσεσθαι δίκαιον
» ~ ΗΝ ἐπ >
ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμονα τῶν δικαίων, ὃ αὖ
΄ ” ~ 9 > ,ὔ ς »
Lopyiav ἔφη Πωῶλος δι᾽ αἰσχύνην ὁμολογῆσαι.
Ἁ a id
Cap. LXIV. Tovtay δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων, oxewo-
’΄ 9 >? Ἁ a \Wree} We ΄ S ~
μέθα Ti ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἃ σὺ ἐμοὶ ονειδίζεις, doa καλῶς
, n 2) ς ” 2 \ > sr 9 en]
λέγεται, ἢ OV, ὡς ἄρα ἐγὼ οὐχ οἷός τ᾽ εἰμὲ βοη-
«ὠ 3, ὍΝ > τος 2
θῆσαι οὔτε ἐμαυτῷ OVTE τῶν φίλων οὐδενὶ οὐδὲ
τῶν οἰκείων, οὐδ᾽ ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύ-
2 \ ‘ > \ oo ΤΑ c c 32»
νῶν, εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄτιμοι Ὦ
τοῦ ἐθέλοντος, ἄν τε τύπτειν βούληται, τὸ νεα-
γικὸν δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ἐπὶ κόῤῥης, ἐάν
TE χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, Edv τε ἐκθάλλειν ἐκ τῆς
πόλεως, ἐάν τε, τὸ ἔσχατον, ἀποκτεῖναι" καὶ οὕτω
διακεῖσθαι πάντων Oy) αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ σὸς
Cc ‘ > ‘
λόγος. ὁ δὲ δὴ ἐμός, ὅστις πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη εἴ-
at “ , ν. ἡ ΄ 2!
ρηται, οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει καὶ ἔτι λέγεσθαι" OV φη-
μι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸ τύπτεσθαι ἐπὶ κόῤῥης ἀδίκως E
αἴσχιστον εἶναι, οὐδέ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ
bd Ἁ > ‘ 2! ‘ , ) Ν ‘ ,
σῶμα TO ἐμὸν οὔτε TO βαλάντιον, ἀλλὰ TO τύπτειν
\ > ‘ Ἁ Ἃ 2 ‘ > “τ \ [4 \ »”
καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ TH EW ἀδίκως καὶ τέμνειν καὶ αἱ-
OYLOV καὶ κάκιον, καὶ κλέπτειν γε ἅμα καὶ ἀνδρα-

GORGIAS. 97

ποδίζεσθαι καὶ τοιχωρυχεῖν καὶ συλλήθδην ὁτιοῦν
ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὸ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ai-
σχιον καὶ κάκιον εἶναι ἢ ἐμοὶ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ.
ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις

δρθθοὕτω φανέντα, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, κατέχεται καὶ δέ-

Cc

δεται, καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἔστι, σιδηροῖς
καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις λόγοις, ὡς γοῦν ἂν δόξειεν
οὑτωσίν, οὕς συ εἰ μὴ λύσεις ἢ σοῦ τις νεανικώ-
> i alt wv , wn «ς 2 Ἁ ~
TEQOS, οὐχ οἷόν τε, ἄλλως λέγοντα ἢ ὡς EYa νῦν
hé A = X 4 Ξ 2 Ἁ ” ς ? a i ’
ya, καλῶς λέγειν - ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος
ἐστὶν ἀεί, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδα ὕπως ἔχει, ὅτι
μέντοι ὧν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα, ὥσπερ νῦν, οὐδεὶς οἷός
τ᾽ ἐστὶν ἄλλως λέγων μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος εἶναι.
ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν αὖ τίθημι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ
οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν ἡ ἀδι-
κία τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, καὶ ἔτι τούτου μεῖζον μεγίστον
2! > TA eed os , ,
ὄντος, εἰ οἷον TE, TO ἀδιχουντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην,
τίνα ἂν βοήθειαν un δυνάμενος avd β
un μ ἄνθρωπος βοη-
θεῖν ἑαυτῷ καταγέλαστος ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἴη;
ε ε

GQ” οὐ ταύτην, ἥτις ἀποτρέψει τὴν μεγίστην

ἡμῶν βλάθδην ; ἀλλὰ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ταύτην εἶναι
τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν, μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν
μήτε ἑαυτῷ μήτε τοῖς αὑτοῦ φίλοις TE καὶ οἰχεί-
οις, δευτέραν δὲ τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ καὶ τρί-
την τὴν τοῦ τρίτου, καὶ τἄλλα οὕτως" ὡς ἕχά-
στου καχοῦ μέγεθος πέφυκεν, οὕτω καὶ κάλλος
τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐφ᾽ Exacta βοηθεῖν καὶ aicyv-
νῃ τοῦ μή. ἄρα ἄλλως, ἢ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Καλλί-
κλεις; KAA. Ovx ἄλλως. Ὶ

Carp. LXV. S22. Δυοῖν οὖν ὄντοιν, τοῦ ἀδι-
9

93 PLATONIS

κεῖν τε καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μεῖζον μέν φαμὲν κακὸν
τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. τί οὖν ἂν
παρασχευασάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθήσειεν αὑτῷ,
ὥστε ἀμφοτέρας τοὶς ὠφελείας ταύτας ἔχειν, τήν Ὁ
TE ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μη ἀδι-
κεῖσθαι ; πότερα δύναμιν, ἢ βούλησιν; ὧδε δὲ
λέγω πότερον ἐὼν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ
ἀδικήσεται, ἐὰν δύναμιν παρασκευάσηται τοῦ
μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται ; KAA. Anhoy
dy τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ἐὼν δύναμιν. 2X2, Τί δὲ δὴ
τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ; πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖν,
ἱκανὸν τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν --- ov γὰρ ἀδικήσει ----, ἢ καὶ E
ἐπὶ τοῦτο δεῖ δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην παρα-
σχκευάσασθαι, ὡς, ἐὰν μὴ μάθῃ αὐτὼ καὶ ἀσκήσῃ,
ἀδικήσει; Ti οὐκ αὐτό γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεχρίνω,
ὦ Καλλίκλεις ; πότερόν σοι δοκοῦμεν ὀρθῶς
ἀναγκασθῆναι ὁμολογεῖν ἕν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λό-
yous ἐγώ τε καὶ Πώλος, ἢ οὔ, ἡνίκα ὡμολογήσα-
μὲν μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄκοντας
τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν; KAA,” Eote
σοι τοῦτο, ὦ “Σώκρατες, οὕτως, ἵνα διαπεράνῃςδιο
τὸν λόγον. 2X2. Kai ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε,
παρασκεναστέον ἐστὶ δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην,
ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσωμεν. KAA. Πάνυ γε. Σ2.
Tis οὖν mot’ ἐστὲ τέχνῃ τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ
μηδὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ὡς ὀλίγιστα ; σκέψαι, εἰ σοὲ
δοκεῖ ἥπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ μὲν yao δοκεῖ ἥδε" ἢ
αὐτὸν ἄρχειν δεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ καὶ τυραννεῖν,
ἢ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας ἑταῖρον εἶναι.
KAA. Ὁρᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγὼ ἕτοιμός εἶμι

GORGIAS. 99

~ ~ ~ , ~
Β ἐπαινεῖν, av τι καλῶς λέγῃς ; τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖς
πάνυ καλῶς εἰρηκέναι.

Car. LXVI. 22. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐάν σοι
δοκῶ εὖ λέγειν. φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἕκά-
στῳ εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, ὅνπερ οἱ παλαιοί
τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὃ ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ. οὐ
καὶ σοί; KAA.” Euoye. Σ. Οὐκοῦν ὅπου
τύραννός ἐστιν ἄργων ἄγριος καὶ ἀπαίδευτος, εἴ

Ld > = / ‘ 7 ”
τις τούτου ἐν τῇ πόλει πολυ βελτίων εἴη, φο-
θοῖτο δήπου" ἂν αὐτὸν ὁ τύραννος καὶ τούτῳ ἐξ
Ο ἅπαντος τοῦ νοῦ οὐκ ἄν note δύναιτο φίλος
γενέσθαι; KAA. “Eow ταῦτα. Σ,. Οὐδέ
» Ν / ” 27Q9 WA re
ye εἴ τις πολὺ φαυλότερος etn, οὐδ᾽ ἂν οὗτος "
χκαταφρονοῖ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῦ ὃ τύραννος καὶ οὐκ
ἄν ποτε ὡς πρὸς φίλον σπουδάσει. KAA. Καὶ
ταῦτ᾽ ἀληθῆ. XS. “είπεται dn ἐκεῖνος μόνος
ἄξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὃς ἄν, buon)
s λόγου φίλος. τᾷ ρ, Os ἄν, ὁμοήθης
2, > Ν , ‘ 2 = 3 , 3!
ὦν, ταυτὰ ψέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν ἐθέλῃ ἄρχεσθαι
καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι. οὗτος μέγα ἐν ταύ-
Dty τῇ πόλει δυνήσεται - τοῦτον οὐδεὶς γαίρων
ἀδικήσει. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; KAA. Ναί. XS.
Ei ἄρα τις ἐννοήσειεν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν
νέων, Τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ
μηδείς μὲ ἀδικοίη, αὕτη, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτῷ ὃδός
ἐστιν, εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ἐθίζειν αὑτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς
χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ παρα-
σκευάζειν, ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὅμοιος ἔσται ἐκείνῳ.
Eovy οὕτως; KAA. Nai. 2X82. Οὐκοῦν τού-
ῳ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι, ὦ
τῷ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖ ὲ μέγα δύν , ὡς
i ς > “-» ,
ὁ ὑμέτερος λόγος, ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπεπράξεται.

100 PLATONIS

KAA. Πάνν ye. 22. * Ao’ οὖν καὶ τὸ μὴ
ἀδικεῖν ; πολλοῦ δεῖ, εἴπερ ὅμοιος ἔσται τῷ
ἄρχοντι, ὄντι ἀδίκῳ, καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ μέγα δυνής-
σεται; ἀλλ᾽ οἶμαι ἔγωγε, πᾶν τοὐναντίον οὐ-
τωσὶ ἡ παρασκευ)) ἔσται αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸ οἵῳ τε εἶναι
ς ~ > ~ \ > ~ \ ΄
ὡς πλεῖστα ἀδικεῖν καὶ adixovvta μη διδοναιδιι
δίχην. ἡ γάρ; KAA. Φαίνεται. XSL. Οὐκ-
- Ἂν , > - \ © 4 Lond
οὖν τὸ μέγιστον αὐτῷ xaxoy ὑπάρξει, μοχθηρῷ
3», Ν Ἁ , ‘\ Ν ,
ὄντι THY ψυχὴν καὶ λελωθημένῳ dia THY μίμησιν
τοῦ δεσπότου καὶ δύναμιν. KAA. Οὐκ oid’
ὅπῃ στρέφεις ἑκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κά-
5 , rn > > “ τ ς ,
τω, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα, OTL οὗτος ὃ μιμού-
μένος τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον ἐκεῖνον ἀποκτενεῖ, ἐὰν
βούληται, καὶ ἀφαιρήσεται τὼ ὄντα; XS. Οἶδα, 8
ὦ ᾽γαθὲ Καλλίχκλεις, εἰ μὴ κωφός γ᾽ εἰμί, καὶ σοῦ
ἀκούων καὶ Πώλου ἄρτι πολλάκις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
> ’ , CH 2 ot , ? Ν Ἁ ‘
ολίγου πάντων τῶν ἕν τῇ πόλει. ἀλλα xal ov
> ov [σὲ 2 ~ is ” VA > A
ἐμοῦ AXOVE, OTL ἀποκτενεῖ μέν, ἂν βούληται, αλλὰ
πονηρὸς ὧν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν ὄντα. KAA. Οὐκοῦν
τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν ; XS2. Οὐ νοῦν
γε ἔχοντι, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. ἢ οἴει δεῖν τοῦτο
παρασκευάζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον
ζῆν, καὶ μελετᾶν τὰς τέχνας ταύτας, αἵ ἡμᾶς ἀεὶ
ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων σώζουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἣν ov κε-Ο
λεύεις ἐμὲ μελετᾶν τὴν ῥητορικήν, τὴν ἐν τοῖς δε-
καστηρίοις διασώζουσαν ; KAA. Ναὶ μὰ Ad’
ὀρθῶς γέ σοι συμθουλεύων.
Car. LXVH. 2.2. Τί δέ, ὦ βέλει δα
“ ~ ~ ue
καὶ ἡ τοῦ νεῖν ἐπιστήμη σεμνή τίς σοι δοκεῖ Et-

yor; KAA. Μὰ di’ οὐκ ἔμοιγε. 222. Καὶ

GORGTAS. 101

κι , ι “ > , \ 3 ,
μὴν σώζει γε καὶ αὕτη ἐκ ϑανάτου τοὺς ἀνθρώ-
πους, ὅταν εἰς τοιοῦτον ἐμπέσωσιν, οὗ δεῖ ταύτης

ἢ τῆς ἐπιστήμης. εἰ δ᾽ αὕτη σοι δοκεῖ σμικρὰ εἶ-
ναι, ἐγώ σοι μείζονα ταύτης ἐρῶ, τὴν κυδερνητι-

va «ἃ > Γι Ἀ ᾿ > ἣν A Ἧς
κήν, ἣ οὐ μόνον τὰς wuyas σώζει, ἀλλο καὶ τὰ
σώματα καὶ τὼ γρήματα ἔκ τῶν ἐσχάτων κινδύ-

7 Cu5 BE 4 \ e \
νων, ὥσπερ ἡ φῥητορική. καὶ αὕτη μὲν προσε-
’ 2 7

σταλμένη ἐστὲ καὶ κοσμία, καὶ OV σεμνύνεται
ἐσχηματισμένη ὡς ὑπερήφανόν τι διαπραττομένη,
ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ διαπραξαμένη τῇ δικανικῇ, ἐὰν μὲν
ἐξ Αἰψίνης δεῦρο σώσῃ, οἶμαι, δύ᾽ ὀθολοὺς ἐπρά-
E Eato, ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου ἢ éx τοῦ Πόντου, ἐὰν
πάμπολυ ταύτης τῆς μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας, σώσασ᾽
ἃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ παῖδας καὶ χρή-
ματα καὶ γυναῖχας, ἀποθιθάσασ᾽ εἰς τὸν λιμένα
δύο δραχμαὶς ἐπράξατο, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἔχων τὴν τέ-
χνὴν καὶ ταῦτα διαπραξάμενος ἐκθὰς παρὸ τὴν

, \ X = ~ 5 ’΄ la
ϑάλατταν καὶ τὴν vavy περιπατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ σχή-
ματι. λογίζεσθαι γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐπίσταται, ὅτι
” if > ivf , 3 4 δὲ 4
ἄδηλον ἔστιν ovotivas τε ὠφέληκε τῶν συμπλεόν-
τῶν οὐκ ἐάσας καταποντωθῆναι καὶ οὕστινας
ἔδλαψεν, εἰδως, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς βελτίους ἐξεθί-

δισθασεν ἢ οἷοι ἐνέθησαν, οὔτε τὼ σώματα οὔτε Tas
ψυχάς. λογίζεται οὖν, ὅτι οὐκ, εἰ μέν τις μεγά-
λοις καὶ ἀνιάτοις νοσήμασι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνε-
χόμενος μὴ ἀπεπνίγη, οὗτος μὲν ἄθλιός ἐστιν, ὅτι
οὐκ ἀπέθανε, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὠφέληται - εἰ

, 2: 2 fe! ~ [4 ͵ ~
δέ τις ἄρα ἐν τῷ TOV σώματος τιμιωτέρῳ, TH

- Ἀ , ” \ Js ae /
ψυχῇ, πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ ἀνίατα, τούτῳ

‘ f > \ Ἁ ~ 32
δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὲ καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσειεν, ἄν τε ἐκ

g*

102 PLATONIS

ϑαλάττης av te ἐκ δικαστηρίον ay te ἄλλοθεν

ὁποθενοῦν σώσῃ. ἀλλ᾽ οἶδεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινόν ἐστι B

~ ~ ~ > r ~ Ἀ ? 4
fyv τῷ μοχθηρῷ ανθρώπῳ κακῶς yao avaynn
ἐστὶ ζῆν. Carp. ΠΧΥΤΠῚῚ. Διὰ ταῦτα οὐ νόμος
ἐστὶ σεμνύνεσθαι τὸν κυθερνήτην, καίπερ σώζοντα
ἡμᾶς. οὐδέ γε, ὦ ϑαυμάσιε, τὸν μηχανοποιόν, ὃς
GUTE στρατηγοῦ, μη ὅτι κυδερνήτου, οὔτε ἄλλον
> ‘ > , Sa? , , ,
οὐδενὸς ἑλάττω ἑνίοτε δύναται σώζειν " πόλεις
‘ ” er g , , ~ Ν A)
yao ἔστιν ὅτε ὅλας σώζει. μή σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν
δικανικὸν εἶναι; καίτοι εἰ βούλοιτο λέγειν, ὦ
Καλλίκλεις, ἅπερ ὑμεῖς, σεμνύνων τὸ πρᾶγμα,
κατοαχώσειεν ἂν ὑμᾶς τοῖς λόγοις, λέγων καὶ πα-
ρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γίγνεσθαι μηχανοποιούς, ὡς
οὐδὲν τἀλλά ἐστιν " ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὃ λόγος.
ἀλλὰ συ οὐδὲν ἧττον αὐτοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῆς
τέχνης τῆς ἐκείνου, καὶ ὡς ἐν ὀνείδει ἀποκαλέσαις
ἂν μηχανοποιόν, καὶ τῷ υἱεῖ αὐτοῦ οὔτ᾽ ἂν δοῦ-
’ > [4 > 9 vn > Ἁ ~ ~
ναι ϑυγατέρα ἐθέλοις, οὔτ᾽ ἂν aVvTOS τῷ σαντοῦ
λαθεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου. καίτοι ἐξ ὧν Ta σαυτοῦ ἐπαι-
γεῖς, τίνι δικαίῳ λόγῳ τοῦ μηχανοποιοῦ καταφρο-

Cc

veis καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον ; οἶδ᾽ ὅτι Ὁ

φαίης ἂν βελτίων εἶναι καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων. τὸ δὲ
βέλτιον εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτ᾽
ἐστὶν ἀρετή, τὸ σώζειν αὑτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ὄντα
ὁποῖός τις ἔτυχε, καταγέλαστός σοι ὁ ψόγος γίγνε-
ται καὶ πη τὴ καὶ ἰατροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
τεχνῶν, ὅσαι τοῦ σώζειν ἕνεκα πεποίηνται. ἀλλ᾽,
ὦ μακάριε, ὅρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ
ἀγαθὸν ἢ τοῦ σώζειν τε καὶ σώζεσθαι. μὴ yao

lend 4 ‘ μα ς Ν [ , c
τοῦτο μέν, τὸ Cyv ὁποσονδὴ χρόνον, tov γὲ asE

GORGIAS. 103

3 ~ ” > , > ‘ \ 3 4
ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἑατέον ἐστὶ καὶ OV φιλοψυχητέον,
ἀλλὰ ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ ϑεῷ καὶ πι-
στεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξὶν, ὅτι τὴν εἱμαρμένην
οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς ἐκφύγοι, τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ σχεπτέον, τίν᾽
vn ld Cz a lj / = «ς
ἂν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν μέλλει γρόνον βιώναι ὡς
ἄριστα βιῴη, doa ἐξομοιῶν αὑτὸν τῇ πολιτείᾳ
διδταύτῃ, ἐν ἡ ἂν οἰχῇ, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ σὲ ὡς
ς , ’ = , ea 7 >
ὁμοιότατον γίγνεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ ta «Αθηναίων, εἰ
μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφιλὴς εἶναι καὶ μέγα δύνα-
> ~ , “ar “ > ἢ ~ \
σθαι Ev τῇ πόλει ; TOVO’ ὅρα El σοὶ λυσιτελεῖ καὶ
ἐμοί, ὅπως μή, ὦ δαιμόνιε, πεισόμεθα ὅπερ φασὶ
‘ Ἁ ’ Ul ‘ ,
Tas τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας, tas Θετταλίδας "
σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις ἡ αἵρεσις ἡμῖν ἔσται ταύτης
τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει. εἰ δέ σοι οἴει OV-
τινοῦν ἀνθρώπων παραδώσειν τέχνην τινὰ τοιαύ-
q¢ , 4 ᾽ν 2 ἊΨ /
Β την, ἥτις σε ποιήσει μέγα δύνασθαι Ev τῇ πόλει
~~ > oy Py] ~ ΄ ΠΣ g) LN \ ,
τῇδε ἀνόμοιον ὄντα τῇ πολιτείᾳ εἴτ᾽ ἐπὶ TO βέλτι-
ον εἴτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς
βουλεύει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις " οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ εἶ-
ναι, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοφυῶς ὅμοιον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι
, > ly > ΄ ~ > ΄
γνήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν «τῷ «Αθηναίων
/ ‘ Ἁ ‘ , = , ,
δήμῳ καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία τῷ Π]υριλάμπους ye πρός.
5 ΄ ς , 2 ,
ὅστις οὖν σε τούτοις ὁμοιότατον ἀπεργάσεται, OV-
τός σε ποιήσει, ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικὸς εἶναι, πο-
C λιτικὸν καὶ δητορικόν " τῷ αὑτῶν γὰρ ἤθει λεγο-
μένων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἀλλο-
΄ ” > , \ oI , 5 ,
τρίῳ ἄχθονται. εἶ μή τι συ ἄλλο λέγεις, ὦ φίλη
κεφαλή. “έγομέν τι πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;
Cap. LXIX. KAA. Οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅντινά μοι τρό-
πον δοκεῖς εὖ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκχρατες. πέπονθα δὲ

104 PLATONIS

τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος " ov πάνυ σοι πείθομαι.
Σ.. Ὃ dnuov γὰρ ἔρως, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνὼν ἐν

~ ~ ~ ~ 5 ἘΞ 2) 9 Pee ,
τῇ ψυχῇ TH σῇ ἀντιστατεῖ μοι" AAA’ EaY πολλα- Ὦ
κις ἴσως καὶ βέλτιον ταὐτὸ ταῦτα διασκοπώμεθα,

’ > , 9 “5 gq 9 ”
πεισθήσει. ἀναμνήσθητι δ᾽ οὖν, ὅτι dv’ ἔφαμεν
εἶναι τὸς παρασκευὰς ἐπὶ τὸ ἕκαστον ϑεραπεύειν
καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχήν, μίαν μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὅὄμι-

~ ἂν ς 4 ‘ ‘ ‘ [4 μὴ
λεῖν, τὴν ἑτέραν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, μὴ κατα-
χαριζόμενον, ἀλλὰ διαμαχόμενον. οὐ ταῦτα ἣν
ἃ τότε ὠὡριζόμεθα; KAA. Πάνυ γε. 282. Οὐκ-
οὖν ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα, ἡ πρὸς ἡδονήν, ἀγεννὴς καὶ

IQs »” δ ΄ δ its mi ,
οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ κολακεία τυγχάνει οὐσα. ἢ γαρ; Εἰ
KAA." Eoto, si βούλει; cot ovtas. 292. “H
δέ γε ἑτέρα, ὅπως ws βέλτιστον ἔσται τοῦτο, εἴτε
σῶμα τυγχάνει ὃν εἴτε ψυχή, ὃ ϑεραπεύομεν ;
KAA, Πάνν γε. 2X2. °Ao’ οὖν οὕτως ἡμῖν
ἐπιχειρητέον ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις ϑε-
ραπεύειν ὡς βελτίστους αὐτοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποι-
οὔντας ; ἄνευ γὰρ On τούτου, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσ-
θεν εὑρίσκομεν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἄλλην εὐεργεσίαν 514

2 ΄ aie 3) 8 \ \ > Vig aks Ἷ
οὐδεμίαν προσφέρειν, ξὰν μῇ καλὴ καγαθὴ ἢ δι-

, > ~ , An ud ‘ ba
ἄνοια ἢ τῶν μελλόντων ἢ χρήματα πολλὰ λαμθά-
νειν ἢ ἀρχήν τινων ἢ ἄλλην δύναμιν ἡντινοῦν.
ϑώμεν οὕτως ἔχειν; KAA. Πάνν γε, εἴ σοι
ἥδιον. Σ.. Ei οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους, ὦ
Καλλίκλεις, δημοσίᾳ πράξαντες τῶν πολιτικῶν
πραγμάτων, ἐπὶ Th οἰκοδομικά, ἢ τειχῶν ἢ νεωρί-
ων 3) ἱερῶν ἐπὶ Ta μέγιστα οἰκοδομήματα, πότε-
ρον ἔδει ἂν ἡμᾶς σχέψασθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ Β

~ ‘ ,

ἐξετάσαι, πρῶτον μὲν EL ἐπιστάμεθα τὴν τέχνην, ἢ

GORGIAS. 105

οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, THY οἰκοδομικήν, καὶ παρὰ TOU
ἐμάθομεν ; ἔδει ἄν, ἢ ov; KAA. Πάνυ ye.
af. Οὐκοῦν δεύτερον αὖ τόδε, εἴ τι πώποτε
οἰκοδόμημα ὠκοδομήκαμεν ἰδίᾳ ἢ τῶν φίλων τινὶ
Y ἡμέτερον αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ οἰκοδόμημα κα-
λὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν ἐστι. καὶ εἰ μὲν εὑρίσκομεν σκο-
Ο πούμενοι διδασκάλους τε ἡμῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἐλλο-
γίμους γεγονότας καὶ οἰκοδομήματα πολλὰ μὲν
καὶ καλὰ METH τῶν διδασκάλων ῳκχοδομημένα
ἡμῖν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν, ἐπειδηὶ) τῶν

ἡεῖν, z ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὴ

/ 2 [ὲ x ,
διδασκάλων ἀπηλλάγημεν, οὕτω μὲν διακειιιένων
VE 9 μ ‘ ’
γοῦν ἐχόντων ἣν ἂν ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἔργα"
εἰ δὲ μήτε διδάσκαλον εἴχομεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπι-

ΚΕ > 7 δ, av ‘ an Ν \ Ἢ
δεῖξαι οἰκοδομήματώ τε ἢ μηδὲν ἢ πολλὰ καὶ μὴ

ν > Sip 5 ἘΝ
δενὸς ἀξια, οὕτω δὲ ἀνόητον ἣν δήπου ἐπιχειρεῖν
τοῖς δημοσίοις ἔργοις καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἀλλήλους
ἐπ᾿ αὐτά. φῶμεν ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι, ἢ Ov ;

D KAA. Πανυ γε.

Car. LXX. 22. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πάντα, τά τε
ἄλλα, κἂν εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαντες δημοσιεύειν παρεκα-
λοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ὡς ἱκανοὶ ἰατροὶ ὄντες, ἐπεσκε-

, / vn Dip ον, ‘ \ Se Dr 2 ,
ψάμεθα δήπου av ἐγώ τε σὲ καὶ OV ἐμέ, Φέρε
πρὸς ϑεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Σωκχράτης πῶς ἔχει τὸ σῶ-

Ν ς re! Tie J 2! Ἀ ’
μα προς υγίειαν ; ἢ ἤδη τίς ἄλλος διὸ Σωκράτην
ἀπηλλάγη νόσου, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ) ἐλεύθερος; Kav

Ἐ ἐγώ, oiuat, περὶ σοῦ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐσκόπουν.

3 ἢ 9

μὴ 2 Ἁ «ς Ἃ 9 c = la 7,
καὶ EL μὴ ηυρίσκομεν δι᾽ ἡμᾶς μηδένα βελτίω γε-
γονότα τὸ σῶμα, μήτε τῶν ξένων μήτε τῶν ἀστῶν,
μήτε ἄνδρα μήτε γυναῖκα, πρὸς Aids, ὦ ΪΚαλλί-:
κλεῖς, οὐ καταγέλαστον ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἰς το-

106 PLATONIS

σοῦτον ἀνοίας ἐλθεῖν ἀνθρώπους, ὥστε, πρὶν ἰδιω-
τεύοντας πολλὰ μὲν ὅπως ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι, πολ-
ha δὲ κατορθῶσαι καὶ γυμνάσασθαι ἱκανῶς τὴν
τέχνην, τὸ λεγόμενον On τοῦτο, ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν
κεραμείαν ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν, καὶ αὐτούς τε
δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἀλλους τοιούτους πα-
ρακαλεῖν; οὐκ ἀνόητόν σοι δοκεῖ ἂν εἶναι οὕτω
προΐττειν; KAA. "Epos. 22. Nov δέ, ὦσιδ
βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, Exedy συ μὲν αὐτὸς ἄρτι ἄρχει
πράττειν το τῆς πόλεως πράγματα; ἐμὲ δὲ παρα-
κοιλεῖς καὶ ὀνειδίζεις, ὅτι οὐ πράττω, οὐκ ἐπι-
σκεψόμεθα ἀλλήλους, Φέρε, Καλλικλῆς ἤδη τινὰ
βελτίω πεποίηκε τῶν πολιτῶν ; ἔστιν ὅστις πρό-
τερον πονηρὸς ὧν ἄδικός TE καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ
” ν ΄σ , , 2 x ,
ἄφρων dia Kalhixhia καλὸς te καγαθὸς γέγονεν,
n ξένος ἢ ἀστός, ἡ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος; eye B

3.7 ΄ ~ > , - τσ , ΄
μοι, Edy τίς σὲ ταῦτα ἐξετάζῃ, ὦ KaddtxAsts, τί
ἐρεῖς ; τίνα φήσεις βελτίω πεποιηκέναι ἄνθρωπον
τῇ συνουσίᾳ τῇ σῇ ; — Οκνεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι, ét-
περ ἔστι τοιόνδε τι ἔργον σὸν ἔτι ἰδιωτεύοντος,
πρὶν. δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν; KAA. Φιλόνει-
κος El, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Cap. LXXI. 22. Αλλ᾽ οὐ φιλονεικίᾳ γε
ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀληθῶς βουλόμενος εἰδέναι ὅντινά
ποτε τρόπον οἴει δεῖν πολιτεύεσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν, εἰ
ΒΩ 2 > , C w > Ν 2. ‘ ἂν
ἄλλον του ἄρα ἐπιμελήσει ἡμῖν ἐλθων ἐπὶ Ta THSC

, , n O gq , c ~
πόλεως πράγματα ἢ ὅπως ὅτι βέλτιστοι Ot πολῖται
auev. ἢ οὐ πολλάκις ἤδη ὡμολογήκαμεν τοῦτο

» 7 \ κ ” c ,
δεῖν πράττειν τὸν πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα ; ὡμολογή-

ΕΝ ” > ς
χαμεν, ἡ OV; ἀποκρίνου. “Μμολογήκαμεν > ἐγὼ

GORGIAS. 107

ς ‘ ~ 2 ~ ? ’ ἐπ -
ὑπὲρ σοῦ ἀποχρινοῦμαι. Kei τοίνυν τοῦτο δεῖ
τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα παρασκευάζειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πό-
λει, νῦν μοι ἀναμνησθεὶς εἰπὲ περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν
ἀνδρῶν ὧν ὀλίγῳ πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἰ ἔτι σοι δο-
D κοῦσιν ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται γεγονέναι, Περικλῆς καὶ
Κίμων καὶ Μιλτιάδης καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς. KAA.
"Euowe, X22. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγαθοί, δῆλον ὅτι
a 2 — 7 > 7 ‘ ee 32 Ἁ
ἕκαστος αὐτῶν βελτίους ἐποίει TOUS πολίτας ἀντὲ
χειρύνων. ἐποίει, ἢ ov; KAA. Noi. 22.
Οὐκοῦν ore Περικλῆς ἤρχετο λέγειν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ,
χείρους ἦσαν οἵ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἢ ὅτε τὼ τελευταῖα
ἔλεον, KAA. Ἴσως. . 292. Οὐκ. tows 37, ὦ
βέλτιστε, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκῃ ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων,
Ἑ εἴπερ ἀγαθός γ᾽ ἣν ἐκεῖνος πολίτης. KAA. Τί
οὖν δή; 282. Οὐδέν. ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι εἰπὲ ἐπὶ
τούτῳ, εἰ λέγονται “AOnvaior διὰ Περικλέα βελ-
τίους γεγονέναι, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον διαφθαρῆναι
ὑπ᾽ ἐχείνον. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀκούω, Περικλέα
πεποιηκέναι ᾿Αθηναίους ἀργοὺς καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ
λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους, εἰς μισθοφορίαν πρῶτον
καταστήσαντα. KAA. Τῶν ta ὦτα xateayo-
τῶν ἀχούεις ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες. L222. Alia
, kor, sh 2 , 2 9 7 les fy ΠΩΣ Ν "
τάδε οὐκέτι ἀκούω, AAA’ οἶδα σαφῶς καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ
, 7 ‘ ‘ ~ > , ~ ᾿
σύ, ὁτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ηυδοκίμει Π|ερικλῆς καὶ
οὐδεμίαν αἰσχρὰν δίκην κατεψηφίσαντο αὐτοῦ
> ~ ΑΕ ὁ ? 4 2 ‘ x A
«θηναῖοι, ἡνίκα χείρους ἦσαν " ἐπειδη δὲ καλοὶ
διοκαγαθοὶ γεγόνεσαν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ
βίου τοῦ Περικλέους, κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κατεψηφί-
σαντο, ὑλίγου͵ δὲ καὶ ϑανάτου ἐτίμησαν, δῆλον
ὅτι ὡς πονηροῦ ὄντος.

108 PLATONIS

Cap. LXXII. KAA. Τί οὖν; τούτου ἕνεκα
κακὸς ἣν Περικλῆς; 282. ᾿Ονων γοῦν ἂν ἐπι
μελητὴς καὶ ἵππων καὶ βοῶν τοιοῦτος ὧν κακὸς
ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰ παραλαθῶν un λακτίζοντας
μηδὲ κυρίττοντας μηδὲ δάκνοντας ἀπέδειξε ταῦτα
ἅπαντα ποιοῦντας δι᾽ ἀγριότητα. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι
κακὸς εἶναι ἐπιμελητὴς ὁστισοῦν ὁτουοῦν ζώου, ὃς Β
ἂν παραλαθδῶν ἡμερώτερα ἀποδείξῃ ἀγριώτερα ἢ
παρέλαθε ; Δοκεῖ, ἢ οὔ; KAA. Πάνυ γε, ἵνα
σοι χαρίσωμαι. XS. Kai τόδε τοίνυν μοι χάρι-
σαι ἀποχρινάμενος, πότερον καὶ ὃ ἄνθρωπος EY
τῶν ζώων ἐστίν, ἢ ov; KAA. Πῶς γὰρ ov;
XS. Οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων Περικλῆς ἐπεμέλετο ;
KAA. Nat. 22. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔδει αὐτούς, ὡς
ἄρτι ὡμολογοῦμεν, δικαιοτέρους γεγονέναι ἀντὶ
ἀδικωτέρων ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου, εἴπερ ἐκεῖνος ἐπεμελεῖτο C
αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸς ὧν τὼ πολιτικὰ; KAA. Πάνυ
γε. 4,2. Οὐκοῦν οἵ γε δίκαιοι ἥμεροι, ὡς ἔφη
“Ὅμηρος. σὺ δὲ τί φῇς; οὐχ οὕτως; KAA.
Nai. Σ.Ώ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν ἀγριωτέρους γε: αὐτοὺς
ἀπέφηνεν ἢ οἵους παρέλαθε, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ εἰς αὑτόν,
ὃν ἥκιστ᾽ ἂν ἐθούλετο.ς KAA. Βούλει σοι ὃμο-
λογήσω; 292. Ei δοκῶ γέ σοι ἀληθὴ λέγειν.
KAA. "Esta δὴ ταῦτα. Σ.2. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ
ἀγριωτέρους, ἀδικωτέρους TE καὶ χείρους; KAA.
"Eoto. 2&8. Οὐκ ἄρ᾽ ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ Πε- Ὁ
ρικλῆς ἦν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ Adyov. KAA. Οὐ σύ
γε φής. ΣΏ. Μὰ Ai? οὐδέ γε ov ἐξ ὧν ὁμολο-
yeis. Πάλιν δὲ λέγε μοι περὶ Κίμωνος > οὐκ
ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτὸν οὗτοι, OVS ἐθεράπευεν, ἵνα

GORGIAS. 109

3 lsd , > “. Ν 2 , ~ ld 4 \
αὐτοῦ δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀκούσειαν τῆς φωνῆς ; καὶ
Ψ > ‘ ~ > 7 ‘ ~
Θεμιστοκλέα ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ
7 4 ‘ A 3 ~
προσεζημίωσαν ; Μιλτιάδην δὲ tov ἐν “Μαραθῶνι
E εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμθαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο. καὶ εἰ μὴ
διὸ τὸν πρύτανιν, ἐνέπεσεν ἂν; Καΐτοι οὗτοι,
εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, ὡς σὺ φής, οὐκ ἄν ποτὲ
ταῦτα ἔπασχον. οὔκουν οἵ γε ἀγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι
κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐκ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῶν ζευγῶν,
ἐπειδὰν δὲ ϑεραπεύσωσι τοὺς ἵππους καὶ αὐτοὶ
ἀμείνους γένωνται ἡνίοχοι, τότ᾽ ἐκπίπτουσιν. οὐκ
ἔστι ταῦτ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἐν ἡνιοχείᾳ ovt’ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔργῳ
ι ͵ t
2 , ᾽ν ~ σ΄ >? ”
οὐδενί. ἢ δοκεῖ σοι; KAA, Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. 222.
᾿“ληθεῖς ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, of ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι
διτἦσαν, ὅτι οὐδένα ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γε-
γονότα τὰ πολιτικὰ ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει. συ δὲ ὧμο-
λόγεις τῶν γε νῦν οὐδένα, τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν,
καὶ 5 τούτους TOUS Gv doas. οὗτοι δὲ
ἘΠ πὸ ἐπῆσαν ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς νῦν ὄντες, ὥστε, εἰ οὗτοι
δήτορες ἦσαν, οὔτε τῇ ἀληθινῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐχρῶντο
.-- οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξέπεσον ---- οὔτε τῇ κολακικῇ.
Carp. LXXIII. KAA. ᾿Δλλὰ μέντοι πολλοῦ
Bye δεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μή ποτέ τις τῶν νῦν ἔργα
τοιαῦτα ἐργάσηται, οἷα τούτων ὃς βούλει εἴργα-
ota. LM. "2 δαιμόνιε, οὐδ᾽ ἐγὼ ψέγω τούτους,
Ω͂ / > 4 2 , i.
ὥς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλά μοι δοκοῦσι
τῶν γε νῦν διακονικώτεροι γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον
(> da ak ? ’΄ - ’ is > , 2 ‘
οἷοί τε ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐπεθύμει. αλλχὰ
a) fu ‘ > 7 ‘ Ν 2 »
γὰρ petabibale τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέ-
πειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο, ὅθεν
5", 2 cA ” c ~ ς ”
ἔμελλον ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι ot πολῖται, ws ἕπος
10

110 PLATONIS

εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν τούτων διέφερον ἐκεῖνοι" ὅπερ μόνον C
ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου. ναῦς δὲ καὶ τείχη
καὶ νεώρια καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐγώ σοι
ὁμολογῶ δεινοτέρους εἶναι ἐκείνους τούτων ἔχπο-
ρίζειν. Πρᾶάγμα οὖν γελοῖον ποιοῦμεν ἐγώ τε
καὶ σὺ Ev τοῖς λόγοις. ἐν παντὲ γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ,
ὃν διαλεγόμεθα, οὐδὲν παυόμεθα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὲ
περιφερόμενοι καὶ ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλων ὅ τι λέ-
γομεν. EYO γοῦν σε πολλάκις οἶμαι ὡμολογηκέναι
καὶ ἐγνωκέναι, ὡς ἄρα διττὴ αὕτη τις ἡ πραγμα- Ὁ
τεία ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν,
καὶ ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα διακονική ἐστιν, ἣ δυνατὸν εἶναι
ἐχπορίζειν, ἐὰν μὲν πεινῇ τὼ σώματα ἡμῶν, σιτία,
ἐὰν δὲ διψῇ, ποτά, ἐὰν δὲ ῥιγῷ, ἱμάτια, στρώμα-
τα, ὑποδήματα, ἄλλα ὧν ἔρχεται σώματα εἰς ἐπι-
θυμίαν. καὶ ἐξεπίτηδές σοι did τῶν αὐτῶν εἰκό-
νων λέγω, ἵνα ῥᾷον καταμάθῃς. τούτων γὰρ
ποριστικὸν εἶναι ἢ κάπηλον ὄντα ἢ ἔμπορον ἢ
δημιουργόν TOV αὐτῶν τούτων, σιτοποιὸν 1) ὀψο- Ἐ
ποιὸν ἢ ὑφάντην ἢ σκυτοτόμον ἢ GxXUTODEWOY, οὐ-
δὲν ϑαυμαστόν ἐστιν, ὄντα τοιοῦτον δόξαι xat
αὑτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ϑεραπευτὴν εἶναι σώματος,
παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδότι, ὅτι ἔστι τις παρὰ ταύτας
ἁπάσας τέχνη γυμναστική τε καὶ ἰατρική, ἣ δὴ
τῷ ὄντι ἐστὶ σώματος ϑεραπεία, ἥνπερ καὶ προσή-
κει τούτων ἀρχειν πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ χρῆ-
σθαι τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι ὅ τι τὸ
χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν τῶν σιτίων ἢ ποτῶν ἐστιν δι8
εἰς ἀρετὴν σώματος, τὰς δ᾽ ἄλλας πάσας ταύτας δ
ἀγνοεῖν - διὸ δὴ καὶ ταύτας μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς τε

B

GORGIAS. 111

>

καὶ διακονικας καὶ ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι περὶ σώ-
ματος πραγματείαν, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας" τὴν δὲ
γυμναστικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον δε-
σποίνας εἶναι τούτων. ταὐτὰ οὖν ταῦτα ὅτι ἔστι
καὶ περὶ ψυχήν, τοτὲ μέν μοι δοκεῖς μανθάνειν
σ [4 \ ς ~ c > Ν σ > Ν
ὅτι λέγω, καὶ ὁμολογεῖς ws εἰδῶς, ὁ τι ἐγὼ λέγω "
“ ‘ 3 - [σὲ , [σὲ 2
ἥκεις δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον λέγων, ὅτι [ἄνθρωποι]
καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασι πολῖται ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὲ
ἐπειδὰν ἐγὼ ἐρωτῶ οἵτινες, δοκεῖς μοι δμοιοτάτους
προτείνεσθαι ἀνθρώπους περὶ τὰ πολιτικά, ὥσπερ
ἂν εἰ περὲ τὰ γυμναστικὰ ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος οἵτινες
ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν ἢ εἰσὶ σωμάτων ϑεραπευταΐ,
” rs 4 ly ? ς 2 /
ἔλεγές μοι πάνυ σπουδάζων, Θεαρίων ὁ ἀρτοκόπος
καὶ Μίθαικος ὃ τὴν ὀψοποιίαν συγγεγραφῶς τὴν
Σικελικὴν καὶ Σάραμθδος ὃ κάπηλος, ὅτι οὗτοι

ἷς ld , 7 ς ‘
ϑαυμάσιοι γεγόνασι σωμάτων TEQUMEVTAL, ὁ MEV
wv ἰς ‘ ! c
ἄρτους ϑαυμαστοὺς mapacxevatav, ὁ δὲ ὄψον, ὁ
δὲ οἶνον. Cap. LXXIV. ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἡγα-

4 5 ” > Ν isd 3 2 “Λ

νάκτεις, εἴ σοι ἔλεγον ἐγῶ, ὅτι, AvOQareE, ἐπαΐεις
οὐδὲν περὶ γυμναστικῆς * διακόνους μοι λέγεις
καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν παρασκχευαστος ἀνθρώπους, οὐκ
ἐπαΐοντας καλὸν κἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν περὲ αὐτῶν, οἵ,
ἂν οὕτω τύχωσιν, ἐμπλήσαντες καὶ παχύναντες
τὼ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπαινούμενοι ὑπ᾽ αὐὖὐ-

Ὁ τῶν, προσαπολοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ Tas ἀρχαίας σάρ-

ε 3 τα 9 2 7, 2 \ c τος
κας. οἱ δ᾽ av δι᾽ ἀπειρίαν οὐ τοὺς EGTLMYTAS
αἰτιάσονται τῶν νόσων αἰτίους εἶναι καὶ τῆς ἀπο-

Θολῆς τῶν ἀργαίων σαρκῶν, ἀλλ᾽ of ἂν αὐτοῖς
Z 2 . Q 5

4 , / \ “ e
τύχωσι τότε παρόντες καὶ συμθουλεύοντές TL, ὅταν
δὴ αὐτοῖς ἥκῃ ἡ τότε πλησμονῇ νόσον φέρουσα

112 PLATONIS

~ 0 , iva > ~ c ~

συχνῷ ὕστερον γρόνῳ, ἅτε ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ γε-

γοννῖα, τούτους αἰτιάσονται καὶ ψέξουσι καὶ κα-

κόν τι ποιήσουσιν, ἂν οἷοί τ᾽ ὦσι, τοὺς δὲ προτέ-

ρους ἐκείνους καὶ αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν ἐγκωμιά- E
\ \ ~ 5 ΄ ς ,

σουσι. καὶ ov νῦν, ὦ Kaddixhets, ομοιότατον

ΝΣ > , > , 2 , ts] ,
τούτῳ ἑργαζει" ἐγκωμιάζεις ἀνθρώπους, οἵ TOV-
τους εἱστιάκασιν εὐωχοῦντες ὧν ἐπεθύμουν, καί
φασι μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέναι αὐτούς "
“ ‘ 2 ~ \ q , 2 9 | oe 7 ‘
ott δὲ οἰδεῖ καὶ ὑπουλός ἔστι δι᾽ ἐκείνους TOUS
παλαιούς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύ- ι9
νης καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ
τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλναριῶν ἐμπε-
πλήκασι τὴν πόλιν. ὅταν οὖν ἔλθῃ ἡ καταθολὴ
αὕτῃ τῆς ἀσθενείας, τοὺς τότε παρόντας αἰτιά-
σονται συμθούλους, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ Κίμωνα
καὶ Περικλέα ἐγκωμιάσουσι, τους αἰτίους τῶν
κακῶν " σοῦ δὲ ἴσως ἐπιλήψονται, ἐὰν μὴ εὐλαθῇ,

Ἁ a WED Chet Ὁ ’ 3 ’ [2 Ἁ Ν
καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἑταίρου AAxibiddov, ὁταν καὶ τα
ἀρχαῖα προσαπολλύωσι πρὸς οἷς ἐκτήσαντο, οὐκ Β
αἰτίων ὄντων τῶν κακῶν, GAA’ ἴσως συναιτίων.

5") ~ ~ G im
καίτοι ἔγωγε ἀνόητον πράγμα καὶ νῦν ὁρῶ γιγνό-
μενον καὶ ἀκούω τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν πέρι.

> la ς ~ ~.
αἰσθάνομαι γάρ, ὅταν ἡ πόλις τινο τῶν πολιτικῶν
ἀνδρῶν μεταχειρίζηται ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, ayava-
κτούντων καὶ σχετλιαζόντων, ὡς δεινοὶ πάσχουσι "

Ἁ 4 2 Ν ἘΝ , , 2
πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκότες ἄρα
ἀδίκως ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυνται, ὡς ὃ τούτων λόγος.

Ν SiG; “ / > , ‘ if
to δὲ ὅλον ψεῦδός ἐστι. προστάτης γὰρ πόλεως C
οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς ποτε ἀδίκως ἀπόλοιτο ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς τῆς

’ Ka ~ ,
πόλεως, ἧς προστατεῖ. κινδυνεύει γοὺρ ταὐτὸν

GORGIAS. 113

εἶναι, ὅσοι TE πολιτικοὶ προσποιοῦνται εἶναι καὶ
ὅσοι σοφισταί. καὶ γὰρ οἱ σοφισταί, τἄλλα σοφοὶ
ὄντες, τοῦτο ἄτοπον ἐργάζονται πρᾶγμα" φά-
oxovtes yoo ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι εἶναι πολλάκις
κατηγοροῦσι τῶν μαθητῶν, ὡς ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς av-
τούς, τούς TE μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην
χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες, εὖ παθόντες ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν.
Ὁ καὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγον τί ἂν ἀλογώτερον εἴη
πράγμα, ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους γενο-
μένους, ἐξαιρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ διδα-
σκάλου, σχόντας δὲ δικαιοσύνην, ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ

νὴ “Sn

οὐκ ἔχουσιν ; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὦ
c ~ ς > ie ~ 2 /
ἑταῖρε; “ὡς αληθώς δημηγορεῖν ue nvayxacas,
ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
Carp. ΧΥ KAA. Zu δ᾽ οὐκ ἂν οἷύς τ᾽
Ἑ εἴης λέγειν, εἰ μή τίς σοι ἀποκχρίνοιτο; XS.

a!

οικά γε" νῦν γοῦν συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων,
ἐπειδή μοι οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἀλλ᾽, ὦ
᾽γαθέ, εἰπὲ πρὸς φιλίου, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄλογον εἶ-
ναι ἀγαθὸν φάσκοντα πεποιηκέναι TLVA μέμφε-
σθαι τούτῳ, ὅτι ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθὸς γεγονώς τε
καὶ ὧν ἔπειτα πονηρός ἐστιν; KAA. * Euowye
δοκεῖ. 2X82. Οὐκοῦν ἀκούεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων

δουτῶν φασχόντων παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν ;
ΚΑ4. ΓἜγωγε. ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων πέρι
οὐδενὸς ἀξίων; 22, Τί δ᾽ ἂν περὶ ἐκείνων λέ-
γοις, OL φάσκοντες προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως καὶ
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, πάλιν αὐτῆς
κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅταν τύχωσιν, ὡς πονηροτάτης;
οἴει τι διαφέρειν τούτους ἐκείνων ; τοιὐτόν, ὦ μα-

10"

114 PLATONIS

, 3. J \ 8 ee, HEN A δι , \
καρι᾽, ἐστὶ σοφιστὴς καὶ δήτωρ, ἢ ἐγγύς TL καὶ
πα απ 16 “ PS > x eh οἷ TIoé2 QA

ραπλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον προς Πώῶλον. σὺ
δὲ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν τὸ μὲν πάγκαλόν τι οἴει εἶναι, B
τὴν ῥητορικήν, τοῦ δὲ καταφρονεῖς. τῇ δὲ ἀλη-
θείᾳ κάλλιόν ἐστι σοφιστικὴ ῥητορικῆς ὅσῳπερ
νομοθετικη δικαστικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῇ ἰατρικῆς.
μόνοις δ᾽ ἔγωγε καὶ ᾧμην τοῖς δημηγόροις τε καὶ

~ 2 > ~ ld / e
σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ

a 2 Ἁ ς >?

πράγματι, ὃ αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσιν, ὡς πονηρόν ἐστιν
εἰς σφᾶς, ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ ἅμα καὶ ἑαυτῶν
κατηγορεῖν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφελήκασιν οὕς φασιν ὠφε-
λεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; KAA. Πάνυ γε. Σ).0Ὁ
Καὶ προέσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἄνευ
μισθοῦ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχώρει, εἴπερ
λληθῆ ἔλεγον. ἀλλ ἕν γὰρ εὐεργεσίαν τις
ἀληθῇ ἔλεγον. ἄλλην μὲν γὰρ 07

> ΄ ~ \ \
εὐεργετηθείς, οἷον ταχὺς γενόμενος dia παιδοτρί-
θην, ἴσως ἂν ἀποστερήσειε τὴν χάριν, εἰ προοῖτο
αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίθης καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος αὐτῷ μι-

‘ gq la ca ‘ ~ x
σθὸν ὅτι μάλιστα ἅμα wEetadidovs tov τάχους Ὁ
λαμθάνοι τὸ ἀργύριον " οὐ γὰρ τῇ βραδυτῆτι,

> > ~ cal >>>9 >? ΄ 5
οἶμαι, ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, GAA’ ἀδικίᾳ. ἢ
γάρ; KAA. Nai. XL. Οὐκοῦν εἴ τις αὐτὸ
τοῦτο ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ
μήποτε ἀδικηθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἀσφαλὲς ταύτην τὴν
εὐεργεσίαν προέσθαι, εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι δύναιτό τις
ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως; KAA. Φημί,

Car. LXXVI. 22. Διὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἄρα; ὡς For
κε, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμδουλὰς συμθδουλεύειν λαμ-.
θάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἷον οἰχοδομίας πέρι ἢ τῶν
ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν. KAA. "ἘΕοικέε

GORGIAS. 115

γε. 2S2. Περὶ δέ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὅντιν᾽
ἄν τις τρόπον ὡς βέλτιστος εἴη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν
αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ ἢ πόλιν, αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται
un φάναι συμθουλεύειν, ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῷ ἀργύ-
ριον διδῷς. ἠγάρ; KAA. Nat. 2X2. Andov
γὰρ, ὅτι τοῦτο αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ὅτι μόνη αὕτη τῶν
εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντ’
εὖ ποιεῖν, ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, Et
εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντ᾽ εὖ πείσε-
pitas " εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ. ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα ;
KAA." Eow. ΣΏ. ᾿ Eni ποτέραν οὖν we πα-
ρακαλεῖς τὴν ϑεραπείαν τῆς πόλεως ; διόρισόν
μοι" τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι ᾿Αθηναίοις, ὅπως ὡς
βέλτιστοι ἔσονται, ὡς ἰατρόν, ἢ ὡς διακονήσοντα
καὶ πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλήσοντα ; Ταληθὴ μοι εἰπέ,

5

ὦ Καλλίκλεις + δίκαιος yoo εἶ, ὥσπερ ἤρξω
παῤῥησιάζεσθαι πρὸς ἐμέ, διατελεῖν ἃ νοεῖς λέ-

Byav. καὶ νῦν εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ. KAA. Aé-
ya τοίνυν, ὅτι ὡς διακονήσοντα. X82. Κολα-
κεύσοντα ἄρα με, ὦ γενναιότατε, παρακαλεῖς.
KAA. Εἴ σοι Μῆῃυσόν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, ὦ Σώ-
κρατες" ὡς εἰ μὴ ταῦτά γε ποιήσεις --- Σ΄). My
εἴπῃς ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηκας, ὅτι ἀποχτενεῖ μὲ ὃ
βουλόμινος, ἵνα. μὴ αὖ καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι πονηρός
γε ὧν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα " μηδ᾽ ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται, ἐάν

Cte ἔχω, ἵνα μὴ αὖ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι ᾿«4λλ᾽ ἀφελό-
μενος οὐχ ἕξει ὅ τι γρήσεται αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ
με ἀδίκως ἀφείλετο, οὕτω καὶ λαθὼν ἀδίκως γρή-
σεται" εἰ δὲ ἀδίκως, αἰσχρῶς " εἰ δὲ αἰσχρῶς,
κακώς.

δ] PLATONIS

Car. LXXVII. KAA. “Ὡς μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώ-
“OATES, πιστεύειν μηδ᾽ ἂν ἕν τούτων παθεῖν, ὡς
οἰχῶν ἐκποδὼν καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσαχθεὶς εἰς δικαστή-
ριον ὑπὸ πάνυ ἴσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπον καὶ
φαύλου! XQ. ᾿ΑἸνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὦ Kaddi-
κλεις, ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μ οἴομαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει
τὸν ee ἢ ᾿ μιῇ ( = ” ”

ς τὰν ! ~ ~

ὁντινοῦν ἄν, ὅ τι τύχοι, τοῦτο παθεῖν. τόδε μέν- Ὁ
τοι εὖ οἶδ᾽, ὅτι, ἐάνπερ εἰσίω εἰς δικαστήριον περὲ
τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων ὧν συ λέγεις, πονηρός
τίς μὲ ἔσται ὁ εἰσάγων" οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν γρηστὸς
μὴ ἀδικοῦντ᾽ ἄνθρωπον εἰσαγάγοι. καὶ οὐδέν

” > 2 Ch / wv ts
γε ἄτοπον, εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι. βούλει σοι εἴπω, διότι
ταῦτα προσδοκῶ; KAA. Πάνυ γε. 22. Οἱ

ἊΣ ἌΝ, 2 (A cr Ν »” /
μαι μετ᾽ ολίγων AOnvaiay, ἵνα wy εἴπω μόνος,
ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ
πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν. ἅτε οὖν

2 Ν , la ‘ ’ « if c U
ov πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὕς λέγω Exa-
στοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδι-
στον, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων ποιεῖν ἃ σὺ παραινεῖς, τὰ

‘ i ἘΣ σε qo f ΕΝ ~ a
κομψὰ ταῦτα, οὐχ ἕξω ὅ τι λέγω Ev τῷ δικαστὴη
΄ ς ϑ αι, AX 4 [σὲ ΄ 4 Ν “Ὁ
gia. ὃ αὐτὸς δέ μοι ἥκει λόγος, ὅνπερ πρὸς La-
λον ἔλεγον " κρινοῦμαι γὰρ ὡς ἐν παιδίοις ἰατρὸς
ἂν κρίνοιτο κατηγοροῦντος ὀψοποιοῦ. σκόπει
yao, τί ἂν ἀπολογοῖτο ὃ τοιοῦτος ἄνθρωπος ἐν
τούτοις ληφθείς, εἰ αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῖ τις λέγων,
ὅτι ἾὯ παῖδες, πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακοὶ ὅδε εἴργα-
σται ἀνὴρ καὶ αὐτούς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους ὑμῶν
διαφθείρει, τέμνων TE καὶ κάων καὶ ἰσχναίνων 522
καὶ πνίγων ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, πικρότατα πώματα δι-
δοὺς καὶ πεινὴν καὶ διψῆν ἀναγκάζων, οὐχ ὥσπερ

GORGIAS. 117

5 A bs ‘ ς 7 Ἁ ‘ 2.»
ἐγὼ πολλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ παντοδαπὰ εὐώχουν
ὑμάς. τί ἂν οἴει ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληφθέντα
τὸν ἰατρὸν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ; ἢ εἰ εἴποι τὴν ἀλήθειαν,
ὅτι Ταῦτα πάντα ἐγὼ ἐποίουν, ὦ παῖδες, ὑγιει-
vas, ὁπόσον οἴει ἂν ἀναθοῆσαι τοὺς τοιούτους
δικαστάς ; οὐ μέγα; KAA. Ἴσως οἴεσθαΐ γε
ld 2 on » 2 ’ 2 ,»» A >
χοή. 2. Οὐκοῦν οἴει ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ av av-
Β τὸν ἔχεσθαι ὅ τι yon εἰπεῖν; KAA. Πάνυ γε.
Cap. LXXVIII. 2&2. Τοιοῦτον μέντοι καὶ
ἐγὼ 010’ ὅτι πάθος πάθοιμι ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικα-
στήριον. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονὰς ἃς ἐκπεπόρικα ἕξω
αὐτοῖς λέγειν, ἃς οὗτοι εὐεργεσίας καὶ ὠφελείας
νομίζουσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτε τοὺς πορίζοντας ζηλῶ
οὔτε οἷς πορίζεται" ἐάν τέ τίς με ἢ νεωτέρους φῇ
διαφθείρειν ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα, ἡ τοὺς πρεσθυτέ-
ρους κακηγορεῖν λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους ἢ ἰδίᾳ
an ? 2 Ἁ γ ‘ cr 2 ~ a 7
ἢ δημοσίᾳ, οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἕξω εἰπεῖν, OTL Aixaiws
C πάντα ταῦτα ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ πράττω τὸ ὑμέτερον
dy) τοῦτο, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν.
ὥστε ἴσως, 6 τι ἂν τύχω, τοῦτο πείσομαι. KAA.
Aoxsi οὖν σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς ἔχειν ἄνθρω-
πος ἐν πόλει οὕτως διακείμενος καὶ ἀδύνατος ὧν
ἑαυτῷ βοηθεῖν; XS. Εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε ἐν αὐτῷ
ὑπάρχοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ πολλάκις ὡμολόγη-
2 ‘ »” ς nd , \ > ,
σας" εἰ PebonOnxas εἴη αὑτῷ, μήτε περὶ avOQa-
D πους μήτε περὶ ϑεουὺς ἀδικον μηδὲν μήτε εἰρηκὼς
μήτε εἰργασμένος. αὕτῃ γάρ τις βοήθεια ἑαυτῷ
πολλάκις ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται χρατίστη εἶναι. εἰ
μὲν οὖν ἐμέ τις ἐξελέγχοι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν
ἀδύνατον ὄντα ἐμαυτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βοηθεῖν, αἰσγχυ-
lt ‘ t 1 ’ x

118 PLATONIS

νοίμην av καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις ἐξελεγχό-
μενος κοιὶ μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου, καὶ εἰ διὰ ταύτην τὴν
ἀδυναμίαν ἀποθνήσκοιμι, ἀγανακτοίην ἄν " εἰ δὲ
κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐνδείᾳ τελευτῴην ἔγωγε, εὖ
by a ς ee 32, aI , ‘ i?
οἶδα, ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἴδοις ἂν μὲ φέροντα τὸν Fava-E
τον. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ. τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐδεὶς φοθεῖ-
TOL, ὅστις μ᾽) παντάπασιν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἄναν-
δρός ἔστι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν pobsitar: πολλῶν yoo
> , 4 \ ‘ ee sf 2
ἀδικημάτων γέμοντα THY ψυχὴν εἰς “ALdov ἀφι-
κέσθαι πάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ βού-
λει, σοὶ ἐγώ, ὡς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἐθέλω λόγον
λέξαι. KAA. AAD?’ ἐπείπερ γε καὶ τάλλα ἐπέ-
ρανας, καὶ τοῦτο πέρανον.
Cap. LXXIX. 22." Axove δή, φασί, μάλα 528
~ , ral \ ‘ ¢ 72 ~ ς > \ >
καλοῦ λόγου, ov ov μὲν ἡγήσει μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἷ-
SS ΄ c > ~ Nae r
μαι, Eva δὲ λόγον" ws ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω
ἃ μέλλω λέγειν. “σπερ yao “Ὅμηρος λέχει,
διενείμαντο τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ Ζευς καὶ ὃ Ποσειδῶν
eS , , Ν Ν “Ὁ Ἂς Ἄ
καὶ ὁ Π]λούτων, ἐπειδῃ παρὸ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλα-
Gov. ἣν οὖν νόμος ὅδε περὶ ἀνθρώπων Ext Κρό-
YOU, καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔστιν ἐν ϑεοῖς, τῶν ἂν-
θρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα xal
5 > ν , > , ΄ ΟΝ
ὁσίως, ἐπειδὼν τελευτήσῃ, ἐς μακάρων νήσους ἀπι- Β
ὄντα οἰχεῖν ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκτὸς κακῶν, τὸν
δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης
δεσμωτήριον, ὃ δὴ τάρταρον καλοῦσιν, ἰέναι. τού-
tov δὲ δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνον καὶ ἔτι νεωστὶ τοῦ
Aus τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων, ἐκεί-
Ging δ ΄ τά ft ~
vn τῇ ἡμέρᾳ δικάζοντες, ἡ μέλλοιεν τελευτᾶν.
- τ ᾿ ΄
κακῶς οὖν αἱ δίκαι ἐκρίνοντο. ὅ τε οὖν Πλούτων

GORGIAS. 119

καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ of ἐκ μακάρων νήσων ἰόντες
C ἔλεγον πρὸς τὸν Mia, ὅτι φοιτῷέν σφιν ἄνθρωποι
ἑχατέρωσε ἀνάξιοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ζεύς, ᾿Αλλ’
ἐγώ, ἔφη, παύσω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. νῦν μὲν γοὶρ
κακῶς αἱ δίκαι δικάζονται. ἀμπεχόμενοι yde,
ἔφη, οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνονται " ζῶντες yao κρίνον-
ται. πολλοὶ οὖν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες
ἠμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματά τε καλὰ καὶ γένη καὶ
πλούτους, καί, ἐπειδὰν ἡ κρίσις ἢ, ἔρχονται αὐ-
τοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντες, ὡς δικαίως
Ὁ βεδιώκασιν. οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑπό τε τούτων Ex-
πλήττονται, καὶ ἅμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχόμενοι δι-
κάζουσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς αὑτῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ
ὦτα καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκαλυμμένοι. ταῦτα
δὴ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται, καὶ τὰ αὐ-
τῶν ἀμφιέσματα καὶ τὰ τῶν χρινομένων. πρῶτον
μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, παυστέον ἐστὲ προειδότας αὐτοὺς
τὸν ϑάνατον " νῦν μὲν γὰρ προΐσασι. τοῦτο μὲν
οὖν καὶ δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεῖ ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ
Ἑ αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα γυμνοὺς κχριτέον ἁπάντων τού-
τῶν " τεθνεώτας yao δεῖ κρίνεσθαι. καὶ τὸν κρι-
τὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ
αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ϑεωροῦντα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόν-
τος ἑκάστου, ἔρημον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ
καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐκεῖνον τὸν
κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρίσις ἧ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦ-
τα ἐγνωκῶς πρότερος 1) ὑμεῖς ἐποιησάμην δικα-
otas υἱεῖς ἐμαυτοῦ, δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς “σίας, Μίνω
pute καὶ “Ῥαδάμανθυν, ἕνα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης,
Aiaxov. οὗτοι οὖν ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωσι, δικά-

120 PLATONIS

-

σουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ ἐξ ἧς φερετον »
ι- t ( ? ῃ 0 t | φ θ

\ ς ἣν > TA ς ) ,

TO 00@, ἡ μὲν εἰς ιακάρων νήσους, ἡ δ᾽ εἰς τάρ-

Η κ ν» > ee , c ,
ταρον. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς Aoias “Ῥαδάμανθυς
κρινεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τῆς Eveanyns Aiaxds: Μᾶίνῳ
δὲ πρεσδεῖα δώσω, ἐπιδιακρίνειν, ἐὰν ἀπορῆτόν τι
τῶ ἑτέρω, ἵνα ὡς δικαιοτάτῃ ἡ κρίσις ἢ περὶ τῆς
πορείας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Carp. LXXX. Τ7Ταῦτ᾽ ἔστιν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἃ
ἐγὼ axnxows πιστεύω ἀληθῆ εἶναι" καὶ ἐκ τού-Β
τῶν τῶν λόγων τοιόνδε τι λογίζομαι συμθαίνειν.

ς / / a! ς 2 Ἁ ~ > ‘
O Favatos τυγχάνει wv, ws ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ovdev
ἄλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτοιν διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς
{ ΘΟ ὙΠ
καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλοιν. ἐπειδον δὲ δια-
λυθῆτον ἄρα ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλοιν, οὐ πολὺ ἧττον ἕκά-
τερον αὐτοῖν ἔχει τὴν ἕξιν τὴν αὑτοῦ ἥνπερ καὶ
ὅτε ἔζη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τό τε σῶμα τὴν φύσιν τὴν
αὑτοῦ καὶ τὸ ϑεραπεύματα καὶ τὰ παθήματα,
ἔνδηλα πάντα. οἷον εἴ τινος μέγα ἣν τὸ σῶμα Ο
φύσει ἢ) τροφῇ ἢ ἀμφότερα ζῶντος, τούτον καὶ
ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὃ νεκρὸς μέγας " καὶ εἰ παχύς,
παχὺς καὶ ἀποθανόντος, καὶ τἄλλα οὕτως. καὲ
εἰ αὖ ἐπετήδευε κομᾶν, κομήτης τούτου καὶ ὁ νε-
κρός. μαστιγίας αὖ εἴ τις ἣν καὶ ἴχνη εἶχε τῶν
πληγῶν οὐλὰς ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ὑπὸ μαστίγων ἢ
ἄλλων τραυμάτων ζῶν, καὶ τεθνεῶτος τὸ σῶμα
ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ταῦτα ἔχον. κατεαγότα τε εἴ του ἦν

,ὔ Ἃ , Lind ‘ ~ 3 Ἁ
μέλῃ ἢ διεστραμμένα ζῶντος, καὶ τεθνεῶτος ταὐτὰ Ὁ

~ ” ic κῶν \ 7 >» >
ταῦτα ἔνδηλα. evi δὲ λόγῳ, οἷος εἶναι παρε-
σχεύαστο τὸ σῶμα ζῶν, ἔνδηλα ταῦτα καὶ τελευ-
τήσαντος ἢ πάντα ἢ τὼ πολλὰ ἐπί τινα χρόνον.

GORGIAS. 12]

ταὐτὸν δή μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτ᾽ ἄρα καὶ περὶ THY ψυ-
χὴν εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις - ἔνδηλα πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν
τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὼν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τά τε
τὴς φύσεως καὶ τὸ παθήματα ἃ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτή-
δευσιν ἑκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὃ
Ἑ ἄνθρωπος. ᾿Επειδὼν οὖν ἀφίκωνται παρὰ τὸν
- ἤ c ‘ 2 om 3 7 \ Ἁ «ς ,
δικαστήν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς “σίας παρὰ tov Padd-
μανθυν, ὁ “PadduavOus ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας ϑε-
ἅται ἑκάστου τὴν ψυχήν, οὐκ εἰδως ὅτου ἐστίν,
ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλον βασιλέως ἐπιλαθόμε-

n ς ~ , vn , ~

vos ἢ ἄλλου otovovy βασιλέως y δυνάστου xatsi-
δὲν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς Ov τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστι-
δοδγωμένην καὶ οὐλῶν μεστὴν ὑπὸ ἐπιορκιῶν καὶ
ἀδικίας, ἃ ἑκάστῳ ἡ πράξις αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρξατο εἰς
τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ πάντα σκολιοὶ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ
ἀλαζονείας καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθυ did τὸ ἄνεν ἀληθείας
τεθράφθαι - καὶ ὑπὸ ἐξουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ
ὕδρεως καὶ ἀκρατίας τῶν πράξεων ἀσυμμετρίας
τε καὶ αἰσχρότητος γέμουσαν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶδεν.
Wav δὲ ἀτίμως ταύτην ἀπέπεμψεν εὐθὺ τῆς φρου-
eas, οἵ μέλλει ἐλθοῦσα ἀνατλῆναι Ta προσήκοντα
πάθη. Car. LXXXI. Προσήκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ
> 24457 Goss) ναὶ > ~ , 1
Β ἕν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι, ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου ὀρθῶς τιμωρουμένῳ, ἢ
βελτίονι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὀνίνασθαι ἢ παραδείγμα-
~ 2} ? a 9 aI c = ,

τι τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι, ἵν’ ἄλλοι ὁρῶντες πά-
σχοντα ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ φοθούμενοι βελτίους γίψγνων-
ται. εἰσὶ δὲ οὗ μὲν ὠφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην
διδόντες ὑπὸ ϑεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὗτοι, Of ἂν
ἰάσιμα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμάρτωσιν * ὅμως δὲ δι᾽ ἀλγη-
δόνων καὶ ὀδυνῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἡ ὠφέλεια καὶ

ul

122 PLATONIS

, t ?
ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν “Aidov: ov γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄλλως ἀδι-
2 » ” 3

κίας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. οἵ δ᾽ ἂν τὸ ἔσχατα αἀδική- Ο
Ἁ “- > > ’
σωσι καὶ διὰ TH τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ανίατοι γέ-
YOVTAL, ἐκ τούτων Ta παραδείγματα γίγνεται,

> . > > + , a

καὶ οὗτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίνανται οὐδέν, ἅτε
ἀνίατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίνανται οἵ τούτους ὁρῶν-

2 , »
τὲς Ol TOS ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα
καὶ φοθερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον,
ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν “Δι-

2 ~ - ~ 2) ~ QZ >
δον ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς HEL τῶν ἀδίκων ἄφι-
i , Ἁ i 2 ᾿ς
κνουμένοις ϑεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα. ὧν ἐγώ Ὁ
7 ” ~
φημι ἕνα καὶ ᾿Αρχέλαον ἔσεσθαι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει
- ~ x
ITakos, καὶ ἄλλον ὅστις ἂν τοιοῦτος τύραννος 7.
οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς εἶναι τούτων τῶν πα-
ραδειγμάτων ἔκ τυράννων καὶ βασιλέων καὶ dv-
ναστῶν καὶ τὼ τῶν πόλεων πραξάντων γεγονότας"
οὗτοι γὰρ did τὴν ἐξουσίαν μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώ-
τατα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνουσι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ
΄ τον ‘ \ ,
τούτοις καὶ “Ὅμηρος " βασιλέας yao καὶ δυνά-
> = , \ > Ω͂ \ ey)
otas ἐχεῖνος πεποίηκε τοὺς ἐν “Avdov tov ἀεὶ E
/ , Vas: Ἁ 7
χρόνον τιμωρουμένους, Τάνταλον καὶ Σίσυφον
3 ,’ ? , ‘ »” a!
καὶ Tigvov. Θερσίτην dé, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος πονη-
09s ἣν ἰδιώτης, οὐδεὶς πεποίηκε μεγάλαις τιμω-
ρίαις συνεχόμενον ὡς ἀνίατον " οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι,
ἐξὴν αὐτῷ" διὸ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ἣν ἢ οἷς ἐξῆν.
ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Καλλίχλεις, ἐκ τῶν δυναμένων stot
καὶ οἵ σφόδρα πονηροὶ γιγνόμενοι ἄνθρωποι "556
οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας
ἐγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα γε ἄξιον ἄγασθαι τῶν
yiyvouevav* γαλεπὸν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ

GORGIAS. 123

Ὁ 2 ’ > > , > Md ~
πολλοῦ éxaivov ἄξιον ἐν μεγάλῃ ἐξουσίᾳ tov
2 ~ ld 7 ΄ 2 a ‘
ἀδικεῖν γενόμενον δικαίως διαδιώναι. ολίγοι δὲ
γίγνονται of τοιοῦτοι" ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλο-
θι γεγόνασιν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἔσονται καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ

Β ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τοῦ δικαίως διαχειρίζειν
a 32; 2 4 by ‘ \ / 2
ἃ ἂν τις ἐπιτρέπῃ" εἷς δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλλόγιμος
γέγονε καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους “EdAnvas, ᾿“ριστεί-
dns 6 “υσιμάχου. οἱ δὲ πολλοΐ, ὦ ἄριστε, κακοὶ
γίγνονται τῶν δυναστῶν. Cap. LXXXII. “Ὅπερ
> ” > ‘ caiG , > ~
οὖν ἔλεγον, ἐπειδὸν ὁ PaddmavOus ἐκεῖνος τοι-
on ν" Pi ‘ \ ? ~ > >
οὔτόν τινα λάθῃ, ἄλλο μὲν περὶ αὐτου οὐκ OLdEY
> , 2! 9 qa 2, 9 - lad ‘ ,
οὐδέν, οὔθ᾽ ὅστις οὔθ᾽ ὧντινων, ὅτι δὲ πονηρὸς
τις - καὶ τοῦτο κατιδὼν ἀπέπεμψεν εἰς τάρταρον,
C ἐπισημηνάμενος, ἐάν τε ἰάσιμος ἐάν τε ἀνίατος
δοκῇ εἶναι" ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος τὰ προσή-
, ᾿Ξ 9 2) > Ce ee
κοντα πάσχει. ἐνίοτε δ᾽ ἄλλην εἰσιδῶν ὁσίως βε-
Guoxviav καὶ met’ ἀληθείας, ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἢ
ἄλλου τινός, μάλιστα μέν, ἔγωγέ φημι, ὦ Καλλί-
κλεις, φιλοσόφου τὰ αὑτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πο-
/ > ~ V4 2 ‘ >
λυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἡγάσθη τε καὶ ES
. Ε > ~ ς
μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψε. ταὐτὼ ταῦτα καὶ O
Aiuxos. ἑκάτερος δὲ τούτων δάθδδον ἔχων δικάζει.
ς ‘ 7 > ἕν , / "

Ὁ ὁ δὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν κάθηται μόνος, ἐχῶν χρυ-
~ ~ a 2 ‘ Ck 7,
σοῦν σχἥπτρον, as φησιν ᾿Οδυσσεὺς ὃ Onunoov

ἐδεῖν αὐτὸν ἱ
χρύσεον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, ϑεμιστεύοντα νέ-
κυσσιν.

Eye μὲν οὖν, ὦ Καλλίχλεις, ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν
λόγων πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ, ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι
- Ἀν Εἰ δὶς , Ν ’ δ Mes
τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑγιεστάτην τὴν ψυχήν. χαίρειν οὖν

124, PLATONIS

δες d ‘ ΜΝ ‘ ~ lend > , Ν
ἑᾶσας τᾶς τιμᾶς Tas τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν
ἀλήθειαν σκοπῶν πειράσομαι τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἂν δύνω-
μαι βέλτιστος ὧν καὶ ζὴν καί, ἐπειδὸν ἀποθνή- Ἐ
oxo, ἀποθνήσκειν. παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους

, > , τὶ , \ \
πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ δὴ
καὶ σὲ ἀντιπαρακαλῶ ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ
τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον, ὃν ἐγώ φημι ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν
2 , 2 Ἂ:Ἅ Ἣν \ 2 ΄ c 2
ἐνθάδε ἀγώνων εἶναι, καὶ ονειδίζω σοι, OTL OVY
οἷός τ᾽ ἔσει σαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν ἡ δίκη σοι ἢ
καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἣν νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ ἐλθῶν
παρὸ τὸν δικαστὴν τὸν τῆς Aiyivys vidv, ἐπειδάν 627
σου ἐπιλαθόμενος ἄγῃ, χασμήσει καὶ ἰλιγγιάσεις

> s fd n > ‘ 2 / Ἁ > ~ 2. »
οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε ov ἐκεῖ, καί σε ἴσως
τυπτήσει τις καὶ ἐπὶ κόῤῥης ἀτίμως, καὶ πάντως
προπηλακιεῖ.

Τάχα δ᾽ οὖν ταῦτα μῦθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι,
ὥσπερ γραός, καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν. καὶ οὐδέν
γ᾽ ἂν ἣν ϑαυμαστὸν καταφρονεῖν τούτων, εἴ πῇῃ

τὶ ” > ~ ΄ A 2

ζητουντες εἴχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ ἀληθέστερα

«ς ~ a Ws (4 ~ > ες ~
evociv*® νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς, ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες ὑμεῖς, οἵπερ
σοφώτατοί ἔστε τῶν νῦν ᾿ἥλλήνων, σύ te καὶ Β
Πῶλος καὶ Τοργίας, οὐκ ἔχετε ἀποδεῖξαι, ὡς δεῖ
γ} ἈΝ ΄ — an a a ‘ > ~
ἄλλον τινὰ βίον ζῆν ἢ tovtoy, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖσε
φαίνεται συμφέρων, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοσούτοις λόγοις τῶν
ἄλλων ἐλεγχομένων μόνος οὗτος ἠρεμεῖ ὃ λόγος,
ς ? f 2 Ἁ Ν ? ~ ~ an” A 2
ὡς ευλαθητέον ἑστὶ τὸ αδικεῖν μάλλον ἡ τὸ ἀδι-

~ \ ‘ Cond 32 \ , >
κεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μάλλον ἀνδρὲ μελετητέον οὐ
τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἰδίᾳ

‘ ’ ΡΞ , , 2S /
καὶ δημοσίᾳ " ἐὰν δέ τις κατά τι κακὸς γίγνηται,

> 7 Ἁ μι , 3 Ἃ Ἁ
κολαστέος ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο δεύτερον ἀγαθὸν peta C

GORGIAS. 125

τὸ εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ κολαζόμενον
διδόναι δίκην" καὶ πᾶσαν κολακείαν καὶ τὴν
περὲ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν MEL τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ περὲ
ὀλίγους καὶ περὶ πολλούς, φευκτέον " καὶ τῇ ῥη-
τορικῃ οὕτω γρηστέον, ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί, καὶ τῇ
ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πράξει.

Car. LXXXIII. “EZyoi οὖν πειθόμενος ἄκο-
λούθησον ἐνταῦθα, οἵ ἀφικόμενος εὐδαιμονήσεις
καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει.
καὶ ξασόν τινά GOV καταφρονῆσαι ὡς ἀνοήτου

Ὁ καὶ προπηλακίσαι, ἐὸν βούληται, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία
σύ γε ϑαῤῥῶν πατάξαι τὴν ἄτιμον ταύτην πλη-
γήν οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσει, ἐὼν τῷ ὄντι ἧς κα-
λὸς κἀγαθός, ἀσκῶν ἀρετήν. κἄπειτα οὕτω κοινῇ
ἀσκήσαντες, τότε ἤδη, ἐὰν δοκῇ χρῆναι, ἐπιθησό-
μεθα τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, ἢ ὁποῖον ἄν τι ἡμῖν δοκῇ,
τότε βουλευσόμεθα, βελτίους ὄντες βουλεύεσθαι
ἢ νῦν. αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἔχοντας γε ὡς νῦν φαινό-
μεθα ἔχειν, ἔπειτα νεανιεύεσθαι ὥς τι ὄντας, οἷς

E οὐδέποτε ταὐτὸ δοκεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῦτα
περὶ τῶν μεγίστων " εἰς τοσοῦτον ἥκομεν ἀπαιδευ-
σίας! ὥσπερ οὖν ἡγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ γρησώμεθα
τῷ νῦν παραφανέντι, ὃς ἡμῖν σημαίνει, ὅτι οὗτος
ὁ τρόπος ἄριστος τοῦ βίον, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην
καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντας καὶ thy καὶ
τεθνάναι. τούτῳ οὖν ἑπώμεθα, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
παρακαλώμεν, μὴ ἐκείνῳ, ᾧ σὺ πιστεύων ἐμὲ πα-
ρακαλεῖς " ἔστι vag οὐδενὸς ἄξιος, ὦ Καλλίκλεις.

et | | ᾿ 515m

RaAo roe Hose or i
TGR ΟΥ̓ δυο UU Low
aad BIORRB Yoge ἴδον τ ἢ
ἈΝ ἂν ok: “Soy rok ho'k see
‘Wwe al doth OF kk ὐγτομα ἃ
νη κεφ gs hh a δ ων δὶ eae

a eee whe SoH WERE
Γι ν οὶ Sails te δια
Ὡρῆρυνῦ BKK ὃ υὦ duals ΚΕ
hd Dil vA aN WOQYINTAX Hob nt
. VELA tine Sane sel eet POF ais) AUN
By, ajo ἜΧΗΙ ‘Ou wer ΚΟΥ ΘΝ δ
ἐδ τ AY ὃν Woh: pH ty “yar gt
Wrids αὐ δ ‘sgt ὟΣ hictt ue ἀξνδνμάνα
Si OTRY νον Freot wd OR aes a

᾿ δῆ

Ὶ de fo Ἶ
i ἡ baie on ᾿ i ale yee
fexoe! WSN 1 Me WHIT Ὁ; posers tae

ΣΟΥ Was “piabrhet, when sige
ἅ

mck ἰϑν δ τ rig ee! gine ἀχνὸ ἘΣ
aid ras Ves ot Κῶ chi Ὗ eS Ae
BHAT Ae pet day Igor Tenos wna onan
et hme Moke φοτσσουν εἰ" wes robes ns |
a Pando gy GGA ty’ thay τὰ wiry ba Ἷ
mr ist) ἀνῆμο, GOA 20 eee
Wertnoin vs ut tow coh tet sora
fax Ὁ isk φὐγοδοχον ἡ πον ἀνῇ
BIOAAW QOS IN Panda ἐξα «λον |
wit tah ψουδηοινε fy G aula fn, von
ake «Ὁ vane ve

δ ἥν et ΠῚ ak

cx,
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his
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ΤΥ;

Ν. Β. The references follow the marginal pages and letters of the text, which are
those of the Paris edition of 1578, edited by H. Stephanus. Mt. stands for Mat-
thiz’s Grammar, second edition; K., for Kiihner’s Middle Grammar, translated by
Edwards and Taylor; Cr., for Crosby’s, second edition; and Soph., for that of Soph-
ocles, quoted according to the original sections : —in the new edition (1847) the ear-
lier and present sections are collated at the beginning.

447 A. οὕτω peradayydvew, so to take part in; i.e. in the
present instance, to take no part in at all. Callicles says,
“Tt were well to have such a share in a battle, as you
have had in listening to Gorgias”; i. e. it were well to
arrive too late for an unpleasant employment, but not for
a feast such as we have had. For the selection of war in
this proverbial phrase, comp. Phedr. 242, B, od πόλεμον
ἀγγελλεις, what you tell me is not at all disagreeable ; and so
Laws, 702, D. τὸ λεγόμενον, as the saying is. Soph.
§ 167, N. 2. Cr. § 334.8. The accusative may be ex-
plained by considering it as the object of the general notion
of action contained in the verbs, — are we doing τὸ λεγόμε-
voy, i. 6. are we too late. ἐπεδείξατο. This verb in the
middle, with an accus. (e. g. σοφίαν or a neuter adjective)
or without, especially denotes that ostentatious display of
their art, which the sophists and rhetoricians at this time
were wont to make.
μεν. As the verbs denote but one act, τούτου might be used
equally well, and the plural is not unfrequently used in
referring to a single verb. Comp. 492, C.

τούτων refers to ἥκομεν καὶ ὑστεροῦ-

130 GORGIAS. [447, B.

B. ἐγὼ yap καὶ ἰάσομαι. καὶ, also, refers to a suppressed
clause. No matter: for if I did the harm, I will also find
the remedy. According to Olympiod. and a Schol., the
words are drawn from the Telephus of Euripides, being
spoken by Achilles, who wounded that- hero.

εἰ μὲν
δοκεῖ. The indic. implies belief that such is the view of
Socrates ; while in ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ the subjunctive expresses
the wish as a mere possible contingency.

ἐσαῦθις, again,
at another time, hereafter. So εἰσαῦθις ἀναβαλοῦ, Sympos.
174, ἘΣ; εἰσαῦθις ἀποθέσθαι, Euthydem. 275, A.
dai; usually, where dai is found, δὲ is in some MSS. as a
various reading. ‘The longer form, it is now admitted, is

’
τι

properly retained after τί and πῶς, where wonder or indig-
nation is expressed. οὐκοῦν ... ὑμῖν. Stallb., Ast, and
others explain the construction by regarding ἥκειν as used
imperatively (Soph. § 219, N. 6; Cr. § 625; K. § 306,
R. 11), ἀκοῦσαι Topyiov being understood. I incline to re-
gard ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν as the proper apodosis, which, owing to
the intervention of the clause beginning with ydp, deserts
its own construction for that of the interposed clause.
The sense is, Well, then, whenever you wish to come to my
house, Gorgias will exhibit to you, for he lodges with me.
So, apparently, Heindorf. Comp. Soph. Cid. R. 227-229,
where the clause πείσεται yap οὐδὲν turns the apodosis fol-

lowing it, which would be naturally γῆς ἀπίτω ἀβλαβής, into
εὖ λέγεις, 1. €. you are very civil

γῆς δ᾽ ἄπεισιν ἀβλαβής.
in inviting us to your house, and quite right in wishing to
spare Gorgias further fatigue. But, etc.

C. διαλεχθῆναι, here, to discourse by way of question
and answer, tacitly contrasted with an ἐπίδειξις, in which
Gorgias would be the sole speaker. Hence, to hold a dis-
cussion, or search for truth in that way, as Socrates did.
Socrates, in Xen. Mem. 4. 5. 12, defines it κοινῇ Bovdeve-
σθαι διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ mpdypara. In the end, the

447, C.] NOTES. 131

notion of question and answer faded away from the deriva-
tives of this word; and that of logical reasoning, or that
of the science of unchangeable, absolute truth, remained.
τοῦ ἀνδρὸς pronominis

δύναμις, essence, nature.
fere partes agit, ut exprimi possit pronomine possessivo,
Ast. The art of the man=his art, with perhaps something
of contempt in τοῦ ἀνδρός.
in person, or himself. And so 481, B. αὐτὸν is taken with
the object of ἐρωτᾶν not expressed.

D. pod, second aor., not épov. No present is used
by the Attics. Soph. § 118, sub voce; K. § 166; Cr.
§ 298. ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Cic. de Fin. 2, init. :
‘Quorum [sophistarum] e numero primus est ausus Leon-

τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, to ask him

tinus Gorgias in conventu poscere questionem, id est, jubere
dicere, qua de re quis vellet audire.” This is spoken of at
length by Philostr. Vit. Sophist., Procem.

448 A. 3 mov... droxpiver, no doubt, then, you answer with
ease, O Gorgias. Ast translates ῥᾳδίως, libenter, but his
power to answer, and not his willingness, is in question,

ἂν δέ ye βούλῃ, ἐμοῦ, SC. λάμβανε πεῖραν. For X. πεῖραν
spoken of a person, comp. εἰ βούλει λαβεῖν μου πεῖραν, Pro-
tag. 341, E, cited by Ast.
difference does that make, if I answer well enough for you ?
To the common formula, ri τοῦτο; is sometimes added
διαφέρει, which Stallb. here supplies. But τί can well
be a nominative. τί τοῦτο; what is that? i. 6. what of
that ?

B. Ἡρόδικος, a brother of Gorgias, of whom we know
nothing besides his name and calling. He is not to be
confounded, as the Scholiast well observes, with another

τί δὲ. .- ἱκανῶς ; but what

man often mentioned by Plato, Herodicus of Selymbria in
Thrace, and originally of Megara ; who first taught gym-
nastics, but on the failure of his health gave himself up to
the attempt to recover it; and was among the earliest to

132 GORGIAS. [448, B.

cure diseases by exercise. τίνα dv... ὠνομάζομεν. The
predicate-accusative with καλεῖν, ὀνομάζειν, may be τίνα, re-
ferring to any one by name or by some appellation taken
from his art, business, etc. ; or τί, which is neuter on ac-
count of ὄνομας Here in τίνα dv... οὐχ ὅπερ both forms
ἢ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ. Polygnotus of
Thasos, the most celebrated of this family of painters. He

painted upon the wall of the Stoa Peecile at Athens gratu-

occur together.

itously, and at Delphi. Of his pictures from epic subjects
in a hall near the Delphian temple, Pausanias gives a mi-
nute account (10. 25. seq.), which has enabled two artists
of the present day to reproduce his designs in the spirit of
ancient art.

C. νῦν δ᾽ ἐπειδή. In this sentence, both the main clause
and that which furnishes the reason are interrogative, a
usage which would be awkward in English, but is lively and
favorable to brevity. A little below, 451, A, we have the
interrogative included between the article and participle (ἡ
περὶ τί... ἔχουσα); as it often is found within a relative sen-
tence. Comp. Cr. § 539. 2. ὦ Χαιρεφῶν. The words
which follow are plainly not in the style of conversation.

The juxtaposition of words from the same root (ἐμπειριῶν
ἐμπείρως, ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, ἀρίστων ἄριστοι), αἰῶνα for βίον,
and the antithetical form of the clauses, all show, that either
the style of Polus is imitated by Plato, or that words from
a treatise of his are hére put into his mouth. They are
quoted as his by Syrianus on Hermogenes. (4. 44. Walz.)
See 462, B.

D. σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστίν. Soph. $196; NP Θυ: § 408;
K. 284. 10. ὁ. δῆλος yap . . . διαλέγεσθαι, for it is plain
to me, even from what he has said, that Polus has studied the
art of rhetoric, so called, rather than how to discourse (logi-

cally) by way of question and answer. δῆλος, etc., for δῆλόν
ἐστιν, ὅτι ἸπΤῶλος, by attraction, as it is sometimes called. The

448, D.] NOTES. 133

tendency to give prominence to the main word — here the
subject — of the second clause caused it to be pushed for-
ward into the leading clause. This made that clause per-
sonal instead of impersonal, and bound the two clauses
together more closely.

E. ἐρωτᾷ. So all the MSS., but the editors give ἠρώτα,"
on account of ποία τις em. But this is unnecessary, for the
present may be rhetorically for the imperfect, or may in-
clude it. Nobody asks you = nobody asked you or now
asks you. Comp. Xen. Anab. 1. 1. 3, διαβάλλει... ὡς ἐπι-
βουλεύοι, for διέβαλλε. In this sentence, ποῖος and ris, which
belong to direct inquiry, are found in company with ὅστις,
by which indirect questions are introduced. Comp. ποῖα
and ὁποῖα together, 500, A. Comp. also οἵαν for ὁποίαν,
450, C, ὅσα for ὁπόσα, 451, B, and other passages.
ὥσπερ ta ἔμπροσθεν. For the asyndeton, comp. 450, B,
note. For τὰ ἔμπροσθεν, comp. Soph. § 141, N. 1; Cr.
§ 478, a. The second clause begins at καὶ viv οὕτως.

449 A. ὑποτείνεσθαι, est questionem ita proponere ut alleri
subjicias quid respondendem sit, et in universo proponere

ὡς τίνος... . τέχνης. Another form of

questionem. Ast.
compound interrogation, when one clause has the particip-
ial structure (ἐπιστήμονα, 56. ὄντα). ἀγαθόν ye, not bene
moraium, as Routh translates it, but plainly egregium certe.
ὡς ἔφη “Ὅμηρος. Il. 6. 211, and elsewhere.

B. οὐκοῦν. See Preface. ἄλλοθι. See Introd. pp.
xlii., Xiv. ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ, etc., but be not false to the promise
you make. Socrates takes for granted that he consents,
Hence ὅπερ, which Ast would change into εἴπερ, is justly
defended by Stallb.
ἐνίας (Heind.), or ἐν ἐνίαις ποιεῖσθαι. See 448, D. In some
of the answers it is necessary to discourse at length.

ς - > a 0.ὃ.
εισι . .- ποιεῖσθαι, == αναγΚαιον ἐστιν

* Stallb. has ἐρωτᾷ in his second edition.
12

134 GORGIAS. [ 449, Cc, Ὁ.

C, D. ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων = ὡς βραχύτατα, OY ws οἷόν τε
διὰ βραχυτάτων, just below. — With this boast of Gorgias,
comp. the ironical passages in Protag. 829, B, 334, Ὁ.
The latter runs thus: “Ὁ Protagoras, | happen to be an
oblivious sort of person, and if | have a long speech made
to me, I forget what is the topic of discourse ; therefore,
_as, in case I were somewhat deaf, you would think that you
ought to talk in a louder tone with me than with others, to
carry on ἃ conyersation with me ; so, seeing I am so forget-
ful, abridge your answers, and make them shorter, to enable
me to follow you.”

mavy... ἐπιεικῶς, quite sufficiently,
or very well.

ἘΣ. ποίους rovrovs... ὑγιαίνοιεν ; what kind of words 2?
are they those which make known by what sort of regimen
the sick can get well? Understand περὶ with ποίους τούτους ;
as in 450, A, line 4. This is a condensed expression for
ποῖοί εἰσιν οὗτοι περὶ ods ἐστιν; The subject of ὑγιαίνοιεν is
attracted forwards to δηλοῦσι as its object. ὡς is quomodo,
not wt, and to be taken with διαιτώμενοι. The two words
have the same sense as rim διαίτῃ. Comp. 453, C.

οὐκοῦν περὶ ὧνπερ, etc. = οὐκοῦν ποιεῖ δυνατοὺς καὶ φρονεῖν
περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧνπερ λέγειν δυνατοὺς ποιεῖ.

B. οὕτως ἔχουσιν - ἑκάστη: One of a number of the in- 450
stances of asyndeton which occur in this dialogue. Some
are owing to earnestness of feeling (449, A, ὥσπερ. . . ἀπε-
κρίνω) ; some heighten’the effect of contrast by bringing
clauses closely together (503, E, rods Cwypagous . . . τοὺς
ἄλλους), or making a word more emphatic (510, C) ; but in
the greater number the second clause is added without a,
particle to explain the first, and, like a noun in apposition,
would rather be separated than connected by a particle.
Comp. K. § 325.
nearly always, in this work, moderates the force of some
universal word, as πᾶς, οὐδείς, According to Lobeck (para-

ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν. ‘This common phrase

450, B.] NOTES. 135

lipom. Gram. Grec. 59), ἔπος εἰπεῖν occurs very often, εἰπεῖν
ἔπος rarely. It denotes, 1. ut ita dicam, as here ; 2. speaking
τῆς δὲ ῥητο-

anaccurately, the opposite of ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ.
ρικῆς. ‘The sense is, But there is no such manual operation
pertaining to rhetoric, but all its activity and efficiency are
exercised by means of words. 'The Scholiast says, that χει-
ρούργημα and κύρωσις are provincial words brought by Gor-
gias from his native town, Leontini. This is probably a
mere random assertion, and unlikely in itself. But the use of
these words, instead of χειρουργία and κῦρος, may be intend-
ed to show forth the artificial and elaborate style of Gorgias.
Thucydides uses κύρωσις (Lib. 6. 103).

C. ap οὖν... καλεῖν; Indeed, I perceive what sort of
art you wish to callit. So Ast. ‘ Formula ἄρ᾽ οὖν eodem
modo ut οὐκ οὖν initio per interrogationem cum negatione
junctam affirmat.” Hermann on Soph. Antig. 628 (632).
Or we need only say that dpa, as it often does, requires an
affirmative answer. Stallb. retains the interrogative force
of dpa, and supposes the question to require a negative an-
swer. Do I understand, etc., i.e. I do not understand.
But μανθάνω can denote a perception that is not yet clear.
Prof. Crosby remarks on this passage as follows : — “+ Is
there not a species of anacoluthon at the beginning of this
chapter? ‘ DoIthen understand what you would call it ?
However, I shall soon know.’ He seems to me to be first
intending to ask Gorgias directly, whether the idea he ob-
tains from his answer is the true one; but then another
mode of satisfying himself occurs, and he changes the dis-
For τῶν μὲν. . . ἔνιαι δὲ, comp. Soph.

course abruptly.”
§ 142, N. 3.

E. οὐχ ὅτι... εἶπες, although in the expression which you
make use of you so said. οὕτως refers to the succeeding
subordinate clause. οὐχ ὅτι is properly elliptical for οὐ λέγω,
or οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι, and sometimes, followed by ἀλλά, means not

<_

136 GORGIAS. [450, E.

only, or not only not. Comp. Mt. § 624. 4.
νειν, to be captious in the discourse or discussion.

B. εἴποιμ av... ὄντας. Complete the sentence by τις 451
τῶν κῦρος ἐχουσῶν, I would say that it is one of those arts
that exert their power with regard to (whose efficiency con-
sists In inquiring concerning) the odd and even, how many
there can be of each, i. e. that it is an art, which asks how
many there are, and whose elements are odd and even num-
bers. γνῶσις is due to a copyist, who thought the structure

duc xepai-

deficient. ὥσπερ of ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι, as those
say who draw up written motions in the meetings of the peo-
ple, i. e. who offer amendments in the assembly. The
clearest light has been thrown upon this phrase recently by
Boeckh, in his Inscriptiones Greece, Vol. I. No. 84. The
allusion is to the formula τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ τῇ βουλῇ, 56.
ἔδοξεν, which was used by those who, in the assembly, made
amendments to the decrees or probouleumata brought down
from the council. They employed the phrase to avoid the
trouble of reading over those parts of the decree which they
left unaltered. σύγγραμμα is so used of a clause in a de-
cree by Aischines c. Ctes. § 127 Bekker. The Scholiast,

with less success, explains these words of cases where two

or more bills proposed by the same person followed one an-
other in succession. It was the custom to prefix the names
of the citizen, of his father, his demus, and tribe, to his res-
olution. In such cases the herald, says he, to save time,
would say ra μὲν ἄλλα κατὰ ταὐτά, the same as before. But
this explanation is unfortunate for several obvious reasons.
Still more so is Coray’s, who understands of συγγραφόμενοι
of public contractors.

C. διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, etc., but it differs (ἡ λογιστική)
thus much: that the art of calculating considers how the
odd and the even are related to themselves (i. e. odd to odd
and even to even) and to each other in respect to number.

451, ο.] NOTES. 137

For πῶς ἔχει πλήθους, see Soph. § 188, N.; Cr. § 363, ;
K. § 274. 3. This definition of λογιστικὴ is found again in
Charmides, 166, A. Arithmetic seems in Plato’s definition
to be employed with number in general, and λογιστικὴ to be
the vulgar art of reckoning, in which numbers are consid-
ered in their relations. A later distinction in the science of
number was into Arithmetic, which inquired περὶ rod ποσοῦ
καθ᾽ ἑαυτό, and Music περὶ τοῦ πρὸς ἄλλο; 1. 6. concerning
the relations of numbers. Sometimes, as here, the former
term included the whole science of number, but was used
ἰδιαίτερον περὶ τοῦ τοσοῦ καθ᾿ αὑτό, more especially of num-
bers in themselves considered.

D. The second ri is added by Stallbaum from a conjec-
ture of Heindorf, and seems necessary to the text. The
stars denote insertion. ἀμφισβητήσιμον καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις.
See Eurip. Alcest. 106, and p. 452, E, ri... τοῦτο λέγεις ;
also Cr. § 528.

ΕἸ. τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν. This scolium, or table-song, is as-
cribed by the Scholiast to Simonides or to Epicharmus. It
is often quoted, as by Athenzus at the end of his work.
Comp. a fine passage, Laws 1.631. The whole song is, —

“ ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνατῷ,
δεύτερον δὲ καλὸν φυὰν γενέσθαι,
τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως,

καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων."

Plato does not allude to the last line, because no trade or
employment is concerned with it.

452 <A. ἰατρός re... χρηματιστῆς. They are named in the
order suggested by the scolium. Heindorf wished to read
ὁ ἰατρός re, but Buttmann observes (the remark does not ap-
pear in the second ed. of Heind.), that the article so used
would denote that one person had all the attributes men-
tioned: ὅ re ἰατρὸς καὶ χρηματιστής, on the contrary, would

15»

138 GORGIAS. [452, a.

sufficiently discriminate the persons; or, in ambiguous
cases, 6
ἐξαπατᾷς. For oratio recta after ὅτι, comp. Cr. ὁ 609, a.

B. θαυμάζοιμί γ᾽ av... εἴ σοι ἔχει. The reason, according
to Stallb., why there is here an indic. in the protasis with

an opt. in the apodosis is, that what the pzdotribe says, * in-

5 AY Ν , 5», σ΄
τε ἰατρὸς καὶ 6 χρηματιστῆς. εἴποι . . . ὅτε ewe

terlocutoris mentem potius quam suam ipsius opinionem re-
spiciat.” As, however, ἔχει ἐπιδεῖξαι is, in his own opin-
ion, only a possibility, he says θαυμάζοιμι ἄν. But per-
haps θαυμάζοιμι ἂν may be considered the optative of
politeness, which expresses, under the form of a possibility,
something real and absolute. Comp. Kihner’s largest Gr.
§ 817. 6. τέχνης depends on ἀγαθόν, good pertaining
to his art.

C. πάνυ καταφρονῶν ἁπάντων is added in satire, to show
the higher pretensions of the meanest of the three employ-
ments. Gorgias and the sophists held philosophy in like
contempt, compared with the arts of show. One of the
comic poets, Anaxandrides (Athenzus, 694, F), proposes
to comply with these high claims so far as to change the
place of the second and third lines of the scolium. He
says, ‘ when the author of it named making money as the
third best thing,” —

[14 ~ > Φ' σε 3 ,
τοῦθ᾽, ὁρᾷς, ἐμαίνετο,
μετὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν γὰρ τὸ πλουτεῖν διαφέρει "

~ 3
καλὸς δὲ πεινῶν ἐστιν αἰσχρὸν θηρίον.

καὶ piv... ὅδε, and yet you see Gorgias here main-
tains on the contrary.

D. καὶ σὲ... αὐτοῦ. There is here a change not un-
known to our language from the relative to the demonstra-
tive construction.
why the men themselves who are possessed of the art are
free. αὐτοῖς is used on account of the contrast with others
whom they govern. There is here a certain rhetorical col-

αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, i. 6. the cause

452, D.] NOTES. 139

oring, which may be intended as an imitation of the style
of Gorgias.

ἘΣ. τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγ᾽ οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι, I certainly pronounce
it, or mean by it the being able to persuade, etc. ἐν ἄλ-
λῳ συλλόγῳ, facile intelligas τοὺς συλλεγέντας. Stallb.
ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει, i. 6. when in or invested with this pow-
ἀλλὰ σοὶ is added as if ἄλλῳ had not gone before.

er.

Comp. 521, D, οὐ πρὸς χάριν .. . ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ
πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον.

453 <A. τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο axel. e. its sum and sub-
stance, its essential quality ends in this or tends to this as
its result, τοῦτο referring to πειθοῦς. τελευτᾶν, meaning to
end, takes the preposition εἰς and adverbs of motion to a
place after it, as including the previous motion, together
with the end itself; — to come to an end. So ἄρχειν, to be-
gin, is joined with ἀπὸ, ἐκ, and adverbs of motion from a
place, = ἐο start.
to be taken with δύνασθαι, and ἐπὶ πλέον is to a greater ex-
tent, plus. Comp. ταῦτα ἐπὶ πλέον εἰπεῖν, Laws, 697, C;
ἐπὶ πλέον τι δύναται, Politicus 805, B. So also ἐπ᾽ ἔλαττον,

ἢ exes... δύνασθαι. Here τι seems

ἐπὶ πολὺ, ἐπὶ σμικρὸν (Soph. Electr. 414), are used.

B. ἐγὼ yap... τούτων ἕνα, be assured that I, as I flatter
myself, — if any other person engages in conversation with
another, because he wishes to know the very nature of that
about which the discourse is held, that I also, I say,— am
a person of that description. It is often the case, as here,
that an infinitive and its subject are introduced after ὅτι.
This happens, for the most part, when a clause intervening
between ὅτε and the infinitive renders the change from the
grammatical construction to its equivalent one less obvious.
But here there is an anacoluthon also. Owing to the
change just mentioned, ἐγὼ is left by itself, and ἐμὲ takes its
place. ἐγὼ... οὐκ οἶδα. Here notice the emphatic
position of ἐγώ, the attraction of τὴν . . . πειθὼ to the main

140 GORGIAS. [ 453, B.

sentence, in which οἶδα is, and the interposition of εὖ ἴσθ᾽
ὅτι between the adverb and the verb.

(, οὐ σοῦ ἕνεκα. . . λέγεται, not on your account (to draw
anything further from you), but on account of the discus-
sion, that it may go on in the way in which it can make the
subject discussed most clear to us. Some authorities have
ποιῇ, Which arose from not perceiving that ὡς here is quo-
modo, and not ut. See 449, E. ὥσπερ av. ἂν belongs
‘to ἠρόμην, and is repeated on account of its distance from
the verb, occasioned by the conditional clause. Comp.
447, D. Ζεῦξις. As this great painter painted for Ar-
chelaus, king of Macedon, who died in the same year with
Socrates, there is here no anachronism, and Pliny’s date for
his entrance on his art (Olymp. 95. 4, after the death of
Socrates) must be incorrect. καὶ ποῦ. These words
have given no little trouble to the interpreters, because the
place where a painter’s works are, which is their natural
meaning, has nothing to do with the definition of his art.
Ast’s explanation of ποῦ as meaning where, in what thing,
in regard to what (i. e. what animals and what properties
of them, etc.), and Cousin’s, where, on what, as canvas or
stone, are hardly deserving of mention. Others suppose
the text corrupt. Heind. conjectures πόσου, for how much,
and Coray, rod, whose son. But how the compensation or
the father of Zeuxis had anything more to do with the
definition of his art than the place where he painted, they
do not inform us. Stallb., after Routh, would read πῶς,
which makes good sense, though it departs too much from
the letters of the actual text. I conjecture (that I likewise
may contribute my mite) that the sentence originally ended
at γράφων; which, indeed, may be argued from the fact,
that Plato afterwards only alludes to ra ζῶα. To this ra
ποῖα τῶν ζώων, and ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῶα, point ; and no other defi-
nition of the art of Zeuxis is hinted at. Next to γράφων

453, C.] NOTES. 141

came ἢ οὔ, HOY, which was corrupted into ΠΟΥ͂ ; and
then καὶ was added to bring ποῦ into grammatical connec-
tion with the sentence. For the confusion of H and Π in
the MSS., Bast’s Epist. Paleograph. in Schefer’s Gregory
Corinth., p. 716, may be consulted. A similar corruption
of ἢ οὗ into που, in Repub. 437, D, is removed in modern
editions.

D. καλῶς ἄν σοι ἀπεκέκριτο ; would your answer have
been a good one? ‘This verb, like several other deponents,
is used both actively and passively, —a usage almost con-
fined to the perfect, pluperfect, and aorist. Comp. Soph.
§ 208, N. 2; K. § 252; Cr. § 564. ov δῆτα denies the
latter part of the alternative, οὐ πείθει.

454 <A. τὸν λέγοντας him who makes this assertion, that rhet-
- oric is the art of persuasion.

B,C. ταύτης. .. τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, SC. THY ῥητορικὴν τέ-

ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζῃς, etc. The form of this

χνην εἶναι.
sentence changes a little as it proceeds. ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω is
written as if μὴ θαύμαζε had gone before. The proper apo-
dosis of iva... θαυμάζῃς is τοῦ ἑξῆς . . . ἐρωτῶ, but the con-
nection is broken up by γὰρ in ὅπερ yap λέγω. The sense
of ὅπερ... λέγω is, for as I say (i. 6. as 1 was just saying,
453, C), I put the inquiry that the discourse may be finished
in due order,— not on your account, but that we may not be
in the habit of too soon catching up each other’s words on
mere suspicion (of what they mean, and without giving one
another time for explanation). With mpoaprdtew... τὰ
λεγόμενα, comp. Herodot. 9. 91, 6 δὲ ὑπαρπάσας τὸν ἐπίλοιπον
λόγον.
ἘΣ. βούλει... θῶμεν like visne videamus, volo hoc contin-
gat. Soph. § 219. 3, last ed.; Cr. § 611.3; K. § 259. 1.6.
455 A. morevriis, productive of belief. διδασκαλικῆς, able
to impart instruction or knowledge, i.e. knowledge founded
upon absolute, unchangeable principles.

ἀλλὰ πιστικὸς

142 GORGIAS. [ 455, A.

μόνον, able to cause belief and nothing more (aiming at con-
viction, and not at truth). This word has been altered into
πειστικὸς by Stephens, Heindorf, Coray, and Buttmann ;
and some MSS. favor the change. Bekker, Stallb., and
Ast, with reason, retain πιστικός. For, as is shown by Ast
at great length, πειστικὸς denotes (having relation to, having
to do with, i.e.) able to produce πειθώ, and is the more
general word, and not necessarily opposed to διδασκαλικός 5
while πιστικὸς means able to produce πίστιν, which has just
been contrasted with ἐπιστήμην (454, D). Again, as to the
form of the word, — which, according to Buttmann, cannot
analogically be derived from πίστις, ---- Ast observes that
adjectives in -ἰκός are freely derived, not only from ver-
bals, but also from nouns (ἀρχή, dpyixds), adjectives (φίλος,
φιλικός), and imaginary forms (νουθετικὸς from νουθέτης).
What objection, then, is there to regarding πιστός, or πί-
otis (comp. φύσις, φυσικός, φθίσις, φθισικός), as the source
of πιστικός ὃ. However derived, such words may take a
genitive. But here there is no necessity of supplying a
genitive with πιστικός.

B. ἴδωμεν τί more καὶ λέγομεν. The force of καὶ in such
a case, before a verb, seems to me to correspond with that
of even. Let us see what we are even saying, where an em-
phasis is thrown on the verb ; = what we can mean. A few
MSS. have λέγωμεν, which gives the inapposite sense of let
us see what we shall say.

περὶ ἰατρῶν αἱρέσεως. ** The
ancient states maintained public physicians at a salary ; and
Hippocrates is said to have been so employed at Athens.
Such physicians had assistants, especially slaves, who prac-
tised among the poorer sort of people. The famous Demo-
cedes of Croton, about Olymp. 60, although as yet little mon-
ey was in circulation, received the large salary of thirty-six
/Eginetic mine or an Attic talent of silver ($1,017). When
he was called to Athens, he received one hundred mine

455, B. | NOTES. 143

($1,692), until Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, engaged his
services for two talents (ὃ 2.034). Boeckh’s Civil Econ.
of Athens, I. § 21. ἄλλο τι ἢ (literally, is there any-
thing else than, is it not true) is a very common formula in
Plato, meaning no more than nonne. Very often ἄλλο τι,
without 7, is found in the same sense at the beginning of a
sentence ; and Bekker always prefers it to ἄλλο τι ἡ. ἈΑο-
cording to Hermann on Viger, note 110, when the latter is
used, the interrogation extends to the end of the sentence ;
but when ἄλλο τι, it stops with those words.
is in the middle. After ἢ νεωρίων, supply συμβουλεύσει
ὁ ῥητορικός. And, just below, a similar clause, which is to
be supplied in thought before ἀλλ᾽ of στρατηγικοί, is after-
A passage precisely like this

αἱρεῖσθαι

wards in part expressed.
occurs in Protag. 319, B.

C. τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν, tuis rebus studere. See 458, B,
note. τινας σχεδὸν καὶ συχνούς. τινὲς includes many
and few, as the more generic word (Wyttenbach on Phe-
do, p. 116), and therefore πολλοί, ὀλίγοι, and similar words,
often follow to define it. Here καί, on account of the po-
sition of σχεδόν, seems to me not to be and, but even. The

sense is, some, almost even many, i. e. some, indeed even

quite a number.

D. αὐτὸς... . καλῶς ὑφηγήσω, for you yourself have admi-
rably led the way, i. 6. in speaking about the docks, etc.,
just now you suggested a good answer.

E. τὰ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Περικλέους. τὰ δὲ is used as if τὰ μὲν
had preceded: and partly through that of Pericles.
ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν, through the advice of thé artificers.
Heind. and Buttmann wish to read τῆς δημιουργῶν. But
there is no need of this, because a man effects what his
advice effects; and such brevity is common in Greek.
Thus, in Alcibiad. I. 135, E, cited by Ast, we have πελαρ-
you ἄρα ὁ ἐμὸς ἔρως οὐδὲν διοίσει, my love then will not differ

144 | GORGIAS. [455, E.

from a stork, i. e. from a stork’s love; and in Repub. 375,
A, we have οἴει τι διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίου σκύλακος εἰς φυ-
λακὴν (in respect to keeping guard) νεανίσκου εὐγενοῦς ;
Comp. Soph.-§ 186, N. 1.
cording to Colonel Leake (Topography of Athens, 354 --
357), this expression denotes both the long walls, which, as

τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους. Ac-

he supposes, reached from Athens to Pireeeus and Port
Phalerum ; so named as being between the city and the
seaports, and also called τεῖχος in the singular, as forming a
sort of fortification. Plutarch (Vita Pericl. § 13) alluding
to this passage, interprets the words — perhaps carelessly —
by τὸ μακρὸν τεῖχος, and thus sanctions Leake’s view. But
Harpocration, 5. v. διὰ μέσου τείχους, explains the phrase of
the southern of the two long walls, so styled as being be-
tween the northern and the Phaleric wall; and this south-
ern wall it is, says he, which Plato mentions in Gorgias.
This is so confirmed by Thucyd. 2. 18, —who speaks of
a Phaleric wall reaching to the city, and also of the long
walls reaching, both of them, from the city to Pireeus,
the outer or northern one of which was guarded, — that it
is not easy to see how the opinion of Leake can stand.
See the commentators on Thucyd. l. c., especially Dr. Ar-
nold. Now this inner or southern leg of the long walls,
τὸ μακρὸν τεῖχος τὸ νότιον (Aschin. de Fals. Leg. § 174,
Bekker), was built after the thirty years’ peace with Sparta,
i. 6. after B. C. 445, when Pericles began to be at the head
of affairs, and when Socrates was over twenty years old.

A. οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας, Soph. § 164, N. 2; K. § 278. 456
2; Cr. § 433.
with the present of an action begun in the past and still

πάλαι ἐρωτῶ. πάλαι is very often found

continued. Join τὸ μέγεθος with δαιμονία, as the accus.

of specification. εἰ πάντα ye εἰδείης. ‘The apodosis must
be something like δαιμονία ἂν καταφαίνοιτο, which is pointed

at by γε.

456, B.] NOTES. 145

B. μετὰ rod ἀδελφοῦ. See 448, B.
etc., to put himself into the physician’s hands, to be cut or
cauterized. A heated iron was applied to the wound for the
purpose of stanching blood by the ἰατρός, who, as Routh
observes, exercised both the medical and the surgical arts.

a σι, a
ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι;

παρασχεῖν, SC. ἑαυτόν ; comp. 475, D. For τεμεῖν, καῦσαι,
see Soph. § 219. 2; Cr. ᾧ 621. 8. An infinitive so used,
if it have the direct object of the leading verb for its sub-
ject, is in the passive, but otherwise in the active.

C. οὐδαμοῦ. . . φανῆναι, would be of no account. Comp.
Soph. Antig. 183, τοῦτον οὐδαμοῦ λέγω : Xen. Memorab. 1.
2. 52, μηδαμοῦ εἶναι, to be nowhere, in no estimation.
εἰ βούλοιτο is elegantly added, says Stallb., to denote the ar-
rogance and pretension of Gorgias, = if he chose te give
himself the trouble.

D. @uabe, sc. rs. Soph. § 157, N. 8; K. δ 238, R. 3;
Cr. § 546. This omission of the indefinite subject ris is
common in this dialogue, as is also the transition from a sin-
gular verb to a plural, or the contrary, where the subject is
ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι dicuntur qui veris

an indefinite one.
armis certare discunt. Nam vulgo juventus non veris
armis se exercebat sed rudibus, aut pilis prepilatis, que di-
cuntur Grecis ἐσφαιρωμένα ἀκόντια [i. 6. with a ball cover-
ing the point]. Que sunt verba Casauboni ad Theophrast.
Charact. p. 79, ed. Fischer. Stallb.

E. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν yap, etc., for they intrusted (them to their
scholars) for the purpose of using them aright against their
foes, and those who wrong them, in defending themselves, not
in beginning an assault. τούτοις refers to the means of de-
fence used in the arts just named. The subject of χρῆ-
σθαι is to be gathered from the context, viz. such persons

as learn to box, and beat their friends. The forms of imdp-

xew, and those of ἀμύνομαι, are often contrasted, in the

senses of acting on the offensive and defensive.
13

μετα-

146 GORGIAS. [456, ¥.

στρέψαντες, turning round, i.e. on the contrary. Comp. pe-
ταβαλών, 480, E.

A. ἐμβραχύ, in short, is taken with περὶ ὅτου ἂν βούληται, 457
to show that that phrase comprises all that can be said, or
is used in its widest sense. Its force is like that of omnino.

B. καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ .. . ὥσπερ καί. For καί, in each mem-
ber of the sentence, comp. the note on Electr. 13801, where
it is said that καὶ often stands after words of comparison to
show connection, without any force that can be given in
English. See also 458, A, at the beginning.
Post participia, καὶ εἶτα, καὶ ἔπειτα inferuntur, ubi εἶτα et

=
κάτα.

ἔπειτα expectes. Stallb. A frequent idiom.
C. δύνανται, sc. of λέγοντες, implied in τῶν λόγων ; or,
more exactly, the subject is indefinite, and plural, because

LA
OvT@

the action of conversing requires more than one.
repeats and recalls the participles. Join διαλύεσθαι to δύ-
vavTal. ;

D. μὴ σαφῶς, i. 6. μὴ φῇ (deny) τὸν ἕτερον σαφῶς λέγειν.
καὶ κατὰ φθόνον, etc., and they think that they are
(i. e. each thinks that the other is) speaking out of envy, or
with ill feelings towards each other, having a contentious
spirit, and not seeking after that which was proposed in the
discussion. For ἑαυτῶν = ἀλλήλων, Soph. § 145, N. 2; K.
§ 302. 7; Cr. § δ. Εν: τελευτῶντες, Cr. § 407. a 5 K.
§ 312, R. 3. οἷα καὶ, etc., so that even the by-standers
feel vexed for themselves, because they consented to be lis-
teners to such people. 'The infinitive follows οἷα here, as it
so often does ὥστε.

E. διελέγχειν, to go on, or through with a refutation of.
διὰ has the same force in διερωτῴην below. In the next
words, the sense is, Lest you should suppose that I speak
with my zeal for debate not directed towards the subject,
that it may become plain, but against you. For τοῦ yeve-
σθαι, comp. Soph. § 187. 1; K. § 308. 2. (Ὁ); Cr. § 372.

457, E.] NOTES. 147

With genitives in this relation of the motive, évexa is often
found.

458 <A. τῶν das... dv ἐλεγχθέντων = τούτων of ἡδέως ἂν
ἐλεγχθεῖεν. K. § 260. 2. (5) Cr: $615.2. Comp. Euthy-
phro 3, D, where Socrates says, that he converses, not only
without taking pay for it, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεὶς ἂν ἡδέως, 56.
μισθόν, but even with a willingness to give pay, if any one
is disposed to hear him. Here προστιθεὶς without ἂν would
mean, that he actually paid his listeners. Just below,
for εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, we should expect εἴ Te. . . λέγοιεν,
or, with the transition to the first person, λέγοιμι, paral-
lel to the succeeding λέγοι. The reason for using λέγω
seems to be that given by Stallb., which Ast opposes: that
Socrates, in speaking of himself, denotes the probability of
his being in an error by εἰ with an indicative ; but only the
possibility of error on the part of another by εἰ and an op-
tative. αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι. Comp. for αὐτὸν emphatic
(the word with which it agrees being omitted), 447, C, οὐδὲν

οἷον αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν.

Β. ὅσον δόξα ψευδής. Greci in hujusmodi compara-
tionibus modo casus preecedenti nomini accommodant, modo
nominativum ponunt, intellecto verbo superiore. Stallb.
Comp. Repub. 334, B, τοῦτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι, ὠφελεῖν
μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἡ δικαιοσύνη, where τὴν δικαιοσύνην would
have been more common. See Cr. ᾧ 655. 4.
παρόντων, the interests or feelings of the present company.
And so τὸ τούτων, just below ; τὸ σὸν σπεύδουσ᾽ ἅμα, καὶ τοὐ-
μὸν αὐτῆς, Soph. Electr. 251. Such formule are some-
times little more than circumlocutions for the pronoun.
Comp. τό γ᾽ ἐμόν, 458, Ὁ. The Schol. thinks that
Gorgias is here finding an excuse to break off. But
probably nothing more than polite attention to the wishes
of the auditors is intended. Gorgias is uniformly polite to
Socrates, and willing to continue the discourse. Comp.
497, B, 506, A.

‘ -
TO τῶν

148 GORGIAS. [458, c.

C. πόῤῥω ἀποτενοῦμεν, we shall extend too far, be too
prolix. ‘The verb is here used without an object, or, if any-
thing is understood, it is ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, rather than τὸν λόγον.
ἐμοὶ δ᾽ οὖν, etc., and as for that (οὖν), may I myself also
never have so much business, that leaving a conversation
such as this, and so carried on (i. e. on a subject of such
importance, and so interesting), it may be of more impor-
tance for me to do anything else.

D. τὸ ἐμὸν is the subject of κωλύει. τὸ λοιπόν, after
this, i. e since all the others wish that the debate should
continue. καὶ ταῦτα, etc., and that too (i. e. and espe-
cially) when I myself announced, that whatever questions
any one wishes to put he may do so.

A. ἐἔλεγές τοι viv δή, you were saying certainly just now. 459
I have written roe νῦν δὴ for τοίνυν δή, at Bekker’s sugges-

τὸ ἐν ὄχλῳ τοῦτο, this ex-

tion, on account of the sense.
pression ἐν ὄχλῳ. This is the subject of ἐστιν, and the re-
ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν. Com-

maining words the predicate.
pare the negative μὴ here, and in ὃ μὴ ἰατρός, with οὐ in ὃ
οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐν τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσιν, just below. In the first two
cases, the negation is general and indefinite: ‘* before
such as do not know, whoever they are,” “ he who is no
physician, supposing such a person to exist.” In the other
two cases, the negation being made concerning something
definite and particular (the orator and the crowd), οὐ is
properly used.

B. ἐνταῦθα, i. 6. in the case of the art of medicine.

C. ῥᾳστώνη, saving of trouble, convenience.
ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγου ἢ, if it come at all within the scope of our
discourse. πρός, (literally,) on the side of, in favor of, to
the advantage of.

D. οὕτως ἔχων. This clause is afterwards defined by

27
€av Tt

γν a > OF
αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς.

A. ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες. See 455, D. οἶμαι iS paren- 460

460, A.] NOTES. 149

thetical: hence μαθήσεται follows, and not μαθήσεσθαι.
ἔχε δὴ, as Ast says, is a formula of exhorting, like ἄγε
yi; as Heindorf, a “" formula subsistendi et inhibendi,’” —
ἔχε σεαυτόν ; as Stallb., after Hermann, one of admonishing
another to remember something, and perceive its results, —
ἔχε τοῦτο. Its use, here, at least, consists in drawing atten-
tion, in causing one to stop and consider something, es-
pecially some objection derived from what had been said.

Β. τἄλλα οὕτω, 56. ἔχει. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, after
the same form of speech, after the same analogy. The next
words, being explicative of this clause, are without a con-
necting particle.

C. The words here inclosed in brackets are so injuri-
ous to the sense, that there can be little doubt, I think, of
their being interpolations. ‘The reasoning is this: He who
has learned justice is just. The just does justly. There-
fore he wills or prefers to do justly. Therefore he never
will prefer to do unjustly. The orator, if taught justice by
Gorgias, is just, and therefore will never will or prefer to do
unjustly. For this passage, consult the Introduction.
ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, from what has been said ; as follows from the
argument. ‘These words show that Socrates begins here to
apply what has been conceded to the case of the rhetori-
cian, which is proof that the words in brackets are indefen-

sible.

D. ἐκβάλλειν, 56. αὐτούς, and so with ἐξελαύνειν, just be-
low. When the same noun follows two verbs, or a parti-
ciple and a verb, in different cases, the Greeks content
themselves usually with expressing it once. Comp. Mt.
§ 428. 2. ὡσαύτως οὕτω, in the selfsame way. These
adverbs answer, as Coray observes, to 6 αὐτὸς οὗτος.

ἘΣ, φαίνεται... οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀδικήσας, appears incapable
of ever doing injustice, = φαίνεται ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀδικήσειε.
F. A. Wolf, on Demosth. c. Leptin. (p. 468, ed. Reiske),

is”

150 GORGIAS. [460, E.

lays down the rule, that φαίνομαι with an infin. = videor, but
with a particip. palam sum.
always discoursing. For the use of the relative, comp. note
on 488, D. Here 6, which refers to pyropixn, is put in
the gender of the predicate πρᾶγμα, by attraction. Comp.
463, E.

A. εἶπον... 67... ἄξιον ein. Here ἂν is not used, be- 461
cause the sense is, I said that it was worth while. With
ἂν the sense would be, I said that it would be worth while.
The first is a direct assertion, in oratio obliqua ; the second
a hypothetical one, in the same form. And so just above,
460, EK, ἐλέγετο ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ . . . εἴης that rhetoric was, but
ὑπέλαβον ws οὐδέποτ᾽ ἂν ein, that it never could be.

B. μὰ τὸν κύνα. A very common oath in the mouth of

ὃ γ᾽. .. ποιεῖται, since it is

Socrates, concerning which much has been written. In
482, B, we have pa τὸν κύνα, τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν, i. 6. * la-
trator Anubis,’ which is either a comic addition to the
original formula, pa τὸν κύνα, or else shows the oath to be
of Egyptian origin. Mr. Mitchell (Aristoph. Wasps, Ap-
pendix, Note D) is of the latter opinion. We refer those
who wish to pursue this point further to the Commentt. and
the Scholl. on that play, v. 83, Solanus on Lucian’s Vit.
Auct. (Vol. Ill. p. 520, ed. Lehm.), and Coray on this
place. The ancients thought that such oaths were intro-
duced by Rhadamanthus, to avoid swearing by a divinity on
a common occasion. Zeno, the Stoic, in imitation of Soc-

rates, swore by the caper-bush. οὐκ ὀλίγης συνουσίας,
haud exigui est sermonis. kai... δοξάζεις. According

to Ast, καὶ affects δοξάζεις, being a little out of its place.

Do you even or really think ? ἢ ole... ἐρωτήματα. A

passage of considerable difficulty, which seems to be best

explained by regarding the sentence, with Schleierm., as a
broken one ; which is indicated in this edition by a dash
after διδάξειν. Polus is so eager, that he cannot end his

461, B.] NOTES. 151

sentence grammatically, but must make a rhetorical exhibi-
tion of his feelings. The sense is, Or do you think, be-
cause Gorgias was ashamed not to admit, both that the
orator must understand the just, beautiful, and good ;
and that he himself would give instruction in these sub-
jects, if one should come to him (to study oratory) igno-
rant of them ;— then, perhaps, from this admission, an
inconsistency arose in the discussion, to wit (δὴ) the very
thing which you take satisfaction in, though you yourself led
the way to such questions (i. e. though you alone, by your
artful questions, are to blame for the inconsistency). For
the first sentence, Schleierm. supplies a close from τοῦθ᾽
ὃ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, as if Polus had at first meant to say, ‘Or do
you think, because Gorgias,” etc. . ... “to find your pleasure
therein.”” But perhaps some other close of more emphasis
may be gathered from the context, such as, (“do you think,
because Gorgias, through shame, made certain admissions,)
that therefore his inconsistency is to be charged to rhetoric.”
The other attempts to explain this sentence which I have seen
are, —1. Ast’s, who gives to οἴει the sense of νομίζεις, and
supplies οὕτω. Or do you think so because, etc. 2. Stallb.,
in his first ed., translates thus: an putas Gorgiam pre
pudore negasse, etc. But this perverts the sense. Comp.
482, C, D, where the passage is alluded to and in part ex-
plained. He also ends the sentence beginning with ἢ οἴει
at ἔπειτα, -- ἃ strange and flat close to the period. 3. In his
second edition, where he blames Ast for his ‘* mira com-
menta,”’ deserting his former view, he continues the sense
in an unbroken period, and treats ofec as though it did not
affect the structure. The sense then becomes, because
Gorgias was ashamed to deny, etc. ,.. did therefore, do. you
suppose, from this admission an inconsistency arise, etc. ?
But an inconsistency did arise, for the very reason con-
tained in the words ὅτι Γοργίας, ete. This is evident from

152 GORGIAS. [ 461, 8.

482,D. The words of Polus then become unmeaning.
μὴ mpocopodroyjoa ... μὴ οὐχί. μὴ ov Sometimes, as here,
follows a simply negative expression, = quin before ἃ sub-
junctive. But more usually it follows a verb of negative
import, when οὐ precedes such a verb. Thus ἀπαρνοῦμαι
μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, I deny that I know, but οὐκ ἀπαρνοῦμαι μὴ
οὐκ ἐπίστασθαι, I do not deny that Iknow. An analogous
formula to this latter is found just below, 461, C, — τίνα οἴει
ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι, ---- where the in-
terrog. implies a negative.

D. ἐπανορθοῖτε. Most of the MSS. have the opt. here
in lieu of the subj. after a present in the principal clause.
The reasons given for the opt. in the present case by
δίκαιος δ᾽ εἶ,
and it is right for you so to do. For δίκαιος, see Mt.
§ 297; K. § 307, R. 6; Cr. § 551. It is for δίκαιόν ἐστί
ve, etc., owing to the cause explained in the note on 448,
D. ἀναθέσθαι, to retract, properly, to put a piece over
again, to change a move in playing draughts. Comp. Xen.
Memorab. 2. 4.4. Cicero, in a frag. of his Hortensius,

Stallb. and Ast are scarcely sufficient.

says, ‘‘Itaque tibi concedo, quod in duodecim scriptis so-
lemus, ut calculum reducas, si te alicujus dicti poenitet,”
borrowing his figure perhaps from Plato. The subject
of ἀναθέσθαι Ast takes to be oe understood. ‘ Quod fieri
non posse manifestum est,” says Stallb. But such cases are
possible, and we believe Ast to be right. Here, σοι δοκεῖ,
just before, and 6 τι ἂν σὺ βούλῃ, just after, almost forbid us
to supply pe. A stronger case occurs Theetet. 151, C:
‘** For many feel so towards me, as positively to be ready to
bite me, when I strip them of some folly of theirs,” — καὶ
οὐκ οἴονται εὐνοίᾳ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, i. 6. that J do this. (Such is
the MS. reading.) φυλάττῃς, if you will only observe
one thing. The middle, if you will guard against, might
stand here.

461, B.] NOTES. 153

E. od... λέγειν, where of all Greece there is the greatest
liberty of speech, "Ελλάδος being a genitive partitive.
ἀντίθες, put over against it, sc. this, viz. σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος,
ete. For this latter passage, compare Aristoph. Acharn.

"303, σοῦ δ᾽ ἐγὼ λόγους λέγοντος οὐκ ἀκούσομαι μακρούς.
ro, though.

462 Β. νῦν δή, nunc igitur.
totle (Metaphys. init.) refers to this treatise, or to the words
of Polus of like import on 448, C, and approves of his
opinion making experience the foundation of art.

C. οὐκοῦν καλὸν... ἀνθρώποις ; does not rhetoric, then,

ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι. Aris-

namely, to have the faculty of giving pleasure to men, seem
to you to be a good thing? The last clause of the sen-
tence explains, and is in apposition with, ἡ ῥητορική. οἷόν
τ᾽ εἶναι = τινα οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι.

1). βούλει οὖν. etc., are you willing, then, since you prize
giving pleasure, to give me a little pleasure? For the play
on xapifoua (which itself playfully alludes to χάριτός twos
καὶ ἡδονῆς, just above), comp. 516, B. In this sentence, the
present infinitive denotes the habit of Polus ; χαρίσασθαι,
that which Socrates wishes him to do in this instance.

E. τίνος λέγεις ταύτης; Comp. 449, E, note on ποίους

τούτους. μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢ, I fear that it may seem too
rude. For δέδοικα omitted, comp. Soph. ὃ 214, N. 4; Cr.
§ 602.2. The comparative, which here denotes a lower
degree of the quality than the positive, is usual in such
apologies.

463 <A. δοκεῖ τοίνυν por... ἀνθρώποις, it seems to me, then,
to be a sort of study, that has not indeed the properties of
an art, but which belongs to a mind dexterous in attaining
its ends, and manly, and possessed of a natural talent to
communicate with men.

B. ὡς δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, etc., yet, as I maintain, is not an
art but experience, or a routine and practice, i. e. has

154 GORGIAS. [ 463, 8.

nothing to do with absolute truth and reason, but proceeds
from accidental discovery that a certain end is gained by
certain means.
nestus ornatus queritur. Stallb.

(Οὐ. τέτταρα. . . πράγμασιν; four divisions these (of flat-
tery or the art of show) relating to four matters or subjects.
These four subjects, according to Coray and Stallb., are
words, food, the ornamenting of the body, and philosophi-
cal disquisitions. ἀποκεκριμένος. Comp. 453, D, note.
πρὶν ay... ἀποκρίνωμα. With πρὶν ““ subjunctivum

κομμωτικὴ differt ἃ κοσμητικῇ qua ho-
rele ἢ μητικῃῇ 4

non usurpant tragici, nisi in priore membro adsit negandi
aut prohibendi significatio.” Elmsley on Medea, 215. In
which case ἂν accompanics πρίν, with some exceptions al-
most confined to poetry, and the subjunctive aorist has the
sense of the exact future of Latin; 6. g. here priusquam
respondero. For the reason why the subjunctive follows
πρίν, see Mt. § 522, C.; K. § 337. 9. Ὁ.

D. ἀποκριναμένου, sc. pov. Comp. 461, 1), note.

‘

πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον, a shadow or semblance of a division
of the political art, * civilitatis particule simulacrum,” as
translated by Quintil. 2. 15. 25, where this passage is ex-
amined.

ΕΣ. Πῶλος δὲ ὅδε. There is here, probably, an allusion
to the meaning of the name colt, as Schleierm. remarks.
For another pun on the name of Polus, comp. Aristot. Rhet.
2. 23: ὡς Κόνων Θρασύβουλον ““ θρασύβουλον"" ἐκάλει, καὶ
Ἡρόδικος (of Selymbria, comp. 448, B, note) Θρασύμαχον,
« αἰεὶ Θρασύμαχος εἶ," καὶ Πῶλον, “αἰεὶ σὺ πῶλος εἶν Kat
Δράκοντα τὸν νομοθέτην, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρώπου οἱ νόμοι ἀλλὰ δρά-

In τυγχάνει ὃν τοῦτο, the predicate τοῦτο deter

κοντος.
mines the gender of ὃν by attraction, instead of ῥητορικὴ, to
which it refers. Comp. 460, E.

Α. οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω, for instance I mean as follows, lit- 464
erally, “cf which sort I mention such a thing as this, viz.”

464, A.] NOTES. 155

This, with or without the article before τοιόνδε, is a common
formula in Plato, when examples are adduced.
para is the accus. of specification.

B. ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον, 1. 6. ed. The subject of ἔχει is

" ,
Ta G@-

supplied by the preceding accusatives, σῶμα and ψυχήν.
But, or, while yet they (soul and body) are none the more
in a good condition. Another construction also is possible :
ὅτι ποιεῖ (τινα) δοκεῖν μὲν εὖ ἔχειν (κατὰ) τὸ σῶμα... ἔχει δέ,
while he is none the more in a good condition.
σώματι, etc., but the art for the body I am not able to name
to you off-hand by one name. σῶμα and ψυχὴ freely take
and lose the article (comp. 465, D). ‘They lose it, perhaps,
as approaching the nature of abstract nouns. In 463, E,
‘they could not have it. μίαν is the predicate-accusative.

A ἊΝ 4328,
τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ

οὕτω, thus, in these present circumstances, is often equiva-
lent to illico. Comp. 509, A.
Here λέγω is to be supplied in thought, and τῆς πολιτικῆς
depends on τὴν νομοθετικὴν, its part. The sense is, And of
the political art I mention (one branch) the legislative as
the counterpart to the gymnastic art, and (the other) justice

τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς, etc.

as the counterpart to medicine. The political art, or the
general art of securing the public good, has two divisions,
Jirst, that which consists in securing the moral welfare by
law, which prescribes what is right, and according to which
the public health will be preserved; and, secondly, that
which restores this health when once impaired, or justice,
the judge’s art. (See Introduction.) Analogous to these
arts for the soul are, for the body, gymnastics, or the art of
preserving, and medicine, or that of restoring health. Pla-
to elsewhere insists on the analogy between the healing art
and justice, 6. g. in Repub. 444, C,—a fine passage, where,
however, justice is taken in the higher sense of that con-
trolling. virtue, which brings all the parts of the soul, like
those of a well-regulated state, into their due place and
order,

156 GORGIAS. [461, c.

C. πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, with a view to the greatest good.

ov γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη. AS αἰσθομένη iS a
general word denoting mental perceptions, whencesoever
derived, it is explained by this clause, not guided by
knowledge, I would have you understand, but by guess.
Comp. 463, A. ὑποδῦσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον, having slipped
under, or by stealth put on the garb of each of the four
divisions.

D. θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν, hunts for, seeks to captivate ig-
norance, or the unwary.

TO... ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ, by that
which is at the time the most agreeable.

A. τοῦτο yap πρὸς σὲ λέγω alludes to 463, D, where Po- 465
lus puts the question concerning the quality of rhetoric.
Comp. 448, C-E.
pet, because it cannot explain what sort of things those are
in their nature, which it makes use of. Here we see what
Plato thought that a τέχνη must be. The MSS. give, al-
most unanimously, 6 προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει, and the editors,
without MS. authority, ὧν προσφέρει. I have restored a
part of the MS. reading, and have since observed that
Stallb., in his second edition, has made the same change.

ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ἃ προσφέ-

ὑποσχεῖν λόγον, to submit the reason, or rationale, to
explain and defend a position.

B. ὑπόκειται, puts itself under, puts on the form or mask
of, — ὑποδύνει above.

ὥστε mow... ἀμελεῖν, SO as to
make men attach to themselves adventitious beauty, and neg-
lect their own, obtained through the gymnastic art.

C. ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω. In the ensuing words, down ‘to
ὀψοποιικῶν, the thoughts seem to be only half expressed, as
if Socrates, anxious to avoid a long speech, were hastening
to an end. Some editors suppose that the text has sus-
tained an injury, but, as I think, without reason. Such,
says Socrates, are these arts in their nature ; but in prac-
tice the Sophists’ art and rhetoric are confounded together ;

465, C.] NOTES. 157

and the like would be true of cookery and medicine, if the
body judged of them without a presiding mind. The
thoughts are not essential to the argument, and are only
thrown out en passant. ὅπερ. .. λέγω refers to what has
just preceded ; but as I say, or was just saying. διέ-
στηκη. The subject of this verb, according to Buttmann
in Heindorf’s edition, is all the arts before mentioned, and
ὄντων has the same subject, which is ταῦτα understood, re-

ferring to these arts. Stallb. restricts διέστηκε, with reason,
I think, in his first edition, to σοφιστικὴ καὶ ῥητορικήῆ. ὄντων
may be used instead of ὄντες, referring to σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥή-
topes, next following. A participle is sometimes found in
the genitive absolute, when its subject is the same as that
of the verb; the cause of which seems to be a desire of the
writer to express the thought contained in the participle
more distinctly. The grammatical construction is caused
by Plato’s passing in thought from the arts to those who

pursue them. dre δ᾽ ἐγγὺς ὄντων, but, inasmuch as they
are conterminous arts, sophists and orators are (mixed to-
gether in the same place and about the same things, i. e.
are) confounded together, and indiscriminately give them-
selves to the same pursuit, and they know not what to make
of themselves, nor their fellow-men of them (i. e. neither
they nor others have any exact idea of their so-called arts).
For the thought, comp. 520, A: ταὐτόν, ὦ μακάριε, ἐστὶ σο-
φιστὴς Kai ῥήτωρ, ἢ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παραπλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον
πρὸς Πῶλον.

D. τὸ τοῦ ᾿Αναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ἦν, what the well-known
(τοῦ) Anaxagoras said (his tenet) would hold extensively
(in regard to these arts). For the uses of the article, see
Soph. § 176, and § 139, N. 1; Cr. δὲ 477. a, 479. Anax-
agoras taught that all things were in a chaos at first; then
came MIND, and arranged them. In other words, he as-
cribed to an intelligent author, not creation, nor motion and

1:

158 GORGIAS. [465, Ὁ.

quality, but only arrangement ; which was, however, a step
beyond the earlier Ionic philosophers, who accounted for

‘
συ

all phenomena by the physical properties of matter.
yap τούτων ἔμπειρος. The Schol. of the Clarke MS. sup-
poses these words to allude to the rhetorical figure called
mapicwots, Which takes place when similar words, as φίλε
Πῶλε here, are brought together. Another Schol. explains
them of the acquaintance of Polus with the philosophy of
Anaxagoras, — to which sect, says he, Polus belonged, —a
piece of information probably picked out of the text. Per-
haps nothing more than ironical praise of Polus for great
knowledge is intended. Comp. 462, A.

E. ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι, SC. ἀντίστροφόν ἐστι τῆς ῥητορικῆς.
The clause might be removed without injury to the sense.
ἀντίστροφον here governs a genitive, but a dative, 464, B.
Some other compounds of ἀντὶ vary in the same way as to
their regimen. ἐκεῖνο, referring to ὀψοποιίας, accommodates
its gender to that of ἀντίστροφον.

A. Init. If, therefore, I too,when you answer, shall not 466
know what to make (of it), do you likewise prolong your
discourse ; but if I shall, let me make use of it. The da-
tive, which should follow χρήσωμαι, is contained in ἀποκρινο-
μένου.

Β. οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι, not even to be thought of, i. 6. to be
held in no estimation at all. This verb, which just above
has a predicate, φαῦλοι, is here used absolutely. Our verbs
to regard, to consider, and others, are capable of the same
twofold use.

C. The colon, which most editors put after κύνα, ought,
as it seems to me, to be erased. Comp. pa τὸν Ala... ἀλλ᾽,
463, D, νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ᾽, 481, C, where the formula of
swearing unites in one clause with what follows. Socrates
does not answer Polus by the phrase νὴ τὸν κύνα, but pred
begins his answer in the next chapter.

466, E.| NOTES. 159

ἘΣ. οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν, etc. Comp. Repub. 9. 577, E.
“Ts not the state that is enslaved and under a tyrant far
from doing what it wishes? Very far. And the soul, ac-
cordingly, that is governed by a tyrant, will be very far from
doing what it may wish (if we speak of the whole soul) ;
and, drawn along forcibly by urgent lust, will be full of
agitation and regret.” For ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, qualifying οὐδέν,
see 450, B. ἐγὼ οὔ φημι; egone nego?
The Schol. on Aristoph. Frogs, 1421, thinks that the name
of the divinity is omitted out of reverence. But the omis-
sion seems intended rather for comic effect, as though the
right divinity did not readily occur to the mind.

μὰ τόν.

\
Kat

τέχνην τὴν ῥητορικήν. Supply οὖσαν. Comp. 495, Ο.

467 <A. ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας. The aorist participle, which Heindorf
declares to be used for the present, has its own force. Ρο-
lus could come to his conclusion, when he had refuted, or by
refuting. The argument may be considered as the prelimi-
nary to the conclusion, or as the means of reaching it. In
the first case, the aorist is needed; the present, if used,
would have the second sense.

Or > Ἢ 5:
οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο κε-

κτήσονται. By τοῦτο, he means τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς.
ἐξελεγχθῇ . . . ὅτι. The verb is here used in sensu pregnan-
ti, unless Socrates be refuted, and it be shown that, thus
answering nearly to our verb convince.

B. οὗτος ἀνήρ. An instance of aposiopesis or reticentia,
a figure often caused by excited feelings, which cannot find
the language to express themselves. ‘In hac formula recte
omittitur articulus, quoniam dicitur δεικτικῶς de eo qui pre-
sens est.” Stallb. οὗτος contains a shade of contempt
sometimes like iste. Comp. 489, B, 505, C. καὶ γὰρ
non est etenim, sed καὶ pertinet ad νῦν. Stallb.; 1. 6. καὶ is

iva προσείπω σε κατὰ σέ, that I may address you

also.
in your own style. This refers to λῷστε Wade, and the arti-
ficial juxtaposition of words of equal length, or of similar
form or sound. Comp. 448, C, 465, D.

160 ‘“GORGIAS. [ 467, 6.

C. πίνοντες παρά, i. 6. πίνοντες τὰ φάρμακα, λαβόντες αὐτὰ
παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν, ἃ construclio pregnans.

D. οἱ πλέοντες, i. 6. who make voyages for commercial
purposes. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο. . . πλουτεῖν, When a demonstrative
pronoun thus prepares the way for the infinitive, the latter

often loses its article. Comp. τοῦτο... ἐξεῖναι, 469, C.

But, just above, we have not only τοῦτο, πίνειν, but also ἐκεῖ-
ἄλλο tt... οὕτω. Supply ἔχει. Is it
not so, then, in all cases ?

E. πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. The preceding question of Socrates
is equivalent to a negative proposition, which is here to be
supplied ; sc. that there is nothing which is not either good
or bad, ete.

A. πράττουσι, on fait, like λέγουσι, on dit. The same 468
indefinite subject appears just before in the first person plu-
ral, βαδίζομεν, etc.

C. ἁπλῶς οὕτως, thus in themselves considered, without
respect to something further.

E. ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ. Not in this city, Athens, nor does
ταύτῃ denote in this way, but in this just-mentioned city, i.e.
in the supposed city. If Athens had been intended, Socra-
tes, living there, would have said, as Stallb. after Boeckh
on Pindar (Not. Crit. in Olymp. 6. 102) observes, ἐν τῇδε
τῇ πόλει. Comp. this formula so used, 469, D, fin. ; Leges
932, A. ὅδε seems to be the strongest, and, so to speak,
most objective of the demonstratives, and to point espe-
cially at that which has a close outward relation (as that

»» , »
ἔστιν. .. δύνασθαι. ἔστιν

vo, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν.

of place) to the speaker.
= fieri potest. ὡς δή, as forsooth, just as though,
Stallb. translates these words by quasi vero, Ast by nam
revera.

A. περὶ dv... τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Comp. Soph. § 151. 3; 469
K. § 332. 8; Cr. § 522.

B. καὶ ἐλεεινόν γε πρός " prepositioni πρὸς absolute posi-

469, B.] NOTES. 161

tee (preterea) adjungi solet particula ye. Ast, — yes, and
pitiable besides. πῶς, CUr.
that. And so, in English, we say how is this? nearly in
the sense of why is this? the reason of which is, that the
manner in which a thing is done often involves the cause
why it is done.

C. ἐξεῖναι. Supply τινι, to which αὐτῷ refers, in the
next line. Ἢ

D. τῷ λόγῳ is added to explain the sense in which ἐπι-
λαβοῦ is used, attack in your discourse, refute by argument.
δὴ seems to belong to the imperative, with the usual horta-
tory sense. ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ, in the agora, when it is
crowded, which it was between early morning and midday.

οὕτως, ws, for this reason

This phrase denotes place, — not time, as Stallb. says, to
which ἐν is opposed. περὶ ἀγορὰν πλήθουσαν is a common
phrase for time. ἀγορά, even when definitely used, is of-
ten without an article, like πόλις, πατήρ, and many other
nouns. And this is particularly frequent after preposi-
tions. Comp. 447, A. τεθνήξει, he shall be dead, the
meaning of τέθνηκα put into a future. This appears to be
the received form in old Attic, and τεθνήξεται came into
use afterwards. See Elmsl. on Aristoph. Acharn. 590.

Twa... τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεαγέναι, that any of them
shall have his head broken, like συντριβῆναι τῆς κεφαλῆς,
Aristoph. Peace, 71. But the accusative may also follow
this verb, as in 515, E. Yet the accusative of κεφαλὴ was
_ disallowed by the Atticists, although used by Lysias and
others of the best writers.

E. τριήρεις, desidero articulym. Stallb. af, which may
have been absorbed by καὶ (ΚΑῚ for KAIAI), is added by
Coray. But the article is unnecessary, being implied or
contained in ra,as Ast observes. One article often suffices,
even for two substantives of different genders, or for two
14*

162 GORGIAS. [470, A.

words separated by disjunctive particles. Comp. Hermann
on Eurip. Hec. 593 of his second edition.

A. τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, etc. The construction is anaco- 470
luthous ; καὶ τοῦτο... ἐστὲ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι being, for the
sake of greater emphasis, in the place of καὶ εἶναι μέγα δύ-
νασθαι. ‘The sense is, To have great power appears to you
to be a good, if success follows a man while he acts as seems
best to him; and this (i. 6. the use of great power when
accompanied with success), as it seems, is to have great
power ; but otherwise to have great power is a bad thing,
and is to have little power. Socrates shows the absurdities
into which Polus, on his own ground, falls.

B. εἰπὲ τίνα ὅρον ὁρίζει. τίς is here used like ὅστις im in-
direct inquiry. See 447, C, 448, ἘΣ, etc.

C. χαλεπόν γέ σε ἐλέγξαι. These words are obviously
spoken in irony.

D. ἀλλ᾽ ἀκούω ye. Routh and other editors since sup-
pose that by this form of words Socrates conveys ridicule
of ὁρᾷς, just above, which is used quite rhetorically. This
may be so, but ἀκούω is often thus used for ἀκήκοα. Comp.
515, E; Cr. § 579, ¢; K. § 255. 1. R. οὐκ οἶδα. The
noble passage down to ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ is freely translated by
Cicero, Tusc. Queest. 5. 12. αὐτόθεν, ex ipsa re. Stallb.,
from the nature of the case itself.

E. παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει. See 451, C.
καὶ γυναῖκα. See 469, E, note.

A. Archelaus began his reign by the foul means men- 471
tioned in the text, in 413 B. C., and died by assassination in
399. He seems to have beey an able prince, and he made,
according to Thucyd. (2. 100), more internal improvements
in Macedonia than all his predecessors. His desire of the

A wa
ἥδ se —

society of men of letters is well known ; besides Euripides,
the poet Agathon and others resorted to his court. (Aélian.
Var. Hist. 2.21.) Socrates, also, is said to have been in-

ami, .] NOTES. 163

vited, and to have replied, ὕβριν εἶναι μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνασθαι
ὁμοίως εὖ παθόντα ὥσπερ καὶ κακῶς. (Aristot. Rhet. 2. 23.)
He said, also, that Archelaus had spent 400 mine in get-
ting his palace painted by Zeuxis, but had spent nothing
on himself. (/élian. u. 5. 14, 17.) Athenezus, in a bitter
passage, filled with aspersions of Plato (Lib. 11. sub fin.),
says that the philosopher was, according to the testimony of
his nephew, Speusippus, on very good terms with the man
whom he here speaks so ill of. But as Plato was scarcely
thirty when Archelaus died, and until that time a man of
little distinction, the story is probably distorted and exag-
gerated. ἐδούλευεν ἄν. Some few MSS. give ἐδούλευσεν.
Heindorf condemns Routh for adopting ἐδούλευεν, saying
that the latter, with dv, is serviret; the former, servisset.
But this is not so. The imperfect indicative with ἂν,
**plerumque refertur ad preesens. Szepe vero etiam ad pre-
teritum, ejusmodi quidem, quod diuturnitatem aliquam vel
repetitionem facti continet.”” Hermann de partic. ἄν, II. 10.

B. θαυμασίως ὡς ἄθλιος. See 477, D, note.
πεμψάμενος, etc. ‘ Insignis est hic locus eo, quod plurima
participia cumulantur, copula non intercedente.” Stallb.
In this, the style of rhetoric seems to be imitated. The
circumstances are compressed into one sentence, and vi-
brated, so to speak, one after another with rapidity, for the
sake of the greater effect.

C. ἐμβαλὼν cis φρέαρ, according to Ast and Stallb., de-
notes the manner in which the action of ἀποπνίξας took

μετα-

place, having drowned him by throwing him into a well.
Perhaps it may suit the rhetorical style here better, if they
are taken side by side, as if καὶ were in the text, having
thrown him into the well (and so) drowned him. For ἀπο-
πνίξας, comp. 512, A. ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ σοῦ, tuque im-
primis, seu interque eos tu primus. Heindorf, who has ad-
duced a number of examples of the phrase.

164 GORGIAS. [471, D.

D. rod... ἡμεληκέναι. This clause is brought, by a
negligent freedom of style, under the influence of ὅτι, al-
though Socrates of course did not praise Polus for igno-
rance of the art of conversation. δὲ has the force of quan-
quam ; although you seem to have neglected the art of dis-
cussing. πόθεν. Comp. my note on Eurip. Alcest. 95.

A. δοκούντων εἶναί τι. Cr., § 450, regards τι as inde- 472
clinable, eorum qui videntur esse aliquid ; not as predic. ac-
cus., eorum qui se putant esse aliquid. Aliquis and ali-
quid are both used by classical Roman writers in the same
emphatic way. Cic. Tusc. Quest. 5. 36. 104: an quidquam
stultius, quam quos singulos contemnas, eos esse aliquid
putare universos. And so tis, τινές, as in the noted line of
Pindar, τί δέ τις; τί δ᾽ οὔ τις; σκιᾶς ὄναρ ἄνθρωπος, Pyth. 8.
95; and in Demosth. c. Mid. § 213, πλούσιοι πολλοὶ... τὸ
δοκεῖν τινὲς εἶναι δ᾽ εὐπορίαν προσειληφότες, Which favors
Crosby’s view. ortyov. Soph. § 220 (223. 2); Cr.
§ 623. Νικίας. This well-known wealthy general per-
ished in the Sicilian disaster, some seven years before the
time when this dialogue is feigned to have been held. He
is, however, without anachronism, selected as a witness, in

the same way that the testimony of Homer might be ap-
pealed to. The men here named were not selected on ac-
count of their unjust actions, — for they were, perhaps, all
of them, among the best Athenian public men, — but prob-
ably on account of their wealth, illustrious connections, and
ancestry. Socrates means to say, that the spirit of all the
great and opulent families in the city led them to prefer
prosperous injustice before depressed goodness. οἱ τρί-
nodes. A favorite kind of votive offering. The tripods

here spoken of were set up on the top of small temples in
the inclosure of the temple of Bacchus, in commemoration
of victories in which the dedicators were the choragi of
their tribes.

᾿Αριστοκράτης, son of Scellias. ‘This man,

472, A.] NOTES. 165

one of the more moderate aristocrats, afier helping, in 411
B. C., to overturn the Athenian constitution, soon again
united with Theramenes to put down the more violent revo-
lutionists. His dislike of democracy is punned upon in
Aristoph. Birds, 125, We find probably the same person
acting as general with Alcibiades, 407 B. C., and one of
the commanders in the great sea-fight of Arginuse, 406
B. C. With five colleagues, he perished, the victim of the
popular frenzy which succeeded that event. It would not,
then, seem very apposite to cite him the next year as a wit-
ness of the tenets of Polus, which his own experience so
sadly belied. Either Plato forgot the date of this transac-
tion, or with concealed irony selects the case of this man
as really disproving what it is intended to prove. And he
may have adduced the others with the same feeling.

B. ἐν Πυθίου, sc. ἱερῷ, in the temple of Apollo Pythius
at Athens. So I have no hesitation in reading, with Coray,
after one MS., for the common Πυθοῖ, Delphi. For τοῦτο
points at a votive offering well known and familiar to Athe-
nians, and this temple (i. e. its sacred precinct) was the
place where those who conquered in the cyclic choruses at
the Thargelia deposited their tripods. Comp. Boeckh’s In-
script., no. 213, and Thucyd. 6. 54.
τῶν ἐνθάδε, by attraction or accommodation to ἐκλέξασθαι,
which contains the notion of taking from. ἐκβάλλειν

. ἀληθοῦς. In these words there is an elegant allusion to

τῶν ἐνθένδε is for

actions of ejectment. There is, also, according to Stallb.,
a play upon οὐσία, which means not only substance, estate,
but reality, truth. ἐκβάλλειν, also, may allude to' the ty-
rants before mentioned; as though Socrates had said,
‘** You mean to act the part of one of these tyrants, whom
you admire so much, and expel me from my only sub-
stance, the truth, by getting a multitude of opinions in your
favor.”'

166 GORGIAS. [472, c.

C. ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι. Supply τρόπον ἐλέγχου εἶναι, and
comp. 473, C, 508, B.

1). σὺ ἡγεῖ οἷόν τε εἶναι. οἷον is neuter, and εἶναι is to
be taken with μακάριον ἄνδρα: another εἶναι being under-
stood, unless we say that the one in the text by brachylogy
performs a double part. Comp. Repub. 486, A: οἷόν τε οἴει
G@Xo TL. ee
διανοώμεθα ; shall we not suppose that you think so2 For
the genitive absolute with ὡς, after a verb of knowing,
comp. Soph. § 192, N. 2; Mt. § 569.5; K. § 312, R. 12;
Cr. § 640. dpa interrogative is sometimes found out of
its usual place at the beginning of the sentence, like other
words of the same class. It is, however, before the most
important clause. Comp. 476, A.

, éya τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν avOpa Bi
τούτῳ μέγα τι iv εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον.

A. ὑπὸ θεῶν. ὑπὸ is used because τυγχάνῃ δίκης con- 473
tains a passive idea — κολάζηται.

B. ἀληθῆ... ἴσως. Hoc ἴσως cum irrisione dictum de
re certa ut Lat. fortasse. Stallb. ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι τοῦτ᾽... χα-
λεπώτερον alludes to 470, C, χαλεπόν γέ σε ἐλέγξαι, and is
ironical.

(Οὔ. ἐκτέμνηται, exsecetur. Ast. τοὺς αὑτοῦ ἐπιδὼν
παῖδας. Supply λωβηθέντας. ἐπιδεῖν (to look upon, to live
to see), “‘ ponitur semper in rebus gravioribus, et ἐπὶ συμ-
φορᾶς ut ait Thomas Magister, p. 9890.) Wyttenbach on
Plut. de sera num. vindict., p. 17, referred to by Heindorf
and others. Not semper, but sepe. We have, for instance,
Eurip. Med. 1025, πρὶν σφῷν ὄνασθαι κἀπιδεῖν εὐδαίμονας ;
Plut. Pelopid. § 84, Διαγόραν ἐπιδόντα υἱοὺς στεφανουμέ-
νους ᾿ΟΟλυμπίασιν, and so several times in Plutarch’s lives.
καταπιττωθῇ, pice oblitus cremetur.

οὗτος εὐδαιμο-
νέστερος ἔσται. ‘The compar. here has far less authority in its
favor than the superl.; and quite a number of MSS. have
εὐδαίμων. Stallb. inclines to the superl., but no sure exam-
ple has been adduced of this degree used for the compara-

473, C.] NOTES. 167

καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων, and by

tive and followed by ἤ.
strangers besides, or and by the rest of men, viz. strangers.
This seemingly pleonastic use of ἄλλος is quite common.
Comp. 480, D ; Pheedo, 110, E, γῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις 5
Leg. 7. 189, D, κάλλος καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ῥώμην; Xen. Cyrop. 7.
3, βοῦς καὶ ἵππους . . . καὶ ἄλλα πρόβατα πολλά.

D. μορμολύττει ad, etc., you are this time bringing up
bugbears, and not attempting a refutation ; and just now
you were bringing up witnesses. Socrates is making game
of the rhetorical substitutes for philosophical proof used by
Polus. For ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρου, comp. 470, 1), 472, A, to
which places there is a reference.

δυοῖν yap ἀθλίοιν.
Supply οὐδέτερος.

E. ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχους This may allude to a
rhetorical precept of Gorgias mentioned by Aristot. Rhet.
3. 18, that the ‘impression produced by the serious dis-
course of the adverse party must be destroyed by mirth;

and that of his mirth by seriousness.” καὶ πέρυσι βου-᾿
λεύειν λαχὼν . .. οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν. Socrates, in his
ironical way, attributes to ignorance a proceeding which
sprang from a conscientious regard to law, and crowned
him with the highest honor. It is narrated by Xenophon,
in his Hellenics, 1. 7, and mentioned by him (Memorab.
1. 1. 18, and 4. 4. 2) and Plato (Apol. Socr. 32, A), and
in the dialogue Axiochus, § 12. Socrates happened to
be the Epistates or president of the Prytanes, and as such
the presiding officer in the assembly, on the day when the
generals. who had conquered at Arginuse (comp. 472, A,
note) were brought before the people on a charge of having
neglected to pick up the bodies of the citizens that were
floating in the water. It was proposed, contrary to the
laws, to try them all at once bya summary process. Some
of the Prytanes, who declared that they would not put the
vote contrary to the laws, were frightened from their pur-

168 GORGIAS. [473, E.

pose by the rage of the people, “ and all promised that they
would put the vote, except: Socrates, the son of Sophronis-
cus, who only said that he would do everything according
to the laws.” (Xen. Hellen. u.s.) Whether Socrates was
overruled by his colleagues it does not appear. One is
tempted to conjecture that they took the affair out of his
hands, and pretended that his delay in allowing the assem-
bly to vote proceeded from ignorance ; and that to this he
playfully alludes. His conduct, however, was viewed by all
in its true light. There is some reason to believe, however,
that for that day he stayed proceedings upon the proposi-
tion. ‘* But on the next day, Theramenes and Callixenus,
with their party, by suborning fraudulently chosen proedri,
procured the condemnation of the generals without a trial.”
(Axiochus, u. 5.) This passage from a work ascribed to a
disciple of Socrates, but commonly regarded as spurious, is
important, not only for this item of information, but also for
the statement, which may have some historical basis, that
the foul plot against the generals was consummated by
means of the proedri non-contribules, as they are called,
who were drawn according to a pretended lot, on the day
of the assembly, by the Epistates for the day, who was the
successor of Socrates.

A. ὅπερ viv δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον is to be taken with ἐμοὶ... 474
παράδος, as I was saying just now, hand over the proof to
me in my turn. He refers to 472, C.

B. τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. These words with
some bitterness silently contrast the philosopher ‘with the
orator, who aims to persuade the many.

διδόναι ἔλεγχον,
to give an opportunity of refutation, to let (another) take
up the argument.

πολλοῦ ye δεῖ. In this formula, καὶ
is often added before δεῖ in the sense of even.

Ὁ. τί δὲ τόδε; intellige λέγεις. Stallb.
ἀποβλέπων, etc. Do you call beautiful things in general

εἰς οὐδὲν

ATA, D.] NOTES. 169

(τὰ καλὰ πάντα) beautiful in each instance without having
reference to anything further 2 i. e. do you consider beauty
a fundamental quality, or resolve it into something else ?
πρὸς ὃ av. ‘These words down to τοῦτο are epexegeti-

cal of the preceding clause.

E. καὶ μὴν τά ye... ἀμφότερα. In this sentence, Ast
wishes to write καλὰ without the article, thus making it a
predicate. τὰ καλὰ is added by way of explanation. τὰ
κατὰ... νόμους --- οἱ νόμοι. The sense is, And, moreover,
laws and studies — those that are beautiful, that is — are
not removed from (are not without) these properties, viz.
the useful or pleasant, or both.

415 A. τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὡσαύτως. Supply ἔχει.
καλῶς .. . ὁρίζει. ‘This conveys a bitter satire of Polus,
who by pleasure and the good meant the same thing.

οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, 1. 6. οὐκοῦν καλῶς ὁρίζομαι, TO
ἐναντίῳ ὁριζόμενος τὸ αἰσχρόν.

B. οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη ; frequens apud Plat. dictio pro
qua quis expectet od καὶ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον ; infra, p. 499, B,
ov ταῦτα ἀνάγκη. Stallb.

(Ὁ. οὐκοῦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ λείπεται, SC. ὑπερβάλλειν αὐτό.

1). ἀντὶ τοῦ ἧττον, SC. κωκοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ.

E. For παρέχων, see 456, Β. ὁ €Xeyxos. . . οὐδὲν ἔοι-
κεν, my mode of proof when put by the side of your mode of
proof is quite unlike it.

476 A. σκεψώμεθα, σκοπώμεθα. The present imperative,

and the subjanctive used for it, seem sometimes to have a
closer reference to the present time than the aorist; and
therefore to be more urgent. Comp. let us be going, and
let us go,in English. It has been remarked (first, I be-
lieve, by Elmsley), that in the present and imperfect the
Attics say σκοπῶ, ἐσκόπουν, ΟΥ̓ σκοποῦμαι, ἐσκοπούμην, but
not σκέπτομαι, ἐσκεπτόμην. ‘There is only one instance of
σκέπτομαι in Plato to very many of σκοπῶ. On the con-

15

170 GORGIAS. [476, A.

trary, they never use σκοπῶ in the future, aorist, or per-
fect.
B. διασκεψάμενος, after careful consideration.

apa
τοῦτο πάσχον, SC. ἐστί, or better, ἀνάγκη τοῦτο πάσχον εἶναι
(i. 6. πάσχειν), τοῦτο being the object. The participle is
used to continve the form of the preceding discourse.

C. The Attic form κάω is justly preferred by all mod-
ern editors to καίω, having, as it does, the support of several
MSS.

D. τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων. The participle is properly
in the present, as the clause may be resolved into ἐπειδὴ
ταῦθ᾽ ὁμολογοῦμεν.

A. ἄρα ἥνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφέλειαν; Supply 477
ὠφελεῖται, to be taken ὙΠ its cognate noun, and for the
place of ὠφέλειαν in the sentence, comp. Soph. ᾧ 151, Rem.
7; K. § 332. 8; Cr. § 522.

B. ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ ἀνθρώπου, in the condition of
a man’s property. So Schleierm. Comp. Repub. 544, E,
αἱ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν κατασκευαὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, and 449, A, περὶ ἰδιω-
τῶν ψυχῆς τρόπου κατασκευήν. Ast, in his translation, joins
ἀνθρώπου With κακίαν.

C. ἀεὶ τὸ αἴσχιστον, etc. In every case, that which is
most ugly is most ugly, from what has been admitted before,
either as occasioning pain in the greatest degree, or harm,
or both. The student will have observed that καλός, ai-
σχρός, preserve the same sense throughout the discussion,
and there seems to be no fit word except ugly by which to
translate the latter of the two. And yet ugly will not bear
to be used in as wide an extent as αἰσχρός. ἀγαθός, κακός,
denote the relation of anything to our well-being, especial-
ly to future and ultimate well-being as opposed to pleasure
in the present time.

Ὁ). οὐκοῦν ἢ ἀνιαρότατόν, etc. Therefore it is either
most unpleasant, and the ugliest of them because it exceeds

477, D.] NOTES. 171

(them) in unpleasantness, or (it is so because it exceeds them)
in hurtfulness, or in both. τούτων refers to the two πονη-

ρίαι of soul and body. ὑπερφυεῖ τινε. . . ὡς μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ.
by some extraordinarily great harm. This may be ex-
plained as a confusio duarum locutionum, ὑπερφυές ἐστιν ὡς
μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ. it ts astonishing by hew great a harm, and
ὑπερφυεῖ τινι βλάβῃ, by some astonishing harm. The com-
mon formula ὑπερφυῶς ὡς, θαυμαστῶς os, with an adjective,
can be explained in the same way, or by an attraction by
which the adjectives trep pues, θαυμαστόν (ἐστιν) are changed
in their form by the relative adverb.

E. ἀπαλλάττει. This means no more than “has a ten-
dency to free.” Some are beyond the reach ef cure by
punishment (525, C). Nor does Socrates teach here that
the ultimate object of punishment is to free the bad man
from his badness, as that of medicine is to cure the sick.
The comparison is not to be pressed in all respects.

478 <A. εἰ μὴ οὕτως εὐπορεῖς, if on this view of the subject you
are not prepared to answer.

C. ἀπαλλάττεται. The subject is to be ae in οἱ ia-
τρευόμενοι, Such as are under cure, which, being indefinite,

readily gives place to a singular. ἰατρευόμενος is added
to explain οὕτως. ἀρχήν, omnino, used chiefly with neg-
atives. Comp. Soph. Antig. 92. τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτῆσις,
the not even possessing it at all.

1). ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἡ δίκη. Hoc dictum multorum
imitatione celebratum esse docuit Wyttenbach. ad Plutarch.
de sera numinis vindicta, p. 23. Stallb.

E. οὗτος δ᾽ ἦν, but this was, i. 6. this is, as we proved,
he who, etc.

479 <A. διαπράξηται Sore. This verb and ἐκπράσσω are often
followed by ὥστε before an infinitive. Comp. Soph. Antig.
303. Eurip. Alcest. 298. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις. In phrases
like this, an apodosis to which ἂν belongs is to be supplied :

172 GORGIAS. [479, A.

here διαπράξαιτο is to be repeated. A little below ὡσπερα-
\ - ot κ x > ε ”
vel παῖς == ὥσπερ φοβοῖτο ἂν εἰ παῖς εἴη.
B. τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν is added to explain τοιοῦ-
τόν τι. αὐτοῦ refers to δίκην διδόναι, implied in δίκην, just
above. μὴ ὑγιοῦς σώματος stands, with a brevity which

is not uncommon in comparisons, for τοῦ συνοικεῖν μὴ ὑγιεῖ
σώματι, in order to prevent the repetition of συνοικεῖν.
Comp. 455, E, note ; Soph. Antig. 75; and Soph. § 186,
N. 1; K. § 323, R. 6; Cr. § 461, R. 2.

(Ὁ. παρασκευαζόμενοι. This verb can be followed by an
accusative, and by a clause beginning with ὅπως. The two
constructions are here united.
whereby they may be.
verb may be united with the participle or infinitive of εἰμί,
or with a simple predicate, as here. Comp. Soph. Electr.
261, note in my ed.

E. τὸν ἀδικοῦντα... διδόντα, the one who, though he
commits the greatest wrongs, suffers no punishment for
them.

A. αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν. .. φυλάττειν, ete. For one needs to keep 480

ὅπως ἂν ὦσιν, the means

συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακόν. ‘This

φαίνεται, SC. ἀποδεδεῖχθαι.

guard especially over himself, lest he act unjustly, on the
ground that (if he so act) he will be possessed of a serious
evil. The subject of φυλάττειν is τινά, With which αὐτὸν is
to be joined; and the same omission of the indefinite sub-

ject occurs a few lines below. ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσῃ. One
MS. has ἀδικήσει, and one other ποιήσει; just below. The old
doctrine of Dawes, that ὅπως μὴ cannot be followed by a
first aorist subjunctive, but requires either a second aorist
subjunctive or future indicative, is now exploded by all re-
spectable scholars.

| ΒΒ. ἢ πῶς λέγομεν. λέγωμεν, which Bekker prefers, would
be equally good here. Comp. τί φῶμεν, just below. The
difference is, that πῶς λέγομεν --Ξ what is our opinion ὃ
πῶς λέγωμεν, what shall we say 2 what ought to be our opin-
ion? what have we good reason to believe ?

480, 9. NOTES. 173

C. εἰ μὴ εἰ. ‘Sometimes a second εἰ follows εἰ μή, as
in Latin nisi si.” Mt. § 617. d; K. § 340, R.5; Cr.
§ 667. 2. Stallb., on Sympos. 205, Εἰ, says: “" Alterum εἰ
rem magis etiam reddit incertam, ut quod exceptioni condi-
tionem adjiciat.” ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον. According to Stallb.,
χρήσιμον εἶναι is here to be supplied, and the clause κατηγο-
pew δεῖν, being explanatory of τοὐναντίον, follows without a
copula. But this view of the construction overlooks δεῖν.

It may explained by supplying οὐ χρήσιμος . .. ἡμῖν again
in thought with εἰ μή τις, etc., or in other words, Plato, stu-
dious of brevity, proceeds as if he had forgotten all of the
sentence preceding οὐ χρήσιμος. For making a defence,
etc.,... rhetoric is of no use at all to us (nor is it of any
use), unless one should suppose, on the contrary, that he
ought to be an accuser first of all of himself, etc.
ἀεί. Here ἀεὶ = at any time. ἀλλὰ παρέχειν μύσαντα,
etc., but to give himself up, with his eyes closed and man-
fully, as to a physician, ete. μύσαντα expresses endurance
of calamity with determination, the impressions concerning
pain derived from the sense of sight, and their effects in
weakening resolution, being thus prevented by the will of
him who shuts his eyes. Comp. Soph. Antig. 421.

E. σοι ὁμολογεῖται. Heindorf and Coray would exclude
σοι from the text. If it be the pleonastic dative, as it is
called, the sense is for you, i.e. I am willing to own to you
that they agree with what was said before. τοὐναντίον,
etc. If,on the other hand, says Socrates, ene would do
evil to another, he must save him by the use of rhetoric
from punishment. ‘Thus the rhetoricians, who place the
value of their art in doing good to a friend, and harming
an enemy, do just the contrary ; they harm their friends by
saving them from justice, and do good to their enemies by
the opposite. All this proceeds upon the principles with
regard to justice and injustice which Polus has been com-

15*

é
ὃς ἂν

174 GORGIAS. [480, E.

pelled to admit. The parenthesis ἐὰν μόνον... εὐλαβητέον,
as understood by Buttmann, amounts to this: that this
method of doing evil to an enemy is only applicable in case
the enemy wrongs a third person; for when the enemy
wrongs the orator himself, to do evil to him thus, namely,
to save him from justice, would be but exposing the orator
to fresh injuries from him. By rhetoric, then, he cannot
gain the point he desires, namely, to do evil to his adver-
sary without injuring himself. μεταβαλόντα, mutata ra-
tione, vicissim. Comp. μεταστρέψας, 456, E. It agrees

with the subject of ποιεῖν. The abundance of words to
denote opposition is worthy of notice: τοὐναντίον, αὖ, and
this participle. ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον, etc. δὲ often resumes the

subject after a parenthesis. The sense of the first part of
this sentence is as follows: But on the other hand, again,
if, reversing the case, one has need to do harm to any person,
whether enemy or any one whomsoever,— provided only one be
not himself wronged by his enemy ; for that must be guarded
against, —if, I say, an enemy wrong another, he (that other)
must procure in every way, by deed and word, that he (the
enemy) suffer not punishment nor come before the judge.

A. ἀναλίσκηται. This, according to Coray, is an iso- 481
lated instance of the middle of ἀναλίσκω used as the active,
and to be altered into ἀναλίσκῃ. This word and ἀποδιδῷ
are in a different tense from the aorists preceding, as con-
taining the signification of continuance, which, however,
rather belongs to μὴ ἀποδιδῷ taken together than to the verb
in itself.

C. νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλά. Comp. 466, C, note.
τερόν σε φῶμεν... σπουδάζοντα. For verbs meaning to speak
construed with a participle, see Mt. § 555, Obs. 2. εἶ
un τι ἢν, etc. Lf men had not the same state of mind, some
of them some one, and others some other (i. e. if classes or
portions of mankind did not agree in one or another state

,
πον»

481, C.] NOTES. 175

of mind), but each of us had a peculiar state of mind dif-
ferent from what the rest of mankind had, it would not be
easy to manifest your own state of mind to another.

Ὁ. ἴδιον 7. This construction with 7, which belongs to
ἄλλος, ἐναντίος, and similar words, is adopted here by ἴδιος, on
account of the notion of difference implied in it.
πονθότες. Soph. § 187, N. 6; Cr. § 337. a; K. § 241,

~ R.8. Then follows épavre, because δύο renders the duality
of the persons more striking. ᾿Αλκιβιάδου. At the time
when Plato would have us suppose this dialogue to be

πε-

spoken, Alcibiades, then a man of forty and upwards, had
retired for the last time from Athens, and long before that
the intimacy between him and Socrates had ceased. That
intimacy was of the purest kind on the part of Socrates.
He saw in the young Alcibiades high natural endowments,
and hoped to win him over to the love of wisdom and virtue.
But political ambition and his passions were more attractive.

τοῦ Πυριλάμπους, the son of Pyrilampes, whose name
was Demus. Pyrilampes was a wealthy Athenian, and a
friend of Pericles. He reared peacocks (see Plutarch.
Pericl. § 13; Athenzus, p. 397,C), as did his son Demus ;
and this, being then a new bird in Greece, attracted visitors
from so far off as Sparta and Thessaly. On the first day
of the month, and at no other time, this living picture-
gallery was open to all. Demus was as much admired for
his beauty as one of his peacocks. Hence the parody in
Aristoph. Wasps, 97 (acted seventeen years before the date
of this dialogue): καὶ νὴ Δί᾽ ἣν ἴδῃ γέ που γεγραμμένον | τὸν
Πυριλάμπους ἐν θύρᾳ Δῆμον καλόν, ἰὼν παρέγραψε πλησίον,
“ Κημὸς καλός.) i. 6. where he finds written Δῆμος καλός, ““1)6-
mus is beautiful,’’ he writes close by it, ‘‘ Kjos’? —the top-
piece of the judge’s ballot-box—‘‘is beautiful.” Pyrilampes
also was considered as handsome and as large a man as any
in Asia, whither he went on embassies to the great king and

176 GORGIAS. [481, De

others. (Charmides, 158, A, if another person of the
name be not meant.) We find Demus commanding a
galley at Cyprus, before the battle of Cnidus, which hap-
pened in 394 Β. Ὁ. (Lysias de Bonis Aristoph. § 25, Bek-
ker.) The object of Socrates here is to teach Callicles, in
a playful way, that he feels constrained to follow his object
of attachment, philosophy, wherever it leads him; just as
Callicles obeys the whims ef the people. I know not why
Alcibiades is brought in, unless it be for the reason which
Ast has given: that, though aside from his main object, it
serves to put Socrates in contrast with the politicians and
orators. ‘I love beauty of mind,” he says, “" in Alcibiades,
truth and justice in philosophy; but you love external
beauty in Demus, and an ignorant, unjust Athenian people.”
drt. . . ov δυναμένου: There is here a confusion of two

expressions, ὅτε . . . δύναδαι, and δυναμένου, without ὅτι, con-
strued with gov. ὅτι thus becomes idle.

A. τῶν ἑτέρων παιδικῶν. The latter word could have an 482
honest sense. ἔμπληκτος, fickle. It has this sense in
Lysis, 214, C (where it is joined to ἀστάθμητος), Soph.
Ajax, 13858, and elsewhere.

B. ἐκείνην ἐξέλεγξον . . . ws, refuée her (philosophy) and
show that. See 467, A.

C. ὦ Σώκρατες. The sense is, O Socrates, you seem to

take airs upon yourself in your discourses, being in very
truth nothing but an haranguer; and in the present in-
stance you make this harangue because the same thing has
befallen Polus, which, he said, befell Gorgias in respect to
you. The first clause relates to the general habit of Soc-
rates, which, as Callicles, judging him falsely, says, was
that of bringing a man into perplexity by sophistical argu-
ments, and then of crowing over him, as from a loftier mor-
al ground. ‘The second clause asserts this to be true in the
instance of Polus. δημηγόρος (comp. δημηγορικά, 482, ἘΠ)

482, c.] NOTES. 177

means one who, like a popular speaker, gains his ends
by sophistry and pretence of honesty. ταὐτὸν παθόντος
furnishes the ground or else the occasion why Socrates in-
dulged in this spirit.

1). ὅτι ἀγανακτοῖεν ἄν, εἴ τις μὴ φαίη, because they would
be displeased if any one were to refuse. Without ἂν the
sense would be, they were displeased. With ἄν, the verb,
if put into oratio recta, would be in the optative ; without
ἄν, in the indicative. Comp. 461, A.

ἘΣ. σὺ yap τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ete. For, O Socrates,
while you profess to be in pursuit of the truth, you in reali-
ty turn (the conversation) to such vulgar and popular things
as these, which are not beautiful by nature, but by law. For
φορτικά, comp. Mitchell on Aristoph. Wasps, 66. It may
be translated, also, disagreeable, disgusting. Schol. φορτι-
kd ἐστι τὰ βάρος ἐμποιοῦντα, and so Ast, Stallb. It is joined
with δικανικά, in the style of pleadings, in Plat. Apol. Socr.
32, A. δημηγορικά, Schol. ra πρὸς τὴν τῶν πολλῶν βλέποντα
δόξαν, i. 6. in the style of ἃ δημηγόρος.
δὲ is rarely found after the third word of the clause. Here,

ὡς Ta πολλὰ δέ.

however, ὡς τ. 7. are in ἃ manner one word. See Poppo’s
note on ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι δέ, Thucyd. 1. 6.

488 A. τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν is in apposition with its relative, be-
ing added to explain it.
deal unfairly in your discussions.

Kakoupyets ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, YOU

ὑπερωτῶν, asking
slyly. He says, that, if a person speaks of anything as ac-
cording to law, Socrates changes the ground cunningly, and

asks about it according to nature, and the contrary.
Πώλου τὸ κατὰ νόμον αἴσχιον, etc., literally, when Polus spoke
of that which was more ugly according to law, you followed
up the law according to nature, 1. 6. in your argument you
followed out law, as if it were nature. Ast, with some rea-
son, wishes to erase τὸ κατὰ νόμον and κατὰ φύσιν, which last
words are wanting in some books. The sense would then

178 GORGIAS. [ 483, A.

be, When Polus spoke of that which was more ugly, you
urged the law, i. 6. you spoke of that which: was by law
more ugly. For the phrase, διωκ. κατὰ νόμον, comp. Repub.
5. 454, B, κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν, to pursue an inquiry ac-
cording to the letter, and not the idea. For ἐδιώκαθες (which
Elmsley on Medea, 186, regards as an aorist, but which
here seems to be an imperfect, and its infinitive, Euthy-
phron 15, D, a present). I beg leave to refer to my note
on Antigone, 1096, second edition. τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. οἷον,
though in no MS., is added before τὸ by several editors,

and assists the sense; though without it ἀδικεῖσθαι (a part)
may be regarded as added in apposition, to explain πᾶν (the
general idea). Being pronounced by the scribes like the
ending coy of κάκιον, οἷον might easily be absorbed by that
word.

B. οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους. See 488, D.

C. ἐκφοβοῦντες. After this word, re stands in a few
MSS. It seems to have been added to do away with the
asyndeton ; which, however, is allowable here, as what fol-
lows is an illustration of the foregoing.

ἀγαπῶσι yap,
etc. For they are contented if they are put on an equality
when they are inferior.

c

7... φύσις. Stallb. observes,
that οἶμαι is sometimes interposed between a noun and its

article or preposition.

D. δηλοῖ. Not φύσις δηλοῖ, but ταῦτα δηλοῖ, these things
show that they are so. But Stallb. and Ast give the verb
an intransitive sense here. These things are evident that
they are so, 1. 6. it is evident.

E. κατὰ φύσιν τὴν rod δικαίου. The three last words,
though in all the MSS., are looked on by several editors
as interpolated. Ast retains them, translating φύσιν δικαίου,
not the nature of justice, but natural justice. He remarks,
that a noun governing a genitive may sometimes be re-
solved into an adjective qualifying that genitive ; and cites,

A83, E.] NOTES. 179

in his support, Aristoph. Plut. 268, ὦ χρυσὸν ἀγγείλας ἐπῶν,
i.e. golden words ; Pheedrus, 275, A, σοφίας... ἀλήθειαν

πορίζεις, true wisdom. ὃν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα πλάττοντες. etc.
The primary idea, as Heindorf observes, is expressed by
the participle. The sense is, Not however, perhaps, accord-
ing to that law which we enact, (thereby) moulding those
among us who have the best gifts and most strength ;—
taking them in their youth, by our incantations and juggler-
ies, we tame them as we would lions, etc. ‘The asyndeton
at ἐκ νέων is like a number already noticed: the clause is
epexegetical of the foregoing. See 450, B. ἴσως is used
sarcastically, the thing being regarded as certain by Cal-
licles.

484 A. ἀνὴρ, according to Stallb. and Ast, is here used un-
emphatically as a man, a person. If contempt were ex-
pressed, ἄνθρωπος would have been chosen, as in 518, C.

ἀποσεισάμενος contains a figure drawn from a horse

throwing his rider.
ἐπαναστὰς, etc. He rises upon us and turns out our master,

— this slave that was, i.e. this one whose spirit we had

curbed by laws against nature. The aorists ἀνεφάνη, ἐξέ-

Aapwe, denote an action wholly indefinite in regard to time,

and thus answer to ἐὰν γένηται in the protasis, instead of

γράμματα, written ordinances.

presents or futures. ‘The aorist, in such cases, represents
a general truth as a matter of experience ; the present, as
something oft occurring in the existing state of things; the
future, as something sure to happen, as the effect of exist-
ing causes.

B. νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς. This fragment of an uncer-
tain poem of Pindar’s is often referred to, especially by
Plato. It is treated of at large by Boeckh, Pind. Vol. III.
640. Boeckh makes it probable that the words κατὰ φύσιν,
or something equivalent, belong to the passage ; φησίν, hay-
ing the same sound, and almost the same letters, as φύσιν,

180 GORGIAS. [484, B.

may have caused that word to be omitted. οὗτος δὲ δὴ are
interposed by Callicles. Something like this followed in
Pindar: ἐπεὶ Γηρυόνα βόας Κυκλωπίων ἐπὶ προθύρων Evpu-
σθέος ἀναιτήτας (?) τε καὶ ἀπριάτας ἤλασεν. Coray supposes
that Callicles perverted the sense of Pindar, but the same
turn is given to the words in Leges, 10. 890, A, and Aris-
tides (2. 69, Dindorf) knows no other. The sense of ἄγει
δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον, according to Boeckh, is affert vim
maximam, justam eam efficiens ; i.e. law (the law of nature)
makes use of might, and calls it right. ἄγει and δικαιῶν
have the same object. Socrates interprets ἄγει, below (488,
B), in the sense of carrying off, plundering, which is suited
to the action of Hercules. Hence Ast derives his transla-
tion, lex abigit 5. rapit, ex suo jure agens, violentissime ;
where τὸ 8. is treated as an adverbial phrase. But Aristi-
des, by using the opposite phrase, ἄγει ra δίκαια πρεσβεύων,
shows that τὸ βιαιότατον is at least the object of δικαιῶν.

τούτου refers forward to καὶ βοῦς .. . εἶναι.
C. The changes of number here are worthy of notice:

εἰ - > , > \ > ,
Tis... ἅψηται, .. . τῶν ἀνθρώπων; .. . εὐφυὴς ἢ; - + - γίγνονται.

ἡλικίᾳ de @tate juvenili intelligendum. Itaque πόῤῥω
τῆς ἡλικίας est ultra juventutem. Stallb. πόῤῥω can take a
genitive in two relations. 1. That of the thing from which
one is far off; as, Pheedrus, 238, D, οὐκέτι πόῤῥω διθυ-
ράμβων φθέγγομαι, my words are not far from the style of
dithyrambs. 2. That in respect of which one is far ad-
vanced; as Symposium, 217, 1), διελεγόμην πόῤῥω τῶν νυ-
κτῶν, I conversed to a late hour of the night; infra 486, A,
πόῤῥω ἀεὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας, always pushing forwards
in philosophy ; and in the text the sense can be, to too late
a period of his youth.

D. καλὸς κἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ, in the mouth of Callicles, means
quite another thing from what the same words would intend
if used by Socrates. In earlier times the optimates were

484, D.] NOTES. 181

so called, 1. 6. the name was given to men of a certain
birth. By the standard of Callicles, it would belong toa
man of the highest rank in public estimation. The moral
character of the individual gave him a right to this title, in
the estimation of Socrates. Comp. Welcker, Pref. to The-
ognis, p. 25.

ἐν τοῖς συμβολάίοις, in stipulations, or busi-
ness transactions in general. ‘The word denotes both pri-

vate and public contracts, and treaties of commerce.
ἠθῶν, characters.

I. “τὸ τοῦ E. See 465, D. The following lines are
from the Antiope, and, as the Schol. says, from a speech
of Zethus to Amphion. Valckenaer, in his Diatribe on the
frag. of Eurip. (the seventh and eighth chapters of which
are devoted to this play), gives these words to Amphion.

i” αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ, etc., where, i. e. in whatsoever, he
happens to do his best, whereinsoeyer he most excels. One
MS. only has τυγχάνει, a reading which the editors before
Stallb. generally preferred. But it is now admitted on all
hands, that in the poets relative words occasionally are
joined to the subjunctive without ἄν. Cousin translates this
line, “ afin de se surpasser lui-méme.” It is strange that
he did not see that in the very next line Plato interprets the
ancient and poetical ἵνα, where (which the Attic prose-
writers did not entirely give up), by ὅπου ἄν. For αὐτὸς
αὑτοῦ, see Soph. § 144, N. 4, and § 232; and for βέλτιστος
αὑτοῦ, ὁ 177, N. 5; Cr. § 464. The comparative with the
reflexive pronoun in the genitive denotes the having gone
beyond a previous or usual state ; the superlative with the
same, the possession of the quality in the highest degree to
which the person spoken of attains.

485 <A. εὐνοίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, out of regard to himself, through
self-love. The genitive is objective, as is the possessive
pronoun, 486, A, εὐνοίᾳ τῇς σὴν
for the sake of education.

16

ὅσον παιδείας χάριν, just

ὁμοιότατον πάσχω, I feel very

182 GORGIAS. [485, A.

much the same thing. 'To ὅμοιος, in the second clause, ὥσ-
περ succeeds, instead of ὅπερ or οἷον. Comp. Xen. Sympo-
sium, 4. 37, ὅμοιά μοι δοκοῦσι πάσχειν ὥσπερ εἴ τις πολλὰ ἐσθίων
μηδέποτε ἐμπίπλαιτο, and 518, B.

1). ἔφη ὁ ποιητής, in Iliad, 9. 441.

E. ἱκανόν, satisfactory, answerable to his powers, or to
the expectations formed of him.

μηδέποτε. Heusdius
μηδὲν excidisse suspicabatur. Sed vere monuit Boeckhius
(in Plat. Minoem et Leges Comment. p. 112) seepius ita τι
et μηδὲν omitti. Stallb.
friendly.

A. Inthe Antiope of Euripides, a dialogue between the 486
brothers Zethus and Amphion was contained, in which the
former, who was a shepherd, exhorts the other to give up
the art of music, to which he had devoted himself. The
dialogue, as the remains show, involved a brilliant compari-
son between the life of the practical man and of one de-
voted to the arts. See Appendix, No. 3.
. +. μορφώματι, you strive to ornament a soul so nobly en-
dowed by a puerile form, or outside. μορφώματι denotes
external decoration ; here, the musical and poetical pursuits
of Amphion.

ἐπιεικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς, am quite

μειρακιώδει

οὔτ᾽ ἂν δίκης, etc., nor in the counsels of
justice couldst thou put forth thy words, nor take hold of
anything probable and persuasive ; i.e. Zethus denies to
his brother the power to defend himself in suits at law, and
to use the arts of persuasion.

ἀπαγάγοι. The word
points at the ἀπαγωγὴ of Attic law, a summary process by
which the accused could be dragged before the proper
magistrate, and locked in prison, without previous citation.
One of the crimes to which this process was applicable was
ἀσέβεια, the offence for which Socrates, though by another
process, was actually tried. ‘There is an allusion below, no
doubt, to what actually happened; to the seeming help-
lessness and unskilfulness of Socrates at his trial; to his

486, A.] NOTES. 183

accusers, who were men of little influence or repute ; and
especially to the leading one, Meletus, a bad poet and a
bad man; as well as to the penalty of death, which they
attached to their indictment. —— ἀδικεῖν, says Stallb., ac-
cipiendum pro ἠδικηκέναι. Heindorf on Protag. p. 310, 1),
makes the same remark, and brings a number of examples
in proof of it. One is from Lysias, p. 678, Reiske : οἱ δ᾽

ἠδικηκότες ἐκπριάμενοι τοὺς κατηγόρους οὐδὲν ἔδοξαν ἀδικεῖν. Ac-
cording to Ast, the present includes the past, = to have done
and to be still doing wrong. ‘This is often true, but it will
not explain such a case as this from Lysias, p. 136, Reiske,
cited by Heindorf: ἀξιῶ δέ, ὦ βουλή, εἰ μὲν ἀδικῶ, μηδεμιᾶς
συγγνώμης τυγχάνειν, where one crime some time before
committed is spoken of. The true explanation is, per-
haps, that ἀδικῶ properly means, J am a wrongdoer, as well
as I am doing wrong. But he is a wrongdoer who has
done wrong.

B. κατηγόρου. . . μοχθηροῦ, a very common and paltry
sort of accuser ; referring to the accuser’s standing in gen-
eral. θανάτου . .. τιμᾶσθαι, to lay his damages against
you at death, which happily is an expression we do not use,
because our law, unlike that of Athens, never places hu-
man life in the power of a vile or revengeful accuser, and
of a throng of unrestricted judges. τιμᾶσθαι, to make his
own estimate, set his price, is the usual word for the plain-
tiff’s claim of satisfaction, whether pecuniary or penal.
The court were said τιμᾶν. The defendant was said ἀντι-
τιμᾶσθαι, to estimate in his turn what ought to be the ver-
dict, or ὑποτιμᾶσθαι, to give his reduced estimate, in case
he had been voted guilty by the judges. And all this was
allowed only in certain suits called ἀγῶνες τιμητοί, or those
in which the laws had not settled the penalty, but left it to

the judges. One of these was ἀσέβεια, for which Socrates
was tried. On being found guilty, his ὑποτίμημα was called

184 GORGIAS. [ 486, 8.

for; and instead of naming some small mulet which might
have saved his life, he named support in the Prytaneum.
This led the judges, who usually chose between the ac-
cuser’s estimate and that of the accused, to sentence him
to death. περισυλᾶσθαι, ζῆν. ‘These infinitives, as
Stallb. remarks, depend on ἔθηκε, which is followed at

first by a participle, δυνάμενον, added as a paraphrase of the

poet’s χείρονα, and then by an infinitive. ἀτεχνῶς. See
491, A.
C. εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον. See 509, A, note.

κόῤῥης τύπτειν, to strike a person upon the side of the head

3

‘
€7t

or temples, is spoken only of blows with the flat hand, and
was the highest insult at Athens. See 527, D.
γμάτων . - - εὐμουσίαν. ‘This expression is from Eurip., and
alludes to Amphion’s pursuit. His brother says, No longer

πρα-

practise music, but musicalness of conduct, i. 6. that which
is in harmony with your nature and powers.

D. ἀγαθά. A. Gellius (10. 22) has quoted the passage
from φιλοσοφία yap, 484, C, to this place, but misapprehends
its import. τὴν ἀρίστην is In Opposition to twa τῶν λίθων.
Just above we should expect ais βασανίζουσι for 7, referring
to τούτων τῶν λίθων ; but 7 comes from Plato’s having twa
λίθον in his mind. προσαγαγών, admovens, is used with

allusion to gold, which was brought to the touchstone to be

rubbed upon it, that a judgment might be formed by the
color. The order here is, πρὸς ἣν προσαγαγὼν αὐτὴν, ἔμελ-
λον εὖ εἴσεσθαι εἰ. Comp. Herodot. 7. 10: “ Pure gold we
do not distinguish by itself, but when we rub it (viz. on the
touchstone) by the side of other gold, then we distinguish
the better.”

E. ἅν --- ἃ ἄν. αὐτὰ τἀληθῆ, true in themselves, ΟΥ̓

the very truth.

A. ψυχῆς πέρι... . μή; as to the soul’s living rightly and 487

the opposite.

487, B.] NOTES. 185

B. μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος. μᾶλλον is often thus used with a
comparative instead of a positive ; and in the same way
πέρας just below, 487, Ὁ.

C. Andron is mentioned in Protag. 315, C. He was
probably the father of Androtion, an orator and disciple of
Isocrates, against whom an oration of Demosthenes was
written. ἐπήκουσα. So Bekker, Ast, and others, with
most MSS. Stallb. prefers ὑπήκουσα, I overheard. (This
he retracts in his second edition.)

D. εὐλαβεῖσθαι .. . διαφθαρέντες. Strikingly like Eccle-
siastes vil. 16: ‘‘ Neither make thyself overwise. Why
shouldst thou destroy thyself?”

ἘΣ. δῆλον ὅτι are often interposed in the middle of a sen- —
tence, without having an effect on the construction. And
SO οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι. τέλος τῆς ἀληθείας, de veritate perfecta et
consummata accipio. Heindorf.
kind. The article is used because ἀνὴρ has its widest ge-
neric sense, and thus forms a definite whole.

488 <A. εὖ ἴσθι τοῦτο ὅτι. τοῦτο traxerim ad ἐξαμαρτάνω.

τὸν ἄνδρα, 1. 6. man-

Nam Demostheni familiaris formula εὖ ἴσθι τοῦθ᾽ ὅτι, Pla-
toni, quod sciam, non item. Heindorf.

B. ἄγειν. See 484, B, note. If ἄγειν is there correctly
explained by Boeckh, we must suppose that Socrates plays
upon the word, without essentially injuring the sense of the
passage from Pindar.

τότε, i. 6. antea,
quum de his rebus disputares. Sic τότε passim ponitur.
Stallb. ti ποτε λέγεις. ‘The present embraces the whole
time of the present discussion. Hence it is here for ἔλεγες.

D. οἱ δὴ καί, ete. Since, indeed, they even make laws
for the one, i. e. to control the one. The relative, as often
elsewhere, renders a reason ; i. 6. =the demonstrative with

C. ἀκροᾶσθαι, obedire, like ἀκούειν.

γάρ. τίθεμαι νόμον is used of a people, or one empowered
by them, making laws, the maker being one of the party
16*

186 GORGIAS. [488, D.

to be governed; τίθημι νόμον, of a sovereign or a divine
lawgiver. ;

A. ὅπως μὴ ἁλώσει. See Soph. ὃ 214, N. 3; Cr. § 602. 489
3; K. § 330, R. 4. αἰσχυνόμενος. Socrates refers with
admirable irony to 482, C, D. -
that I may get confirmation (for it) from you, seeing that
a man who is competent to decide has admitted it.

wa... βεβαιώσωμαι., etc.,

B. κινδυνεύεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν, it seems that you were
not speaking the truth; for λέγειν is the infinitive of the im-
perfect.
said, 483, A. ὀνόματα θηρεύων, verba aucupans. Comp.
490, A. The same metaphor is seen in our word captious.

a... κακουργῶ.- He quotes what Callicles

δήματι ἁμαρτεῖν. to use a Wrong expression.

C. ἢ οἴει pe λέγειν, etc. Or do you think my opinion to
be, that if a rabble should be collected of slaves and of all
sorts of men, of no account except by reason of their bodily
strength, and these persons should say anything, that these
very things which they say ought to have the force of law.
Join τῷ ἰσχυρίσασθαι together. This verb can mean pol-
lere, contendere, fidere. For the first meaning, which is
less common, but seems to belong to it here, comp. Dio
Cass. 44, p. 406, Reimar: χαλεπὸν ἰσχυριζόμενόν τι τῷ σώ-
ματι φρονιμώτατον ἐκβῆναι, difficile est corpore esse valido, et
animo prudenti. φῶσιν must be taken absolutely, without
an object, in the sense of decreeing, determining, but with
contemptuous disparagement ; unless we read, with Hein-
dorf, ἅττα for αὐτά. And αὐτὰ ταῦτα refers to the edicts im-
plied in φῶσιν.

1). τοὺς δύο... rod ἑνός. As the numerals are opposed
to one another, they have a certain definiteness. Hence
the article. So ra δύο μέρη, sc. out of three, two thirds.
Comp. Cr. § 483. τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους is as legiti-
mate an expression as τίνας ποτε, which Routh wished to
put into its place.

439, E.] NOTES. 187

E. προδίδασκε. Schol. περιττεύει ἡ πρόθεσις ᾿Αττικῶς. I
believe that in προδιδάσκειν, προμανθάνειν (Aristoph. Clouds,
476, 966), πρὸ means forwards, and that it is prefixed
without adding much to the meaning of the verbs, because
the idea of advance is involved in learning and teaching.
This word alludes to a school, as is shown by ἀποφοιτήσω.
ov pa τὸν Ζῆθον. Comp. 485, E. Most MSS. want
ov, which, however, is necessary here, for although μὰ ‘is
almost confined to oaths expressly or impliedly negative, it
is in itself merely affirmative, being connected, perhaps, in

origin with μήν, μέν. ᾧ σὺ χρώμενος, etc., whose words
you used of me just now with much raillery.
λέγεις, you ulter mere words.

490 ΒΒ. πολλοὶ ἀθρόοι, multi simul. Sepenumero sic jun-
guntur. Stallb.

C. ἢ οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων, etc. Must he then have more
of these provisions than we, because he is better ; or ought
he, in virtue of his authority, to distribute them all, etc.

εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιοῦσθαι, unless he intends to pay the
penalty (by making himself ill).
βελτίστῳ. Supply ἑκτέον.

ἈΠ ἃ
ονόοματα

πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ

1). ποίων ἱματίων ; sc. δεῖ αὐτὸν mov ἔχειν. ποῖος 15 often
used in questions conveying wonder, indignation, or con-
tempt. Aristoph. Clouds, 366, Ὃ Ζεὺς... οὐ θεός ἐστιν;
ποῖος Ζεύς; οὐ μὴ ληρήσεις ; οὐδ᾽ ἔστι Ζεύς. Just below we
have ποῖα ὑποδήματα... ἔχων ; what shoes are you talking
nonsense about? ἔχων here takes an accusative, unless we
write ποῖα ὑποδήματα ; φλυαρεῖς ἔχων. Of this last phrase
explanations, not quite satisfactory, are given by Hermann
on Viger, note 228; Mt. ᾧ 567; Cr. ὁ 632; K. § 668,
R. 1 (largest Gr.). Comp. 497, A.

E. ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. Comp. Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 6,
ὃ δέ ye ταύτου δεινότερον, ἔφη, ὦ “Immia, οὐ μόνον det Ta αὐτὰ
λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν - σὺ δ᾽ ἴσως, διὰ τὸ πολυμαθὴς

Ψ iY a Yer »Ὰ \ eae ,
ειναι, πέρι τῶν αὐτῶν οὐδέποτε Ta avuTa λέγεις.

188 GORGIAS. [491, A.

A. ἀτεχνῶς, absolutely, positively. You never stop talk- 491
ing always about cobblers and fullers and cooks, and posi-
tively nothing else. In the sense without art, the penult
has the acute accent.
joined thus redundantly with οὐδὲν παύομαι again, 517, C, and
in Leges, 2. 662, E. Socrates was often thus reproached
or derided for drawing his illustrations from homely sources.
He was led to it by love of simplicity, contempt for preten-
sion, the desire to find a general truth by means of familiar
instances, and frequent conversations with artisans. See a

det... A€yov... οὐδὲν παύει. ἀεὶ is

a r ,
περὶ τίνων .. . πλέον

fine passage in Sympos. 221, E.
ἔχων. Heind. remarks that περί τι, not περί τινος, is the

usual formula with πλέον ἔχειν. τοὺς κρείττους οἵ εἶσιν, etC.,
by the better, namely, by who they are I do not mean, etc.
οἵ εἰσιν dictum est cum abundantia quadam qualem Calli-
cles in hac oratione sectatur passim. Poterat enim omitti.
Stallb.

B. For κατηγορεῖν with the genitive of the person, see
Soph. § 183. 2 (Ὁ 194, N. 3).

D. τί dé;... ἀρχομένους; The reading and pointing
here are quite uncertain. ‘The passage in brackets is
omitted by Bekker, after one MS. It has the look of an
explanation of τί dé. Nor does Socrates afterwards do
anything with ἀρχομένους, while ἄρχοντας is easily supplied
with αὑτῶν. ‘The sense without this passage is, But what ?
Does justice consist in this, that those who rule themselves
should have more than others. Stallbaum’s reading in his
second ed. is αὑτῶν... τί [ἢ τί] ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους;
where ri is quatenus, qua in parte. But how can ἀρχομέ-
vous be the subject of πλέον ἔχειν ὃ or how could he say
quatenus sibimet ipsis imperantes unless he had already

Δ a ‘ OL a
ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ.

spoken of governing one’s self.
δεῖ sometimes takes an accusative of the thing, when that

is a pronoun.

491, E.] NOTES. 189

E. ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ answers nearly to the French comme vous
étes plaisant ! how ridiculous or foolish you are! γλυκὺς

is used in the same way. τοὺς ἠλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώ-
gpovas, you mean those fools the temperate. ‘The one accu-
sative is in apposition with the other; unless, with Stallb.,
we make τοὺς ἠλιθίους the predicate-accusative ; in which
case the sense is, by the temperate you mean the silly. The
sophists struck a disastrous blow against morality by giving
it this title. Comp. Repub. 348, Ὁ. ‘ What !'” says Soc-
rates to the sophist Thrasymachus ; ‘‘do you call justice

(κακίαν) badness?” ““ No,” said he, * but (πάνυ γενναίαν

εὐήθειαν) very noble folly.” πάνυ ye σφόδρα, SC. τοῦτο
λέγεις.

402 B. ois... ὑπῆρξεν. .. υἱέσιν εἶναι ἢ αὐτοὺς... ἱκανούς.
εἶναι belongs to both clauses. For the transition from the
dat. dependent on the verb to the accus. construed with the
infinitive, comp. 510, E, fin., and Soph. Electra, 962.
Ti... κάκιον ein, for τί dv... κάκιον etn. Comp. tis... κα-
τάσχοι, Soph. Antig. 605; Mt. § 515, Obs. ἂν may have
dropped out here, as τί itself is wanting in ten MSS., both

being absorbed, so to speak, by the last two syllables of

δυναστείαν. οἷς ἐξὸν, etc. A contracted expression for
οἵ, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς . . . αὐτοὶ ἐπαγάγοιντο, which is much the same
as εἰ, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς, etc., if, when they had it in their power,
... they were themselves to introduce. Comp. Repub. 465,
fin.: ‘“* Do you remember that some one reproved us, be-
cause we, in his opinion, made (ποιοῖμεν) our guards not
happy, οἷς ἐξὸν πάντα ἔχειν τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχοιεν, Who,
when they could possess everything belonging to the citi-
zens, were to have nothing.”

C. τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀρετή, etc. τοῦτο refers, not to the three
nouns just preceding, but rather to ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, ---- to
the condition of things when τρυφὴ, etc. are able to supply
their wants. ra δὲ ἄλλα. The predicate is φλυαρία καὶ

οὐδενὸς ἄξια.

190 GORGIAS. [ 492, D.

D. ἁμόθεν γέ ποθεν, undecunque, from obsol. duds, Attic
duds, = τις, Whence μηδαμοῦ ‘This is Bekker’s emenda-
tion of ἄλλοθέν ποθεν, which is evidently a false reading.

ἑτοιμάζειν 1S for ἑτοιμαστέον, which the construction of
the first clause would require. With this infin. supply dew
involved in κολαστέον.

ἘΣ, ὥς ye σὺ λέγεις... ὁ Bios, such a life as you mention.
The lines here quoted are probably from the Polyi-
dus of Eurip., and very similar to another fragment from
his Phrixus. The second trimeter is completed by κάτω

νομίζεται. The passage is parodied by Aristoph. in the
Frogs, 1477. '

A. The singular passage next following is introduced 493
by the way, and perhaps half in sport. At the beginning
of an argument concerning the good and the pleasant,
Socrates takes breath a moment, and changes reasoning for
playful illustration. He first mentions an opinion concern-
ing the true life, which was expressed by the Orphic and
Pythagorean theologists ;— that the body is the tomb of the
soul, release from which will admit it into real existence.
To this dogma Plato alludes in Cratylus, 400, C. He says
(ironically throughout), upon the derivation of σῶμα, that it
may come from σῆμα, because some call the body the σῆμα
of the soul, as being that in which in this present it is
buried ; or because the soul σημαίνει by means of the body
its thoughts and wishes. But he thinks that the name is
due to the followers of Orpheus especially, who taught that
the soul was inclosed and kept (σώζειν) in it to atone for its
crimes in an earlier state. This derivation, he says, would
require no change of letter. The Pythagorean Philolaus
(Boeckh’s Philolaus 181, Clem. Alex. Strom. 3. 3, p. 518,
Potter) says, that ‘‘ the old theologers and diviners testify,
that the soul is joined to the body to suffer a certain penalty,
and is buried in it καθάπερ ἐν σάματι." ΤῸ this, and to the

493, A.] NOTES. 191

comparison of the body to a prison, there is frequent allu-
sion. Socrates now passes on to an allegorical explanation
of the fable of the Danaides, which illustrates the unsatisfac-
tory nature of devotion to animal desire. It was the doctrine
of some Mysteries (the Orphic or Bacchic especially), that
the initiated fared better in the world below than the unini-
tiated, and use was made of this fable to show the difference
in their condition. ‘The fable was afterwards spiritualized,
as we see in the text, and applied to the soul and its parts.
It may be doubted who is the author of this punning alle-
gory. Boeckh contends that it was Philolaus, who was a
native of Croton or Tarentum. But there is no evidence
that this allegory, and the dogma first spoken of, are to be
attributed to the same person. The Schol. refers it to Em-
pedocles, and Olympiod. (apud Stallb.) does the same. But
their assertions may be mere guesses. Ast regards it as
Plato’s own invention, playfully ascribed to an Italian or
Sicilian, for the purpose of laughing at the countrymen of
Polus and Gorgias. τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς, ete. And that that
part of the soul in which the desires lodge is capable of be-
ing persuaded, and of changing from one side to the other.
There may be a side-thrust at rhetoric, the object of which
is πείθειν, when it is said that the part of the soul which
contains the desires is moved this way and that by persua-
μυθολογῶν, expressing in the form of a fable.
The ensuing words, as Buttmann, in Heindorf’s ed.,
observes, seem to be taken from a song of Timocreon of
Rhodes, a lyric poet contemporary with the Persian war;

sion.

of which song a few words in Ionic a minore dimeters pre-
served by Hephestion (p. 71, Gaisford) are as follows:
Σικελὸς κομψὸς ἀνὴρ ποτὶ τὰν parép” ἔφα. κομψός. On
this word, Ruhnken (Timezeus s. v.) says: κομψὸν dicitur
quicquid scitum et venustum est. Plerisque autem locis,
apud Platonem vox habet aliquid ironize Socraticz, ut non

192 GORGIAS. [493, A.

tam de vera et naturali, quam de nimia et adscititia venus-
tate capienda videtur. Gorg. 521, E. Pro splendidis nugis
sumendum est Gorg. 486,C. Neque tamen desunt loci ubi
simpliciter et sine ironia ad laudem referatur: which he
considers to be the case here. It answers to nice, fine,
refined, and witty. I cannot help thinking that it here
contains something of irony. παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι; mak-
ing a change in the word, altering its sound a little.

B. τῶν δ᾽ ἀμυήτων, ete., and that that part of the soul of
the uninitiated, where the desires reside, —its incontinent

and irretentive part, —he said that this was a cask with
holes in it ; making the comparison on account of its ἀπλη-
atia. ἀμυήτους, besides its similarity to ἀνοήτους, seems to
have a double sense, uninitiated (a, pveiv) and not closing,
unable to contain, as if from da, μύειν. The construction is
completed by supplying ἔφη, suggested by ὠνόμασε. αὐτοῦ
seems to refer to ψυχῆς. although no reason appears why the
neuter should here be chosen. Heindorf wished to read
διὰ τὸ ἀκόλαστον, in which case αὐτοῦ would refer to τοῦτο τῆς
ψυχῆς.
of what you have expressed.
of course the invisible, i. e. the intellectual, as opposed to

τουναντίον and σοὶ are to be joined, the opposite

τὸ ἀειδὲς δὴ λέγων, Meaning

the material. Comp. Phzdo 80, 1), ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀειδές,

τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον ἕτερον τόπον οἰχόμενον. οὗτοι . . . KooKive,
that these uninitiated persons are, as it would seem (εἶεν
dv), the most wretched, and carry water into the cask with
holes in a sieve likewise perforated. The early mysteries
seem to have consisted of purifications, the effect of which
was to remove guilt. Hence the initiated escaped the pun-
ishment in the future world which was to fall on others.
This was denoted by making use of certain fables of the
poets, which exhibited the popular view of the punish-
ment of great offenders, and applying them to the un-
initiated.

493, C.] NOTES. 193

C. ἅτε οὐ δυναμένην, etc., on account, namely, of its ina-
bility to retain, through unbelief and forgetfulness. ἀπιστί-

av alludes to πίθον. ἐπιεικῶς. Non explicuerim cum

Heindorfio satis, admodum, sed habet vim affirmandi atque
concedendi, ut Latinorum utique, sane quidem. Stallb.
Ut candide loquar. Routh. ὑπό τι, aliquatenus, quo-
dammodo. Stallb. δηλοῖ μὴν, etc. Yet they make that
clear, by the exhibition of which I wish to persuade you —
if in any wise I can —to change your mind.
σθαι, SC. γνώμην or ψῆφον. The next words explain pera-
θέσθαι, and therefore have no need of καί, which is in

μεταθέ-

some editions. Just below, μετατίθεσαι is used in what is
called the constructio pregnans like ἐξελέγχω, p. 482, B.
The sense is, And do you change your opinion, and say
that, etc.

D. ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ viv, from the same school
with that just now, from some allegorizing sophist. For
ὁ αὐτὸς followed by the dative, in brief phrases, see Soph.
§ 195, N. 3. After οἷον supply λέγοις ἄν.

E. νάματα «νον ἑκάστου τούτων, liquors belonging to, or
put into, each of these tubs.

494 B. κχαραδριοῦ. A bird, so called from the ravines and
beds of torrents where it lives, of a yellowish color, and

very voracious. ἅμα τῷ ἐσθίειν ἐκκρίνει, says the Schol.
The Schol. on this place, and many others, mention that

these birds were reputed to cure the jaundice by being —
looked at; whence those who brought them into town for
sale kept them covered, lest they should effect a cure for
nothing. More about the bird will be found in Schneider
on Aristot. Hist. Animal., Vol. IV. 80, seq. He thinks it
to be the Charadrius edicnemus or C. hiaticula of Linneus.
τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις, οἷον, do you allow that there is such a

thing as.
C. λέγω, καὶ, etc. λέγω, to be repeated after καὶ in the
17

194 GORGIAS. [494, c.

sense of speaking of, takes a personal object with which
the participles agree. The sense is, Yes, and I speak of
(allow that there is such a thing as) a man having all the
other desires, and able to live happily by taking pleasure in
feeding them.
ἀπαισχυνεῖ is used with allusion to what Callicles has said
of the modesty of Gorgias and Polus, as in 489, A.
κνώμενον διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον explains the preceding clause.
Hence the asyndeton. Snunyspos, coarse, vulgar.

D. ἀνδρεῖος yap εἶ. This alludes ironically to his defi-
nition of the βέλτιστοι as being the ἀνδρεῖοι (491, C).

ΕΣ. zo... κεφάλαιον, id quod rerum hujus generis (i. 6.
turpissimarum) caput est. Ast. κεφάλαιον is in apposition »
with 6 Bios. ἀνέδην, freely or openly.

A. dvopodoyovpevos, inconsistent, disagreeing ; from épo- 495
διαφθείρεις
«νον λόγους, you make what we have said before good for
nothing. Ξ

B. καὶ γὰρ σύ. Well, what of that? For you do too,

1. 6. παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ λέγεις.

C. διελοῦ τάδε, etc. Explain the following. You mean
something probably by ἐπιστήμη (certain knowledge), do
you not 2 ἄλλο τι οὖν, etc. Did you not accordingly,
on the ground that knowledge was a different thing from
manliness, speak of these as two? ‘The allusion in this
and the prior question is to 491, A, B. With τὴν ἀνδρείαν,
οὖσαν is to be supplied. ‘The aceus. absol. is often found
without the participle of «iui expressed. Bekker, without .
MS. authority, adds ὃν after ἕτερον, which is a very prob-
able conjecture, as ὃν may easily have been swallowed up

ὅπως ph, 1. Θ. σκόπει ὅπως py, as usual.

λογούμενος, used as an adjective, and 4 priv.

by ἕτερον. The participle ὃν would be attracted in gender
to the predicate.

D. δ᾽ Αχαρνεύς. Socrates playfully but severely imitates
the solemn style of covenants, in which the demus of the

495, D.] NOTES. 195

parties was mentioned. Some of the demz, as that to which
Socrates belonged, had no corresponding adjective forms.
The want was in most cases supplied by an adverb in θεν
taken with the article.
496 A. περὶ drov... ἀπολαβών, look at this with regard to
any part of the body you please, taking it by itself, or sep-
ᾧ, which disease, refers to νοσεῖν implied in

arately.
νοσεῖ.

C. ὑπερφυῶς ὡς. Comp. 447, D.

D. οὐκοῦν τούτου οὗ λέγεις, etc. In that of which you
are speaking, the one part, viz. διψῶντα, being thirsty, is
then feeling pain, is it not? He was speaking of διψῶντα
πίνειν.

E. κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις ; do you speak of taking
pleasure so far forth as the act of drinking is concerned 2

i. 6. does the pleasure go with the drinking ἢ λυπούμε-
νον ; at the same time that the person feels pain? εἴτε

ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος. Stallb. would read ψυχῆς πέρι. But
there can be no objection to taking τόπον with the genitives ;
and χρόνον is excused by being in its company.

497 Α. γίγνεται. See 525, Εἰ, note. ἀκκίζει. Olymp.
apud Stallb. προσποιῇ μωρίαν καὶ τὸ μὴ εἰδένα. Moris de-
fines ἀκκισμὸς as the Attic expression for προσποίησις.
From examples of the use of the word, its meaning evi-
dently is, to pretend that you do not, particularly to decline
taking a thing (as food at table) when you want it. Comp.
Coray on Heliodor. 2. 64. θρύπτομαι has sometimes much
the same sense, e. g. in Plut. Anton. § 12, where it is used

of the feigned reluctance of Czesar to wear the crown.
ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς. Comp. 490, E, note. Stallb. (first ed.) and
Ast suppose this to be a gloss. Stallb. (second ed.), after
Winckelmann on Euthydem. 295, C (quite a parallel pas-
Sage, οὐκ ἀποκρίνει, ἔφη, πρὸς ἃ ἂν ὑπολαμβάνῃς, ὅτι ἔχων φλυ-

αρεῖς καὶ ἀρχαιότερος εἶ τοῦ δέοντος); gives καὶ πρόϊθί ye...

196 GORGIAS. [497, A.

vovbereis to Callicles, and οὐχ dua... πίνειν to Socrates.
On this passage we may remark, — 1. That ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς,
a choice Attic expression, has not the look of a gloss, and it
is not easy to say what it is a gloss upon. 2. The phrase
is not in dramatic keeping with the politeness of the Pla-
tonic Socrates. But then, 3. As Callicles wishes to break
off the discourse, πρόϊθι εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν is not what he
would say. 4. νουθετεῖς can only point at the advice given
by Callicles to Socrates, on pp. 484 —486, and not to any-
thing said by Socrates. Comp. 488, A, ὥσπερ ἤρξω νουθε-
τεῖν pe, referring to Callicles. 5. There is no mark of a
change of person at οὐχ dua, and little at καὶ πρόϊθι. These
last considerations induce me to reject Winckelmann’s
view, and to regard it even more probable that ὅτι ἔχων |
ληρεῖς are words spoken by Socrates. But I can arrive at
no sure affirmative conclusion respecting the passage.

B. οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή, this damage or cost is not yours,
i. 6. this does you no harm.

C. ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι. There is an elegant allusion
to the mysteries of Ceres; which were divided into the
small, held in the city, and the great, held chiefly at Eleusis.
The latter could not be witnessed until a year or more after
initiation into the other. The sentiment is something like
that in Artegall’s words to the Giant : —

“For how canst thou those greater secrets know,

That dost not know the least thing of them all ?

Ill can he rule the great, that cannot reach the small.”
ὅθεν ἀπέλιπες ἀποκρίνου, answer beginning where you
left off. 'The usual construction of épy with an adverb of

motion is here adopted by ἀποκρίνομαι. πεινῶν 1S ἃ par=
ticiple ; παύεται here adopts two constructions.

D. ὁμολογεῖσθαι seems to mean to agree with itself ; σοι
being the ethical dative, and τὸν λόγον or ταῦτα understood
the subject. But ὁμολ. σοι may also denote to be consistent

with your previous admissions. Comp. 487, D.

497, E.] NOTES. ᾿ 197

E. τοὺς ois ἂν κάλλος παρῇς. Supply καλοὺς καλεῖς. The
article is here used as a demonstrative, — a usage not un-
common before a relative sentence introduced by ὃς, ὅσος,
or οἷος.

498 A. ἀμφότεροι ἔμοιγε μᾶλλον, i. 6. χαίρειν δοκοῦσι. This
is said in contempt, as if Socrates were not deserving of a
sensible answer.

C. ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, etc. If cowards, who, according
to Callicles, are the bad, feel more pleasure and pain than
brave men when enemies retire and advance, and if pleas-
ure and pain are the same as good and evil, then the bad
are both bad and good in a higher degree than the good,
which is absurd. After μᾶλλον ἀγαθοί, the MSS. have οἱ
ἀγαθοί, which Routh and succeeding editors have justly left
out; as wholly perverting the sense.

E. δὲς γάρ τοι, etc. A proverb, imputed by the Schol.
to Empedocles, a part of one of whose hexameters νυ. 164
in Sturz’s Emped.) is καὶ δὶς yap ὃ det καλόν ἐστιν ἐνισπεῖν.
τοι, you know, is often used in making familiar remarks or
citing well-known passages. A little below, in 499, B,
πάλαι to, it has, according to Stallb., “vim confirmandi
cum quadam admiratione vel indignatione,” = really, or
dowt you know.

499 B. ὡς δή, see 468, E.
grief, sometimes joy, or, as here, wonder. It is oxytoned
by all the editors of Plato. Others would write ἰοῦ, either
always, or when it does not denote grief.

C. αὖ, again, refers to 491, C. He is again inconsist-
ent with himself. ἑκόντος εἶναι, tf you could help it, if
you had your way about it. See Soph. § 221, N. 3; Cr.
§ 623, N.; K. § 806, R. 8. According to Hermann (Ap-
pend. to Viger, de pleonasmo), it is not simply sponte, but
quantum quis sponte quid faciat, and is used “ de eo potis-
simum quod quis facere detrectat.” Dr. Arnold (on Thu-

1"

ἰοὺ sometimes expresses

198 GORGIAS. [199, c.

cyd. 2. 89), after Hermann, says that ἑκὼν εἶναι “is used
generally in negative sentences where the speaker wishes
to qualify his denial or refusal, by saying that he wil not
do it if he can help it, but that very possibly he may not be
able to help it.” He adds, that in Prometheus, 266 (ἑκὼν
ἑκὼν ἥμαρτον). ἑκὼν εἶναι would make nonsense.

τὸ παρὸν
εὖ ποιεῖν, to do well what is in one’s power, to make the best
of what you have.. This proverb again occurs in Leges,
124959,.Cz — ἡδοναί τινές... ai pev...ai dé. The con-
stant use of ὁ μέν, ὁ δέ, in antitheses, seems to be the reason
why (by a kind of apposition, perhaps).they follow τινες

here. Instead of τινες μὲν. .. ἄλλαι δέ, some,.. . others,
we have, as if the contrast needed to be made stronger,
some, these I say... those. Comp. Eurip. Hee. 1185, ποὰ-
λαὶ yap ἡμῶν, ai μὲν εἴσ᾽ ἐπίφθονοι | αἱ δ᾽, etc. In Auschin. ec.
Ctes. (ὃ 11, Bekk.), of μὲν follows τίνες, and the second οἱ
μὲν is suppressed, as is often the case with ὁ μέν, ὁ de alone.
The formula often occurs as in Plat. Repub. 8. 560, A.

D. εἰ ἄρα τούτων. Greci frequenter relativam orationis
structuram permutant cum conditionali. Stallb. The rel-
ative structure would be at μὲν ἄρα τούτων, etc.

E. τέλος, etc. Comp. Cic. de Fin. 2. 2. 5: Hune ipsum
sive finem sive extremum sive ultimum definiebas, id esse,
quo omnia, qu recte fierent, referrentur, neque id ipsum
usquam referretur. j

A. ἐκ τρίτων, and ἐκ τρίτου, in the third place, third. 500
Eurip. Orest. 1173, σωτηρίαν σοι, τῷδέ τ᾽, ἐκ τρίτου τ᾽ ἐμοί.
Sympos. 213, Β. ὑπολύετε ᾿Αλκιβιάδην, ἵνα ἐκ τρίτων κατακέηται.
Cap. 55. ὧν αὖ for αὖ ὧν. αὖ is out of its clause for
the sake of rhythm.

B. See 464, B, seq.
serves, is a middle term, standing for τέχναι and ἐμπειρίαι

παρασκευαί. the Schol. ob-

both, like ἐπιτηδεύσεις. μέχρι ἡδονῆς, terminating in

pleasure. ‘This is explained by the next words, where

500, B.] NOTES. 199

αὐτὸ τοῦτο refers to ἡδονήν, i.e. τὸ ἡδύ. καὶ ἐτίθην, etc.,
and among those pursuits which relate to the pleasures, 7
set down cookery as a knack, and not an art ; but of those

which have to do with good (I set down) medicine as an art.

πρὸς φιλίου, Supply Διός. μήτε αὐτὸς οἴου, etc. In
this sentence, the two main clauses begin with μήτε ; and
the clause beginning with μηδὲ is the second part of the first
clause. Comp. K. largest Gr. § 743, R. 4.
ἂν τύχης, etc., and do not, contrary-to your opinion, answer
whatever comes into your head, nor take what I say as
though I were in sport.

μηδ᾽ 6 τι

C. οὗ τί ἂν μᾶλλον. .. ἢ τοῦτο. The last words are
added to recall οὗ to mind, and τοῦτο takes the construction
of τί rather than of περὶ τούτου οὗ. It often happens that
ἢ and quam are so inserted after a genitive depending ona
comparative.

SIN et. =, - S90 _ of BY ~ 23>
ἐπὶ Ov, 1. 6. τοῦτον ἐφ᾽ ὅν. Ta TOV αν-

δρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, whether I ought to spend my life in
doing those deeds of the real man, forsooth, that you spoke
of. The reference is to 485, A—D. δὴ is ironical.

ἢ ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν βίον. We should expect τόνδε τὸν βίον, sc.
Gv; but Plato forms this clause as though he had written
πότερον ἐμὲ παρακαλεῖς ἐπὶ τοῦτον, etc.

D. εἰ ἔστι. . . τὼ Bio. A rare instance of a dual agree-
ing with a singular verb. As is usual in similar examples
in Attic writers, where plurals not neuter are joined with
a singular verb, the verb is ἐστί, and it precedes the noun.

E. Socrates breaks off in the middle of the sentence,
to know whether Callicles is so far of the same opinion.

501 <A. ἡ δ᾽ ἰατρική, i. 6. δοκεῖ μοι τέχνη εἶναι. Just below,
ἡ ἰατρικὴ is added to explain ἡ μέν. Comp. ὁ μὲν... ὁ κο-
λαζόμενος, 476, E.
ἔρχεται. There is a striking change of construction here.
The sentence begins with ἡδονῆς, as if Plato had in his
mind the form of the preceding sentence, and were going

> 4. Ὁ Lol ε - a5. 2 > 4
ἡ δ᾽ ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς . . . em αὐτὴν

200 GORGIAS. [501, A.

to say, τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν.
But this thought, which afterwards appears in the parti-
cipial form, is postponed, and the intervening clause, πρὸς
ἣν ἡ θεραπεία... ἅπασα, determined him to say, ἐπ’ αὐτὴν
ἔρχεται, accommodated to πρὸς ἥν, and to leave ἡδονῆς in the
lurch, so to speak. It may be asked, why, when he read
it over, he did not dismiss ἡδονῆς from its irregular position.
The answer is, that the Greeks were governed in their style
by nature, —a higher rule than grammar, — and did not
object to such irregularities of structure asarise from the
nature of the mind, and are heard in good conversation.

ἀτέχνως. and not ἀτεχνῶς. Comp. 491, A.

ἀλόγως
τε παντάπασιν, in a manner altogether irrational, making, I
may say (1. 6. almost), xo estimates (or discriminations), a
mere practice and experience.

B. ᾧ δὴ καὶ πορίζεται. ᾧ refers to τῷ μνήμην σώζεσθαι

‘ “- ΄ 5, 4 Φ ~ #6
καὶ εἶναί τινες, 1. 6. καὶ el δοκοῦσί

“a 5 , ,
τοῦ εἰωθότος γίγνεσθαι.

σοι εἶναί τινες. It might have been said equally well, εἶναί

τινας. etc. ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, 1. 6. as in the case of the body.

οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς, etc., nor having any concern about
aught else but gratification merely, no matter whether it be
for the better or the worse. Here the structure changes
to the impersonal participle, and the subject of the prior
clause becomes αὐταῖς. -

C. ἐμοὶ... . δοκοῦσι εἶναι, it seems to me that there are
such, or they seem to me to exist. ‘The words refer to εἶναί
τινες πραγματεῖαι, etc. It is strange that Stallb. and Ast,
overlooking this plain sense, understand κολακεία as the
predicate.

συγκατατίθεσαι. ‘The word means, properly,
to drop one’s vote in the same vessel with another person,
as a judge in the court. ἡμῖν is ironical, as he had com-
pelled Gorgias and Polus to agree with him.

D. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καί. οὐκ denies the previous sentence taken
as a whole.

χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι, 1. 6. ἔξεστι.

501, E.] NOTES. 201

ἘΠ. τοιαύτη tis... διώκειν. The infinitive explains the
demonstrative, and depends on δοκεῖ repeated. ἄλλο οὐ-
δὲν φροντίζειν. This verb, in the sense of caring about,

usually takes a genitive, or a genitive with περί, but some-
times a neuter accusative. Soph. § 182, N. 1.
ριστικὴ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι. Plato condemned all music on the
flute, as tending to render the young unmanly and fond of

ἡ κιθα-

pleasure. He was, however, for retaining the lyre and
harp in education, but disapproved of some of the occasions
where they were used, such as the public contests of cho-
ruses, dramatic or dithyrambic, thinking that pleasure and
not good was their object, and that they tended to agitate
and not to calm the soul. Comp. Repub. 3. 398 - 403.
ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία, the exhibition of choruses, so
called because the instruction of the chorus was the princi-
pal preparative. The chorus in dithyrambic poetry is es-
Κινησίας of Thebes, so called, it is

pecially intended.
said, because ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ἐχρῆτο πολλῇ κινήσει. He was
much laughed at for his poetry by the comedians (Aris-
toph. Birds, 1877, and Schol.), and attacked by the orators
on account of his character (Lysias in Athenzus, 551,
552).

502 <A. τί dé... Μέλης ; 1. 6. ἐδόκει σοι, as above τί ἡ dida-
σκαλία καὶ ποίησις; i. 6. καταφαίνεταί co. <A little below,
τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ, etc., the construction is different, namely,
τί δὲ δή ἐστι τοῦτο ἐφ᾽ @ ἐσπούδακε ἡ σεμνὴ, etc. What is
said here is a mere passing fling at Meles on account of the
badness of his odes.

B. 4... θαυμαστὴ 9 τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις. The ordi-
nary collocation, as Stallb. remarks, would be ἡ θαυμαστὴ
ποίησις, ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας. He cites Herodot.7. 196, ὁ vav-
τικὸς ὁ τῶν βαρβάρων στρατός ; Repub. 565, D, τὸ ἐν ᾿Αρκαδίᾳ
τὸ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Λυκαίου ἱερόν, and other examples.
μάχεσθαι... ὅπως μὴ ἐρεῖ. Is its aim... to insist upon it

δια-

202 GORGIAS. [502, B.

... that it will not say, ete. εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδές,
For ὃν omitted, comp. Soph. Electr. 313.

ποτέρως .. «
παρεσκευάσθαι, utro modo tibi videtur comparata esse. For
Plato’s view of tragedy, comp. Repub. 8. 568, C, 2. 378,
seq., and a noble passage, Leges, 7. 817. Another admira-
ble passage treats of the corruption of tragedy by popular
influence. Leges, 2. 659.

C. εἴ tis περιέλοιτο. Aristides, in opposing this passage,
and the Schol., have περιέλοις which Coray and Stallb.
prefer. Ast, in defending the text, says that εἰ περιέλοι de-
notes if one were to strip off, εἰ περιέλοιτο, tf one were to
strip off for himself, i. e. in his own mind to conceive of it
as stripped off.

μέλος, musical accompaniment ; ῥυθμόν,
definite succession of arses and theses ; pérpov, definite suc-
cession of long and short syllables.

ἄλλο τι ἢ λόγοι γί-
γνονται. The verb is attracted in number to the predicate
λόγοι.

1). οὐκοῦν. .. ἂν εἴη, It (tragedy) would be then a rhe-
torical species of popular speaking.

δῆμον τοιοῦτον, οἷον
παίδων, i. 6. to a people (or audience) composed of boys,
ete. The grammatical construction, which would be οἷός
ἐστι (δῆμος) παίδων, is forsaken through a singular kind of
attraction, by which οἷος, ὅσος, ἡλίκος, with the noun or ad-
jective they accompany, adopt the case of the antecedent.
It has been inferred from this, and a few other passages of
Plato, that women attended the theatre at Athens, at least
in tragic exhibitions. Comp. Leges, 2. 658, D, 7. 817, C,
and Becker’s Charicles, excursus to Scene 10.

A. οὐχ ἁπλοῦν, etc. = τοῦτο ὃ ἐρωτᾷς οὐκέτι ἐστιν ἁπλοῦν, 503

ji. 6. does not admit of a simple answer. διαμάχεσθαι
λέγοντα, to persist in saying, or steadily to say.

B. τί οὐχὶ. . . αὐτὸν ἔφρασας. Mt. ᾧ 508, c, says: “ Af-
ter τί οὐ an aorist often follows, where we should have

looked for a present.” A degree of urgency is contained

503, B. | NOTES. 203

in this mode of speaking. It may be explained by the
practice of expressing a wish by means of an interrogative
sentence. ‘‘ Why did you not tell me?” = “I wish you
had already told me,” and by implication, “Tell me at
once.” —— αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν, have it ascribed to them, is here
used in a good sense.

C. οὐκ ἀκούεις. Praesens hujus verbi de durante fama,

—perpetuo ponitur. Stallb.; i. e. it is used of something
which is said and may be heard until now. Comp. the ed-
itor’s note on Prometh. 683 (ed. sec.).
twenty-three years before.
E. For Plato’s opinion of Pericles, see the Introduction.

νεωστί, 1. 6. about
οὗ καὶ axnxoas. See 455,

εἰ ἔστι ye... ἣν σὺ ἔλεγες ἀρετήν, ἀληθής. Comp. for
ἀρετήν, Soph. § 151, Rem. 6. The apodosis of this sen-
tence, which might be “they are good men,” is omitted.
“When a proposition with εἰ μέν, or ἢν μέν, has another
with εἰ δὲ opposed to it, the apédosis is often suppressed in
one of the two.” Mt. ὁ 617. In the ensuing clause, the
predicate, ἐστὲν ἀληθές, is left out, and ὅτι before the infini-
tive is redundant. Examples are given by Heindorf, on
Pheedo, 63, C. Comp. 453, B, above. ὅτι was used as
though δεῖ ἀποτελεῖν was to follow; but when Plato came to
that part of the sentence, he accommodated ἀποτελεῖν to εἰ
δὲ μὴ τοῦτο : “if this, viz. ἀποπιμπλάναι, is not virtue, but
this, viz. ἀποτελεῖν, etc., is 50. ,

D. τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι. The nominative here is
used by anacoluthon, as if, instead of ἠναγκάσθημεν ὅμο-
λογεῖν, Plato had written ὡμολογήθη.
quite calmly, or pretty calmly. οὕτως, like sic in Latin,
throws into the adverb before which it stands a certain
modification of its meaning, which cannot be easily ex-
pressed. Comp. Eurip. Alcest. 680, for an analogous use
of οὕτως with verbs.

ΕΣ. ὥσπερ καὶ of ἄλλοι, etc. ἄλλοι 15 used here as in 473,

ς > ΄
οὑτωσὶν ἀτρέμα,

204 GORGIAS. [5085 E.

C. The verb προσφέρει leaves the number required by
δημιουργοί, through the influence of ἕκαστος, added in apposi-
tion to that noun. Comp. Mt. § 302, Obs.
βούλει ἰδεῖν. In this sentence the apodosis is omitted. One
can supply in thought ῥᾳδίως τοῦτο ὄψει. But the true ac-
count of the sentence is, that the apodosis should have be-
gun at ὡς eis τάξιν (‘if you wish to look at painters, etc., —
you will see that, etc.”’); but by_a change of style the clause
ws eis τάξιν is made to depend on ἰδεῖν, and the apodosis

τ >
OLOV εἰ

loses its proper form under the impression that an impera-
tive, ἴδε εἰ βούλει, instead of εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν, had commenced
the sentence.

B. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματά φαμεν, i. 6. τάξεως τυχόντα χρη-
στὰ εἶναι.

Ο. εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὄνομα, to mention the name for
it, as you did for that. Inthe MSS.., ἐκεῖνο stands, which,
if genuine, is put briefly for ἐκείνου τὸ ὄνομα.

E. ἢ ἄλλ᾽ ὁτιοῦν, etc., or anything else which sometimes
will not be of more use to it (the body) than the contrary
(i. 6. abstinence from such gratifications will be) according
to aright view of the case ;— nay, even of less. So this
clause must be rendered as it stands. But I am persuaded,
notwithstanding what Stallb. says, that ἢ ought to be insert-
ed before κατά, as Heindorf proposes, or ye turned into δέ.
For since ye shows that the clause xara . . . λόγον relates to
the foregoing, καὶ ἔλαττον Stands quite by itself; and the
asyndeton (xai being etiam) is intolerable.

B. οὐκοῦν... κολάζειν ; ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ belongs to εἴρ-
ὥσπερ . . . gov relates to ἀκολασία. See Chap.

yew.
46, 48.

C. οὗτος ἀνήρ. See 467, B. Kor..(dépevos is obvious-
ly in apposition with πάσχων ; but we might have also had
κολάζεσθαι in apposition with τοῦτο. According to Aristotle
on Rhet. 1. 10. 17, cited by Stallb., κολάζειν (to chastise,

504

505

505, ο.] NOTES. 205

correct, lit. to cut off, prune) differs from τιμωρεῖσθαι (to
take satisfaction from, punish) in this ; that the former takes
place for the sake of the sufferer, the latter for that of the
doer. μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν ; are we ending the
discourse in the middle 2. Some inferior MSS. have καταλύ-

copev, are we going to end, and some καταλύωμεν, which (or
rather καταλύσωμεν, as the action is momentary) would be
shall we end. The present denotes that they are doing that
which is equivalent to stopping, that they are beginning to
stop. αὐτὸς γνώσει, you yourself must judge, i. 6. | wish
to stop, but leave it to you.

D. θέμις. This word,-being here an accusative, must
be indeclinable. Of this use few will doubt, after reading
what Elmsley and Hermann (Soph. Cé#d. Col. 1191), and
Buttmann (largest Gram. 1. § 58, and 2. p. 405) have writ-
ten. The other examples occur in Cid. Col. ἃ. s., Xen.
(Econ. 11. 11, and Asch. Suppl. 331. In A%sch. Choeph.
632, it is a neuter nominative. No phrases are found be-

sides θέμις ἐστί, θέμις εἶναι. ‘This is a strange, but not a soli-
tary anomaly. Comp. χρέων, δεῖνα sometimes indeclinable,
περιίῃ,
Sc. ὁ μῦθος. The style changes from the plural to the sin-
gular. Comp. for the expression, Leges, 6. 752, A, οὔκουν

κρᾶτα in Sophocles nominative and accusative.

» «+. Gy μῦθον ἀκέφαλον καταλίποιμι, πλανώμενος yap ἂν ἁπάντη
bed x ΒΩ ,
τοιοῦτος ὧν ἄμορφος φαίνοιτο.
E. τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου. Athenzus (7. 308, C, and 8.
362, D) gives his words in ἃ trochaic tetrameter, τὰ πρὸ τοῦ

δύ᾽ ἄνδρες ἔλεγον εἷς ἐγὼν ἀποχρέω. ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι
οὕτως. Supplent ποιεῖν ellipsi inaudita. Equidem οὕτως in-
terpretor : in hoc rerum statu, quum tu nolis amplius mecum
colloqui. Stallb. οὕτως seems to me to be loosely used for
τοῦτο. Comp. Soph. Antig. 706, ὡς φὴς od — τοῦτ᾽ ὀρθῶς
ἔχειν, for ὃ φὴς σύ.

506 A. οὐδὲ yap... εἰδὼς λέγω. Socrates often places him-

18

206 GORGIAS. [506, A.

self in the attitude of a searcher after truth, unable of him-
self to find it, and hoping that others know where it is.

B. ἕως... Ζήθου, till I had given him back the speech
of Amphion for that of Zethus, i.e. until I had defended
philosophy from his attack. See 485, E. ἕως with an im-
perfect or aorist indicative accompanies another clause con-
taining the same tenses with ἄν, when a res non facta is
spoken of.

C. ἀχθεσθήσομαι. This form is condemned by Merris
as un-Attic, but is found several times in Attic writers,
where, however, it may have come from the scribes. ἀχθέ-
εὐεργέτης . . . ἀναγεγράψει.
An allusion to the honorary votes recorded on marbles, in

σομαι is the approved form.

favor of foreigners who had rendered Athens a service.
λέγε αὐτός. αὐτὸς is by yourself, without another

speaker, and so in σοῦ αὐτοῦ διιόντος above.
D. οὐ τῷ εἰκῆ. An elegant and certain emendation of
Stallb. (ed. sec.) for ody οὕτως εἰκῇ.

κάλλιστα παραγίγνε-
ται. One would expect καλλίστη. Coray wishes to strike
out the word ; Heindorf, to read μάλιστα. The sense is,
attends upon it, or is present most beautifully, i. e. is pres-
ent in its greatest beauty, or highest perfection.

A. ἢν δὲ αὕτη, 1. 6. now this we found to be. ἦν points 507
to the time when such a soul was (subjectively to them,
i. 6. appeared to be) ἄφρων, etc. Comp. 478, E, note.

B. a δεῖ... φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν. With the definition of
the σώφρων ἀνὴρ here given, Routh compares Aristotle’s in
the Eth. Nicom. 3, sub fin. : ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς
δεῖ καὶ ὅτε.

C. τὸν δ᾽ εὖ πράττοντα... . εὐδαίμονα εἶναι. Plato passes
in this same way from εὖ πράττειν to εὐδαίμονα εἶναι in Re-
pub. 1. 353, E, Charmides 172, A, Alcibiad. 1. 116, B.
As εὖ πράττειν has the two senses of acting well, and being
prosperous, Plato may seem to have unfairly used this am-

507, c.] NOTES. 207

biguity in his argument. So Heindorf and Stallb. view the
passage. Routh, on the contrary, says: ‘¢ Vult philosophus
consequens esse necessario ex antecedentibus eum qui recte
agit felicem esse. Vix enim potest credi ut Plato duplici
sensu verborum εὖ πράττειν ad argumentum probandum abu-
ti vellet.” Finally, Ast, after Schleierm., correctly, as 1
think, observes, that Plato “in his conclusionem non ducit
ex ambiguo,—sed usum loquendi cogitandus est in rem
suam conyertere, eumque quodammodo corrigere voluisse,
ex ea enim quam posuit-ratione,— nisi bonum quod est,
nihil est prosperum ac beatum.”” With this Stallb., in his
second edition, agrees.

D. Bovddspevoy εὐδαίμονα εἶναι... διωκτέον. The subject
of the action of a verbal may be in the accusative or in the

dative. ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν = ὡς ἔχει τάχους, Thucyd. 2. 92,
= ὡς τάχισταις. Comp. Soph. § 188, N.; Cr. § 363, B.
παρασκευαστέον is the verbal of the middle voice here,
— dei παρασκευάσασθαι. Mt. § 447. 2.
opposed to the state), an individual.

ἰδιώτης (when
In the next sen-

tence, εἰς τοῦτο refers to dros... ἔσεσθαι, and οὕτω πράττειν
to συντείνοντα and what follows it.

ἘΠ. ἀνήνυτον κακόν, an endless or cureless evil, is in appo-
sition with the participial clause preceding it, and in the
accusative. Soph. § 167, N. 4; Cr. § 334. 8; K. § 266,
rey φασὶ δ᾽ of σοφοί, etc. The allusion is more par-
ticularly to Empedocles, who -made φιλία and νεῖκος funda-

mental causes in his world of phenomena; the former, or
the attracting principle, the cause of union among things
unlike, of organization and of motion when one is made out
of many, and the latter, or the dissolving principle, the cause
of separation. He is the Agrigentine who taught in verse,
that “ quze-in rerum natura constarent, quaeque moverentur,
ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam.” Cic. de
Amicit..7. His causes for the phenomena of the world

208 GORGIAS. [507, E.

were physical; and Socrates here gives playfully a moral
turn to his doctrine.

A. τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο. . . κόσμον καλοῦσιν. The universe owed 508
the name κόσμος, order, system, to Pythagoras. Comp.
Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 11, ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος,
which shows that even then the appellation had not become
very current.

ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικῆη. Geometrical equal-
ity is that of ratios, arithmetical, of numbers. It exists
figuratively in morals and politics, when the receipts of one
are to his claims as those of another to his, i. e. when jus-
tice prevails and assigns to each according to his due, and
not according to his power of receiving. But πλεονεξία or
selfishness disturbs and destroys this kind of equality. In
the state, this equality takes power from the bad, i. e. from
the unjust and ignorant, and gives it to the wise and virtu-
ous, because it is right that only they should govern who
can govern well. There is a noble passage on the two
equalities in the Leges, 6. 757, B, cited by Routh.

B. ἐξελεγκτέος . .. as. See 467, A, note. κακίας δὲ
οἱ ἄθλιοι. The predicate ἄθλιοι is omitted. See K. § 852,
2, largest Gr. This is the more natural, because the pre-

ceding words, εὐδαίμονες of εὐδαίμονες, clearly indicate the
construction. Stallb. has added ἄθλιοι, without authority
or sufficient reason.

τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα. ‘This use of τί
in the predicate with a plural subject is not uncommon.
Comp. Auschin. c. Ctes., ἀπόδειξιν ποίησαι τί mor ἣν ἃ ἔπρα-
Eas, καὶ τί ποτ᾽ ἢν ἃ ἔλεγες. (ᾧ 165, Bekker.) The same
formula is repeated just below, τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν a. . . ὀνειδίζεις.
D. εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ, ete. And that I am in the
power of any one who has the will, as those punished by
civil infamy are in any one’s hand who wishes it (lit. belong
to any one). There were three kinds of civil, infamy at
Athens, and they are particularly described by Andocides
(p. 35, Reiske). The lowest consisted in a deprivation of

508, D.] NOTES. 209

certain particular rights, as that of bringing an action as a
public accuser. ‘The next involved the taking away of all
civil rights; and to this the highest added confiscation.
As, in the two latter kinds, the person affected with ἀτιμία
could not appear in court as a prosecutor or a witness, or
complain of his wrongs before the people, he was plainly in
the power of his enemies.

νεανικὸν denotes high-spirit-
ed, ‘or rather overbearing. The clause is in apposition
with τύπτειν ἐπὶ κόῤῥης. Comp. 507, E. The same is true
of τὸ ἔσχατον, as it respects ἀποκτεῖναι. Socrates refers to
486, A-C.

E. τέμνεσθαι, when taken with σῶμα, is in frusta disse-
cart.

509 A. καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερόν ... ἐστι. These words are used
to excuse the confidence and want of deference to others
which Socrates here displays. Comp. 462, ἘΣ, 486, C. In
the latter passage, we have εἰ καὶ a.,and here καὶ εἰ a.
According to Herm. (on Viger, note 307), referred to by
Stallb., καὶ εἰ, etiam si, is used concerning that which we
only assume as true; εἰ καί, quamquam, concerning that
which we declare to be true. Socrates, then, does not
here admit that his expression is impolite ; but in 486, Ὁ,
Callicles acknowledges by εἰ καὶ his trespass against the
rules of good-breeding.
primo aspectu. Ast.

B. τίνα ἂν βοήθειαν, ete. By his inability to afford
what kind of aid to himself would a man be in truth ridic-
ulous? This alludes to 486, B, μήτε αὐτὸν αὑτῷ δυνάμενον
βοηθεῖν.
βοηθεῖν is for αἴσχιστον εἶναι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι
βοηθεῖν. that it is most disgraceful not to be able to render
this assistance, etc. (viz. this assistance which will avert
the greatest evil). With this very strange instance of at-
traction, if it be such, we may compare the expression in

18*

οὑτωσὶν ut Latinorum sic est

΄ 9 ‘A > , ἡ». 4 li
ταύτην εἶναι THY αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν, μὴ δύνασθαι

210 GORGIAS. [509, B.

our own language which Routh adduces, this is the most
shameful thing to be without, for it is most shameful to be
without this thing.

C. τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ, sc. βοήθειαν, and that the aid
given to prevent the evil next in magnitude is second (sec-
ond in shame if inadequate, and in honor if adequate ; for
this latter is implied). βοήθεια κακῶν is like ἀλκὴ κακῶν in
Euripides.

καὶ τἄλλα οὕτως, 56. ἔχειν, not ἔχει, which
Stallb: supplies.

D. ἀδικήσεται. See Soph. § 207, N. 6; Cr. § 554, a;
Κ- $2515 ἘΠῚ
about doing wrong? ‘This genitive without a preposition
may be compared with that which accompanies verbs of
speaking. Comp. Soph. Electr. 317.

E. τί otk... ἀπεκρίνω. See 503, B, note. The im-
perfect ἀπεκρίνου is in most MSS. ; but in this formula that
tense is not used.

τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ; well, but what

μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν. See 468,
C, and the Introduction, p. xxiv.

A. ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσωμεν. See 480, A, note. 510

Β. φίλος μοι δοκεῖ, etc. Here ὅνπερ refers forward to
ὁ ὅμοιος, and ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα is taken with φίλος. οἱ πα-
λαιοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ alludes especially to Hom. Odys. 17. 218,
ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον. The thought is
found also in Sympos. 195, B, ὁ γὰρ παλαιὸς λόγος εὖ ἔχει; ὡς
ὅμοιος ὁμοίῳ ἀεὶ πελάζει, and in Lysis, 214, where it is said
that the bad, being unlike themselves, that is, variable and
unstable, cannot be friends. Comp. also Leges, 716, C,
τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον ὄντι μετρίῳ φίλον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δ᾽ ἄμετρα ovr’
ἀλλήλοις οὔτε τοῖς ἐμμέτροις.

C. δύναιτο φίλος γενέσθαι. Repentina subjecti mutatio,
says Stallb., i. 6. τούτῳ refers to 6 τύραννος, and the subject
of δύναιτο is ὁ τοῦ τύραννου βελτίων. This appears most
probable, as Plato might easily return in his mind to the
earlier subject of the clause, εἴ ris... εἴη ; and as οὐδ᾽ ἂν

510, ο.] NOTES. 211

οὗτος shows that the same subject was still in his mind. It
is not, however, necessary, because either this person or
the tyrant might be called a friend to the other.
ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει. See 468, E, note.

2
εν

D. χαίρων, impune, the opposite of κλαίων, passim apud
dramaticos. And so gaudens is used in Latin.
- +. 600s ἐστιν. αὕτη, the subject of ἐστι, refers to ἐθίζειν,
but is attracted, as often happens, in gender, to the predi-

a
αὕτη,

cate ὁδός.

E. ἔσται ἐπὶ τὸ οἵῳ τε εἶναι, will be in favor of, or will
tend to his being able. Here the construction of the dative
with the infinitive is followed by that of the accusative.
See 492, B.

511 ΒΒ. οὐκοῦν... ἀγανακτητόν; Well, then, is not this just
the thing to rouse indignation ?

1). προσεσταλμένη. simple, properly spoken of garments,
drawn close to the body, in contrast to a garment which
spreads out with numerous folds and plaits.
διαπραξαμένη, etc. But when it has effected the same things
with the forensic art, it charges, I presume, but two obols if
it has brought a man safe from A:gina hither ; and if from
Egypt or the Pontus,— at the highest rate (ἐὰν πάμπολυ),
when it has conveyed in safety what I just now spoke of, the
man himself, and his children, and property, and women ;
having landed them in the port, it demands but two drachms.

- Ast and Coray wish to change the order in this sentence.
I see not why; for it is not more broken than often hap-

ἀλλὰ ταὐτὰ

pens in earnest conversation. ἐπράξατο is the aorist of
indefinite time. See 484, A. With ἐὰν πάμπολυ, supply
πράττηται.

512 A. λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ, etc. Here οὐκ belongs to βιω-
τέον ἐστὶ καὶ ὀνήσειεν, Which is the primary clause. But the
sentence assumes an antithetical structure, the clauses εἰ
μέν τις; =. « εἰ δέ Tes, and οὗτος μέν, τούτῳ δὲ being paired off

212 GORGIAS. [512, A.

against one another. On this form of sentences, Mt. § 622.
4, remarks, that ‘‘ clauses are put in contrast with one an-
other by means of μὲν and δὲ, of which only the second
clause suits the connection, while the first in other lan-
guages would be treated as a parenthesis.” Preserving the
Greek order and form nearly, we may translate, “‘He reflects
that it cannot be (οὐκ). if a man afflicted with great and in-
curable diseases, whom he has saved from drowning, is mise
erable because he lost not his life, that he on the other hand
ought to live, who has many incurable maladies in that which
is more precious than the body, the soul, and that he (the
person so reflecting) will do him good if he deliver him
from the dangers of the sea, or the tribunal, or any other
place. Nay, he knows,” etc. The use of the optative
ὀνήσειεν is to me at least perplexing. Stallb. renders it, with
its attendant words, neque a se ullo modo juvari posse, and
then in defence of it refers to Mt. § 529, on the oratio obli-
qua. But if Iam not deceived, such a form as λογίζεται
(being a present not equivalent to a historical tense, and not
reducible to the form of oratio obliqua, as cases like λέγεται
ὥς twa τις δέξαιτο are) ὅτι οὐκ ὀνήσειεν Would not be Greek,
and if it were, must mean, not can benefit, but probably
benefits. Heindorf conjectured ὀνήσειεν ἄν, can (not) do
him good, which in some degree removes the difficulty. I
beg leave to offer an opposite conjecture, ὀνήσει, on the sup-
position that the final syllable ev may owe its birth to ἂν
wrongly repeated.

B. οὐ νόμος ἐστί, it is not the custom. μὴ ὅτι κυβερ-
νήτου, 1. 6. μὴ εἴπῃς ὅτι, not to say, or to pass by the pilot,
who is not mentioned in order to select a stronger case, that

of the general. Comp. οὐχ ὅτι, 450, E, note.

ἐλάττω

᾿ σώζειν = ἐλάττονα σωτηρίαν πορίζειν, Or ἀπεργάζεσθαι.
μή σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι ; does he seem to you to be
on a level with (and not rather above) the forensic man 2

512, B.] NOTES. 213

Comp. Repub. 466, B, μή πῃ κατὰ τὸν τῶν σκυτοτόμων φαίνεται
Ρ Ρ μη πῃ "

βίον; does it seem to you to rank with the shoemaker’s kind
of life 2

C. λέγων καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν. Briefly for λέγων

δεῖν, καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν. ὡς οὐδὲν τἄλλά ἐστιν, ON
the ground that everything else is of no value (in compari-
son with engineering).
of καλέω, as Stallb. remarks, is often used when a name is
given in anger or contempt, = to call by a nickname, to call
contemptuously, or with a scornful air. “Examples may be
found in A%schin. c. Ctes., and in Reiske’s Index to De-
mosth.

ἀποκαλέσαις. This compound

ἐξ ὧν ra σαυτοῦ ἐπαινεῖς = ἐκ τῶν ἐπαίνων ods τὴν
σαυτοῦ τέχνην ἐπαινεῖς.

D. μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο... ἐατέον ἐστί. μὴ denoting suspicion
that something is true, or mild expression of opinion, may
be joined with an indicative ; and the like may be said of
ὅρα μὴ also. Comp. Soph. Electr. 581, 584 (where τίθης,
and not 767s, is supported by the MSS.); Alcibiad. 2. 139,
D, ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα μὴ οὐχ οὕτω ταῦτα ἔχει. μὴ may here be trans-
lated by perhaps, or I suspect. The sense is, I suspect that
a man deserving the name ought to throw away the idea of
living as long as ever he can, and not love his life too well ;
and yielding the disposal of all such things to the Deity, as
well as believing what the women say, that no one, whosoever
he be, can escape his destiny, that he ought to consider there-
upon how he can best live during the life which he is probably
about to live, ete. A fine parallel passage occurs in Leges,
2. 661, C. ἐπιτρέπειν, in the sense. of committing or refer-
ring to, and of giving up to, takes a dative of a person, often
with a genitive with περί. Auschin. c. Ctes. § 83, εἰ ἐπιτρέ-
mew ἐθέλοι πόλει τινὶ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ περὶ τῶν ἐγκλημάτων, if he
wished to refer the grounds of complaint to some impartial
and disinterested state. Alcibiad. 1. 117, D, τῷ κυβερνήτῃ
ἐπιτρέψας ἂν ἡσυχίαν ἔχοις ; would you let the pilot have his

214 GORGIAS. [512, Ὁ.

own way, and be quiet? For οὐδ᾽ εἷς, more emphatic than
οὐδείς, comp. Eurip. Alcest. 671 (note in my ed.).
A. καὶ viv δὲ dpa δεῖ depends on σκεπτέον ἄρα. τὰς 513
τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας. ‘The Thessalian sorceresses, who
drew down the moon by their incantations, drew down mis-
chief also upon themselves. They lost, it was thought,
their eyes or their children, to which last rots φιλτάτοις al-
ludes. Even an astrologer, in predicting an eclipse of the
moon, which was akin, in the minds of the vulgar, to magi-

cal arts, was supposed to incur calamity. Hence ἐπὶ σαυ-

τῷ σελήνην καθαιρεῖς, OL καθέλκεις, is used proverbially of
those who draw down calamities upon themselves by their
conduct. The next words, σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις, must mean
with the loss of what we hold most dear, i. e., as Socrates
estimates things, of virtue and truth. σὺν here properly de-
notes the means, and it is only by inference from the con-
nection that the phrase can imply the loss of. The preposi-
tion, as Stallb. observes, seems to be chosen with allusion .
to Iliad, 4. 161, σύν τε μεγάλῳ ἀπέτισαν | σὺν σφῇσιν κεφαλῇ-
σι γυναιξί τε καὶ τεκέεσσι.

B. ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇδε, i. 6.ὄ in Athens. See 469, D, and
468, E, note. ἀνόμοιον ... χεῖρον, So long as you are
unlike the political institutions either on the better side or
on the worse, 1. e. so long as you are not assimilated exactly
to the democracy of Athens, but are either like the true
philosopher, in favor of better institutions, under which
knowledge and virtue, and not the popular will, shall gov-
ern, and resemble such institutions in your character; or,
on the other hand, have the selfish spirit in the extreme,
like the tyrant who first corrupts, and then destroys, popu-
Jar liberty. Thus, I suppose, the polities of Plato, as set
forth in the Republic and Laws, require us to understand
these words.

τι γνήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι, etc., to effect any
genuine or real result in regard to obtaining the friendship

513, B.] NOTES. 215

of the Athenian people, i. 6. to be on terms of true friend-
ship with Athens. δήμῳ depends on φιλίαν. For τῷ Πυ-
ριλάμπους, see 481, 1).
Ast, after one MS., omits πολιτικός, but Stallb. justly says
of it, iteratur non sine vi et gravitate. There is, as it
seems to me, even something of scorn in the emphatical
repetition of the word. ὡς is since, seeing that; not as,
i. 6. according to (your wishes).

D. πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν, 1. 6. τό τινα πρὸς 48. σώματι καὶ
ψυχῇ ὁμιλεῖν. With the indefinite subject of the infinitive
agree the two subsequent*participles.

ἘΣ, ἡ δέ ye ἑτέρα, ὅπως. Supply ὁμιλεῖ, as ὁμιλοῦσα is
understood just above with ἡ πρὸς ἡδονήν. ἐπιχειρητέον
..- θεραπεύειν. ‘The infinitive is added epexegetically, and
the datives depend on the verbal. Comp. Soph. Electr.
543, 1277. For the construction of ποιοῦντας, see 492, B,
note. It is without a copula as explaining οὕτως, and ὡς is
taken with βελτίστους only.

514 A. εὑρίσκομεν. The Atticists and MSS. vary in regard
to the augment of verbs beginning with ev. The earlier
practice seems to have been, to leave the diphthong un-
changed. Mt. § 167.6. Below, 514, E, two of the best
MSS. give ηὑρίσκομεν, and ηὐδοκίμει, 515, Τὰ. ἐὰν μὴ
«ον ἡντινοῦν explains and defines ἄνευ τούτους Comp. ἃ
similar apposition of a clause beginning with ἐὰν μὴ in
Soph. Antig. 87.
γμάτων, after we had engaged in a public capacity in any
transactions of the state. ‘The genitive is taken partitively.
The words πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων denote any employment in
the state’s service, as that of an ἐργολάβος, or contractor,
like Phidias, and of an ἀρχιτέκτων, like Ictinus, the builder
of the Parthenon.

Bis) el ἐπιστάμεθα, and a little below, εἰ ῳκοδομήκαμεν.
After would it be incumbent on us to examine, we should add

c > ΄ ‘ >
ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικὸς εἶναι.

δημοσίᾳ πράξαντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πρα-

216 GORGIAS. [614, 8.

in English, whether we knew, εἰ ἠπιστάμεθα, relative to ἔδει ἄν,
and not εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα, which is absolute: and so whether we
had builded (in the plupertect), not whether we have builded.
But the Greeks, in many kinds of dependent clauses, pre-
ferred the absolute to the relative form, as here. The cause
of this lay in that liveliness of mind which made the past
present and the possible real, and often led them to the use
of oratio recta for oratio obliqua.

C. ἰδίᾳ... ἡμῶν. According to Ast, ἡμῶν depends on
ἰδίᾳ, which would alone express the idea, were not ἡμῶν
wanted for the contrast with μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων. Those
who would reject such an expression as ἰδίᾳ ἡμῶν, which is
destitute of the support of parallel examples, must read
with Stallb., after one MS., ἰδίᾳ ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν.
ακειμένων, etc. It would be the part of prudent men, if 30
situated, to engage in public works. Here ἦν has ἄν, but
just below is without it. I think, with Ast, that although
ἦν is often used without ἄν, (see Mt. § 508, Obs. 2,) yet here
the influence of ἂν can extend to the second ἦν.

D. A very similar passage may be found in Laches, 186,
B,C. In the first sentence, ἂν belongs to ἐπεσκεψάμεθα,
which verb is taken with πάντα... ἄλλα, as well as with εἰ
παρεκαλοῦμεν. ‘The aorist, with ἂν following the imperfect,
here denotes transitory action referable to present time (if
we were urging... we would examine: see Hermann de
partic. ἄν, 1. 10), or possibly (since we have ἐσκόπουν just
below) there may be an inaccuracy of style, like that of
using our potential pluperfect for the imperfect, — would
have for would. Comp. 447, D, for the opposite use of the
imperfect (εἰ ἐτύγχανεν dv ... ἀπεκρίνατο), in speaking of
something continuing in past time. Some would read ém-
σκεπτόμεθα here, but it is scarcely Attic. See 476, A,

“ 4
OUT@ μεν δι-

note.
E. ἀνθρώπους ... ἐτύχομεν. The style passes freely from

514, E.] NOTES. 217

the first person plural, as a representative of a general truth,
to the third, and then back again. There is no reason why
we should suspect ἀνθρώπους, or read ἔτυχον. ὥστε goes with

ὅπως ἐτύχομεν, = in an ordinary way, as we
could, utcunque. τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο. See 447, A.
ἐν τῷ πίθῳ, etc., to try to learn the
potter’s art by beginning with the jar, —the largest vessel,
and therefore the hardest to make. This proverb occurs
again in Laches, 187, B, in company with its opposite, ἐν

» ΄
επτιχείρειν.

δὴ is just or even.

τῷ Καρὶ ἡμῖν ὁ κίνδυνος, i. e. to risk what you value least,
attempt what you can best afford to fail in; which refers
to the Carian mercenaries in war, whose blood was less pre-
cious than their employer's.

515 B. σὸν iSarevovros. Soph. § 174; Cr. § 454; K.

§ 266. 2.
D. For what is here said of “ the four,” see the Intro-
duction. ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται here is much the same as aya-

Ooi τὰ πολιτικά, which is used as an equivalent, 516, C,
Sly, A.

ἘΣ. ἀκούω. See 508, Cc:
στήσαντα, by being the first to bring them into the practice
of taking pay for performing their political duties. Peri-
cles introduced the practice of paying the judges. The
pay was one obolus per diem at first, and then three. Af-
ter the death of Pericles, the people also drew pay for at-
tending in the assembly. All this is explained at large in
that admirable book, Boeckh’s Civil Economy of Athens,
Book II. $$ 14, 15. τῶν Ta ὦτα κατεαγότων. See 469,
D. This phrase. is explained fully by Protag. 342, B.
“The Lacedzmonians,’’ Socrates there says, “" conceal
their philosophy, and thus deceive those in other states
who affect Spartan manners, and who, in imitation of them,
have their ears bruised by blows received in boxing, (ὦτα κα-

τάγνυνται μιμούμενοι αὐτούς,) and bind the czestus round their
19

εἰς μισθοφορίαν ... κατα-

218 GORGIAS. [515, E.

hands and study gymnastics, and wear short tunics, just as
though the Lacedzmonians surpassed the rest of Greece by
such means.” The phrase, then, denotes the partisans of
Sparta, those who admire Spartan institutions, and are ill-
affected towards Athens.

Α. γεγόνεσαν. Comp. Soph. § 79 (91. 6, N. 4); Cr. 516
G9 DyeKe Yazoy Rees κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο.
Thucyd. merely says (2. 65) χρήμασιν ἐζημίωσαν. Plutarch
mentions an accusation and a fine (Vit. Pericl. § 35), as
does Diodorus also (12. 45); but the charge was no doubt
false: he was χρημάτων διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος by the testi-
mony of the most impartial of historians. See Appendix,
No. II. θανάτου ἐτίμησαν. See 486, B, note: δῆλον ὅτι,
487, E, note. ὄνων ἐπιμελητῆς. Comp. Xen. Memorab.
1. 2. 32, for a similar passage, ἀπέδειξε... ποιοῦντας,
if he had caused them to do. This verb and ἀποφαίνω are
often used in the sense of causing something to appear, of
effecting, rendering, and, like φαίνω, δείκνυμι, take their
complement in the form of a participle.

Β. καὶ τόδε... χάρισαι. There is ἃ similar play upon
χαρίζομαι in Repub. 1. 351, Οὐ, σοὶ yap, ἔφη. χαρίζομαι. Ev
ye σὺ ποιῶν: ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τόδε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγε.

C. ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος. Nusquam disertis verbis hoc dic-
tum in eo quem hodie habemus Homero, nisi quis hue tra-
here velit quod Routhius fecit Odyss. 6. 120, 9. 175, ἢ ῥ᾽
oly ὑβρισταί τε καὶ ἄγριοι, οὐδὲ δίκαιοι. Heindorf. Plato
puts the ἀγαθοὶ and ἥμεροι together, in Repub. 5. 470, E,
and makes τὸ ἥμερον a part of the philosophic nature in Re-
pub. 3. 410, E. ὃν ἥκιστ᾽ ἂν ἐβούλετο, 1. 6. εἰς ὅν.

D. What is here said of Cimon and Themistocles is
well known. What is said of Miltiades rests on the au-
thority of Plato, and of the Scholiast on Aristides 3. 677,
Dindorf, whom Valck. on Herodot. 6. 136 first cited from
a MS. The Scholiast says ὅτε ἐκρίνετο ἐπὶ τῇ Tap (i. 6.

516, D.] NOTES. 219

on account of his fruitless attack upon the island of Paros
soon after the battle of Marathon), ἠθέλησαν αὐτὸν κατακρη-
μνῆσαι, ὃ δὲ πρύτανις εἰσελθὼν ἐξητήσατο αὐτόν. Plato per-
haps exaggerates a little in saying ἐψηφίσαντο. The Pry-
tanis, being president of the assembly of the people which
tried the case, was probably one of those friends of Miltia-
des of whose advocacy Herodot. speaks, and by his inter-
cessions led the judges to lower the penalty from death to a
heavy fine. But for that, death, by being thrown into the
pit, would have been his portion. See Grote’s Greece, Vol.
IV. p. 491. τὸν ev Μαραθῶνι, him who was at Marathon,
the general there. ἐν is used because the action was “ in
Marathonio agro.” See Soph. Electr. 1. ‘Thucyd. 2. 85,
τὸ βάραθρον is de-
fined by Timzeus (Lex. Platon. 5. v.), ““ ἃ place like a well,
where the condemned were thrown,” and in Bekker’s An-
ecdot. 1. 219, is said to be ‘‘an excavation in Keiriade, a
demus of the CEneid tribe, where they threw down. the capi-
tally condemned, as the Lacedemonians did into Keadas.”
Herodot. 7. 133, says that the heralds of Darius were thrown
by the Athenians into this place. Comp. Aristoph. Clouds,
1450, and the Schol. on Aristoph. Plut. 431.

E. εἰ μὴ διά, but for. This not unfrequent formula has
always the same sense as if some part of κωλύω were under-
stood. The origin of the phrase is not clear. Ast ac-
counts for it as a confusion or union of two forms of speak-
ing; 6. g., in this case, εἰ μὴ ὁ Πρύτανις ἦν, if the Prytanis
had not existed, .. . ἐνέπεσεν ἄν, and διὰ τὸν Il... . οὐκ ἐνέ-

τῆς ἐν Στράτῳ μάχης, at, near Stratus.

TECEV.

οὔκουν οἵ ye ἀγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι, ete. This sentence
is formed like that explained in the note on 512, A. The
sense is, It is not true that good drivers are not at first
thrown from their chariots, but when they have improved their
horses by care, and have become betier drivers themselves, that
they are then thrown out. Ζεῦγος is often used of the vehi-
cle, as well as of the yoke or pair of animals drawing it.

220 GORGIAS. [517, A.

A. τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν. Here, by a kind of zeugma, ἔλε- 517
yes, readily suggested by ὡμολόγεις, is to be supplied, togeth-
er with τινάς, which is contained in οὐδένα. Comp. Soph.
Antig. 29. οὐ yap ἂν ἐξέπεσον. The metaphor is bor-
rowed from charioteers, and is the more natural, as persons
who lost their rank or authority were said ἐκπεσεῖν. Comp.
Soph. Antig. 679. οὔτε τῇ κολακικῆ. If they had used
the true art of rhetoric, that is, had been good politicians,
they would have made the people better, and not have had
to rue its ingratitude: if the flattering art of rhetoric, they
would have escaped from dangers, because that art, accord-

ing to the Sophists, σώζει ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μάλιστα
μὲν ἑαυτόν. Aristides triumphs in a supposed inconsistency
of Plato, who had before called ‘‘ the four” κόλακας, and
now says that they did not use τῇ κολακικῇ ῥητορικῇ. But
he does not see into the meaning. The words contain a
sneer at the rhetoricians. They were κόλακες, inasmuch as
they studied to gratify, not to benefit; and carrying such a
motive into their public addresses, they imbued all their
words with it. But if the false art of rhetoric can rescue
from dangers, and makes that its first aim, they fell short
of it. In other words, the art cannot gain its own dearest
ends. ‘They had the principles of the false rhetoric, but
could not gain that for which the art was esteemed.

Β. πολλοῦ ye Set... py... ἐργάσηται. πολλοῦ δεῖ is
usually followed by an infinitive, and Stallb. says that he
knows of no example like this. ‘The reason for the con-
struction seems to be, that πολλοῦ δεῖ, being in sense a nega-
tive, adopts the construction appropriate to od. οὐ μὴ ἐργά-

onra Would be a familiar formula. ὃς βούλει, a singular
expression for (ris) ὃν βούλει, to be referred to the rule of
attraction of the relative. Comp. Cr. § 526. y. The verb
must be regarded as coalescing with os to form one notion,

like quivis in Latin.

ὥς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, as to

517, B.] NOTES. 221

their being servants of the state, or considering them merely
as (ὥς ye) being servants of the state. Stallb. thinks that
the phrase arises, by a confusio duarum locutionum, out of
ὡς . «. διακόνους, and διακόνους εἶναι. But the infinitive with
ὡς can be used in this relation to the main verb, as well as
in others. καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, and in regard to not letting
them have their own way. The infinitives limit διέφερον.

τούτων, politicians of the present day.

C. οὐδὲν παυόμεθα... ἀεί. Comp. 491, A.
οὔντες ἀλλήλων ὅ τι λέγομεν. ἀγνοέω takes a genitive, like
μανθάνω and other verbs of learning or understanding.
Soph. § 182; Cr. § 375. 8; K. § 273. 5, ἢ

D. 7 δυνατὸν εἶναι is for ἧ ὃ. ἐστι, by a change of style
from direct to suspended discourse. Supply ὡμολογήκαμεν.

ayvo-

ῥιγῷ is for ῥιγοῖ, subjunctive of ῥιγόω ; and so ῥιγῶν
for ῥιγοῦν infinitive, in Aristoph. Clouds, 442. This is
quite analogous to the contraction of πεινάω, and a few oth-
ers In aa, by 7 instead of a, but is usual with no other verb
except ἱδρόω. Buttmann (Jargest Gr. 1. 506, and note in
Heindorf) thinks that both contractions are relics of a

general method prevailing in old [onic.
ριστικὸν εἶναι, etc. This sentence changes its structure, and
proceeds as if ὄντα, and not εἶναι, had stood here. The

τούτων γὰρ πο-

anacoluthon is caused by the explanatory clause 4 κάπηλον
ὄντα... σκυτοδεψόν, and by the difficulty of carrying out
the original construction.

518 <A. διὸ δὴ καὶ ταύτας... εἶναι. The construction changes
from ὅτι and a finite verb, εἰδότι ὅτι ἔστι τις, etc., to an in-
finitive with its subject accus.
Now at one time you seem to be aware that I say that the
selfsame thing holds good of the soul also, and you agree
to it, as if understanding what I mean. τοτὲ μὲν answers to
ὀλίγον δὲ ὕστερον, and δὲ is, in a sense, out of its place.

B. προτεινέσθαι, to hold forward as a sample of what
19*

? ~
ταὐτὰ οὖν ταῦτα, etc.

222 GORGIAS. [518, B.

one has got, hence to take, or select as a specimen.
ὁμοιοτάτους ... ὥσπερ. See 485, A. Θεαρίων must have
been the fashionable baker at Athens. He is thus spoken
of ina fragment of the Gerytades of Aristophanes (Athe-

nus, 3. 112, E): ἥκω Θεαρίωνος ἀρτοπώλιον | λιπών, ἵν᾽ ἐστὶ
κριβάνων ἐδώδια, ---- which is a parody of the beginning of the
Hecuba. And a longer fragment from the Omphale of An-
tiphanes, preserved in the same place, asks, (by way of
parody on Soph. Electr. 257, perhaps,) how a man of noble
birth could ever go out of the house where he saw the
white loaves of bread . . . obs δημόταις | Θεαρίων ἔδειξεν.
ἀρτοκόπος. Inanumber of MSS., ἀρτοποιὸς appears. Still

another word for the same thing is ἀρτοπόπος, which has
most commendation from the Atticists, and which has prob-
ably been without reason thrust out of its place by the other
words ina number of instances. See Lobeck on Phryni-
chus, 222. Μίθαικος, etc. Mithecus, who wrote the
treatise called “Τα Cuisine Sicilienne.’ The Sicilians
were in the gastronomic art to the Greeks what the French
are now to the world, and Mithecus was a Syracusan cook.

Repub. 3. 404, 1), Συρακοσίαν τράπεζαν καὶ Σικελικὴν ποικι-
λίαν ὄψων, ὡς ἔοικας, οὐκ αἰνεῖς. Atheneus, 12. 518, C, δια-
βόητοί εἰσιν ἐπὶ τρυφῇ καὶ αἱ Σικελῶν τράπεζαι. Comp. also
Cicero de Fin. 2. 28. According to Maximus Tyrius (23.
1), cited by Routh, Mithecus went to Sparta, but they,
thinking that too many cooks would spoil their broth, drove
him away. To Sarambus (or Sarabus, as Meineke,
Com. Gree. frag. 4. 525, would write the name) many later
writers allude, but they seem to have derived their knowl-
edge of him from this passage. See the commentators on

Suidas, sub voce. ὶ

C. παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους. ἄνθρωπος is often added in
contempt, having something of the force of our fellow.
ἀνὴρ is used, on the contrary, with an honorable sense. This

518, C.] NOTES. 223

is shown at large in Valckenaer’s Opusc. 2. 243, ed. Lips,
οἵ, ἂν οὕτω τύχωσιν, etc. Who, it may be, after they
have filled and fattened the bodies of the men, and while
they are praised by them, will cause the loss (not only of
this increase of flesh, but) of their old flesh besides.

1). ὅταν δὴ αὐτοῖς ἥκῃ, when now their former repletion
shall have brought on disease a good while afterwards.
ἥκω φέρων is often nearly the same as φέρω, and can only
be figuratively explained here of the repletion acting as a
cause bringing in its train disease as the effect.

E. Nothing is truer than these remarks. The seeds of

present national evil are sown in the past, and yet we blame
the men of the present for what we suffer, and praise the
men of the past, who are the true source of our calamities.
It is thus that some, who look with alarm on the turn our

affairs are taking, worship Jefferson as a political saint.
καί φασι. . . αὐτοὺς is for καὶ οὕς φασι, by a change of style
from the relative to the demonstrative.

519 A. καταβολή. περιοδικὴ λῆψις πυρετοῦ, interprete Timo
Lex. p. 154 ubi v. Ruhnkén. Heindorf. ᾿Αλκιβιάδου.
As he had some time before left Athens for the last time,
Plato is here forgetful of dates. See 481, D, note, and
Appendix, No. I.

Β. ἀγανακτούντων, sc. αὐτῶν, these politicians.

C. Comp. 460, C, and Xen. Memorab. 1. 2. 7.
δυνεύει ταὐτὸν εἶναι, (τούτοις,) ὅσοι, the same thing seems to
hold good of those who, etc. But Mt. § 632, has a different
explanation of the form of the sentence.

D. καὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου. For καί, Heindorf, without
authority, writes καίτοι. But καί, in the beginning of im-
perative and interrogative sentences, marks liveliness of
transition (Mt. § 620), like our and in animated questions,
particularly in those where objections are refuted. δη-
μηγορεῖν με ἠνάγκασας. See 482, C, 494, D.

κιν-

224 GORGIAS. [519, E.

E. συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων. The construction seems to
be twas τῶν λόγων συχνοὺς τείνω, 1. 6. ὥστε συχνοὺς εἶναι, SOME
things which I have to say I dwell largely upon. But if
λόγων depends on συχνοὺς, as it well can (comp. Soph.
§ 177. 1), the sense must be, 1 think, a good many of my
discourses I extend in length. πρὸς φιλίου. See 500, B.

A. ὅταν τύχωσιν. Comp. 514, E, 518, C. What is 520
said here refers to Protagoras, Prodicus, and other professed

teachers of virtue, as Heindorf remarks ; and it is amusing
to see the contempt felt by the friend of Gorgias, a mere
teacher of words (λέγειν οἴεται δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινούς, Meno, 95,
C), for the Sophists, whose pretensions were as much higher
as wisdom is higher than eloquence.

B. ἢ... ἅμα καὶ ἑαυτῶν κατηγορεῖν. Here supply δεῖν or
ἀνάγκην εἶναι, which is readily suggested by ἐγχωρεῖν. Comp.
517, A.

C. προέσθαι, to bestow freely, and in the first instance,
without knowing what return the party receiving the favor
will make. Comp. Thucyd. 2. 48, κάλλιστον ἔρανον αὐτῇ
προϊέμενοι, bestowing upon their country a most precious
contribution. So προεμένους εὐεργεσίαν, Xen. Anab. 7. 7.
47, where Schneider adverts to this sense.
Protagoras, who first openly called himself a Sophist and
took pay (Protag. 349, A), says (328, B) that he had a
price, which his student might give if he pleased; but if
not, that the student went to a temple, and paid so much as
he (the student) pronounced on oath the instructions to be
worth. For the opinions of Socrates on this point, see,
among the rest, Xen. Memorab. 1. 6. 18.
The absolute form without ἂν is here used for the hypotheti-
cal with it. See Mt. § 508, Obs. 2; K. ᾧ 260, R. 3.
τὴν χάριν, the favor due, the compensation, as a mark of a
grateful mind.
should not take the money in consequence of a bargain made

Bad ~
ἄνευ μισθοῦ.

ἐνεχώρει.

καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος... τό ἀργύριον, and

520, c.] NOTES. 225

with him (i.e. should not take it as the payment which was
stipulated) at the very time when he was imparting to him
the power of swiftness. ὅτι μάλιστα is joined with ἅμα to
increase its preciseness.

E. ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῷ διδῷ. αὐτῷ refers to the indefinite
subject of φάναι. avr εὖ ποιεῖν. ‘There can be little
doubt that Stallb. is right in separating these words, in op-
position to Buttmann (2. 361, largest Gr.), who writes in
one word ἀντευποιεῖν. εὖ and dvs are united only to deriy-
ative forms, except in the instance of the strange word dve-
θνήσκων, used by Euripides. εἰ εὖ ποιήσας. Heindorf
writes 6 εὖ ποιήσας, “sed fallitur, loco qui repudiat articu-
lum non recte explicato.” Hermann on Eurip. Hecuba,
485, 2d ed. The indefinite subject is understood, and εὖ
ποιήσας denotes after conferring a favor.

521 A. ὡς διακονήσοντα καὶ ὁμιλήσοντα. Instead of writing
τὴν τοῦ διακονεῖν καὶ ὁμιλεῖν, Plato deserts the construction
of the nearest words, through the influence of ὡς ἰατρόν,
and accommodates the participles to παρακαλεῖς. See Mt.
§ 555, Obs. 2. Just below, Heindorf, Coray, and Stallb.
think that ὡς has fallen out before κολακεύσοντα.

B. εἴ σοι Μυσόν ye ἥδιον καλεῖν. “The sense of this
vexed passage seems to be that which Stallb. and Olym-
piod., whom he cites from the MSS., give to it, if you like
better to call (such a man) a Mysian, call him so; i. e.
**'You may give the political man the most contemptible
name that you can find. Do as you like about that, since
if you will not act so as to gratify the Athenians (εἰ μὴ
. +. ποιήσεις) you will .’ The apodosis to ei ... καλεῖν
is omitted, being readily suggested by the sense of the pas-
sage. It is οὕτως κάλει, or οὐδὲν κωλύει, Or something equiy-
alent. The apodosis which εἰ pi... ποιήσεις would have
had, if Socrates had not cut the sentence short, is to be
found in his words. With καλεῖν must be understood rod-

226 GORGIAS. [52], 8.

τον, this political man, whom in fact, though not in so many
words, Socrates calls a κόλακα. But the connection with
the foregoing must be owned to be rather loose. ‘The My-
sians stood low among the people of Asia Minor. Μυσῶν
ἔσχατος (Theetet. 209, B) is a proverb for the vilest of the
vile. Cicero, in his Or. pro Flacco, ὃ 27, says: “ Quid
porro in Greco sermone, tam tritum atque celebratum est,
quam, si quis despicatui ducitur, ut Mysorum ultimus esse
dicatur ? ”

C. οὐχ ἕξει ὅ τι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς. αὐτοῖς is his property,
before spoken of in ἐάν τι ἔχω. In 465, αἱ the indicative,
but in many places the subjunctive, follows ἔχω in this for-
mula. ‘The distinction seems to be, that with the future the
action is viewed as simply future ; with the subjunctive, as
connected with and dependent on some contemplated cause
and ground of action. Thus, in οὐκ ἔχει 6 τι χρήσεται, the
subject is in doubt about his future action ; in οὐκ ἔ. 6. χρήση-

ται, about his rational future action. ὥς μοι δοκεῖς. ὡς

is exclamatory. ὡς οἰκῶν. .. καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσαχθείς, as
though you were living aloof, and could not be brought (on
trial) into court. For εἰσαχθεὶς ἂν comp. 458, A, note.

D. ὅτι τύχοι. Mireris Heindorfium ὅ τὶ ἂν τύχοι corri-
gentem. Nam optativus post relativa in obliqua oratione
haudquaquam infrequens est. Addito ἂν hoc loco scriben-
dum erat τύχῃ. Stallb. The dissatisfaction with the
political institutions of Athens, which is here clearly im-
plied, was felt by Socrates to some degree, but far more by

Plato, whose ideal turn of mind was not fitted to find satis-

faction in the present under any system, particularly under
one where demagogues reigned, and philosophers had to

drink poison. πονηρός. An allusion, no doubt, to the

actual accusers.

οὐδέν ye ἄτοπον, SC. εἴη.
E. τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτας An allusion to what Callicles says,

486, C. ὅδε εἴργασται ἀνήρ. ὅδε, like οὗτος, 489, Β,

521, E.] NOTES. 227

used of a person who is present and pointed at, has no arti-
cle.
ὑμᾶς εἴργασται, and serves to contrast the whole ὑμᾶς with

‘ > , Ν \ ΄ » \ = = =
καὶ αὐτούς. Kat τοὺς νεωτάτους. αὐτοὺς is taken with

the part νεωτάτους. καὶ = and especially. νεωτάτους
διαφθείρει. An allusion to the actual charge against Socra-
tes. Comp. 522, B.

522 A. For εὐωχεῖν governing two accusatives, see Mt. § 421,
Obs. 1; Cr. § 430. This construction (which γεύω also
sometimes takes) seems to be owing to this; that the verb
means substantially to make to eat, and needs an object for

each of these notions.

The sentiment conveyed by this
comparison of the cook and the physician is expressed in
another way by Crates of Thebes, a Cynic philosopher
who flourished at Athens in Alexander’s time (Diog. Laert.
6. 86): rider μαγείρῳ μνᾶς δέκ᾽, ἰατρῷ δραχμήν - | κόλακι τά-
λαντα πέντε, συμβούλῳ καπνόν: | πόρνῃ τάλαντον, φιλοσόφῳ
τριώβολον.

Β. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονάς. To οὔτε, ἐάν τε answers. An δἷ
firmative and a negative proposition are often thus bound
together by οὔτε and τε; but οὔτε must come first. αὐτοῖς

the judges implied in δικαστήριον. οὔτε οἷς πορίζεται,

i. 6. οὔτε τούτους, οἷς ταῦτα (referring to ἡδοναί) πορίζεται.

ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα. This was a frequent charge against
Socrates. The doubt he threw upon their former opinions,
and the unsettled state of mind which he produced, may
have been unwelcome to a few, and regarded as dangerous
by a few more; but probably nothing made him more un-
popular than his provoking way of bringing men who ar-
gued with him to a stand, so that they did not know what
to say. Meno.says (79, D, cited by Heindorf), ‘*O Socra-
tes, I used to hear it said of you, before I became acquaint-
ed with you, that you do nothing else except αὐτός τε ἀπο-
peis, Kal τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν.᾽

C. πράττω τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο, and herein I am doing

228 GORGIAS. [522, ¢.

just (δὴ) what is for your interest. Ast takes πάντα ταῦτα
with πράττω. as well as with λέγω, and ὑμέτερον . . . τοῦτο as

added in apposition. οὕτως διακείμενος (not οὕτω). Vi-
detur οὕτως, etiam sequente consona litera, usurpatum esse

ubi vi et pondere suo pollet plurimum. Stallb.

ἐν αὐτῷ
ὑπάρχοι. Heindorf wishes to erase ἐν, or write ἕν, with some
reason, as ὑπάρχω takes with it a simple dative.

D. βοήθεια ἑαυτῷ: This noun with the dative denotes
help afforded to ; with the genitive, against (comp. βοήθεια
κακοῦ, 509, C, βαρβάρων, Plat. Epist. 7. 332, E), or to any
one. There is an allusion here to 486, B:

ΕΠ. αὐτὸ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν. Comp. for the sentiment Pla-
to’s Apol. 28, B, et seq. φοβεῖται, sc. mas τις, by bra-
chylogy supplied from οὐδείς, just above. See my note on
Soph. Antig. 29. ὡς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει depends on λόγον
λέξαι, as if it were λόγῳ δεῖξαι ὡς . .. ἔχει.

A. φασί, i. 6. as story-tellers say, when they begin α 523
story.

λόγον opposed to μῦθον is a historical narrative,

Ὅ
μη-

καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι, et semper

a true story, as opposed to a fictitious narrative.
pos λέγει. Iliad. 15. 187.
et nunc etiam. Ast. ἔστιν includes a past tense.

B. νεωστί, in modern times, used relatively to the days
of Saturn. οἱ ek... νήσων. The preposition is accom-
modated to ἰόντες (see Soph. Electr. 137), because the offi-
cers set over the blessed islands came from thence. Comp.
Cr. § 659 ; K. § 300. 4; and 472, B, note.

C. ἑκατέρωσε, in each direction, to the blessed islands,

and to the prison of punishment.

D. προκεκαλυμμένοι --- ἔχοντες προκεκαλυμμένον. See
7Esch. Prometh. 862; Soph. Electr. 54. *The sense is,
having eyes and ears, and the whole body, spread as a veil
before the soul.
their way.
them.

αὐτοῖς. .. ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται, are in

τοῦτ᾽ αὐτῶν, this property of theirs, this in

523, E.| NOTES. 229

ἘΣ. ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος == εὐθὺς ἀποθανόντος, the mo-
ment he is dead. Soph. § 222, Ν. 4. By a constructio
ad sensum, ἔρημον ... καταλιπόντα are in the masculine, be-
cause τὴν ψυχὴν ἑκάστου is the same as each person. δύο
ἐκ τῆς ᾿Ασίας. Routh explains this by their being born of
Europa, a Pheenician, and adds, that Minos was regarded
by some as a stranger in Crete. ‘Sed Cretam insulam
Asie assignasse videntur veteres sicut Libyam modo Euro-
pe modo Asiz contribuerunt ; ut duas orbis terrarum partes
posuerint, Asiam et Europam.” Ast. But no proof has
been found elsewhere, that Crete was assigned to Asia.

524 A. ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ete. Virgil, Aaneid, 6. 540: —
«ς Hic locus est, partes ubi se via findit in ambas:
Dextera, que Ditis magni sub meenia tendit,

Hac iter Elysium nobis: at lava malorum
“Exercet penas, et ad impia Tartara mittit.”’

B. οὐ πολὺ ἧττον . . . ἥνπερ καὶ ὅτε ἔζη. A free and rath-
er irregular construction, instead of ov πολὺ ἧττον... ἢ ὅτε
ἔξ. ἥνπερ is brought in through the influence of τὴν ἕξιν
τὴν αὑτοῦ, and alters the ensuing words to suit itself.

D. οἷος εἶναι παρεσκεύαστο, etc., such as he had prepared
himself to be while living in regard to his body, i. e. such
as were his ways of using his body. Just below, ἔνδηλα
ταῦτα refer to the qualities of body implied in οἷος εἶναι πα-
ρεσκεύαστο, as if οἷα ἔσχεν ἐν τῷ σώματι had been written.

ἘΣ. κατεῖδεν... ψυχῆς. The aorist marks indefinite
time (484, A, note): ψυχῆς depends on οὐδέν ; nothing be-
longing to, or in, the soul. Comp. Repub. 376, A, ὃ καὶ

ἄξιον θαύμασαι τοῦ θηρίου. ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην, etc.
Tacit. Απμπα]. 6. 6, ‘‘ Neque frustra prestantissimus sapi-
entice firmare solitus est, si recludantur tyrannorum mentes,
posse adspici laniatus et ictus; quando, ut corpora ver-

beribus, ita szevitia, libidine, malis consultis animus dilace-

retur.”
20

΄

930 GORGIAS. [525, B.

B. οἱ ὠφελούμενοι . . . καὶ διδόντες, i. 6. those who, while 525
they suffer, are made better . . . are such as, ete.

C. τοῖς dei. See 464, D; Prometh. 937.

1). τοὺς πολλοὺς... παραδειγμάτων. By a constructio ad
sensum, παραδειγμάτων used of the persons who serve as ex-
amples, is joined to πολλούς, as if it were masculine.
Ὅμηρος. Odys. 11. 575, seq.

E. οὐ yap ἐξὴν αὐτῷ, sc. συνέχεσθαι.
θρωποι, the men who prove to be even very wicked are of the
class of the powerful. Here, 497, A, 526, B, and else-
where, γίγνεσθαι means to become subjectively, i. e. to be-
come in the view of the mind, to be found out to be.

C. ἐπισημηνάμενος, ἐάν τε, etc., putting his mark upon 526
him to show whether he thinks him curable or not. Comp.
Repub. 10. 614, which 1 will give in English. ‘ When,
therefore, his soul went out of his body, he began a journey,
with a number of others, and they came to a wonderful —
place, where there were two openings in the ground close
by one another, and others opposite to them above in the
sky. Between these judges sat, who, whenever they fin-
ished judging, bade the just take the road on the right and
upwards through the sky, having first attached certificates
(σημεῖα) to those who had been judged, in front ; and or-
dered the unjust to take the road to the left and leading
downward, with marks behind indicating all their conduct.”
ov πολυπραγμονήσαντος, Who has not been “a busybody
in other men’s matters,” who has not gone out of his own
sphere of duties, to perform a part belonging to another.

In Repub. 4. 433, A, it is made a definition of justice, that

a man τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττει καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονε. Here the

ἐκ TOV... ἄν-

words especially point at taking an active part in politics,
which, for a man who is not yet qualified for political
life, is undertaking another’s duty to the neglect of his
own.

526, C, D.] NOTES. 231

C,D. ἑκάτερος ... νέκτυσσιν. This passage is considered
to be spurious by Heindorf and Ast, for reasons which, as
far as I can see, are altogether insufficient. The passage
from Homer is in Odys. 11. 568.

ΕΣ. ἀντιπαρακαλῶ. ἀντὶ denotes in my turn, in reply to
the exhortations which you gave me to engage in politics.
Just below, ἀντὶ... ἀγώνων denotes worth all the trials
here, i. e. to be set against or equal in importance to all
the trials before human tribunals, where rhetoric, as its ad-
vocates alleged, would save a man from condemnation. ἐν-
θάδε, ἐκεῖ, and ἐκεῖσε are often used of this life, and of death
or a future state; the context of course suggesting the ex-
planation. Comp. Soph. Antig. 76; Electr. 356; Eurip.
Alcest. 363.

527 A. τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης υἱόν. AXacus (son of Jupiter and
ffgina), as being the judge for all from Europe. Olympi-
od. apud Stallb. says, “" He adds ‘gina because Callicles
was from AZgina.”” But as that Platonic Scholiast can have
known nothing about Callicles, I suspect that the last word,
Αἰγίνης, is an error in transcribing for Ἑὐρώπης, occasioned
by the similar word preceding it.
noble passage alludes to 486, B. τυπτήσει. ‘The Attic
form of the future of τύπτω, according to Thomas Magister
and Meeris sub yoce. Comp. Aristoph. Clouds, 1379, 1443.
The later writers used all the forms from τυπτέω, unless it
be the present and imperfect.

χασμήσει, etc. This

B. ἐκεῖσε... συμφέρων, advantageous there. See 526,
E. The adverb of motion is used, because the journey
from this world is thought of. It is the same as when we
go thither. Comp. the opposite in A®schin. ο. Ctes. § 97,
Bekker: ‘** He said that he wished to report to you τὴν ἐκ
Πελοποννήσου πρεσβείαν ἣν ἐπρέσβευσε, his embassy into Pelo-
ponnesus, strictly the embassy into P. from which he had
returned. ἠρεμεῖ, remains quiet, unskaken, i. e. unre-

Ὰ

232 GORGIAS. [527, B.

Suted. οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι. Comp.
the noble words in Repub. 2. 861, A, ἐσχάτη ἀδικία δοκεῖν
δίκαιον εἶναι, μὴ ὄντα. AXschylus was the source of the ex-
pression, Sept. c. Theb. 574, οὐ yap δοκεῖν ἄριστος GAN εἶναι
θέλει. upon which words all the theatre turned and looked
at Aristides, according to Plutarch in his life.

C. οὕτω χρηστέον. οὕτω is immediately explained by
ἐνταῦθα, to that kind of life. ἐνταῦθα
came perhaps to be used with a verb of motion, because
with the motion its end, rest in the place, is often thought
of. ὡς 6 λόγος σημαίνει, as the discourse shows. Stallb.
Zives ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, with the best of the MSS., to which Ast
very justly objects. The same false reading appears 511,
B, 460, C, and Socrates could not call the argument, so far
as it proved this point, the argument of Callicles, to whom

ϑιὺν A , - Ὁ}
ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί.

he here speaks.

D. πατάξαι. The interpreters are divided between πα-
τάξαι, with which ἔασόν τινα and σε, from cov, just above,
are to be supplied, and πάταξαι sine te verberari. Buttmann
even denies that the middle can have this sense, and, I in-
cline to think, with reason. It may denote strike yourself,
or get yourself struck (i. e. do something which shall cause
the action of striking to come back upon yourself), but not
allow yourself to be struck, i. e., in this place, ** bear such
an infliction without thinking it the greatest evil in the
world.” Stallb., in defence of the middle so used, cites
from Aristoph. Clouds, 494, φέρ᾽ ἴδω τί δρᾷς, ἤν τίς σε τύπτῃ ;
where Strepsiades replies, τύπτομαι : this word Stallb. takes
in the sense of ἐῶ ἐμαυτὸν τύπτεσθαι. I apprehend that
τύπτομαι is in the passive. ‘* What do you do,” says Socra-

tes, ‘if a person beats you?” ‘Tam beaten,”

is the reply ;
i.e. 1 do nothing but suffer, I get beaten. We need not be
troubled by σύ ye θαῤῥῶν; for od is occasionally repeated

with ye in the second clause, with a certain increase of

527, D.] NOTES. 233

force in the exhortation. Comp. Herodot. 7. 10, “I shall
hear of you as being torn to pieces by dogs and birds, ἤ κου
ἐν γῇ τῇ ᾿Αθηναίων ἢ σέ ye ἐν τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων ; " Soph. (Βά.
Tyr. 1101, τίς ce... ἔτικτε... Πανὸς - -. προσπελασθεῖσ᾽, ἢ
σέγε. .. Λοξίου; The sense is true of 6 ye, and tu in Latin.
Nor do I see how θαῤῥῶν opposes this construction any
more than θαῤῥούντως would. The sense, then, is, Yes,
indeed, and do you calmly let him give you this dishonorable
blow. - Stallb., I find, has given up his defence of πά-
rafat, imperative middle, in his second edition.

E. οἷς οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ δοκεῖ. Comp. 491, B. He in-
cludes himself in the censure, to give it a milder form.

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ΔΤ Ν ΤΙ

Νο. 1.

Where and when does Plato represent this Dialogue to have
taken place ὁ

1. Where? In the house of Callicles, say all with whose
opinion Iam acquainted, except Schleiermacher. He de-
cides in favor of some public place, such as the Lyceum,
where other conversations of Socrates were held. His rea-
sons, given in a note on his translation of Gorgias (Vol. IL
473, of his Plato), are principally these. 1. Socrates (447,
B) seems to be going into the place where Gorgias is. He
meets Callicles without, who says, “ Whenever you wish to
come to my house, Gorgias will exhibit to you, for he lodges
with me.” (See the note on that place.) The words,
whenever you wish to come, must relate to some future time.
What does Callicles do, then, if they are at his house,
(Schl. leaves to be implied,) but shut the door in his vis-
itors’ faces. To tell a stranger just entering your house to
call at any time, without asking him in, is to turn him away.
2. Schl. finds it strange, and not consistent with Athenian
politeness, that Callicles should have deserted his guests,
and be going away from his own house. ‘To these reasons
of Schleiermacher’s may be added two others. 3. If Soc-
rates and his friend were at the door of Callicles’s house
to hear Gorgias display his rhetorical powers, and if Che-
rephon knew Gorgias well, why should they need the infor-
mation that Gorgias lodged there? 4. Perhaps it may be

236 GORGIAS.

regarded as a slight argument, that Socrates says (506, A),
ἐῶμεν χαίρειν καὶ ἀπίωμεν: to which Gorgias replies, “ It
does not seem to me that we ought yet ἀπιέναι." For ἀπιέ-
ναι must have the same subject as the preceding ἀπίωμεν.
Here, then, Socrates expects that the other parties to the
conversation will go away from the place when the dis-
course is broken off; and Gorgias repeats what Socrates
had said, including himself among those who would leave
the place. But this could not be, if they were where Gor-
gias was staying.

No one within my knowledge has examined what Schleier-
macher says on this point, or given reasons for choosing
the house of Callicles as the scene of the Dialogue, except
Cousin. His reasons, I must think, have little weight.
1. There would have been some allusion, direct or indirect,
to the place, if a public one. The same might be said,
with equal reason, I think, on the other side. 2. It was
mainly in private houses, as Plato affirms in Hippias Major,
that Gorgias spoke. Plato’s expression is ἰδίᾳ ἐπιδείξεις ποι-
ovpevos, and idia, contrasted with ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, just preceding,
means nothing more than in other places besides the assem-
bly. 3. Of Callicles leaving his guests, and going out to
talk with Socrates, he says, “" Nothing is more natural than
to go to meet persons who are visiting you, and whom you
are to receive, at the entrance of your house.” If I mis-
take not, the porter would have admitted the strangers, and
the master of the house have been in a distant part of the
building, 4. To Schleiermacher’s main remark, he replies,
that, as Gorgias was fatigued, Callicles could not ask him
to repeat his exhibition, and therefore begged the visitors
to call at another time. But need they be turned away?
Might they not be invited in, without the necessity of a new
exhibition on the part of Gorgias ?

2. When? ‘The passage 473, E, which is treated of at

APPENDIX, 237

large in the note, has been usually supposed to determine
the time. But several scholars, as Boeckh (which I learn
from Ὁ. IF’. Hermann’s work, I. 634) and Foss, have ascribed
an earlier date to the Dialogue, and one so early even as
the first visit of Gorgias to Athens. The arguments, so far
as I know them, with a single exception, are of little impor-
tance. They are,— 1. Pericles is spoken of as νεωστὶ τε-
τελευτηκώς, 503,C. But νεωστὶ may be widely used. Comp.
523, B. ‘“Nuper, id est paucis ante seculis.” Cic. de
Nat. Deor. 2. 50. It was twenty-four years before 405
B.C. And Pericles in this passage is contrasted tacitly
_with Themistocles, Cimon, and Miltiades, whose deaths
were considerably earlier. 2. Archelaus is said to have
committed the crimes by which he gained the throne ‘“ yes-
terday and the day before.”’ But this is very plainly a rhe-
torical contrast with the παλαιοῖς πράγμασιν, just before
spoken of. See 470, D. 3. Demus, son of Pyrilampes,
was a youth when the Wasps was written, seventeen years
before 405 B. C. See 481, D. Suppose him thirty-two in
405, Plato, I imagine, if he had been aware, at the time
of writing, of his exact age, would not have scrupled to
say what he does. 4. The passage, 473, E, where Socra-
tes speaks of his ignorance of the way to put the ques-
tion when he was a presiding officer, is inconsistent with
Apology 32, B, which refers to the famous occasion in 406
B.C. Socrates, therefore, must allude to something else.
I can scarcely conceive how any one, used to the style of
the Platonic Socrates, can take what he says 473, E, as
sober earnest. 5. In 481, D, and 519, A, Alcibiades is
spoken of as beloved by Socrates after their intimacy must
long have ceased, and as likely to be punished by the Athe-
nians, after his last departure from Athens, and a little
before his death. This appears to me the most serious ob-
jection to the year 405. But I apprehend that this is by

238 GORGIAS.

no means the only instance in which Plato assigns the rela-
tions of one time to another, changing the more immaterial
circumstances, as the tragic poets did those of the fables,
to suit his design.

No. II.

On what is said of Pericles, 516, A, and on the Character
given to him in this Dialogue.

An eminent historian (Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, Vol.
III., chap. 18, and Appendix, 2) has examined the passage
above quoted, and thinks that Plato’s charge of peculation
at this time arose out of a confusion of dates and circum-
stances. This may be so, but there are two things which
ought to be said on behalf of Plato, before we fully con-
demn him for injustice towards his great countryman. The
first is, that he expresses no opinion as to the justice of the
charge. If it is admitted to be unjust, his argument is so
much the stronger, for it turns upon the ingratitude of a
people towards its public servants. Indeed, taken in con-
nection with the charges against Themistocles, Cimon, and
Miltiades, it wears the appearance of an unfounded accusa-
tion. The other is, that the fact may have been as Plato
represents it: the people, in a sudden outburst of displeas-
ure, may have at this time fined him, upon a charge of
peculation so frivolous, that Thucydides does not think it
worthy of mention. ‘The circumstances were these. Peri-
cles was deposed from his office of general (Plut. Pericl.
§.35, Diodor. 12. 45),— it may be at one of the epicheiro-
toni, or in consequence of a special process, an eisangelia.
A suit was brought against him, — probably a γραφή, though
Plutarch calls it a δίκη. Cleon, Simmias, or Lacratidas

APPENDIX. 239

was his accuser, and he was fined in a sum variously esti-
mated at fifteen, fifty (Plut.), and eighty (Diodor.) talents.
The nature of the suit is not stated, but it certainly may
have been κλοπὴ δημοσίων πραγμάτων, based upon some
trifling circumstance, occurring at a time when moneys
would be under his control, as commander of the forces.
The general Timotheus, with no more reason, perhaps, was
accused of treason, and then, at the rendering of his ac-
counts (euthyne), charged with bribery, and fined one hun-
dred talents. To this it may be added, that Aristides, in
his vindication of Pericles, nowhere, so far as I have ob-
served, taxes Plato with inaccuracy, but follows his state-
ment, as if he thought it true. And this he does in a
work where he accuses Plato of anachronisms and mis-
quotations. (Aristid. 2. 319, 327, de Quatuory. ed. Din-
dorf. In the latter place the Sophist says: —‘“If one
should ask Plato whether, supposing he had been one of
Pericles’s judges when he was tried for peculation, he
would have been one to condemn him, and would have
given more weight to the words of Cleon than to those of
Pericles, or,” etc.)

Plato, then, in this very serious and not at all ironical
passage (see Thirlwall, III. 91), may have given no credit
to the charge against Pericles, and, notwithstanding the si-
lence of historians as to the nature of the suit, may be right
in calling it one for peculation.

Upon another point, — Plato’s consistency in the char-
acter which he gives to Pericles, —I will say but a word.
There are three passages which concern us here; Gorg.
515, -- 517; Meno, 99, Β -- 100, B, compared with 94, B ;
and Pheedrus, 269, A-—270, B. In Meno, εὐδοξία, or cor-
rect opinion, is ascribed to Pericles, without wisdom, and
in Phedrus he has the credit of possessing consummate
eloquence, derived from the discipline of Anaxagoras. In

240 GORGIAS.

Gorgias, he is denied to be a true orator, but in Pheedrus is
declared to be πάντων τελεώτατος εἰς τὴν ῥητορικῆν. ‘The
seeming inconsistency can be explained by taking into con-
sideration, that Plato judges of the orator in Gorgias by a
moral standard, and in Phedrus looks at him as capable of
producing a work of art; and perhaps by this consideration
also, that while he would grant to Pericles all that knowl-
edge of the mind which the physical instructions of Anax-
agoras could furnish, he might still refuse to him the attri-
butes of a truly philosophical artist.

No. Ill.
See 486, A, note.

Tue verses yet extant of this dialogue between the broth-
ers have been collected and emended by Valckenaer, Mat-
thie, and others. We here add the passage adjacent to
the lines cited or alluded to by Plato, according to Har-
tung’s arrangement in his Euripides Restitutus (Ham-
burg, 1843). Zethus invites his brother Amphion to go a
hunting, and, on his refusal, reproaches him with effemi-
nacy of mind, as giving himself up to the musical art and
to indolence, while he neglects useful pursuits! To this
scene Horace alludes (Epist. 1. 18. 39) :—

‘Nec tua laudabis studia, aut aliena repréndes,
Nec, cum venari volet ille, poemata panges.
Gratia sie fratrum geminorum, Amphionis atque
Zethi, dissiluit, donee suspecta severo
Conticuit lyra; fraternis cessisse putatur
Moribus Amphion.”’

Zethus first speaks : —
ἔλμφιον, ἀμελεῖς ὧν ἐπιμελεῖσθαί σε δεῖ *

ψυχῆς δὲ... ὧδε γενναίαν φύσιν

APPENDIX. 241

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SsSICAL AND
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